

AIR, SPACE, AND CYBERSPACE POWER IN THE 21ST CENTURY
38th IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security Strategy and Policy

January 20 – 21, 2010

DAY ONE

SESSION TWO

Dissuasion and Deterrence in the New Security Landscape

10:30 A.M. TO 12:30 P.M.

Lt Gen Frank G. Klotz

LIEUTENANT GENERAL FRANK G. KLOTZ: Ladies and gentlemen, could I ask you please to be seated so that we could begin the second panel? Please be seated as soon as possible so that we can begin the second panel. Welcome back, everyone. I'm Frank Klotz, the Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command. And it's an honor here for all of us to participate in the 38th IFPA Fletcher Conference.

Let me pass on my thanks as many of you have, to the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and the International Security Studies Program of the Fletcher School at Tufts for the opportunity to be the moderator for this very distinguished panel, and to join many friends and colleagues seated out in the audience. I'd also like to thank the co-sponsor for this event, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force's Strategic Studies group.

Today, I have the distinct honor of being the moderator for Session 2 panel entitled "Dissuasion and Deterrence in the New Security Landscape." Now, allow me to introduce the members of this esteemed panel. You have their more extensive and comprehensive biographies in the literature, which has been handed out by the conference organizer. So I will only make note of their current position.

First of all, General Kevin P. Chilton, the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command. The Honorable Andy Weber, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. Dr. Paul Bracken is Professor of Management and Professor of Political Science at Yale University. Dr. Clark Murdock is the Senior Advisor at the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic International Studies. And Dr. Camille Grand is the Director of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique.

Before we turn to the individual panel member presentations, the conference organizers have graciously afforded me the opportunity to make a few remarks about Air Force Global Strike Command. And therefore, to fully justify my TDY coming here to Washington, D.C. [laughter] Upon assuming office in the summer of 2008, Secretary of the Air Force Michael Donnelly and Air Force Chief of Staff, General Norti Schwartz, launched a comprehensive, multifaceted roadmap designed to restore a culture of compliance to rebuild the nuclear enterprise, to invest in nuclear capabilities and to insure that those nuclear weapons under Air Force stewardship will remain safe, secure and reliable.

Now, there were many aspects of this roadmap and Air Force Global Strike Command was one of those. This command is a visible commitment to the nuclear enterprise, clearly aligning the intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM, and nuclear capable long-range bomber forces under a single chain of command, providing focused oversight and advocacy of the Air Force's long-range nuclear forces.

Now, the command was founded on the premise that as important as other defense priorities may be, none are more important than the responsibility for operating, maintaining, securing and supporting nuclear weapons. For if there is one unchanging, immutable fact about this awesome capability, it is that it demands our constant and undivided attention. This was true in the past, it's true now, and it will be true in the

future, regardless of the ultimate size and composition of our own nuclear deterrence and global strike forces.

Now last year at a speech in Prague, President Obama made this point perfectly clear. "Make no mistake," he said, "as long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary and guarantee that defense to our allies." This, then, is the fundamental mission of Air Force Global Strike Command, to develop and provide safe, secure, credible, effective, reliable, nuclear deterrence and global strike forces, both to deter attacks and to assure our allies. And it performs this mission with a highly disciplined, elite team of American airmen with special trust and responsibility for the most powerful weapons in our nation's arsenal.

Now, Air Force Global Strike Command is being established in a methodical, step by step approach to once again bring all of the Air Force's long range nuclear capable forces under a single, major command. The first phase was a standup of a provision command right here in Washington, D.C., across the river at Bolling Air Force Base under the very able leadership of then-Brigadier General, now Major General, Jim Kowalski, who is also now the Vice Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command. The principle tasks of the provisional organization were to develop the initial planning documents, to define manpower requirements and to begin the process of assigning people to the new command.

The next phase took place on August 7th, with the formal activation at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, of the new headquarters. Now, upon the activation of the headquarters, the first order of business was to insure the functionality of our organization to include moving newly assigned individuals into their existing facilities at Barksdale Air Force Base, and providing the necessary tools, communications equipment, computers that they needed to perform their duties.

A response task force and crisis action team were established, trained and equipped to respond to any serious incidents, including weapon system accidents and natural

disasters. Our inspector general developed a concept of operations that insures that Global Strike Command has a rigorous inspection process to instill an uncompromising adherence to standards. Now, these are but a few of the literally hundreds of action items from the chief of staff approved program plan that the staff addressed while preparing to take control of operational forces.

The first transfer of operational forces occurred on the 1st of December when Global Strike Command assumed responsibility for the intercontinental ballistic mission. Originally part of the strategic air command, America's ICBMs were assigned to Air Force space command in 1993. Under the new command arrangements, the 20th Air Force headquartered at Frances C. Warren Air Force Base and its three missile wings in North Dakota, Montana and Wyoming, now fall under Air Force Global Strike Command on the same day that Global Strike Command also took charge of the ICBM test mission of the 576 flight test squadron at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. The transfer of these organizations under the new command added approximately 8500 personnel to the command.

On February 1st, just a short 11 days away, the transfer of forces to Air Force Global Strike Command will be complete as the new command assumes responsibility for 8th Air Force and the long range nuclear capable bomber mission from air combat command. The mighty 8th and their commander, Floyd Carpenter is here today, has its headquarters at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana and exercises command over the two B52 wings, one at Barksdale, the other at Minot, and the B2 wing at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. Over 13,000 people are assigned to 8th Air Force.

So, Air Force Global Strike Command will achieve full operational capability later this year in the summer with about 900 personnel on board at the headquarters, and nearly 23,000 people in the entire command.

Now, the Minuteman 3 ICBMs, as well as the nuclear capable B52 and B2 bombers, which are part of Air Force Global Strike Command have been, and most importantly

remain, essential components of our nation's armed forces. Each makes important and unique contributions to the security of our nation, as well as the security of our allies and friends. Of the three legs of the strategic nuclear triad, the ICBM are perhaps the most responsive national leadership. The B52 and B2 are also critical components of the strategic nuclear triad because of their great flexibility and versatility. And, just as the various components of the strategic triad provide mutually reinforcing complementary capabilities, so too do the two different bombers. With the B52 providing unique, unmatched stand off capabilities and the B2 providing the capability to attack heavily defended targets.

Thus, the nuclear deterrence and global strike forces of Air Force Space Command remain vitally important to the nation, as well as friends and allies around the world. The men and women of Air Force Global Strike Command it means we have an extraordinarily important mission, noble and worthy work to perform and work that demands the utmost in professionalism, discipline, excellence, pride and esprit.

Now, the weapons for which Global Strike Command is assuming responsibility were originally developed and deployed in the midst of the Cold War. However, 21st century dissuasion and deterrence requirements differ dramatically from that era. As your conference brochure sets out, they now include nuclear and conventional components and encompass state and non-state actors, as well as other entities that may not be deterred by the traditional means or based exclusively on the threat of retaliation or punishment. In view of these threats and challenges that were so eloquently put forward in the opening session this morning, this panel will address the role of dissuasion and deterrence in shaping the emerging security setting encountering such threats and challenges.

Now at this time, each of the panel members will give their presentation and we'll start with General Kevin Chilton, the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command. General Chilton? [applause]

your thoughts on the use of traditionally nuclear delivery systems, short or long range ballistic missiles, for deterring a range of unconventional threats, everything from biological, all the way up through nuclear.

DR. GRANDE: As you might know, there was a big debate in France after not the last nuclear policy speech, because we don't do-- we are a truly presidential system, so we don't do NPR, so we do nuclear policy speech by the President. But it's more or less the same process. So, the last speech by Chirac in 2006 which raised the big debate because he mentioned the nuclear retaliation in the context of terrorism, although he made clear that it was not the purpose, there was some misreading about that so there was a big debate that started with that.

Let's say that from a French doctrinal perspective, we are very clear about the fact that nuclear weapons are about deterring existential threats. So the point there is that the nature of the threat, whether it's nuclear, biological, chemical or conventional, is not the critical issue. Obviously, the nuclear threat is the most relevant, but the others, as if they create an existential threat, a vital threat to a vital interest, the president leaves open the option of putting a nuclear weapon at play, and we've made that clear in several contexts. And honestly, when I look at bio weapons, I really do think that it is an issue that we can't completely underestimate in that line of thinking. And that's one of the reasons I'm personally reluctant in the so-called sole purpose logic, when it's nuclear, it deters nuclear, full stop. I think there can be a danger here.

Having said this, I think we also have to be clear that nuclear weapons are not made to manage contingencies that emerge in low intensity or even high intensity warfare because there are, let's say, a more manageable-- because there are little more options than conventional means. And I think it is important to make clear to the rest of the world, also for diplomatic purposes, that those weapons are special and they're not easy to use conceptually because I wouldn't imagine a situation in which we western countries would be the ones breaking the taboo.

GENERAL KLOTZ: I wonder if any other panel members would like to comment on that?

AUDIENCE: I meant a traditional nuclear delivery means, not so much the nuclear weapons. So if we're using an ICBM, for example, not armed with a nuclear warhead ... (inaudible)?

DR. GRANDE: If I may, I have a one sentence follow-up on this. I'm sorry, I didn't touch upon that. Honestly, we have a very strong reservation on this issue for doctrinal reasons. I think it could be very complicated. I see the point, especially given the virtues of trident, of using it in a conventional-- it might not be cost effective, but it might be effective. Having said this, I nevertheless view with a certain anxiety a situation in which a U.S. or U.K. trident submarine would fire conventional tridents, and I would wonder what would be the flying time, what would happen in Moscow, Beijing or elsewhere during that period? So I think that if you do a cost and benefits balance on the whole, the conventional use of strategically dedicated means might prove more dangerous or creating more instability than the benefits that you can expect in terms of times of delivery, and so on and so forth.

GENERAL CHILTON: I'll just add a couple of thoughts on. Again, I think it's important to go back in the history of why we even talk about prompt conventional global strike. And it was the realization that if there was a desire to go after a target with a conventional weapon really quickly on the other side of the world, the only way we could do that-- Well, we couldn't do that. The only thing we had were nuclear weapons to do that, and that's maybe in certain circumstances or threshold you absolutely don't want to cross, yet you want to achieve the effect.

The question, though, is a conventional problem called the strike, a replacement of the nuclear deterrent, though, I think is one that's very debatable. First of all, if you go back to my comments about the necessity of fear, the fear element of a deterrent, I don't fear conventionally tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles, nor do I think our adversaries.

So there's a difference there in scale, if you will. That said, there could be some second or third order deterrence value from it. But I think it's very debatable that you start looking at equivalencies there.

The other thing as we look at-- There's filling this niche, and the niche is prompt capability with a conventional strike capability, adding another arrow to the quiver, if you will, to national decision makers options. Again, as I caution in missile defense, you have to look more broadly at the context of deployment of such a system. Deployed in large numbers, a highly precise intercontinental kinetic weapon might very much look to an adversary like a first strike cluster if you deployed in vast numbers, and along with a vast missile defense system, it could be destabilizing. And so we have to weigh not only whether or not you want this capability, I think there is a valid need for it, war fighting means, but then you also have to look at it through the lens of deterrence and what other nations might think of this as you deployed. What second and third order consequences, as were mentioned earlier, that other people might have, and they get a vote in the direction they're going to go.

In my mind, I guess to kind of close the thought out, I think of the capability besides filling the niche, as more of an escalation control weapon, potentially, which is more of a war fighting element of deterrence than deterrence itself.

GENERAL KLOTZ: Paul, you had a comment?

DR. BRACKEN: Just quickly. I mean, I think the answer to your question will look in terms of escalation control. My own personal feeling is we're confronting this very quickly with mixed loads for tridents or SSBN-X, which there's a lot of money being put into. The other point I'd make is that if you look in the first nuclear age, the super powers put enormous effort into separating conventional and nuclear forces in everything from command and control to politics. And any general who overstepped that bounds and talked about nukes tended to be fired. If you look at the North Korea/India/Pakistan and even to a certain extent Israel, you do not see that. So the threat environment we're

going into, they are mixing not consciously, but they're not separating them, I would say, their conventional and nuclear forces. This also applies to command and control. And if you believed the published descriptions of the Pakistani or Indian command and control systems, I have a bridge that I'd like to sell you.

GENERAL KLOTZ: Well, I'm afraid, ladies and gentlemen, that we have run out of time in this most stimulating discussion. However, all the panelists will be around. You'll have an opportunity to pursue them individually as we move to lunch.

Now speaking of lunch, since we're starting late, it's going to begin immediately after we leave this auditorium. It'll be served in the atrium ballroom. So once again, thanks to every member of our panel here. Would you please join me in a round of applause?
[applause]

END OF SESSION 2