

***AIR, SPACE, AND CYBERSPACE POWER IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY***  
***38<sup>th</sup> IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security Strategy and Policy***

***January 20 – 21, 2010***

**DAY ONE**

**SESSION TWO**

***Dissuasion and Deterrence in the New Security Landscape***

**10:30 A.M. TO 12:30 P.M.**

**Dr. Camille Grand**

**LIEUTENANT GENERAL FRANK G. KLOTZ:** Ladies and gentlemen, could I ask you please to be seated so that we could begin the second panel? Please be seated as soon as possible so that we can begin the second panel. Welcome back, everyone. I'm Frank Klotz, the Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command. And it's an honor here for all of us to participate in the 38<sup>th</sup> IFPA Fletcher Conference.

Today, I have the distinct honor of being the moderator for Session 2 panel entitled "Dissuasion and Deterrence in the New Security Landscape." Now, allow me to introduce the members of this esteemed panel. You have their more extensive and comprehensive biographies in the literature, which has been handed out by the conference organizer. So I will only make note of their current position.

First of all, General Kevin P. Chilton, the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command. The Honorable Andy Weber, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. Dr. Paul Bracken is Professor of Management and Professor of Political Science at Yale University. Dr. Clark Murdock is the Senior Advisor at the International



proliferation, especially if you add to this the proliferation of missiles, and of other weapons of mass destruction.

The second point of this nuclear disorder, the fact that the issue is no longer a European issue, but has become a completely Asian challenge. From the Middle East to south Asia to northeast Asia, and I think this is, again, a very different picture.

Thirdly, there is a renewal of the abolition debate which has reframed the conceptual framework for disarmament, and I do think it really sharply contrasts with the lack of visibility about the thinking about the future of deterrence, as if the need to rethink deterrence in that environment was somehow inhibited by the abolition debate.

So I think that those issues are very much intertwined and that we can't really disconnect the various sides of the nuclear debate, the missile defense debate, the space policy debate, some of the conventional strike capabilities debate, so it's very complicated. And if you add to this from a technical perspective the civilian nuclear renaissance which adds more countries that will be getting into the nuclear business, hopefully only in the civil nuclear business, but you add a factor of complication.

So in this context, we certainly need to address proliferation and we need to address the abolition disarmament debate, and we need to address deterrence as a sort of package. Let me focus on proliferation, because I think it is the key issue. Either we manage to somehow roll back the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea, or we enter this second nuclear age which will be a darker nuclear age than the previous one. For what reasons?

Very briefly, because we run the risk of those cascades of proliferation with new states coming in and some of them that are friendly states but that we will review their calculus about their nuclear abstention. The spread of technologies might also increase. We've seen that with the A-Q Khan network, we might see that with a Kim Jong-Il network tomorrow. So, I think we really have a serious issue.

This will come with the falling apart of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, either mildly or brutally, that's not known at this stage. But what is clear is that in my view, the NPT will not survive a second withdrawal of a country that has cheated within the treaty. I think we were weak on the DPRK withdrawal for wrong reasons. But I think today, if a second country has succeeded in cheating within the treaty and becoming a nuclear capable state, I think obviously what the NPT is primarily, that is a great collective security arrangement, will lose many of its virtues for many states.

That will go with the increased risk of use and the erosion of the nuclear taboo and the facilitated access to nuclear materials and technologies from state actors and terrorists. And more broadly, a form of re-nuclearization of international relations, including amongst big powers. So that dark scenario can truly-- a key to avoid that, or at least to mitigate those dark consequences, is certainly to manage Iran. Iran, Iran and Iran are our top -priorities. Because I do agree with somehow what Paul Bracken was saying about the fact that North Korea was already dragged into the picture by many countries, including in the Asia.

For all these reasons, the 2010 NPT conference will be a very important opportunity to consolidate the regime and reestablish a broad consensus about nonproliferation that has been weakened over the past. That means addressing the concerns of non-nuclear countries and making clear that going nuclear is not a wise choice. That works together with the abolition debate, obviously. I think the current new abolitionist debate is of great interest. There are many features that make it new, and I would insist on that, novelty.

First of all, there are many senior political figures, the four horsemen and others, that enter that not through a moral prism, but from a security prism. And I think it makes an interesting point. Secondly, many states have adopted at least the rhetoric and potentially the objective of a nuclear weapon free world, including NATO members, some of our non-nuclear allies, and to a certain extent nuclear weapons states. I realize that most of you quoted the second part of the Obama Prague speech in your segment. But there is a first part about a nuclear-free world that is part of this picture. And that's also true for Gordon Brown in Britain and others. So I think it's part of the policy picture.

There is also a very serious attempt to address some of the objections raised by nuclear experts like many of us here, and addressing them seriously. And I think the sort of arguments we've been hearing are much more robust than they used to be. But there is also in this global picture of abolition, a sort of underlying midterm objective that is the de-legitimization of a nuclear deterrence. And there I see a risk, because behind those kind words of reduced salience and lower importance and things like that, somehow a sort of interim step is de-legitimization of deterrence, which is after all about preserving peace. And I think there, we run an important risk. And I'm not quite satisfied with the way certain concepts tend to become widely accepted; no first use, sole purpose and all that. I think on these, we have to be very careful of what we mean by that. I'll come back to that in a second.

So there are many unknowns combined with the issue of abolition, and complex issues to be addressed. Of course, the NPR from an outsider perspective is one defining moment in that debate. It's also going to be interesting to see whether we are in a cycle, as in the past, or is it a more general movement? How will the outcome of the NPT 2010 conference give some international legitimacy to that move? Are we talking about a western debate? I mean, this is very interesting to see that we're going to have a global zero conference in Paris in a few weeks from now. We have had very important speeches by the U.S. President, by the British Prime Minister, by the French President about this issue but I have not heard the Russian, the Chinese and the new comers formulate clear views about abolition.

**DR. GRAND:** --All this being said, the nuclear-weapon free world theme will remain a long-term vision that serves a diplomatic purpose of importance in the NPT context in particular. But, to think and define the key features of an interim nuclear order that will hopefully remain as stable and safe is the core task we are facing today. By pursuing disarmament, by making clear that in our effort to downsize our arsenal is not an attempt to threaten the whole world and sort of, "Do as I say and not as I do" policy. So, all these issues are very much interconnected. And, I think we have a great period to debate that in the next few years. Thank you very much for your attention. [applause]



missiles, for deterring a range of unconventional threats, everything from biological, all the way up through nuclear.

**DR. GRAND:** As you might know, there was a big debate in France after not the last nuclear policy speech, because we don't do-- we are a truly presidential system, so we don't do NPR, so we do nuclear policy speech by the President. But it's more or less the same process. So, the last speech by Chirac in 2006 which raised the big debate because he mentioned the nuclear retaliation in the context of terrorism, although he made clear that it was not the purpose, there was some misreading about that so there was a big debate that started with that.

Let's say that from a French doctrinal perspective, we are very clear about the fact that nuclear weapons are about deterring existential threats. So the point there is that the nature of the threat, whether it's nuclear, biological, chemical or conventional, is not the critical issue. Obviously, the nuclear threat is the most relevant, but the others, as if they create an existential threat, a vital threat to a vital interest, the president leaves open the option of putting a nuclear weapon at play, and we've made that clear in several contexts. And honestly, when I look at bio weapons, I really do think that it is an issue that we can't completely underestimate in that line of thinking. And that's one of the reasons I'm personally reluctant in the so-called sole purpose logic, when it's nuclear, it deters nuclear, full stop. I think there can be a danger here.

Having said this, I think we also have to be clear that nuclear weapons are not made to manage contingencies that emerge in low intensity or even high intensity warfare because there are, let's say, a more manageable-- because there are little more options than conventional means. And I think it is important to make clear to the rest of the world, also for diplomatic purposes, that those weapons are special and they're not easy to use conceptually because I wouldn't imagine a situation in which we western countries would be the ones breaking the taboo.

**GENERAL KLOTZ:** I wonder if any other panel members would like to comment on that?

**AUDIENCE:** I meant a traditional nuclear delivery means, not so much the nuclear weapons. So if we're using an ICBM, for example, not armed with a nuclear warhead ... (inaudible)?

**DR. GRAND:** If I may, I have a one sentence follow-up on this. I'm sorry, I didn't touch upon that. Honestly, we have a very strong reservation on this issue for doctrinal reasons. I think it could be very complicated. I see the point, especially given the virtues of long-range ballistic missiles, of using it in a conventional-- it might not be cost effective, but it might be effective. Having said this, I nevertheless view with a certain anxiety a situation in which the U.S. or a U.K. trident submarine would fire conventional long-range missiles, and I would wonder what would be the flying time, what would happen in Moscow, Beijing or elsewhere during that period? So I think that if you do a cost and benefits balance on the whole, the conventional use of strategically dedicated means might prove more dangerous or creating more instability than the benefits that you can expect in terms of times of delivery, and so on and so forth.

**GENERAL CHILTON:** I'll just add a couple of thoughts on. Again, I think it's important to go back in the history of why we even talk about prompt conventional global strike. And it was the realization that if there was a desire to go after a target with a conventional weapon really quickly on the other side of the world, the only way we could do that-- Well, we couldn't do that. The only thing we had were nuclear weapons to do that, and that's maybe in certain circumstances or threshold you absolutely don't want to cross, yet you want to achieve the effect.

The question, though, is a conventional problem called the strike, a replacement of the nuclear deterrent, though, I think is one that's very debatable. First of all, if you go back to my comments about the necessity of fear, the fear element of a deterrent, I don't fear conventionally tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles, nor do I think our adversaries. So there's a difference there in scale, if you will. That said, there could be some second or third order deterrence value from it. But I think it's very debatable that you start looking at equivalencies there.

The other thing as we look at-- There's filling this niche, and the niche is prompt capability with a conventional strike capability, adding another arrow to the quiver, if you will, to national decision makers options. Again, as I caution in missile defense, you have to look more broadly at the context of deployment of such a system. Deployed in large numbers, a highly precise intercontinental kinetic weapon might very much look to an adversary like a first strike cluster if

you deployed in vast numbers, and along with a vast missile defense system, it could be destabilizing. And so we have to weigh not only whether or not you want this capability, I think there is a valid need for it, war fighting means, but then you also have to look at it through the lens of deterrence and what other nations might think of this as you deployed. What second and third order consequences, as were mentioned earlier, that other people might have, and they get a vote in the direction they're going to go.

In my mind, I guess to kind of close the thought out, I think of the capability besides filling the niche, as more of an escalation control weapon, potentially, which is more of a war fighting element of deterrence than deterrence itself.

**GENERAL KLOTZ:** Paul, you had a comment?

**DR. BRACKEN:** Just quickly. I mean, I think the answer to your question will look in terms of escalation control. My own personal feeling is we're confronting this very quickly with mixed loads for tridents or SSBN-X, which there's a lot of money being put into. The other point I'd make is that if you look in the first nuclear age, the super powers put enormous effort into separating conventional and nuclear forces in everything from command and control to politics. And any general who overstepped that bounds and talked about nukes tended to be fired. If you look at the North Korea/India/Pakistan and even to a certain extent Israel, you do not see that. So the threat environment we're going into, they are mixing not consciously, but they're not separating them, I would say, their conventional and nuclear forces. This also applies to command and control. And if you believed the published descriptions of the Pakistani or Indian command and control systems, I have a bridge that I'd like to sell you.

**GENERAL KLOTZ:** Well, I'm afraid, ladies and gentlemen, that we have run out of time in this most stimulating discussion. However, all the panelists will be around. You'll have an opportunity to pursue them individually as we move to lunch.

Now speaking of lunch, since we're starting late, it's going to begin immediately after we leave this auditorium. It'll be served in the atrium ballroom. So once again, thanks to every member of our panel here. Would you please join me in a round of applause? [applause]

END OF SESSION 2