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The Marine Corps: America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness**

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Session 3, "Meeting the Demand: Responding to Crisis and Applying Force"**

**LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL A. VANE:** Good afternoon, everybody. I'm Mike Vane and, as mentioned earlier, the Director of our Army Capabilities Integration Center, which is responsible for helping the Chief and the Secretary think about what should be the future of the Army.

And I want to, of course, thank not only General Amos, I'm sure, my friend George Flynn, but particularly the Institute here and the Fletcher activity, Jacquie Davis. Thank you for the invitation and giving us a chance here to talk about what our value and our role is as an Army in this future environment.

But first, I'd like to just share a little bit of context, and perhaps a joke some of you might have heard.

At one point during the game, a coach said to one of his young players, "Do you understand what cooperation is? What a team is? What teamwork is?" And the little boy nodded in the affirmative.

The coach then went on to say, "Do you understand that what matters is whether we win together as a team?" The little boy, again, nodded yes.

So the coach continued, "When a strike is called and you're out at first, you don't argue or attack or curse the umpire. Do you understand all that?" And the little boy then of course nodded and said yes.

"Good," said the coach, "now go over and explain that to your mother." [Laughter]

So what we're all talking about this afternoon, and we do very well out in our combatant commands, is working together and how we work together. And not just the players on the field, but with our joint partners, our civilian leadership, as well as with industry and academia.

And together, not only do we need to work together, continue to operate together, we must recognize the world as it exists, not how we want it to be. As Mr. Work said, predicting the future's pretty tough. Just like Yogi Berra said, it's really tough to predict things, especially when you're talking about the future.

And to a large degree it's about capabilities and looking at who it is you might have to operate against. And that has to influence the way you design your systems, the way you design your forces and the capabilities that you put inside of those units.

But again, it's about the world as it exists. We don't have enemies out there just waiting for us and waiting for our strengths. Instead, they're finding ways to work around them.

And to reinforce this spirit of teamwork, the Army, too, recognizes that more than ever we need our Navy to help assure and secure our access in the many regions – and when I say our, I mean our military; this isn't about just the Army, this is about our military – access in the many regions and chokepoints around the world. After all, there are more supplies, activities, and forces that are moved around the world by the sea than by any other way.

Likewise, we need our Air Force. We need our Air Force to gain and maintain air dominance through air superiority, air supremacy, in all areas in which we operate. We as an Army, we rely tremendously on the Air Force, the Navy and the whole of government to make our own contribution to the nation in these realms.

The Army and the nation have the need to go into places with infrastructure that's insufficient, seaports and airports, and the Marines, of course, play a major role in helping get the US military into many of those places.

The Army continues to hone and strengthen our ability to conduct simultaneous military activities with the Marines, along littoral areas in particular, leading into inland areas of operation. And support of these land operations will continue to come via sea/land and air/land activities.

And so, we must jointly look at these challenges that have been laid out by our esteemed speaker, Mr. Work, just a few minutes ago. And I would like to say I think the Army largely endorses many of those comments, if not all of them.

The Army must seek to maintain the land dominance that it has had in major combat operations, arguably in the past, and maintain those capabilities under hybrid kinds of conditions in the future. We also must now collectively look at how do we address regions and nations in "Phase Zero" throughout building partnership capacity activities and seek to gain those kinds of dominant capabilities like we've had in major combat operations in the past in order to carry them into counterinsurgency and irregular warfare operations of the future. And we will not be dominant without the full support of all of our joint partners.

The Army also has specific joint support requirements to provide services to the other Services that I'd like to remind everybody of as we talk about gaining efficiencies. These requirements sometime impact our ability to operate a little bit more austere and in the future when you're relying upon another service to provide such things as common-user land transportation, common class five, common fuel, air and missile defense, mortuary affairs, veterinary services and medical support, to name but a few, the requirements for a larger footprint are there. And those have to be factored in as well if we expect to keep our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines that are operating on the land at the level of support that they've enjoyed in the past, and we need to give them in the future.

I don't want to spend a lot of time on the operational environment, but let me just talk about it a little bit and provide you some insights on what, then, we think our Army must do. I think George Flynn might have mentioned this morning or yesterday, the Army as well, led by myself, the ARCIC (Army Capabilities Integration Center) over the past eight or nine months has undergone a comprehensive review of our force structure and our modernization strategies in this, a future unpredictable environment, and made a series of recommendations to the Department of the Army a couple of months ago – and that now is being taken through the new Chief of Staff, and of course over the next couple of months, it hopefully becomes part of a Senate Resolution by June. All of this looking at this operational environment and redefining what we think this Army must do, post-Afghanistan and Iraq, and shaping what an Army of 2020 must do using the 14-18 POM.

And, as we all know, we've still got six or eight months before we need to wrap that input in, which gives us time to allow the new Chief of Staff, the 37th Chief, to help shape that environment.

But the environment is obviously highly unpredictable. The Earthquake and Tsunami in Japan, operations in the Middle East, are great examples of this from very different points across a spectrum of potential missions.

But just taking Egypt for a second, it's a challenging environment that went the right way so far. But if the use of U.S. military was called into action there, we would be possibly operating against a conventional force there that has over 800 tanks.

So we have to look across, broadly, all of our regions, not only at what our capabilities are and what they need to be, but what the capabilities of potential friends and allies will be, and what their POMs are supporting, and understand that in this global environment, our friends of today may not be our friends of tomorrow. Our adversaries of today may not be the only threats or competitors of tomorrow. And recognize that they, too, have to be factored into the equation of the kind of versatility that our military across all the services needs to attain and retain if we want to retain our place as a nation in this international world order.

History has shown that getting into many of these areas that have difficult terrain and hybrid enemies is difficult, as well, getting out is also very difficult. And so, whether the Joint Force effort is about knocking down doors and deploying at a host nation's request or based on policy decisions, there's also an issue about trying to get ourselves out, which, despite the fact many of our leaders have said we're going to do things very rapidly and then it will all be over and return to normal, history has shown that we haven't left many of these countries that we've been involved in over quite some period of time.

So what is it we need an Army to do? Well, we wrote a concept last summer looking at all the lessons learned and tried to do a number of wargames shaping the future. And the central idea that came out of all that is that our forces need to be operationally adaptable; our forces not only in contact with the enemy, but in the way we generate forces and in the way the Pentagon operates, needs to become more operationally adaptive, a quality that leaders and forces have to exhibit based on critical thinking, comfort with ambiguity and decentralization, a willingness to accept prudent risk, and an ability to make rapid adjustments based on a continuous assessment of the situation.

Again, this is something our forces in contact, whether they're Marine forces, Army forces, air and sea forces, have done extremely well, while in contact with the enemy, over the course of the last seven, ten years. This adaptability is still something we seek in our ability to program, change budgets and adjust in our training bases inside of TRADOC, for example.

So the Army has to be organized, trained and equipped to get after what we've been calling full spectrum operations, which is inside of each of our formations, a versatility that allows that formation to operate on offense, or operate on defense, or operate in a role of providing support to civil authorities. And that requires that capability across the full spectrum or range of military operations.

And as we've done this review and this assessment over the course of the last eight or nine months, we've connected it to the national military strategy, as we understood it, and as we understood it was evolving, along the lines of prepare, prevent, prevail and preserve.

So this environment sets the conditions requiring our forces to operate in and among the population, across wide areas previously known as ungoverned or white space areas, in order to provide security for our forces in the population necessary to set conditions for this range of military operations. And this wide-area security area operation allows us to consolidate gains and ensure freedom of maneuver and freedom of action.

The environment also established the conditions necessary for offense, defense and stability operations by employing combined arms maneuver, to seize, retain and exploit the initiative gained by wide security area operations. And this may include forcible entry operations.

We in the Army and in the Marines have been looking very hard at our capabilities to build partnership capacity. We've also got a very significant effort underway to establish what the needs are and the solutions to establish the correct kind of capability in building partner capacity, and have made a series of recommendations to the department staff here and to the Chief that they're also looking over.

That includes relationships between the general purpose forces and special operating forces as well, and what we're calling a theater engagement capability that is regionally based. So in conjunction with TSOCs, Special Forces, Marine activity, and in-country ambassadors, you're going to see a new capability emerging over the next few months that the Army is establishing to be able to set the groundwork during Phase Zero on which maybe we can help our forcible entry capabilities overcome some of these area denial and anti-access capabilities.

Our previous visions of mutual supporting elements have also been greatly challenged, in terms of size and distance. Battalion commanders, in Afghanistan and Iraq in particular, are operating and responsible for areas that during World War II would be almost near half the entire landing force operational area in Sicily. And so, our forces must have the mobility to travel rapidly over

complex and dangerous terrain, dismounted, mounted, and communicate from their equipment, mounted and dismounted, in mobile operations to accomplish these wide-area security and combined arms maneuver missions.

But these extended distances, dispersed enemies and non-state adversaries without uniforms also create the need for even the smallest of our fighting units, the infantry squad, to operate greatly dispersed on the battlefield, and in a highly decentralized manner.

They must be agile and adaptable, whether mounted or dismounted, or operating from a FOB (Forward Operating Base) or a COP (Combat Outpost). And they'll be forced to engage the enemy in not only the most probable kinds of conditions, as we described, but as the only Army, as the only Marine force, as well as the only Navy and the Air Force, you have to have this broader set of capabilities to be able to address the most dangerous courses of actions that enemies could provide.

Or even maybe some things that we haven't, in the Defense Department, really addressed yet, the unthinkable. What are the unthinkable kinds of conditions that might be in the future that we again need to address and ensure we factor into our risk calculations? One of the most dangerous conditions for our ground force is a conventional capability with weapons of mass destruction.

And these soldiers are also facing a number of what I'm calling new norms, new kinds of capabilities that each individual soldier must seek excellence in and have the skills in: individual operational adaptability; ability to operate in complex, uncertain situations; cultural and language proficiency; the ability to have negotiation skills, even down to the smallest tactical levels; digital literacy; space knowledge; continually operating in the contested cyber space; weapons technical intelligence; and site exploitation.

And the last one that we've just begun a very, very serious effort on is relooking at what it means to be a soldier in the profession of arms and in the ethical application of warfare in the future, given the variety of challenges that our forces have seen over the last seven to ten years.

Other things that we need an Army to do include building and maintaining the relationships with diverse partners, conducting sustained engagement with them. We'll talk about overcoming anti-access and aerial-denial. Reconnaissance and close combat with the enemy and civilian populations, using reconnaissance to induce action, influence operations while operating under conditions of uncertainty under 24-hour transparency.

As mentioned already before, the Army, like other forces, is essentially a CONUS (Continental US) -based force. And we're no longer predominantly forward-deployed. And by 2013, more than 90% of the Army will be CONUS-based.

And I think Mr. Work already mentioned the particular quote here recently from the Secretary of Defense about expeditionary forces that are really self-evident, whether they're inside of Marine forces, Army forces or special operating forces. We've got to maintain some part of the Army that has an expeditionary capability, but to recognize, as well, the campaign-quality nature of the Army is one of the unique competencies that we also bring. As I mentioned before, combined arms maneuver and wide-area security being those two core competencies in an operational level of this campaign-quality Army.

Our challenges include today that— and this is a collective challenge. The Army is reliant, almost 100%, upon the Navy and the Air Force for strategic lift. And we must know our requirements and we must make sure that we're communicating those requirements and working together on those requirements.

Activities such as humanitarian assistance and security may cause us to stay a while in an operation. And if so, the ground forces of a larger size may be called for. And how do we get it there? We know the fastest that we can get an infantry battalion task force someplace in the world from home station is about three to five days, by any means. And we know that our heavy brigade combat teams can be moved by sea or air in a range of about four weeks to five weeks, if you go sea or air and what your maximum on-the-ground capability is in a variety of countries.

So between the time one would do a forcible entry or a non-permissive kind of operation and the time you could get a brigade there is going to be constrained by lift with a gap of about three or four weeks. That we know. And the mobility capabilities and requirements study that was recently concluded said that the lack of foreign infrastructure required to support major force deployments remains the fundamental constraint when attempting to reduce deployment timelines.

So it's not about reducing the weight. You only get marginal increases in your ability to move heavy brigade combat team, a Stryker Brigade Combat Team, or an Infantry Brigade Combat Team. And therefore, the airborne capability that the Army retains in conjunction with Marine amphibious capabilities, it becomes a required capability to retain, to fill that first-30-day gap, and get in anywhere in the world, depending on how much life and destruction of property is occurring and depending how fast the national authorities want to get us there. You've got about 30 days there that you need these forces to get there quickly and start providing that capability.

But we haven't really focused on forcible entry in the last few years. Most of us have been kind of busy doing something else. So here only recently we started, as a result of this two-year look at our concepts and changing our horizons closer in over this past year, and we began a series with Joint Forces Command, with the Marines, with the Navy and the Air Force, relooking at joint forcible entry, JFEWE, 'ja-foo-ee.' (Joint Forcible Entry Warfighter Experiment)

And we ran one of these experiments here recently, down at Fort Benning, with the partnership of all the other services, to begin to look at what are our real capability needs are now after seven to ten years that we haven't been looking at forcible entry operations.

So we took this on under the umbrella of the Joint Operational Access Concept that's been generated by Joint Forces Command, with the purpose to review not only what the Army's baseline capabilities need to be and where then do we need the 2018-2020 capabilities to be built towards, but also to help, in conjunction with the other services, to review that as well.

And as you might expect, the first time that we looked at that, we really turned it into more of a training exercise. It became everyone trying to remember how we did this before, pulling out the old TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures), places where we had doctrine, places where we didn't have doctrine, some of the old constraints that we had put ourselves on, or these dream kind of capabilities, that I'm going to get all this airlift out of the whole world to move some large part of the 82nd Airborne Division or the 18th Airborne Corps, which, frankly, again as we got done with that, we realized we have got to look at different ways of conducting joint forcible entry operations.

We didn't challenge ourselves enough, I don't believe, in the Navy, in the sea environment. And our Naval forces got very close to littoral operations, perhaps not fully exploring some of the challenges related to sustaining a Naval force very close to littoral areas without having a lot of other threats that are getting after it.

And so, there were a number of significant insights that came out of it so far, and obviously an agreement to conduct another one of these exercises this summer, to ensure that the capability we're all trying to put into the POM are appropriately wargamed. But we found the human terrain was as important as the maneuver space.

National technical means that were portrayed in JFEWE were unable to locate about 65% of the enemy systems, making it very difficult to achieve what we used to have as the go and no-go criteria for the use of air and naval operations in support of forcible entry ops. And we went by those and conducted the operation anyway in order to learn from it. But that's a significant challenge that we have to go back and understand better how we're going to solve it.

We obviously also had challenges of operating in degraded command and control environments and counterintelligence, including camouflage, concealment and deception continued to be a challenge for us as the enemy increasingly improves his ability to operate in and among the populations.

As I mentioned, airborne and amphibious, go and no-go criteria may be difficult to attain against near-peer with precision-guided, indirect munitions MANPADs, anti-ship cruise missiles and modern mine warfare capabilities. I don't think we've fully explored that. We really need a new joint CONOP to integrate joint forcible entry operations.

We found that JFEWE airdrop and airlanding demands exceed the capacity of the planned fleet by over 30%. This shouldn't have been a surprise to us. But again, most of that work hasn't been continued for the last seven to ten years. And now we've got to get back after either different ways to do it, or helping convince ourselves that some other way of achieving forcible entry with the sea and air capabilities we have can be achieved.

We also recognize that there needs to be a base piece of building partner capacity that's understood in conditions of when you have partnerships existing in the country and when you don't. Certainly the events in Libya and Egypt give you some stark realities, perhaps, to go analyze and what kind of outcomes those can be. But we have to do that in conjunction with our special forces, our MISO (Military Information Support Operations) and our security force assistance (SFA) capabilities, and improve not only our partners' individual unit capabilities, but our own. And develop our leaders' capacity for understanding all this in a country, and this is driving us towards a regionally based set of brigades and capabilities that do understand better what COCOM's and ASCC's requirements are in various regions of the world during Phase Zero operations.

The Army/Air Force concerns on lift drive us to look at joint requirements, the need to focus on our 2018 capabilities in order to determine not only what the Army, but the other services should be looking like in 2020 and how our dependencies and interdependencies can be maximized.

We are obviously looking for help from all the services as we try to tackle this problem together. And as we move towards the next couple of months of taking the sets of recommendations that we've done for our core structure, our end-strength, and modernizing our capabilities over the next few months, we look forward to partnering with each of our services and academia.

And again, I'd like to thank you for inviting me here, and look forward to questions. [Applause]

[JUMP TO Q&A]

**DR. JACQUELYN K. DAVIS:** Well, that was a very provocative panel and many different sets of comments. A common theme, of course, goes back to the original opening comments set by Secretary Work, referring to Secretary Gates's statement yesterday – what missions can we afford to shed if we are going on the trajectory that we all think we're going on with respect to Congress and the budget.

So I would like, before they leave, each of our panelists to address that from his service perspective – what mission do you think your service can afford to shed as we think about force efficiencies and budget efficiencies in the period ahead.

Also, on the last point, Bing, you raised a very intriguing point and important point, I believe, about the trainers. There is a little organization, and everyone's going to groan when I mention NATO, but it's an organization called the NATO SOF Headquarters Element. It is technically part of NATO, but not really part of NATO's peacetime establishment operation. And it is an MOU organization, led by the United States. SOCOM has now taken ownership.

It was really stood up by General Jones when he was SACEUR, and embraced by Admiral McRaven, who is going to take over at SOCOM, as you know. And it is a coalition of nations with partner relationships. So that includes the Australians, New Zealanders, the Jordanians, the UAE, who are operating on the ground, in Afghanistan, in precisely that role, Bing, you're talking about, with respect to both the ANA, as a training and equipping force, but also now the police force. And they're working with EURPOL, which is very interesting, all sorts of non-traditional partnerships. And US DEA, which is another key, I believe, to an exit strategy that gets us out where DoD supports another agency that might have a more fundamental role in leading.

So I think we need to think more creatively about the NATO SOF Headquarters Element, led, by the way, by an Air Force three-star now, Frank Kisner, which is doing amazing things, and no

one hears about it because it's under NATO's radar, which I think is a good thing. But I think that the partnership activities it's engendering is very important, with non-traditional NATO partners, and that's why I think it's actually working.

Now, having said that, I'd like to open the floor for questions. The Secretary made, I think, one of the most compelling arguments for why we need a joint forcible entry capability. And I certainly hope you're going to be working on those papers that go to the Secretary when you argue about amphibious assault capabilities and joint forcible entry.

But please, questions? Microphone? Please identify yourself.