Previous IFPA-Fletcher Conferences

National Stategies and Capabilities
for a Changing World

November 15-16, 2000
Crystal Gateway Marriott
1700 Jefferson Davis Highway,
Arlington, VA

Conference Opening & Introduction

Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army

Morning, all. Thank you, Dr. Pfaltzgraff. Many thanks to you to the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment for cosponsoring this conference on National Strategies and Capabilities for Changing the World. General Ellis, many thanks to you and your staff as well for your assistance in orchestrating and coordinating this conference. General Shinseki big hooha to you. I know we're the host as the Army of this conference, but I think really the inspiration for last year's conference and this year's, much of it goes to you and I want to thank you for helping to put this together. To all of our distinguished guests, general officers, flag officers, distinguished guests from other countries, ladies and gentlemen.

What a perfect time to hold this discussion on national strategies and capabilities for a changing world. Last year's Presidential election is still too close to call. Throughout this past year, there was a good deal of speculation regarding what the perceived policy differences between the two candidates might mean for the U.S. role in the world. In view of the challenges that he is likely to face, the question of who will lead the United States for the next four years remains a source of apprehension. Not just here at home, but throughout the world.

Whoever's elected will indeed face a rapidly changing world. Festering tensions, terrorist acts, fast-paced developments in situations in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, on the Korean peninsula, in Africa and Indonesia and elsewhere all highlight how volatile the world we live in really is.

Meanwhile, the forces of globalization offer nations and individuals either great promise or great peril depending on where they sit in this increasingly interconnected world. As a transition of leadership of our nation from one administration to the next, it is indeed a good time to closely question, evaluate and consider what contributes to our national security. And what capabilities we must have to insure our future security.

As the time of this conference suggests, our national strategies and capabilities for dealing with this welter of change are far broader than just the strategies and capabilities of our armed forces and our Department of Defense. They include, to say the least, our economic and diplomatic efforts to confront longstanding problems within and among nations. To open new markets to mutually beneficial investment and trade. And to contribute to the spread of democracy and the rule of law. Indeed, insuring our own economic security through investments in public goods such as healthcare, education, infrastructure, and workforce development, is also an important element in providing for our national security.

The next President will have to look across all of these instruments of national power to decide how each best contributes to U.S. economic and national security interests. He will have to prioritize and choose because he will not be able to do everything in the national security arena or elsewhere. On what basis will he make the tough strategic resource allocation decisions that he will be called on to make? I would modestly offer a few thoughts to him and to this distinguished group as you begin to ponder what the strategies and capabilities are that will best support our national interests.

First I would suggest that America's greatest strength lies not in her military might, but in her principles and ideals. The principles and ideals of liberty, equality, and justice for all that underlie all that we have achieved in this country. And that every year cause tens of thousands of people around the world to risk their lives to try to get to our shores. The principles an ideals that cause millions more around the world to look to America as their best hope for freedom from want and oppression. And that leads so many nations to emulate our systems of government and economy and to seek closer bilateral ties with us, including closer military ties.

Further, I would suggest that the many things that we do to give these principles and ideals life in the international context including through the use of our military and operations other than war, in humanitarian, peacekeeping, counter-drug and other stability and support operations, contribute greatly to our national security by ameliorating the very crises that can lead to larger conflicts.

It is therefore, I think, very important that any analysis of what contributes to our national security include not only those things that represent war-fighting capabilities, but also those things that help prevent wars. Not just through deterrence, but through proactive, people to people interventions of the kind that the Army regularly performs as humanitarians, peacekeepers, trainers, and allies.
I would suggest that in this post-Cold War era, it is these people to people interventions coupled with our economic and diplomatic efforts that are the key to our security backed up by the unmistakable preeminence of our war fighting military capabilities.

The upcoming quadrangle defense review will, I am hopeful, help the new administration begin to sort out some of its conclusions about the kind of military that we need. As the new administration undertakes this QDR process, I think they need to consider four questions: first, what are the short and long-term threats to our national interests, including the new threats to our direct interests and to stability in the world that we see on the horizon? Second, what are the capabilities that our nation must have to counter those threats, both as preventative or ameliorative forces, and in the event that such preventative measures fail? Third, what is the core structure that is necessary to deliver the capabilities we need, including those preventive capabilities? And fourth, what will it take to resource the required force structure?

From the perspective of the services, it is important that the QDR be done in a comprehensive manner that accurately and honestly captures not only what our requirements are for fighting the two MTWs, but also the requirements and capabilities that are implied by all the missions that we are currently performing in the world, and that we reasonably foresee we will continue to perform. If the QDR is nothing more than a budget drill where the existing program is made to fit a given budget, then we will continue to have a structural program budget mismatch in which certain parts of the program, by definition, must be under resource. Invariably, those are the parts of the program that affect our service members and their families.

If we hope to retain our high quality people, then we must not balance the books on their backs by asking them to do more with less. Less housing, less healthcare, less time off, fewer spare parts, and fewer support services. They somehow always manage to get the job done, although often at great cost to themselves and their families, but that good will is not endless.

The structural budget program mismatch we have today, the need to address newly emerging threats, as well as any changes to the national security strategy all point for the next administration to make some very difficult spending decisions including with respect to how, when and where we will deploy our forces. To accomplish all this, the next President must have the freedom and support to push the services toward achieving greater joint integration including by eliminating inefficiencies and redundant capabilities in order to deliver the most program for the resources available.

As the new administration weighs some of the competing claims for the limited dollars that will be available for defense spending, I would offer four further observations about the indispensable role that the Army plays as part of the joint forces team. Now, these are admittedly from the perspective of an Army Secretary, but I think nonetheless important to consider.

First, the Army's ground forces are critical to achieving quick, decisive and lasting victory. Our enemies are smart and adaptable. They have learned that if all we are willing to do is fire at them from a distance, from off shore or overhead, then all they need to do to preserve their regime is to disperse their forces, to put their tanks and artillery pieces near churches, mosques, hospitals. Hospitals are human shields. To button down and to wait us out. If our goal is to compel the enemy to surrender in short order on terms favorable to us, then we need to take the conflict to decisive victory.

The oft-stated claim that a national aversion to casualties makes ground wars a thing of the past is dangerous and fallacious thinking. We need robust conventional ground forces as part of our joint team now as much as ever. Moreover, I have no doubt that the American people are as capable today as they have been in the past of understanding and supporting the risk of sacrificing our sons and daughters if it is in our nation's interest, and if it is properly and honestly explained to them.

Second, I would conclude that the Army is the most relevant force that our nation has today for shaping the international environment and preventing war through people to people intervention. Each of the services contributes mightily to deterrence through our war-fighting readiness and our presence throughout the world. But the Army, by nature of its size and staying power, plays an indispensable role in shaping the world by performing the lion's share of the long term, muddy boots missions that support U.S. leadership, principles and ideals in the world. The Army is simply the nation's premier engagement force and its principle operations other than war force, and that fact needs to be recognized.

Third, the Army is too small to do all that it is currently asked to do. Generals Zinni and Sullivan have previously made the case that to be prepared for war fighting, to be able to conduct theater-level operations in a war fight, to execute the CINCs' military engagement and exercise program, and to be the principle operations other than war force requires a larger Army. We simply cannot sustain the level of commitment that we have today without additional personnel. It would be a mistake, I think, and contrary to logic and experience, to say that we will simply do less in support of U.S. leadership in the world.

The fourth, last, and yet perhaps most important conclusion that I would offer is that we have failed to recognize in our budgeting that the Army has become as capital-intensive a service as the Navy and Air Force. Leveraging information technology for the benefit of our soldiers as we are doing today in our digitization efforts, in LAN warrior, in Army transformation, is capital intensive. Re-capitalizing and replacing our aging equipment, from helicopters to artillery pieces, with the increased capabilities that platforms that are geared to the network-centric battlefield will have is capital intensive. But it is worth every cent it takes to increase the lethality, effectiveness and survivability of the men and women who serve in our Army.

We simply cannot provide our soldiers mobility on the battlefield, real time situational awareness, or digital operational connectivity for the precision targeting of enemy forces at greater distances on the less than $10 billion a year of modernization funding that the Army gets. It simply can't be done. If it was ever the case that the Army was not capital-intensive, that day is long gone. The Army today needs the same two to three times larger modernization budgets as the other services enjoy.

I trust that those are some provocative thoughts to begin this conference with. They certainly underscore that there are important matters to discuss as we consider what meeting our national security needs will mean in this early part of the 21st century. That's why we're all here. The results and findings of this conference will provide significant intellectual contributions whose implications will stretch far beyond these two days. They will provide an informed basis for thinking about a number of important future decisions ranging from the conduct of the QDR to the future engagement strategies for our nation.

So it is critical that these topics be addressed in a bipartisan, open manner before the American people, and that the best minds of our nation work together to insure our nation's security, leadership, and preeminence in the world. I am grateful to you all for participating in this dialogue.

This morning I also have the distinct pleasure of introducing the man who for more than two decades has exemplified the forward-looking, bipartisan thinking our nation needs from its leaders. Our keynote speaker for the conference, Senator Carl Levin. Senator Levin is the ranking Democratic member on the Armed Services Committee. His focus has always been on the welfare of our military. He's worked diligently to modernize the armed forces, improve our procurement practices, and reduce the threat to our nation's security from weapons of mass destruction. Senator Levin, thank you for your strong leadership, which has earned the trust and respect of your colleagues on both sides of the aisle in the Senate, as well as the American people, and our men and women in uniform. Ladies and gentlemen, it is my distinct honor to introduce to you our keynote speaker, Senator Carl Levin. (Applause).