National Stategies and Capabilities
for a Changing World

Panel 1: The National Interest - What is Driving Our National Security Strategy and What Should?

Panel Members:

General John Galvin, USA (Retired), former Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Dean Emeritus, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

Representative Ellen O. Tauscher (D-CA), House Armed Services Committee

Ambassador Richard Armitage, President, Armitage Associates L.C.; former U.S. envoy and Department of Defense official

Dr. Graham T. Allison, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

General Galvin: Thank you. It's nice to be the moderator. Once again, I'd like to congratulate Bob Pfaltzgraff on this conference. This marks the 30th, as you know. And 30 years ago, just about that time, I went to Fletcher as a fellow, got to know Bob, and it's been a wonderful ride that we've seen here throughout all these conferences. Also it's been a lot of fun being Dean of Fletcher. When you move from something like the Armed Forces to academia, it's always a very interesting thing to do.

And the students ask me when I first arrived if there would be any changes as a result of my taking over as dean. And I said no. Reveille, of course, and taps. And the uniform. But nothing— Nothing big.

I would— I think that we have— We're privileged here in this group, in this panel, to kick off this National Strategies and Capabilities in a Time of Change. Certainly change is probably the most important word that we will be dealing with over the next two days, and that is how do we respond to that change? But as a good moderator, I will not try to handle that. I'd like to say that we have three wonderful people on the panel, Congresswoman Ellen Tauscher is a member of the House Armed Services Committee. She's the ranking member of the subcommittee on nuclear security, and a person very, very interested in the matters that we have before us today and the pressures that those matters create.

And Rich Armitage (sp?) who has served this country in all kinds of ways, in the State Department, Defense, in the business world. And who is a good friend that I've worked with a lot.

As is Graham Allison, an educator, a writer, a person of enormous influence, good vision, great vision and private and public service. The three, I think, can provide you some interesting comments on what is really driving our national security, what should be driving our national security, and what do we think about the term national interest.

After they have had a chance to talk, we will get into a question and answer, and I really do hope that we can get a lot of participation. I know that's what you came here for, not to just sit and listen, and we will work that out. I will do my best to just watch the watch and keep us on time to hear Tom Friedman at lunchtime.

So as we start off, I would like to introduce then Congresswoman Ellen Tauscher and give her the lectern if she wants.

Ellen Tauscher: Thank you General Galvin. I'm frankly happy to be anywhere today where I don't have to say the word recount for two or three hours. Thank you for inviting me here today to be with such a prestigious group of accomplished individuals. And I'm so happy to see that the Fletcher School has continued its long tradition of bringing together great minds to discuss national security. I want to thank the Fletcher School at Tufts University, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, the office of the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment, and my friends at the Army, especially General Shensecky for sponsoring the important discussions that will occur over the next couple of days.

I am honored and excited to be counted among this impressive group and to offer my thoughts on what drives our national security strategy. As we begin a new century, I believe we must construct a security policy that reflects the successes of the last century. But we cannot rely on the paradigms of the previous 100 years to address the challenges of the next 100 years. We no longer live in a polarized, east/west world where threats were balanced, stakes were clear, and we knew our enemies. The size and power of our democracy's traditional enemies like communism and its accompanying dictatorships are disappearing.

Instead today, we face enemies that operate as if a puff of smoke. We often can't see them, touch them, or even understand them. And increasingly, the threats to our nation are not from established dates for traditional reasons. We have reached the era of entrepreneurial terrorism, when cowardly acts like the attack on the U.S.S. Cole and the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Africa pose the greatest dangers to our national security. In a world that has changed dramatically, our principles remain constant. Peace, freedom, opportunity, community, democracy. But our approach to achieving those goals must be adapted to the new environment in which we operate.

What is the role of the United States as the world's only remaining super power? What is the correlation between economic security and national security? What is the role of international institutions in our foreign policy? How do we assure that the size and capability of our military is matched to the threats that we face? These are the questions we ask ourselves today and the challenges we will meet tomorrow. In addressing these questions, I believe we must be guided by three principles: the development of strong alliances and the accompanying commitment to economic security; a credible reputation as a global force of beneficence; and an ability to mount and maintain a reliable military deterrent.

First, we need to strengthen and expand a series of alliances that span the globe and stretch our resources. For the last 50 years, a select group of highly developed countries including the United States, western Europe and Japan has dominated the world stage and leveraged the prosperity that democracy has brought our nations. We now have the opportunity to use the largesse accumulated during the last half century to bring other countries into that fold.

To do so, we must expand traditional definitions of alliances and partners. On a practical level, this means enlarging NATO to include the nations of eastern Europe and strengthening similar alliances in Asia. Bringing other nations into the fold also means reforming international institutions like the United Nations so it reflects the participation of smaller, less powerful nations.

Expanding alliances is important for the agreement and acceptance of certain standards of behavior. And strategic alliances are important because they stretch out each nation's resources and help get the most bang for the buck.

Furthermore, strategic alliances permit our nation to keep equipment and personnel in certain regions of the world, which enhances our ability to respond in a time of crisis. In return, these arrangements provide other nations with a constant super power presence and a peace of mind that comes with a visible force standing watch.

But our alliances with these nations must not be limited to military engagements. Indeed, a driving force and factor of our foreign policy, and an area that must govern our strategic alliances, is a deep commitment to economic security. Only with an economic security can a nation build the way to prosperity and the resulting peace.

While the Asian economic crisis in 1997 has largely ended, the recovery has implications for U.S. regional security and for democracy around the globe. The crisis accelerated existing challenges to the political status quo and moved nations in the direction of greater democracy and transparency. Witness the transfer of power in Indonesia just two years ago. With the resignation of authoritarian President Suharto, and the reformist approach of his successors, as well as the subsequent South Korea election of Kim Dae-jung, also a reformist platform.

We can see the move toward greater democracy in action now with President Kim's commitment to making peace with North Korea. The results of the Asian economic crisis illustrate the importance of economic security of our alliances. U.S. prestige must not suffer a blow in this vital region, and yet how the U.S. assists Asian governments with lingering socioeconomic effects of the crisis will determine whether we sustain or roll back the gains democracy has made in this region.

As we continue to review what caused the crisis and the accelerated recovery, we must look forward to what the U.S. can do to prevent this from happening in other developing regions in the world where a recovery might not be as speedy. Steps like this have to do with our own interests, but they also have to do with creating a foreign policy that is based on doing what is right and doing— In addition to doing what is necessary.

And that is the heart of the second principle which plays into our ability to drive foreign policy. The maintenance of a credible reputation around the world, one that is based on beneficence instead of self-preservation. We can maintain the kinds of strategic alliances we want if our motives are pure and our credibility is unchallenged. We lose credibility as a keeper of peace when we tolerate genocide or allow conflict to go unanswered. This means taking action in parts of the world once relegated to be outside of our national interest.

What is more, we now have the ability to use the status that the last 50 years have brought us, both in financial terms and in repute to respond to devastating losses of life overseas. For example, I believe we need to start expanding our largely Eurocentric concentration in foreign policy into the countries of Africa. That continent is largely ignored while it is quietly enduring the loss of an entire generation of people due to HIV and AIDS. This region cries out for help. And in our ever-shrinking globe, we can ill afford nor morally abide the deprivation of entire tribes and countries once so hopeful of democracy.

The fact is, we can do solid things to address the standard of living in many African and highly indebted nations. We can restructure or completely erase their debt. We can help them insure basic day to day requirements like clean water, sewage treatment. And we can build efficient transportation systems, provide civil government models, and police training to start those regimes into a better opportunity for peace and prosperity.

Bringing nations in need up to a distant and sustainable standard of living will gradually increase their ability to partner with the rest of the world and eventually increase the world's access to the natural resources that they all contain.

In order to implement these ideals, and so that we can protect our own people from would-be agitators, I believe we must keep our military the best in the world. So a final principle in this discussion of foreign policy is the maintenance of a reliable, state of the art military force. It is important to note that keeping the peace requires a set of different military equipment today than the force we've deployed in the past. This is because our missions in the next century will be different from past missions, and because the enemies we face in any kind of conflict will not look the same as what we have been used to.

Peacekeeping missions require high mobility and speed without any sacrifice in lethality or the traditional— Or our traditional weapons. This demands a re-calibration of our force in all respects. People, equipment, and communications technology so that it is efficient, effective, right-sized, ready, and quickly deployable. The problem is we don't know how to re-calibrate until we actually understand what our enemy looks like. This is the biggest challenge the Pentagon is facing right now.

To a certain extent, we need to recognize that we can't completely know what our enemy will look like, and therefore, we must be prepared for a broad spectrum of possibilities. But we do know that our future battles are not only going to be fought with force on force combat, or destroyers or bombers. Instead, while we invest time and money into researching the newest and lightest sophisticated weaponry, some of our new enemies will be using a rundown warehouse to throw together Molotov cocktails or bombs with instructions from the Internet.

Ms. Tauscher, continued: I am not saying that we should abandon all our traditional war fighting mechanisms to concentrate solely on combating terrorism or cyber warfare. What I am saying simply is we simply have to do it all. To be sure, this will require more money. But I am optimistic that as Americans begin to understand these new threats, they will understand what it takes to mount a credible deterrent. And with the right political leadership, they will make the tough choices.

Likewise, I am hopeful that those in the Pentagon will understand the tough choices that they need to make. Like the balance between current readiness and the important work we need to do in R&D. For an example of leadership in this area, look no further than my friend General Shensecky who has worked tirelessly for his visions of a transformed Army and made a myriad of difficult decisions in order to invest in R&D. Increasing our capabilities in new areas like terrorism requires shifting funds from our current modernization budget. Simply put, the next administration needs to make a commitment to increased spending in defense, but the Pentagon must not shy away from its obligation to rebalance the defense investment portfolio.

Redefining our enemies and investing in the future also means taking a long, hard work at the requirements we lay out for our future force structure. Specifically, I hope that the next quadrennial defense review will adjust the definition of a two-war concept because it is an unsupportable historical model. Today is my 49th birthday, and we haven't faced that challenge during my lifetime. It is unrealistic to expect that the exact same challenge will come from two disparate locales in the world.

Cookie cutter approaches to war will not work when, as we have just said, each aggressor is characterized by different motives and fighting tactics. Instead, the QDR might better emphasize the need to be able to fight one all-out war and simultaneously respond to a short term crisis. The challenge then becomes how do we satisfy these requirements while also mounting an effective deterrent at home?

By making our requirements more realistic and accounting for changes in the tactics of any potential adversary, we can assure ourselves a more accurate idea of what to expect. Changes like these will help us defend ourselves against aggression, but will also protect the network of allies we have worked so hard to create.

In closing, I would like to suggest that none of you leave here thinking we've just all heard this before. No matter how much we sit around and ponder these decisions, the fact is we don't have a choice. We must confront these questions and find workable solutions because that is how we will keep the peace in this new environment. We know we can do it because we've done it before. You know, the greatest battles are lauded and applauded, and they are entered into the history books and they are the subjects of box office hits. But the greatest success comes when no battle is fought. And that's what we have done in recent decades.

After looking back at our unprecedented peace and prosperity in the latter part of the last century, we should not be confused about where to go. Instead, we should be taking a victory lap. It is our job to leverage this success so that we can continue to build and maintain the most effective fighting force in the world. And right now, that means making it relative to the 21st century paradigm. Any strong organization learns to respond to changes in its environment, and the military is no different. These changes are simply evolutionary. Only those who articulate and execute successful strategies live to plan another day. With the steady hand of experienced leadership and the eager minds of our youngest officers, I have no doubt that we will reach consensus on these important questions and succeed in all of our endeavors. Thank you very much, and I look forward to questions when we're all finished. (Applause)

General Galvin: Thank you, Ellen. And happy birthday from all of us. I think that Congresswoman Tauscher brought up very carefully three aspects of facing this change that we're talking about. And three aspects that drive strategy. And those principles of hers, a series of alliances and interrelationships and structures in the world, a credible United States in every way and a kind of deterrent that will meet the future. Those are things I know we will be considering as we move along here. And I'd like to thank you for that comment. There will be questions and so forth later.

And I would like to turn it over now to Rich Armitage. You can stay there, you can come up here, do whatever you'd like.

Richard Armitage: Is the mike on? Are we good? I think I'll stay here, save my energy for the great efforts that will follow off of Saturday's decision, I hope. We'll see. I'll not mention the dreaded word, Congresswoman.

Chief, thank you very much for inviting me back, Dr. Pfaltzgraff, Andy. It's good to be with you. Slightly different topic from last year's transformation discussion. But I want to do basically what I did last year, and what I think I did. And that is to steal a bit from John McCain's straight talk express and have some straight talk about strategy and what drives our strategy, which after all is the subject for discussion.

I think if we're going to talk about strategy, we better talk about what our purpose is before we develop a plan, which is what a strategy is. And I'll tell you what I believe our purpose is in the world. I believe it is to preserve and prolong our preeminence as a force for good, as long as humanly possible. And is to be excellent in the international arena without being arrogant. That's my purpose.

If you accept that purpose, then, what drives our national security strategy is the same thing that has driven the national security strategies of every country from time immemorial. Many of us have studied with Dr. Hans Morgenthau, the excellent University of Chicago international relations professor. German-born, American by choice. And he reminds us, I think, I should reiterate, the following. International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Statesmen can seek power, freedom, security, or prosperity and cloak their goals in religious terms, their philosophic terms, economic terms, their social ideals. But at the end of the day, power is what drives the search for power, is what drives our national security strategy. I hope the power to do good in the world. But that is what drives it.

Now, I want you to sigh a collective sigh of relief when I tell you that I'm not going to try to lay out for you some follow on strategy to George Kennan's (sp?) containment. I clearly admit to you I have not the capability. Dr. Allison will take that duty, I'm sure.

I'm going to, however, try to lay out for you four principles which I think might usefully guide our nation as we seek a follow on strategy to Kennan's containment. These principles are as follows. The first, I believe, is the absolute need for U.S. leadership. Let's face it. I think everyone in the room involves that we are involved in the world beyond the continental limits imposed by our great oceans. And we're certainly involved in the world beyond the constitutional limits imposed by our great laws. We've got power. We've got prestige. We've got influence. We've got military clout. Beyond that known in the history of the world. And we can either use those gifts or those tools wisely and well, or we can use them foolishly and badly. And to not engage, simply walk off the playing field in my view is every bit as irresponsible as an indiscriminate intervention when U.S. supported equities aren't at risk.

Now, this brings me to a point that was raised very much in the campaign, and I want to hit it today. And that is whether we are or not a 911. If we're going to be a shining city on the hill, which I think we are, and we should be, then we are going to get the 911 calls. But unlike your police precinct who has to send a car to the disturbance, we don't have to send our military. I don't think this point was illuminated sufficiently in the great debates that were held recently in our country. We have many tools in our quiver. We will get the 911 call. We don't necessarily have to answer it with military force. We've got political power. We've got economic power. We've got international financial institutions. We've got a host of tools. But we are going to get those 911 calls. So my view is the first principle is the absolute need for U.S. leadership.

The second one might seem a little evident, but if you listened carefully to the debate, whether you're a Democrat or a Republican, held over the last year, you might get the impression that all that matters is domestic politics or perhaps worse, there's sort of a wall or division between foreign policy on the one hand and domestic policy on the other. And I want to lay out to you my second principle. Is there is no line. There's no dividing wall between foreign and domestic policy. Many times when we're acting in what we think are simply domestic issues, there are actually huge international implications.

Let me give you an example. To the extent we allow producers of daytime television to put trash on your TV, to the extent we don't insist on excellence in education, or to the extent we stifle individual initiative, responsibility, what are we saying to the world? We're saying the world in my view, we don't have anything special to offer the world. And if that's our point of view, you're simply going to feed the cynicism of those who pollute our airwaves and dumb down our schools and foster victimization as a vocation. So my second principle, there is no wall between foreign and domestic affairs.

The third principle, which I hope would usefully guide us is this; in the conduct of foreign policy, there's a place for military force, but it is not the first place. If there's one thing that surprised me when I left Vietnam, made my way to Washington to seek fame and fortune, which has consistently eluded me, it was the alacrity with which policymakers generally call for the use of military. In my view, after weak-kneed policy had gotten us involved in some hellhole or another, diplomats, policymakers, would call for military force. Surgical strikes, etc. To get them out of a jam. That in my view, in many cases, weak-kneed diplomacy had gotten them into.

So in the conduct of foreign policy, there is a place for military force. It's not the first arrow, in my view, that comes out of the quiver. And I want to drill down a little bit on this issue. We've had many debates over the past couple of years about peacemaking and peacekeeping. And a fellow from Columbia University by the name of Richard Betts has done some remarkable writing, I believe, on this phenomenon. And I think it would be very useful to lay out a couple of the points that he eliminates for your consideration. And I hope for policymakers' consideration in the future.

Speaking specifically about this kind of murky peacemaking, peacekeeping atmosphere that we very often find ourselves in today. Professor Betts says the following. He says war has many causes, but the root cause is about who rules after the fighting is done. Second, he tells us that if compromise was not tolerable to prevent or avert war, then how much less attractive is compromise going to be once blood has been shed. And third, that making peace means deciding who rules. Making peace means deciding who rules. So before we start to kill, we better have made that decision.

The fourth and last and perhaps most useful of all for policymakers, he notes that half measures often work in the domestic context because after all, we do have peace here. Half measures will not work in an area or an atmosphere of non-peace.

Thank you for allowing me to drill down on those four points. But I think it's very important that policymakers think about these things before get involved in something. Now, I was talking about when I came back to Washington after leaving the service, and the surprise I found at the alacrity with which policymakers would call for the use of military force. Look, it's not that I don't think there's a place for the U.S. military. It's just that before we engage, we have to think about what we're doing. I won't speak for the Chief, or General Galvin. But I was personally and professionally excoriated for having done my part in an unpopular war about 27, 28 years ago. And all I want is what any fair-minded policymaker should be willing to give before we order U.S. troops into combat. And that is a clear national strategy and a coherent military mission. And if you give those two, all right. Policymakers can get out of the way and we'll turn it over to you and your colleagues. But my third principle is, in the conduct of foreign policy, there's a place for force. But it's not the premier place.

And the last principle I'd like to lay out for you is this. If we're going to conduct foreign and security policy in the 21st century, perhaps we ought to organize to do so. It wouldn't surprise any of you if I made the not particularly bold statement that the Department of State, Department of Defense, are monumentally mismanaged. I mean, it's a given. It's understood by everyone in this room. We've had a— Whether you're in the Pentagon or the Department of State, we've had a mushrooming of single issue policy mavens who could thwart the development of strategy or policy with a stroke of a pen. If we're going to conduct foreign policy, we need to organize to do it. We've got to get back to a simpler way of doing business.

You know, if you're a Henry Kissinger or a Zbigniew Brzezinski sitting on the seventh floor of the State Department in the Secretary's office, perhaps you can separate from the cacophony of sounds coming up those nuggets of policy wisdom. But for the rest of us who are merely air breathers, I think we need to organize to be able to pick those nuggets of sage policy advice. That if we're going to have the military that the Congresswoman spoke of very eloquently this morning, if we're going to be able to take our rightful place in the world of the 21st century, then it's about time we organized to do so.

Well, thank you very much, General Galvin, and thank you, ladies and gentlemen.

General Galvin: Thank you, Rich. You didn't say anything about your birthday. Is that any time soon?

Mr. Armitage: No.

General Galvin: No?

Mr. Armitage: I'm going backwards, General. Counting back.

General Galvin: Well, Rich Armitage said that there are four things we need to consider about strategy and how it is driven, and where we are. One is our leadership, one is the fact that foreign policy and domestic policy are very much part of the same effort. The third is that know what you're doing when you're going to use military force. And the fourth is let's get organized in State and DOD so that we all truly understand what the strategy is and we can get on with our business.

I appreciate that. I just wanted to sum that up, give Graham Allison a chance to get his act together over there. And Graham? Go ahead. It's up to you.

Graham Allison: Maybe I'll follow Rich's precedent and just stay here, if that's okay.

It's a great pleasure for me to be here and Chief, Andy and Bob, I'm glad to be part of such a distinguished panel and on such an interesting and important topic. The topic announced for this session is National Interests. What is driving our national security strategy, and what should? I applaud the organizers of the conference for starting at the beginning. Their proposition being that a conception of the national interests should serve as the foundation for American foreign policy and national security strategy.

This is a proposition that is affirmed by a bipartisan commission on American national interests, which I was a member of, and Rich as well. For which I'll have something to say about in the context of my remarks. Where it says, "The only foundation for sustainable American foreign policy is a clear sense of American national interests. Only a foreign policy grounded in American national interests can identify priorities for American engagement in the world."

So let me organize my ten minutes of remarks as answers to three questions. Question one: What are American national interests? Are American national interests essentially whatever happens to interest Americans, as many people would suggest today. Or on the other hand, is there an objective bedrock of American national interests? And a hierarchy that prioritizes among these national interests that exists whether any particular leadership of the U.S. at some time or the American public happens to be interested in? That's the first question.

Second question. How do national interests relate to national security strategy? Of course, national interests are a foundation for, but what's the specific connection between national interests on the one hand and national security strategy on the other? If one understands our national interests clearly, does that settle the question about what our national security strategy should be, or whether we should be using forces here or there?

And finally, I don't want to introduce too much of a partisan tone to this conversation, but it seems like since the votes are being counted, we might nonetheless ask whether there's any connection between these topics and what was not a very vigorous debate but nonetheless a mini-debate between two candidates in the context of a Presidential campaign about an old versus a new security agenda. Which one referred to but not referenced in the two prior comments.

So those are my three questions. Let me go through quickly. On the— And for those of you who haven't seen this report of the Bipartisan Commission on American National Interests, I would recommend it to you as a good starting point for these purposes. This was a commission which I played a role in as one of the co-lead authors with Bob Blackwell, about which included 24 Americans, Republicans and Democrats, Senators from the same center like Pat Roberts or Bob Graham, John McCain and Sam Nunn. So other usual suspects.

And this group of people don't presume any monopoly of wisdom, but nonetheless, the question we were organized to answer is what are American national interests today in the aftermath of the Cold War? Now without, as I say, any monopoly of wisdom, I think at least the commission erred on the side of saying what we thought. Many people didn't like it, but in any case, we offered four columns in which we say these are vital interests, these are extremely important interests, these are less important interests, and these are even less important. And people who found their favorite hobbyhorse in one or the other of the columns rather than the first column were oftentimes offended. But in any case, this is what this group of 24 people thought.

So to the question, what are American national interests? Briefly stated, we say a spectrum of national interest stretches from vital interest to extremely important interest, to important interest, to secondary interest. We say that vital means what the dictionary says vital means. I understand this is a radical idea in a town like Washington which has a very promiscuous use, I would say, of the word vital. Vital means, I think it's very important and you should agree with me, for many political leaders. But we say vital means what the dictionary says vital means.

So you look it up in the dictionary, and the dictionary says, "Vital means essential for the survival or the continuation of something." That's what means vital. So we say use vital the way vital is used in the dictionary. Thus, vital interests are only those strictly necessary to safeguard and enhance American survival and wellbeing in a free and secure nation. Extremely important interests are interests that have compromised, would severely prejudice but not strictly imperil the ability of the U.S. government to safeguard and enhance Americans wellbeing in a free and secure nation. And so on down the line.

Now many, many people find these distinctions are a hierarchy that prioritizes very uncomfortable because a hierarchy that relegates restoring democracy in Haiti or stability in Bosnia to the column important rather than vital, seems to some insensitive or invidious. But you can't have a hierarchy without having distinctions. And we offer in any case for our nickel a set of distinctions in which we insist on a sparse and hierarchical conception of interests.

As it turns out, this group of 24 people who were not all naturally inclined to agree about everything, agreed that there are only five U.S. vital national interests in the decade ahead. Only five. These are, and let me quote quickly, "To prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapon attacks on the U.S. or its military forces abroad. Secondly, to insure U.S. survival, U.S. allies survival, and their active cooperation with the U.S. in shaping an international system in which we can thrive. Third, to prevent the emergence of hostile major powers or fail states on U.S. borders. Fourth, to insure the viability and stability of major global systems: trade, finance, supplies of energy, and the environment. And five, finally, to establish productive relations consistent with American national interests with nations that could be become strategic adversaries, namely China and Russia." So just five.

Second point. How do national interests relate to national security strategy? I'm not going to give you a lecture you'll be glad to hear, but I do think there's a conceptual point here that needs to be taken into account. And the part of the commission report that I find the most valuable and interesting is a section called, "Trying to think clearly about American national interests." In which we offer 11 pointers.

We say, and I believe this is conceptually important, interests on the one hand exist independently of threats to the interest. So one might not notice that you have an interest because it's not threatened. But the interest exists. So too often, one sees debates about issues in which because a difference doesn't happen to be threatened at the moment or at the time, one doesn't take appropriate account of it. Or interests and the threats to the interest are confounded.

Take for example the question of China, we said. Maybe China poses little threat to national interests today, some would say. But one's got to think about a problem over the longer run. And if over the longer run China were to become a major strategic adversary of the U.S., this would surely undermine Americans well being as certainly would a collapse of energy supplies for the Gulf. So thinking shorter term versus longer term is one of the more difficult parts in trying to distinguish between interests and national security strategy.

Similarly, while interests are a foundation or starting point for policy prescriptions, as Rich Armitage was saying, and one's got to start by asking the question, "Why should we care?" And how much, when the phone rings, or when we see something happening in the world that may be happening over the longer run? But once interests are identified, choices about preferred strategies and policies require complex analyses of threats and opportunities, of options for action, of the cost and benefits of these actions, and of the capacities for implementation.

As the commission argues, an interest based approach to American foreign policy does not provide a silver bullet for settling policy debates. But it does focus these debates on the preeminent issues which then can be debated on the basis of evidence and analysis. So to take an extreme case, which we put into the report just to help stretch one's mind conceptually, the case of the environment, the case of environmental threats to the U.S. are not a question about whether a livable environment is vital to U.S. national interests. Of course it is. If the biosphere should become inhospitable to Americans at home, this is an American national interest.

The issue of whether current developments like global warming threaten a livable environment for Americans and what policy exists— What policy options exist to address those threats, and what the costs and benefits of those would be, are all additional questions that have to be examined. So I would say the connection between interests and strategies or policies is complex, but interests are the starting point.

Finally, to conclude, Mr. Chairman, how does all this relate to this debate between old and new agenda? I think that's a longer topic, but I'll just say briefly, in the debate which didn't turn out to be a sharp a debate as one might have wished for, hoped, whether by the candidates or by their surrogates, occasionally one camp said to the other, "You're just only subscribing to the old agenda." And the second camp said to the first, "Well, you've got an undisciplined, new security agenda that will involve sending in American troops everywhere, on every occasion to do everything."

I think that as the member of Congress, Ellen Tauscher, has said, rightly, because U.S. predominance is so overwhelming, it is not the case that the U.S. military only has to be used in cases in which the U.S. has a vital interest. The fact that the U.S. is in Bosnia or was bombing Kosovo, does not, per se, demonstrate that the U.S. had a vital interest there. A country that is as strong and powerful as ours can choose, if we do, to use instruments including our military forces, for purposes that do not threaten or affect our vital interests certainly in the short run, and maybe not even in the intermediate run. Whether we should do so is an interesting and debatable issue. It deserves to be debated, but it's certainly within our capacity.

And as a country that— That seeks, as I think Rich said very rightly, to preserve a position that we didn't actually seek, of preeminence, but a position of preeminence that entails a moral and a benevolent character and quality, not an imperialistic predominance or prevalence, attending to issues that may be further down the time horizon but that can over time substantially impact American vital interests or maybe only extremely important American interests, will be a central part of the debate about American foreign policy going forward. And a national interest-based approach to this will discipline that conversation but won't settle the argument.

General Galvin: Thank you very much, Graham. I think that Graham Allison brought us back to the question of national interests very clearly and thanks for running through what the Commission on the National Interests had to say about that. And the five major areas that are called vital. I think that was very, very helpful.

I'd like to say a word or two myself before we go to questions. Before we started, and as I thought about being moderator, I took a couple of notes and I see that we, in every case, the things I thought were major, actually were covered. One of those, to me, Rich Armitage brought out very clearly. And that is, when you start talking about the national interest, the national interest is in fact international as well as domestic. That domestic and foreign policy are very much mixed together.

I think that Ellen Tauscher brought out quite well the fact that you need allies. There are not very many major questions in this world today. Graham brought up the environment. There are many, many others that are just as important, just as big. And just as unanswerable by any one single power alone as they probably always will be. In other words, we can't do it all ourselves and therefore, we have to rely on allies and we have to, as Graham said, or the Commission said, get some productive work done to make sure people who are not our allies are also not our enemies. And I think that that question is one that we really have to take up.

There's another one, too. And I think that we've touched on it in different ways. I think all of our speakers this morning on the panel have. And that is that we need to think about, really, what is the situation out there? I mean, when we're— When we're trying to draw up a strategy, the very first thing you would have to do, I think, is say what's the situation? What is the world really like? And why is it that we would have opposition to the United States of America in certain areas? And what can we do about that?

As I said, Graham also brought that up. And so did— So did Rich. I think all of us did. So we want a world in which we can thrive. So what it really means is not just what we are going to do with our national strategy, it means how do we keep the world a world that we like? And that we prosper in? And a world that everybody else prospers in? So we have to be looking outward I believe, at that. And to get to practical aspects of that, I personally think that we need to look at infrastructure. We need to be more involved and committed to the United Nations, to the regional infrastructures around the world that have a relationship with security, stability. None of them are perfect, and neither are we, for that matter.

And so now we're going to turn to questions, and please wait for the mike, and identify yourself if you will so that what we put down here on tape, our videotape, will be understandable. And let's go ahead and talk to the panel. Let me see if I can— It's a little hard to see you. Yes, ma'am?

Audience: Stephanie Kenny, the Department of State. And Mr. Armitage, you have left a pregnant question hanging in the air. What are your views on how we should be organized?

Mr. Armitage: Thank you very much, and I have bet that you will agree 100 percent down the line with what I'm going to say. How about starting with empowering Assistant Secretaries and state officers for a change? And removing the Secretary of State from being the chief desk officer in whatever particular issue is on the table that day? How about cutting down the six undersecretaries that you have to a more manageable number? And winnowing out, as I discussed, the single issue policy mavens who are able to thwart regional and country specific policymaking with just the stroke of a pen?

For instance, let me be specific. I believe, and I think— I hope most the people— All of the people in this room— Believe human rights and respect for human rights are integral. Must be integral to our policymaking. And if that's the case, why do you have a standalone assistant secretary for it? As an example? And I think you can go down the line.

I think you have to empower— You've got to make a decision on what you want out of the people that represent us overseas. If you want their views, fine. If you don't want it, don't ask. And since you're in the department, you know exactly what I'm referring to. Where the views from the field are often inconvenient for the Secretary of State or for senior policymakers. So why ask if you're not interested in them? So how's that for starters? (Laughter)

General Galvin: Okay. Yes, sir? Right up in here? Yes?

Audience: My name is Noboru Yamaguchi, Defense Attaché of the Embassy of Japan. I have a question to Professor Allison about your report on America's national interests. In addition to the contents themselves, I was so interested in the order of discussion. Particularly in order of regional discussions. If I remember correctly, started with Asia Pacific and then Russia, Middle East, Europe followed. I was curious, what is in— What was in the background of this order? I thought— Was it on seriousness or importance? Or from the most problematic part to the least? Or most important to the least? If you have any idea about this?

Mr. Allison: Well, I thank you very much. Let me interpret the question slightly and then I'll try to give a brief answer. In the Commission's report after laying out the conceptual base and these four columns of interest that I mentioned, we then turned in the latter half of the report to the topic of challenges to and opportunities for advancing American national interests in the decade ahead. And we view then the regions and functional issues. And it is the case that unlike 1996, this year's report, or the 2000 report, begins in the regions with China, Japan and East Asia, and then moves on to Russia, whereas earlier it had begun with Europe.

Now, a number of Japanese reporters have come to ask me and other members of the Commission about that. I think that the prominence of Asia in the American policymaking community's attention span and focus has grown particularly as one looks at the complicated nexus of relations in a setting in which the institutions are relatively weak as compared with the European framework. And therefore, in terms of both challenges to American national interests in the decade ahead, and opportunities for advancing American interests in the decade ahead, the China, Japan, India, Pakistan, North Korea nexus does indeed and will demand more attention and more focus.

But in each of the regional discussions, we start the discussion by saying, "Here's what we think are vital interests in this area, and here's where we think are extremely important interests. And here's what we think are important. And here's what we think are less important." So it's not meant to say that the U.S. has vital interests there, or greater vital interests in Asia than in Europe because in each section we at least say what we think. Nonetheless, I think in terms of demand on time and attention, the question is that— Is on point.

General Galvin: Go ahead, Rich.

Mr. Armitage: Graham, I wouldn't dare say what you say. I want to put it in a little different context, and very succinctly for a primarily military audience. Major General Yamaguchi, it's unthinkable that we'll go to bed tonight and wake up and be involved in a major war in Europe tomorrow morning. It's quite thinkable that we could go to bed tonight and unfortunately be involved in a major war in Asia. All the hot spots that Graham just pointed out bring me to that point of view.

Now that, although I think rather graphically, describes why there's a lot of interest in Asia beyond the economics, beyond the great and vibrant societies, etc.

Mr. Allison: I've always known that Rich could say in one minute better than what I say in three. (Laughter)

General Galvin: Let's see. Right here? I hope I'm getting all the way around.

Audience: I'm Jim Robbins, National Defense University. This question is mainly for Ambassador Armitage, although anyone can comment on it. I was wondering if you could give us your views on the concept of shaping, and whether the Department of Defense should be the lead agency in pursuing that?

Mr. Armitage: Thank you. I'm— Let me say, much to, I'm sure, collective surprise of those in the audience, that the national security strategy that's been laid out, was laid out in the last QDR I actually think was quite good. And shaping to me seems to be a very sensible proposal. Whether— But you've hit on the case here and that's whether the Department of Defense should be the lead agency. My view is it should not. But over the past several years, the Department of Defense has been seen— I think it gets back to the young lady from the Department of State's question. We have been seen as being able to do something, to make chicken salad out of you know what. Therefore, the Department of Defense has become more and more the lead agency. We have resources, we're used to bringing order out of chaos, etc.

I think that it leads to sort of the impression that the DOD should then be the lead agency, so I think that's backwards. I actually think the Department of State should be the lead, and there are other elements, whether it's USAID or OFDA and other— Some elements of the Department of State that could be very helpful on that. And the Department of Defense has a very key role, but it should not be the lead role because over time not only do we run our troops ragged, but I think it leaves people with an impression of the United States which is unhelpful in the extreme over the long run. That what we really care about and all we care about is the mailed fist. And that's not us. We've got one. We've got the clout, but it's not the first thing that should come to mind.

Mr. Allison: If I could make just a comment on that please, Jack. I— I certainly agree with half of what Rich said, namely that the Department of Defense should not be the lead in the shaping strategy. But in a national security strategy, we have a Department of Defense, but we also have a Department of Treasury, and the behavior and actions of the Department of Treasury have about as much to do with the shaping of the new international environment as do the Department of Defense in a different setting and over a longer frame.

So for better or worse, the way our government is organized, this is a task for a National Security Council and a government to have a coherent national security strategy which is an extraordinarily challenging thing in any setting. And almost impossible for us as a government as we are organized now, especially in the aftermath of the Cold War.

When there was a good, clear focal enemy, one could get the act together in a way in which questions now, at least if I've watched over the last eight years, but the four years before that as well, the degree of integration between, for example, Treasury buttons on the one hand and Defense buttons on the other, hardly— Hardly occurs. And I think that's going to be a challenge for us all going forward.

General Galvin: I think it's going to be an enormous challenge. And the question of economic security in the world has been so separate from other aspects of security, and I think that it's— It behooves us to get a much closer connection than that. Yes? We'll get you a mike here.

Audience: Hello, I'm Bob Hopper from the Foreign Service Institute, but I'm going to ask a defense question, not a State Department question. Many colleagues from the defense world have told me that James Schlesinger was the best Secretary of Defense ever because he didn't get bogged down in trying to decide today's issues and actually said his rule was that "If it involved today, I'm not going to do it." I'm sure he violated that rule. But that he would only look at issues that involved the infrastructure and the future down the road. I think for many of us that sounds like wonderful advice, but how would we organize all of us to look at infrastructure issues and to look at a year from now and help the Secretary of State not be the desk officer for today?

General Galvin: Anybody want to try to take that?

Ms. Tauscher: Well, I think he was probably a good Secretary of Energy, too. I think we all have different kinds of abilities. I can only speak— When I came to Congress, I had not been elected before, and I think it was a great enhance to my ability to be an executive in my office. And I think that to a certain extent the next administration, if you just take a step back, we expected it to be seven days into transition today. And we're not. Doesn't mean that either side is not planning for that.

But I think that the new management paradigms that you see out there— Rich has talked very eloquently about the opportunity for us to build organizations that look a lot more like the Fortune 10. Much more flexibility, at the same time, big investments in technology and communication technology so that we are actually interconnected. I would add to Professor Allison's list the Commerce Department. I think the Commerce Department as a lead agency to go out and be actually infiltrating throughout the world, making trade agreements. The alliances— The USTR along with Treasury is a big opportunity for us to be out in the world, to be meeting and greeting and making relationships.

If diplomacy is essentially what our best opportunity is to maintain a strong military but not have to be at war, then we have a lot of arrows in our quiver to do that. But I think the new administration, whoever it is, is going to have to not only challenge themselves to pick appropriate people with good experience, people that can stay out of the partisan fights, but people I think with a new opportunity to manage in a very different way than these departments have been managed before. And I think that will be the hallmark of success if we can see it in the next few weeks.

Mr. Armitage: I can't comment knowledgeably about whether Mr. Schlesinger was the best Secretary of Defense or not. He had a number of short tenures at any number of cabinet posts. And I don't know. But a lot of things have changed since Dr. Schlesinger was the Secretary of Defense.

The irony of the Department, or one of the many ironies of the Department of Defense is that the man in charge is not often there. With representational duties, with almost seen as a co-equal to the Secretary of State which I, by the way, think is out of whack and is not appropriate, but it has happened over the years. And I think Congresswoman Tauscher— Or not herself, but her institution bears some responsibility. Some balloon goes up anywhere and the chiefs and the Secretary are up before one committee or another trying to explain something they have very little knowledge of. And if so in a way that they won't be second and third guessed and have their words parsed by every reporter and every member of Congress.

So to get to the situation that you want where your people are thinking you had the great minds or thinking great thoughts are going to take a lot of cultural changes in the building, in the Congress, and in other places.

Mr. Allison: I'm a great admirer of Jim Schlesinger, but I will tell you a story that was told by one of my colleagues who worked for both Jim Schlesinger and Harold Brown, and was asked to compare the two. He said, "Well, you know, Jim Schlesinger, he's a forest man. He sees the big forest. Whereas Harold Brown is a tree man. He looks at this tree, this tree, this tree." And he added, in addition, "But Jimmy Carter, he's a leaf man. (Laughter)

General Galvin: Okay. Yes, ma'am. Down here.

Audience: Kathy Monti from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. A few months ago there was a series of articles in the Washington Post about the CINCs and how they might be sort of moving into state's turf. I wonder if you all would care to comment on that, and if that's part of your— What you would recommend as part of the reorganization of state and possibly defense? Thank you.

General Galvin: All right, Rich?

Mr. Armitage: Yes, I think everyone in Washington noticed that article. I hope a few actually understood it. What you were seeing is military officers doing what they need to do when there's a vacuum. And the vacuum that existed was a vacuum of civilian leadership. That's what you're seeing. So the CINCs have stepped up trying to fill that vacuum and it's going to be hard, I think, to get things back to a proper perspective because the CINCs, I think, have done enormously well. It's wrong. It's not our system. It shouldn't be. But there's been generally such weak leadership in the Department of Defense and the Department of State that it's happened. That's what you'll see in that article.

Mr. Allison: Let me put a footnote on that as well. I think it's a very important article and very important question. One of the— Fifteen or twenty years ago with another co-author, I wrote a book on organizing for foreign affairs in which we almost entitled a chapter on the State Department, "The Withering Away of State," using a line from Karl Marx. If you look at what happens in international corporations, they first start out by having a department that does formulations. And then little by little, everybody discovers that they have to do the business themselves because it's too much trouble to go through that unit, and then frequently that unit just withers away.

So I think this is a serious structural problem in terms of the way the world works now. That the Treasury doesn't want to go to the State Department and have some advice about whether or not we should bail out Mexico. And a CINC, as well, unless he's got strong ambassadors and a strong Assistant Secretary of State is not going there for guidance about questions that he needs to get today. So I think one of the biggest challenges for the next administration will be to try to address this, which is not some minor fix up of State. It's a major fix up.

Mr. Armitage: Let me make sure that— I don't mind being seen in a partisan light, God knows. But I think to be fair, this erosion of civilian control is not something that just happened in this administration. And it gets back again to the question about the Department of State. In the Schultz era at the Department of State, the assistant secretaries both formulated and implemented policy. In the Baker era, at the Department of State, assistant secretaries did not formulate policy, but they implemented it.

At present, assistant secretaries neither formulate nor implement policy. So it's been a steady erosion over the past 12 or so years. So I want to be clear this is not a partisan statement. This is a fact that we all have to deal with, and it's been developing over quite a while.

General Galvin: Let me also take a crack at that question, since I was a CINC. Twice. For a total of seven years in Panama and in Europe— In Latin America and in Europe. In Europe at that time, for example, something that fell under my responsibility in the military sense was whatever happened in 77 different countries. That's up now. For Wes Clark that was something like 86 different countries. In Latin America, it was a smaller number, but it was the same kind of thing.

Now, this is a very interesting circumstance to be in. One of the first things that I said to myself is, "I must serve as a good example of what is a soldier in the United States of America. Because I'm going to be very salient in these jobs." And so one thing, probably the primary thing that I think a soldier has to know, is that soldiers aren't in charge in the end, of anything. It is civilian leadership that is in charge. And so each time I went to a country, I got with the ambassador and I recognized always that the representative of the United States in that country is the ambassador. It's not the CINC. Not anybody else. It's the ambassador.

Now, the problem is that things in the world don't get resolved all the time on a bilateral basis, one country to another; the United States to Japan or— They're— The whole world is out there, and there are regions of the world, and there are interests that cross borders of all kinds. Now, the way that we try to deal with that in the United States and indeed any department of the exterior, or the State Department, is going to deal with that, is to have a desk in State. And the desk handles the region. And whenever the person, who's called the desk, by the way, goes— Wants to impress herself, himself on that region with that fact, the person goes out there and calls a meeting of all the ambassadors in the region and says, "Here's how we're going to do things." Theoretically.

But the thing is, on a day to day basis, State really is not strong in those areas. And things have to get decided, and people want to know things, and they want to do things. And I read those articles, I really didn't like them very much. I realized of course that if you sit with somebody in an airplane and go and visit countries and so forth and so on, you can pick out some words here and there and make the folks look pretty bad. And in some cases, that is true.

I faced the same problem. I tried to deal with it, yet there's much more to this. It's more sensitive than that. When you stop and think, if you have an American Commander in Chief who has a responsibility outside of the responsibility, what is that real responsibility? And what about, let's say, the Japanese Commander in Chief who has a responsibility for Latin America or something else? This is what I meant earlier when I said, "We really have to think of how we look to others and how we go about these things." I don't think we have a good answer with the CINCs right now, the way things go. I think that it's probably the best answer that we can come up with right at the moment.

What's the simple answer? Strength in the State Department. Everybody has said that over and over. And I would say it also. And we still have a little bit of time. Maybe five minutes. Yes?

Ms. Tauscher: I think that we in the Congress would be very supportive of the next administration's reorganization of things like State. You know, when I came from the business world, for the last ten years the paradigm shift and the Fortune 1000 was something called supply chain reengineering, which was a fancy way of saying, "Get the middleman away." And you can imagine three years ago Thanksgiving, when Bob Rubin was meant to be bone fishing in Florida and instead he was spending 24/7 on the phone with the various heads of state in Asia during the Asian contagion. You can imagine how hard it would be from somebody from State to assert himself when all they wanted to do was talk to Bob Rubin. And I think that what you see is this sense of— Solely on management.

We're going to have to understand either specifically by region or by alliance or by specific country what those portfolio and spectrum of interests are, what our particular interfaces are, and how we structure the relationship. And it's no different than any major relationship that you have to manage when you are trying to diplomatically and trade wise and certainly currency wise, and obviously militarily manage a relationship to the betterment of both parties. And to create some kind of success.

And I think it's going to be very important for this new administration to look at that opportunity so that we can gain the most from the people involved, but also I think not suffer the kind of brain drain that I'm concerned about of people going into the foreign service who feel as if they're just basically putting two principals together and that they're not important.

General Galvin: Yes. You know, my own feeling about the foreign service, and I've watched it for years and years and years and gone to a lot of the meetings and so forth, is they have wonderful people in the foreign service. That's not the problem. The problem's really not that. The problem is how the State Department is seen by Washington. How it's seen by the most senior leadership. And if it's seen as just keep us out of the headlines while we do some domestic things, you can't get there from here. Bob, I'm going to go until about 20 of. Is that all right? Okay. So we still have— Yes, please. Over here. Yes, sir?

Audience: I'm Colonel Tim Gregory from the British Embassy. I just want to ask a question about moral imperative. Representative Tauscher implied that there might be a moral imperative for U.S. involvement. Can you square that with the realities of a lack of state construct in places like Africa? The possible long-term engagement in these countries, and how you make take a mission with no clear end state and no clear military strategy?

Ms. Tauscher: I was a major supporter of our operations in Bosnia, and obviously our fight in Kosovo and I thought we did the right thing. But we obviously, in the House of Representatives, had three votes where I thought it was a shame that we couldn't come to any conclusion on a partisan basis of what we were going to do. We voted essentially to not go forward. Then we took another vote to not go backward, and then we had a split decision on what we were actually going to support, and I think it was a very sad day for our democracy where because of partisan differences and the activities at that time we couldn't support our military fighting men and women and certainly our Department of Defense and our State Department on what was I think a very heroic decision.

We often get asked politically, those of us that are trying to build a political will of the American people to do this these, you know, why aren't we in Sierra Leone? And I can tell you that we're not in Sierra Leone because Sierra Leone's not in Europe. And while it is very difficult, I think, to watch on CNN and see the tragedies that are going on in various places around the world, I believe it was imperative for us to be in Kosovo as it was to be in Bosnia because we could not afford after 15 years of investment in NATO and in western Europe to have the back porch of Europe on fire, and to watch the genocide that we were watching.

But at the same time, I believe that our policies in this country have to be about our national interests. And that there are other things that we can do to support the countries in Africa. And I think many of them have to do with the Treasury Department, with foreign aid, and with the IMF and with the U.N. and other agencies and using our allies to make sure that we provide the right kind of support, but not direct involvement with us.

We have to make tough choices. We cannot be everywhere. I do not believe we should be the 911 or the 411 of the world. But I do believe that this discussion about what is in our strategic interests when the nexus includes little old ladies being thrown out of their farmhouses and people being murdered in front of us on television is going to be a very trying one for this country to watch over a long period of time. And that's why we need the political leadership along with our military strength and our diplomacy to be able to articulate what our positions are. We have not done a very good job of that politically for a while because the world has changed dramatically.

And I think that we need to have people in political office along with smart people in your jobs to be able to make sure that as the globe shrinks, and as we understand what these problems are that we're doing the right thing. And that's why I'm so supportive of debt forgiveness in Africa, making sure that we're making major investments to uplift their lives, that we're dealing with AIDS and HIV. But at the same time, I think a military presence is not in our best interests at this time.

General Galvin: All right. Way in the rear? Go ahead.

Audience: David Ansor of CNN. I think it's fascinating that in this room so much has been said about the weakness of the State Department and the importance of it reasserting itself. We all know that in Washington, a big part of what gives a part of government strength is money. The State Department budget has been cut and cut and cut year after year. As a comparison with, for example, the Pentagon budget. Do the panelists, in particular Mr. Armitage who might be an important member of possibly a new administration, favor perhaps cutting the Pentagon budget and putting some of that money in the State Department?

Mr. Armitage: No. (Laughter and applause.) But look, the State Department needs money for a lot of things. The installations— To use the vernacular— Suck. They're terrible. We haven't applied the money that Bill Crowe and other excellent citizens requested following on Admiral Edmonds investigations of many years ago for the need to upgrade security. All these things are necessary, and I personally don't believe it's beyond the ken of the Department of State, political leadership, and the U.S. Congress to come up with some more meaningful budgets for the Department of State.

But I'll tell you, the representatives of the Department of State have to also prove that they're worthy of this largesse from the U.S. Congress. They can't go up and make a presentation and just go back and whine about it. They've got to do exactly what the Pentagon has to do, which is go up and fight for your sweet— Every single day and prove that they're worthy of this.

Now, by the way, the Defense budget hasn't exactly accelerated dramatically over the past eight years, Mr. Ansor, so I wouldn't want to leave that impression in the audience.

General Galvin: We're going to try for one more question. Okay. All right. Go ahead, please. All right. We'll do two. Please.

Audience: Thank you. Felippe Herrera (sp?) from the French Embassy. I just wanted to ask a question that Graham Allison left somewhat pending in more specific terms to Richard Armitage and Ellen Tauscher. Which is where do— Or where would Russia and China fit in, in the definition of national security interests and implementation of a national security strategy, in your view? Thank you.

Mr. Armitage: Both of those— Look at it— Where Republicans generally look at it, both of those countries, if we don't handle relationships right, have the ability to change the direction of civilization. The fundamental difference between a Russian Federation and a People's Republic of China and a, say, North Korea. Which is nettlesome and bothersome, but it's not going to fundamentally change the direction of Western Civilization. So we'd find those extraordinarily important interests. And depending on what they do, they might become vital interests.

Republicans generally hold the view that the most important development in the first half of the next century will be the rise of China taking what we hope is a rightful place on the world stage along with the rise of India. And the management, at least temporarily, of the relative decline of another formerly great power, the Russian Federation. Both are fraught with opportunities and dangers. We hold the view regarding the Russian Federation that we want to have a good, congenial and friendly relationship. We will try our best to be of assistance in building institutions which outlive personalities in their political— Body politic.

With China, we'll take the view that China is a great country. Note I said great country. Not yet a great power. A great country with great problems, where we can help alleviate some of those problems, and I think the bipartisan efforts of WTO go somewhere in that direction, although in the short term, I think there are going to be some meaningful dislocations. We should do so. And— But we have not made a determination on the ultimate disposition, if you will, of the People's Republic of China. Right now, from point of view, they're a great country with great problems. Neither friend nor foe. We hope to have a friendly relationship with them. Would even at some point in the future like to consider the possibility of a strategic partnership with them. But we don't see that possible under the present circumstances. And therefore, we view them as a strategic competitor.

Ms. Tauscher: If I could just add quickly about Russia. I've been to Russia a couple of times. I have two national nuclear labs in my district, Livermoor and Sandia National Laboratories and I'm the ranking member on the Arms Services Panel to oversee the new National Nuclear Security Administration. And our biggest problem in Russia, aside from the fact that its economy is completely upside down and they haven't made a direct commitment to capitalism and they have no contract law and you can't pay anyone. And I'm mean they just have a terrible economic portfolio and a situation on their hands that's going to take a lot of political will on Putin's part to right. And a lot of help from us.

We have major arms control and proliferation problems there. We have just begun inventory control regime over the last two or three years. Investments of hundreds of millions of dollars to lock down all of their highly enriched uranium, plutonium, tritium and other— Their bombs are everywhere. They had them in hundreds of places as opposed to three or four places where we manage our portfolio. So we have a lot of problems over there that lead to a great unease for our European allies and for Asia, and certainly for the Indian subcontinent and for the terrorist organizations around the world for proliferation. It's not just about material. It's a huge brain drain problem. They've got a hundred thousand nuclear weapons, scientists and technicians that haven't been paid, in many cases, for 18 or 20 months since the devaluation a year and a half ago.

They've got ten closed cities that are, just as you could imagine, away from where anybody can find them, where there are tens of thousands of people, families living that are just absolutely destitute. And obviously they've got a reorganization of the military so that they can try to right size them so they can afford to do simple things like take their bombs off hair-trigger alert. So I think this is a relationship we really have to manage. And obviously China is one where I think the Secretary is right. Engagement is not endorsement, but we have a very strong relationship brewing with them, and we've got to continue to work that on the economic front primarily right now.

General Galvin: Thanks, Ellen. Thanks everybody for your interest. I really have to wind this up. We're running over, and there were lots and lots of hands that are still up. I would like to say again that thanks to Bob Pfaltzgraff and Polly Jordan for setting this up. She did that— A lot of this work.

But I'd also like to say to Rick Shinseki, thanks for being there, the mastermind behind this. This has been— I think— I hope you will see that we're off to a good start with the fine panel that we've had here this morning. Thank you. (Applause.)

And now what we're going to do is we're going to move into that room behind us for lunch. And Bob, you want to say anything about that? I think just the simple thing is, we're going to be going in there. Lunch will start in about 10 or 15 minutes, so please make your way to the back of the hall.