Transcripts:

Setting Priorities for a New National Security Strategy

Dr. Condoleezza Rice
Hoover Senior Fellow and Professor of Political Science, Stanford University

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Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.:
President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University:

We must now must turn to much more important and much more serious business, and go on to our luncheon presentation.

I would like to begin by saying that our luncheon speaker today has held numerous high level appointments in government as well as in academia. These extend from work with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to service as Director of Soviet and East European Affairs with the National Security Council. At the National Security Council under President George Bush, she was appointed as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Soviet Affairs.

She has also served as provost at Stanford University and holds a professorship in the Stanford University Political Science Department, as well as Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford. She is the author of numerous articles and books and rather recently co-author of a very important and outstanding book that I have highly recommended to many people, "Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft." This is a wonderful book in which she had the role in the development of the statecraft for it.

She holds a doctorate from the University of Denver's Graduate School of International Studies, and she has asked me as I introduce her to say to you that she has neither been offered nor accepted a position in a new administration. So it is a great pleasure to welcome Dr. Condoleezza Rice as our luncheon speaker on the topic, "Setting Priorities for a New National Security Strategy." Condi, welcome.

Dr. Condoleezza Rice: Thank you very much. Actually what I asked Professor Pfaltzgraff to say is that I am still shamelessly campaigning for the job that I really want, which is the Commissioner of the National Football League. So if any of you have ties, I would really like to have your help.

Thank you very much for the chance to come and address you. I especially want to thank General Shinseki for the chance to be here. It's obviously a stunningly interesting time for our country. But it has been, for some time, a very interesting time for our country: because we have gone through major revolutions in the world in the last ten years; and we are still adjusting, I think, as the United States to our role of sole super power and asking important and probing questions about what our role should be.

Indeed, the dramatic changes that have happened in the world can sometimes be underestimated because they happened, for the most part, so peacefully. I can remember back to the time when I worked for a person who's going to talk to you afterwards and therefore correct anything that I'm saying, Brent Scowcroft. That period between 1989 and 1991 was a period of dizzying change. It was a time when most of the verities of international politics, about the role of the Soviet Union, about a divided Europe really came to be swept away in very, very short order. And it was sometimes a dizzying time for those of us who were working on the front lines at the end of the Cold War.

But in February of 1990, I went to Moscow to meet with an advisor to Gorbachev who was advising him on American affairs. And he was about an hour late for our meeting, and he was rather disheveled when he got there, and he said, "Professor Rice, I'm very sorry, but every day I come in to see what disaster has befallen us now." And it suddenly occurred to me that I might have been working sixteen hours a day, and I might have been disoriented, but at least I was working on the "right side of history."

The question for us is: "are we ready and are we capable of taking on the challenges of having been on the right side of history?" There is no doubt that the structural changes that are going on in international politics very much favor the values, the institutions, the beliefs of the United States and its closest allies; that we have a chance in this period to extend peace, prosperity and democracy in ways that we would never have dreamed several years ago.

This is because there have been twin revolutions in the international arena. And what I would like to try to do is set a context for some of the other issues that you are dealing with, about the capabilities of our military forces to set a larger political context for our thinking.

First of all, when the Soviet Union collapsed, it was not just another super power that collapsed. It was a claim to an alternative way of organizing human beings and human history that collapsed. It was a Soviet Union that had claimed that it could be completely isolated from the international economy.

It was an economy that did not have private property; that planned all economic activities from the top down; that believed the state could own every piece of property; that thought entrepreneurship and the creativity of individuals did not matter. It was only "the plan." And the Soviet Union was powerful enough to extend that vision to clients, some witting, and some unwitting. This notion that you could be isolated from the rigors of the international economy and from the rigors of private capital flows was really very acceptable and indeed somewhat attractive to countries as far flung as Cuba where you had an $18 million a day subsidy if you were part of the socialist alternative. It was attractive to countries like India which relied largely on state enterprise as the base of their economy.

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When the Soviet Union collapsed, that alternative collapsed with it. And now there is one international economy and the goal of almost every country is to try to find its place in that international economic order. To find what it is that it can sell, what it is that it can make, what ideas it can bring to the table to attract private capital for growth.

Today, the United States attracts forty percent of the private capital in the world because it is an economy that is open. It is transparent. It has accounting rules that people can understand. It has a creative and innovative population. It has relatively open immigration. And so on and so on.

But for much of the world the goal is to try to find a place in that international economic order. That leaves the United States and its allies, which of course were founded on and believe strongly in market economies and in creativity born of democratic institutions, in an extremely strong position.

There are two dangers to this period in which we have a great chance to extend peace, prosperity and democracy. And those two dangers are over-extension through a lack of focus in what we try to do. And out of that, missed opportunities to make structural changes in international politics that will extend this period of influence. If you take as the goal of this great period, this great revolutionary period, to extend peace and prosperity and democracy, let's take a look at how one should think about each of those goals.

First there is the matter of maintaining the peace, because the goal of extending the peace and stability in the international system is disproportionately that of the American Armed Forces and a few of its closest allies. Peace, first and foremost, must be maintained through the prevention of conflict of global strategic significance. There will be no extension of prosperity; there will be no extension of democracy if we cannot make certain that big conflicts do not again dot the globe in places of global strategic significance. I have in mind problems in East Asia. I have in mind problems in the Persian Gulf. Places where global stability is really at stake.

The United States with its allies, therefore, must make certain that it has the right forces, that it has the right combination of alliances and coalitions, and that it has the will to make certain that large-scale conflict does not break out in places of global significance.

Secondly, the United States needs to continue to worry about the potential rise of hegemonic power with interests, values, and intentions that are hostile to American and allied interests. I have in mind here the kind of war that we had to fight in 1990-91, the Gulf War in which Saddam Hussein threatened the Persian Gulf, threatened the Gulf states, threatened as much as forty percent of the world's oil supply and threatened to destabilize an area of vital interest through his own will and intention to make himself the regional hegemon. The United States and its allies must maintain forces that can prevent such a threat.

We must be certain also to prevent blackmail to the American homeland and our allies, because if the United States is susceptible to blackmail, it is not capable of acting with freedom of action in places like the Persian Gulf. And I have in mind here the new threats: weapons of mass destruction, cyber terrorism, terrorism of all kinds. It is one reason that any discussion of capabilities must include the ability to defend against these threats and must include ballistic missile defense. It is not that ballistic missile defense needs to be aimed as it was, or as it would have been during the Cold War at the thousands of Soviet nuclear weapons; but rather at the smaller threats that now proliferate as weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them proliferate around the world.

So for the United States and its allies, ballistic missile defense is critical. Now very often, the argument against ballistic missile defense breaks down into several categories. One is technically, "can we get there?" Well, it's very early in the program and, for the United States, our faith in technology should say that it is a program well worth continuing. After all, if I had told you some thirty years ago that a small silicon chip was going to make the personal computer on your desk almost as powerful as a Cray [supercomputer], you would have told me that I was out of my mind. The technological sophistication of the United States is such that the technical problems ought to be surmountable.

But there is also the issue of whether or not the politics can be managed. And the diplomacy here is extremely important. We should not expect that the diplomacy is going to be easy concerning ballistic missile defense. There is much to be done with the Russians. There is much to be done with the allies. There is much to be done with other nuclear powers as well.

Finally, there is the question of whether ballistic missile defense deals with the entire range of threats of an asymmetric kind that the United States and its allies face. And of course it does not. The call for ballistic missile defense to deal with the threat of ballistic missiles does not alleviate the need to deal with cruise missile threats, to deal with terrorism, to enhance intelligence, to be able to deal with the wide range of threats such as the kind that affected the U.S.S. Cole.

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Even if we were able to prevent the rise of conflict in areas of global strategic significance, the rise of hegemonic regional powers, blackmail to U.S. allies and to the United States itself, there are other kinds of conflicts that are critical to this vision of a world growing in peace, prosperity and democracy. And I have in mind here large-scale conflicts - regional and local - that are arising out of civil wars, that are arising out of man's inhumanity to man.

Clearly the United States cannot ignore these threats. The United States cannot sit and watch its values undermined by large-scale civil conflicts. The question is: "what is the role of the United States and its military forces in managing those conflicts?" And there are really two kinds of conflicts here that need to be understood.

When one deals with the Kosovo situation, the Balkans, where a NATO action was undertaken rightfully by the United States and its allies, Milosevic threatened values that are critical to stability in Europe. After all, what was Milosevic saying? He was saying, "You are Albanian. You can't live here." If that became the way of thinking of all of Eastern Europe, given the fact that it has a patchwork of ethnic groups - if it became the case that you could not have multi-ethnic groupings because dictators insisted on ethnic purity for political enclaves - that would be a threat to all of Europe.

Similarly, we have faced conflicts born of civil wars, born of man's inhumanity to man in other parts of the world where other regional powers have taken the lead. In East Timor, it was Australia that took the lead with American support, with American help. That could also be the case in Sierra Leone where Nigeria has said that it is interested in and willing to take the lead.

So the United States need not believe that it stands alone in responding to large-scale violence coming of man's inhumanity to man. It is not a matter of ignoring it. It is a matter of arranging coalitions, of sometimes finding others to bear the burden with American support and help. It is the recognition that mounting missions cannot be sustained for the American Armed Forces. That the United States is drawing increasingly on civilian soldiers, the National Guard, the Reserve, to fill in the gaps where our active forces are inadequate to the full range of activities in which we find ourselves engaged.

We as a country have got to take a hard look at the match between the resources that we are providing and the missions that we are taking on. It is not to say that these missions need be ended today. But it is to say that if we do not rebalance resources and commitments, we will not be ready for the myriad missions and the myriad responsibilities that we have around the world.

There's another way in which to think about our responsibilities in the myriad conflicts around the world. And that is to recognize that sometimes the answer to civil conflict, sometimes the answer to nation building, sometimes the answer to promotion of prosperity and democracy is not the use of armed forces. We have been quite bipolar in the way that we have thought about intervention since the end of the Cold War. Either the United States and its allies intervene militarily, leaving the military there for extended deployments, or we don't intervene at all.

Rather, it is well to remember that in most cases, many of the conflicts once they have passed their violent stage, really come down to questions of the allocation of resources to populations that have been disenfranchised; come down to questions of building civil institutions, of building civil society. And that in fact some of our most important instruments are not our military means, but instruments having to do with trade, with economic development, with investment in human capital. Our commitment to free trade is absolutely critical in this regard. Where countries are prepared to take on the difficulties and the rigors of economic reform, the United States and international financial institutions need to be ready to help them make the structural reforms necessary to attract private capital.

Finally, it is time to value more greatly the role of non-governmental institutions in building civil society. I have very often said that in many countries of the world, the Red Cross, the Boys and Girls Clubs, the Salvation Army and the Rotaries, university exchanges and scholarships are more critical to the building of civil society than anything that the United States government can do.

And finally to recognize that there may be new roles for forces of a different type. When civil conflict is well beneath the place that combat forces are needed, where police functions are needed, we need to think hard about the development of forces that are appropriate to police functions. It is simply not the case that combat forces, made over into police forces, are the best answer.

Let me finally raise the issue of how to deal with Russia and China - - two big countries whose internal transitions are critical to global stability.

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China is a problem for, and a challenge to, American interests because it's a rising power. Any rising power with unresolved vital interests will be a challenge. It would be wrong to think of China as an enemy, but it is not wrong to think of China as a challenge. China resents our presence in East Asia. The Chinese continue to proliferate technologies to deliver weapons of mass destruction to unstable parts of the world. It is a problem in the regional balance of South Asia, and of course it has unresolved vital interest around Taiwan.

At the same time, though, there are great opportunities with China as it makes an internal transformation that is quite dramatic. Anyone who has been to China in the last twenty years recognizes that for the first time, the Chinese people are no longer fully dependent on the government for their livelihood, and that that will change the dynamics of both economics and politics in China in dramatic ways. The chore for the United States, the challenge for the United States is to prepare for challenges on the security side - the business of the people at this conference - without sending signals that we do not recognize that there is a major transformation going on internally in China. It is if you will, to walk and chew gum at the same time, to deal in shades of gray, which are not always the easiest issues for the United States of America.

Russia, a country that I've spent my life trying to understand, is a challenge for different reasons. It is a challenge because it is a declining power. And managing a declining power is every bit as difficult as managing a rising power. Clearly, it is not appropriate for the United States to become so deeply involved in Russia's domestic affairs that the Russians themselves begin to believe that it is the United States' responsibility or the Europeans' responsibility to deliver economic prosperity to Russia. That has to be to the Russians' to do.

But, when it comes to the security challenges that Russia poses, the United States and her allies have an agenda with the Russians that should provide an opportunity for considerable interchange and indeed for considerable progress. It is time to restructure our antiquated nuclear relationship with Russia so that we can incorporate ballistic missile defense, but also so that we can bring the number of nuclear weapons to something that is more appropriate to deterrence in this era, and perhaps bring to the United States and Russian forces greater stability through de-alerting some forces. This is the conversation that is well worth having with the Russians, as are conversations about the safe disposal and handling of nuclear materials and the safe dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons.

There's a large security agenda with the Russians that we and our allies need to pursue. It will only be clouded if we take upon ourselves the responsibility for Russia's domestic well-being. And if there's a positive development in the last year or so, it is that the Russians themselves have taken a step back from their constant call for international financial assistance. They say they want to address the structural problems that keep entrepreneurship from developing in Russia - tax policy, corruption, and the rule of law. And we ought to wish them well and be there to help. If we can rebalance the agenda with the Russians to one that deals more with the security challenges that we both face, I think that we will have both a more realistic and a more fruitful relationship with Russia.

In sum, it is a time of tremendous opportunity for the United States and its allies. It is a time of tremendous opportunity for states that believe in democracy, in markets, and wish to see them spread. But it will require that we are more focused in what we do; that we pay attention to the structural realities and to our role in those structural realities. It will require that we rebalance our commitments and our resources. And it will require that we recognize that our diplomatic instruments are many - military power is only one of them - and that we do not always think of military intervention as the first line of defense when we have waited too long and can't think of anything else to do.

Thank you very much. (Applause) I'm going to take a few questions.

Dr. Pfaltzgraff: Thank you very much Condi. We now have an opportunity for questions. So who would like to pose the first question for Dr. Rice?

Dr. Geoffrey Wawro, Professor, Strategic Research, U.S. Naval War College: Dr. Rice, you mentioned the Persian Gulf as a vital interest, and I'm wondering, do you believe there's greater Middle East, including the Trans-Caucasus in Central Asia, that is also included among our vital interests? As vital as the Persian Gulf?

Dr. Rice: Yes, I think that we're facing a kind of arc of instability in that region as a whole. Obviously, the most proximate question is the Middle East, the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians and the immediate envelope in the Middle East and that's what's on everyone's mind. And obviously trying to get the parties out of the streets and back to the table is quite critical there.

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But there is a broader strategic context. In the Persian Gulf, the Iraqis are beginning to break down the will of the coalition to maintain strong sanctions, there have been no inspectors in Iraq for close to two years now, and Saddam Hussein threatens from time to time, as he says, to "play the oil card." This is an area that American credibility is on the line in dealing with problems even in the more proximate Middle East.

You rightly also note that there are significant problems, whether it is from Afghanistan, Pakistan, or countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia where basic control of borders is a major issue. In those places, terrorism is a real threat. Yes, there is a tremendous arc of instability in that entire region. The truth of the matter is that we need the help of stable governments in the region to make this work.

Let me just point to the importance in this regard of Turkey - a NATO ally, a country that needs to be stable, that needs to be a kind of stable example of a non-radical Islamic state that can play an active role. We frankly may need the help of the Russians in this region, and it is probably something, at some point in time, to raise with the Russians, though while they're doing what they're doing in Chechnya, it's very difficult to talk about a more cooperative way to think about the Caucasus and to think about Central Asia. But under no circumstances should the United States be seen as trying to push the Russians out of the region. If the Russians can bring themselves to act less like a nineteenth century power in the Caucasus, they could also be a very important part in dealing with this very, very difficult area. There is no doubt that with the lawlessness in Afghanistan, with the problems in Pakistan, and now with the problems in every place from Kyrgyzstan to Turkmenistan to Tadjikistan, yes, this is a region of vital interest, and it's a region that's quite troubled.

Dr. Pfaltzgraff: Our next question is from right over here.

Mr. David Earl, Associated Press: Dr. Rice, how extensive have your conversations been with Governor Bush concerning transition planning and what was the substance of those discussions?

Dr. Rice: I thought this was about military issues. Look, I think that we are all awaiting the outcome of this election. I think that's appropriate. That's where the Governor is at this point in time. Obviously I talk to the Governor frequently to keep him updated on foreign policy issues. But the nature of those conversations is, of course, between the Governor and me.

Dr. Pfaltzgraff: There was another question, I thought, back here as well. (Applause)

Ms. Elaine Monihan, Reuters News Agency: Dr. Rice, I have two short questions. The first is, do you think it's a good idea to stay with the "two wars at once" preparedness strategy in next year's Quadrennial Defense Review? And also do you think that the trouble with electing a President in this country is doing any damage to America's image in the world? Thank you.

Dr. Rice: Let me take the second question first. Obviously, we'd all like to see this come to an end and we would like to have a declaration of a President. But I've been really tremendously heartened by the American people, who are patient, who do believe in the system, who are demonstrating their faith in the system. And I think it's a lesson to the rest of the world, to the degree that the rest of the world needs a lesson in this regard. Democracy is sometimes a little bit messy. But if you have strong institutions, and you have a belief in those institutions, you can come through it just fine. So obviously it would be good to get this settled. But aside from the occasional barb out there that I've read as much as you have, I think that people should be very much impressed with the way that the American people are dealing with this circumstance.

The question about the two wars at once, there is no doubt that the United States military needs to take a hard look at the missions that it expects to have to perform over the next several years and the threats to and challenges to performing those missions. And I think you have to include not just conventional threats of the type that we've tended to think about, but also asymmetric threats to our interests. And that there needs to be a post-Cold War look at what we're trying to do with our forces, and whether they're properly resourced to do the things that we're trying to do.

I don't want to prejudge any such outcome of any kind of review, but I do think that it is high time to do that. We can't just keep adding on missions on top of already established missions and then providing inadequate resources to perform all of them. We're going to have to make some choices. It's time to do such a review.

Dr. Pfaltzgraff: Okay, next question. There are three over here, so let's begin with the young lady here, and then we'll go to Jim Robbins, and then over to this one.

Ms. Elaine Sciolino, New York Times: Professor Rice, can you share with us your analysis of the suggestions in recent days by Russian officials that they may be willing to amend the Anti-Ballistic Missle (ABM) treaty if the cuts in strategic offense weapons were deep enough? And if I could ask a second question? You proposed the creation perhaps of new police forces. Are you talking about some kind of standing, multi-national peacekeeping force? And what would be the command and control structure of such a force?

Dr. Rice: Let me take the second question first, Elaine. I'm not proposing new police forces. What I'm saying is I think we have to take a hard look at how we're going to provide for policing functions when combat forces are no longer appropriate to that mission. And again, I don't think it's probably appropriate to try and prejudge how those forces would be constituted or certainly at this point what kind of command and control.

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But obviously there is a need-- I know that in the Balkans they've been trying desperately to raise police forces in time to do some of the functions in Bosnia, for instance. It's been hard to get them and we do need to think about these functions with our allies, with countries around the world and figure out what we're going to do when combat forces are no longer the appropriate means to provide civil order.

Now, on the Russians' recent announcement, I think it's quite interesting that the Russians are probably finally getting to a place that they are sizing their forces to a level that is more appropriate to their needs at this particular point in time. This could not have been easy. I don't know how firm some of the decisions are. But obviously we ought to welcome military reform in the Russian armed forces, which has been desperately needed for a very, very long period of time. They could not go on with inadequate resources for a force that was too big, that was orphaned in parts of the former Soviet Union, and to the degree that they can rationalize those forces and adequately resource them, it's going to be good for everyone.

As to the nuclear matter, I've said, and Governor Bush has said, that it is high time to take a hard look at our strategic force posture, to take a hard look at our strategic relationship with the Russians because we have been operating within a strategic concept that dates from the Cold War - that dates from a time when Soviet forces were deep into the heart of Europe.

Whether or not the Russians are fully ready to accept ballistic missile defense as a part of that strategic concept, I can't judge. The numbers that the United States may or may not need to maintain deterrence really has to be determined by a U.S. internal review, and I think should not be held hostage to some kind of deal with the Russians until we've done our own work. But that it is time for a rethinking of these strategic nuclear relationship with Russia, and a rethinking of the requirements of deterrence, I think is incontrovertible.

Dr. Pfaltzgraff: Okay. Next question is from here.

Dr. James S. Robbins, Professor of International Relations, National Defense University: A previous speaker indicated that we spend three times the resources in Kosovo than we do in all of Latin America. I was wondering if this represents to you a resource imbalance and what we can do about it?

Dr. Rice: Clearly, let me not try to judge whether we're spending too much money in one place or another. Clearly our inattention to Latin America is a serious problem. This is a region that has great promise and great hope and really the last seven or eight years have been quite remarkable. When you look at where Latin America was in 1989 or 1990 and you look now at the spread of democratic governments throughout the region and strong economies, it is impressive. Look at the election in Mexico. Look at strong market economies in a number of parts of Latin America. Look at the importance of this region potentially to the United States. But problems are emerging in Latin America, whether it's Colombia or Venezuela.

We simply have to pay more attention to the region. And in really three important ways. First, to put it on the agenda, to pay attention to it in a consistent way. To recognize the importance of those relationships and to engage in what George Schultz calls "gardening," which is constant contact with those countries.

Second, is out of that, to have strong partners to manage some of the problems that may be arising in Latin America. The United States should not be a lone wolf in Latin America to solve all the problems of the region. There are strong, important partners that want to have a role there.

And third, on the economic front, to recognize that the potential there for free trade is really quite great. That there've been several missed opportunities because the President has not had fast track authority. There were several missed opportunities because we did not extend the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and aggressively pursue the free trade of the Americas to make sure that that gets on the agenda. So whatever the resources required to do that, it is quite clear that Latin America needs to be much more on the agenda.

Dr. Pfaltzgraff: One more question over here. Mr. Andrei Sitov, TASS: I'm with TASS, the Russian news agency. You just answered my question. The lady from the New York Times asked it. So I wanted to ask you whether this was something you wanted to do on your birthday, speaking to this conference?

Dr. Rice: Well, thank you very much for telling everyone that I just had a birthday. I greatly appreciate that. I very much wanted to speak at this conference because the United States and its allies face some difficult issues about how to use this extraordinary period of peace, this extraordinary period in which our institutions and our values are being affirmed around the world.

And it will require hard choices. It will require hard choices about the American military forces and what they're really for and how to use them. But unless we as a democratic country can have that conversation, then you know, if we can't have it, no one else can.

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Dr. Pfaltzgraff: We have time for one more question.

Audience Member: Thank you. Yesterday at this conference, Rich Armitage addressed several issues, one pertaining to structure and organization. And he stated rather categorically that he believed that a restructuring, a reorganization of the Departments of State and Defense were necessary in order to better formulate and execute our National Security Strategy. And by extension, I presume he also would include the National Security Council staff and the intelligence community. Would you care to comment on his statements?

Dr. Rice: Well, that's a big agenda. (Laughter) Look. I don't know whether or not one needs to think about organizational reform, moving the boxes or not. I think sometimes we get overly caught up in moving the boxes when it isn't clear what else to do. And we all know that sometimes you can make structural reforms that end up creating new problems and you wish you'd stuck with the old structures.

I won't try to second-guess what Rich was talking about, but I do know that we do have some new challenges. Today's structures came out of 1947. There have been reforms over time. You know, I actually think Goldwater-Nichols and the reform of the Joint Chiefs of Staff system is one of the great success stories in American institutional reform. It was well done. It had strong support on the Hill. It had strong support from the attentive public. It was a good reform. So it's not as if we haven't done some reforms along the way that have served us very well. But

I would rather ask ourselves, kind of what are the challenges out there that we are not currently meeting? And how should we think about the structures to meet those challenges?

Just to give you an example, I'm not sure we very effectively integrate the various instruments of diplomacy that we have. And we often compartmentalize them in a way that means we use the ones that are easiest to use. I talked at one point here about trade and economic assistance and so forth. We've never been particularly good at integrating our economic instruments into our foreign policy more generally.

And one of the problems with Russia was that we had American policy going off into several different directions, some of them economic, some of them security, some of them diplomatic. And so one challenge for the system is to figure out how to better integrate economic instruments into our foreign policy.

Another challenge is how to think about the myriad non-governmental actors that now have as much impact on foreign policy day to day as the U.S. government does. Everything from global companies, to capital markets which make decisions that are largely and, for the most part, rightly unrelated to American "strategic" interests. How to think about those roles, something else that we don't do particularly well.

And there are a host of non-governmental actors, NGOs, that are playing a quite dramatic and in many ways quite helpful role around the world in the building of civil institutions, the building of civil society. And how the government can be supportive of those efforts without getting in the way. I think there are a lot of challenges of the new environment that the current structures don't meet. Whether you meet those challenges in an ad hoc fashion by just forcing more cooperation across these boundaries, or whether you actually need structural reform I think is the question.

But I am confident, and I am somebody actually who has a lot of faith in the ability of these institutions to actually take on the mantle of reform and to actually get something done. I just wanted to mention that I saw in the paper this morning that General Shinseki has been pushing hard for the transformation of the Army. This is within the Army. This is a good thing to have these reforms from within. So before one jumps to the conclusion that you have to make wide scale structural reforms, let's ask questions about what it is we're trying to accomplish. Some of the institutions may in fact be appropriate to that mission. Some of them may need to be reformed.

But the real question we ought to be asking is: "are we getting things done?" - not just how are we moving the boxes around to show movement.

Dr. Pfaltzgraff: On that very important concluding note, I would like to express our collective thanks to Dr. Condoleezza Rice for being with us today, for giving us a comprehensive, very important contribution to the work that we're doing in this conference. You've added a great deal, Condi, to what we're trying to do. Thank you for a wonderful presentation.

Dr. Rice: Thank you very much. (Applause)

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