Previous IFPA-Fletcher Conferences

The 33rd IFPA-Fletcher Conference
on
National Security Strategy and Policy

October 16-17, 2002
The Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center
Washington, D.C.

Transcript Session 3: Allies and Coalition Partners

Coalition Opportunities and Challenges in the Middle East and Europe
Address by General John J. Sheehan, USMC (Ret.), former Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic

Jacquelyn Davis: So I would like first to introduce former General Jack Sheehan. All of you know him formerly as CINC ACOM and SACLANT who will discuss NATO futures and U.S. partner relationships in Central Asia and anything else that he wants. Jack.

Sheehan: Thanks. Tony, Hank and I are going to sit down. When you get to be old, you want to conserve your energy. We are not going to stand up at the podium. First observation, I don’t live in the United States any longer. I live in Europe, London, specifically. After I retired five years ago, I spent my first two years in Central Asia, living in Kazakhstan and spend a great deal of time in Central Asia today and in the Mid East.

So, first take away from the presentation, is that Washington, D.C., is not the center of the universe. The discussion today, it strikes me, as being very Washington-centric. There is actually a world outside the Beltway that is really interesting and you might want to get out and touch it, because that is what reality is.

Second take away is that the world did not start or stop on the 11th of September. Although it is a horrific event that clearly is causing us to question a lot of our assumptions, there was actually a very large body of strategic thinking that pre-dates September 11th and I would suggest really is still a very good basis for going forward and doing some additional research as we move forward.

Let me answer the seven questions we have been given. I won’t answer them all but, in the order in which they appear in your program. And the first one is, “How important are coalitions?” I think the issue Jacky touched on, is the debate about multi-lateralism versus unilateralism. This is the contemporary debate here in Washington.

But let me take you back 10 years to the first of the Clinton years in the White House when the stated policy, under Madeleine Albright and, at that time, Tony Lake was that they U.S would not engage on any unilateral action anywhere in the world without a multi-lateral coalition . That lasted until the Somali operation, when we decided to chase Aidid, and the Ranger incident, in which we had 18 Rangers killed and dragged through the streets.

At that point the administration regressed from its multi-lateral approach and it went to an isolationist view of the world. And then it gradually worked its way forward out of an isolationist view to a quasi-multi-lateral approach. Don’t forget we had allies all over the world who watched us go through this eight years of port and starboard policy process. At the same time, we had events going on in the former Yugoslavia where policies would depend on how long it took Warren Christopher to get to the airport and fly to Brussels.

The policy would change en route or while he was there and he sometimes never knew what the policy was when he arrived. So, in terms of confusion, we did a great job confusing our European allies and our other friends as to what we were really all about. The Bush administration has come in, and with clearly a disdain for the NATO process and for our European allies. And that is not without cause because, very frankly, the Europeans en large have been negligent in their security responsibilities.

So I think there is some reason, legitimate reason, for a debate as we move forward as to what the nature of this relationship is and what the reciprocal responsibilities are of that relationship. But let me also remind you that, if I had to pick four examples of contemporary transatlantic policy evolution the first would be the deployment of cruise missiles to Europe in the early 1980s under the Reagan administration, that clearly was a very difficult decision for the Europeans. They eventually took it, but it cost the control of one government by the party in power.

INF treaty is the second case in point where I think the Americans are right and the Europeans are wrong. But let me also remind you that at one point in the recent history in our European relationship, we had a proposed policy called the Sonafeld Doctrine, which proposed to formally recognize the de facto cold war boundaries in Europe. Today many of those nations are part of NATO and free nations like the Czech Republic, Hungary, Baltic States, etcetera.

There actually was a U.S. proposal earlier in our life made by President Jimmy Carter, now a Nobel Laureate, for the use of neutron bombs in Europe. So, our policy history with Europe sometimes confuses people as to what we really stand for and I would argue that that is what is going on now. Our unilateral versus multi-lateral approach to the problem is not always going to deliver a very clear answer but if you don’t engage the Europeans in the debate and a dialogue, then you are going to get it wrong.

I would also argue the case and I would use the example of the Rangers in Somalia, if we allow the Special Forces to operate independent of a Combatant CINC as was suggested earlier today, you had better go back and read the Senate Armed Services Committee Report on the Somalia operation. If you allow Special Operations Force to run willy-nilly around the world without some kind of adult leadership, I think that we are putting ourselves in the position of repeating a sad lesson of history.

So, I would only say to you that after 9/11 don't forget there is a whole ream of history that, if we don’t read it and understand it then we are going to get it wrong. Now, me congratulate General Jones as a Commandant because when I left the U.S. some five years ago there were fewer commands here in the U.S. than there are today. Now, today, clearly he is allowed the proliferation of organizations that consume manpower and resources and add nothing to the gross national product. So, Jim, congratulations on a job well done. (laughter) The other point I would ask you to remember is that October is of a very special month in a lot of ways. The first part that I ask you to remember is that next week, 19 years ago, we had over 200 Marines killed in Beirut, a terrorist activity that took place in the Mid East. If you want to read something interesting, read the classified Long Report on what happened and the subsequent evolution, as Jim Locher tried to explain of why we had to restructure from a combatant command perspective because the division responsibilities among services and military organizations were so distorted.

In that report there is a section that deals with the political leadership on how you go to war. It is very clearly a paragraph or series of paragraphs that I commend you to read if you can get your hands on it as we go forward in our war on terrorism. Unilateral activity or unconstrained activity or if you want to call it, uncoordinated activity can lead to consequences you will regret ever happened.

I will give you a contemporary case in point, I currently live in the U.K. and Paul Wilkinson and I discussed this earlier; if you look at what the U.K. did in Northern Ireland in the ‘70s and what is coming out in the press today as a result of public investigations, it is absolutely abhorrent what was done under the guise of secrecy in their war on terrorism. There clear violations of human rights committed.

So I would just suggest that whatever path you take in the future, you clearly need to understand that the more consultative process there is to what ever decision you take the better off you are, the more you adhere to a standard of law, international law, the better off you are. So, those are just a couple of points. The other question is the issue of weapons of mass destruction. We act as though weapons of mass destruction were invented yesterday. They have been around for 50 years.

We have had for 50 years a very developed deterrent theory that evolved during the cold war. We have also lived with other states that had nuclear weapons, Israel, South Africa, etc. We have been successful in dealing with this issue. I am struck by the discussions that are shocked that chemical and biological weapons were used during the Iran-Iraq War.

They often neglect to mention the fact that we participated in the process, providing intelligence to one of the belligerents. So, I am having a hard time understanding what our current deterrent strategy on weapons of mass destruction is. It doesn’t have the substance and texture nor does it have the academic or the context of the academic debate that occurred during the Cold War process.

Weapons of mass destruction clearly are issues that we need to come to grips with but as the last question that gets asked, does technology allow you to deal with this issue? The answer is yes. But it cuts both ways. Technology over the last couple of years has allowed politicians and people in the White House and other civilians and organizations to treat warfare as if it’s a Nintendo process.

When you give somebody an overhead picture and you ask him or her which window they want taken with a cruise missile, that can not be the end of the conversation. Technology should allow you to do things without collateral damage. But it also brings to the table the absolute essential part of having a strategy, of having a policy where the means and ends are related.

It also does not absolve you of the responsibility of a cooperative engagement process with allies. Allies are necessary first off because we never would have won the Gulf War unless NATO existed because we had common procedures, and a common vocabulary. Ad hoc-ery is exactly that. It is ad hoc-ery.

You can’t just stuff things in your rucksack, jump out of the back of an airplane and figure out what you are going to do when you get on the ground. It doesn’t work that way. Warfare is a deliberate activity that requires deliberate planning and integrated activity. So, as we move forward in this discussion, the second event that makes October special was that five years ago when I parachuted into Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, we almost didn’t get to do it because of two reasons.

First, the State Department was concerned about what the Russians would think because we were encroaching on former Soviet territory. And the second reason I was given was that I would upset the balance between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban, that by parachuting in non-stop from Fort Bragg North Carolina with 250 paratroopers, this exercise would upset the balance of power in Afghanistan.

That was five years ago. I think the world has changed. The other point I would make, from a Central Asian perspective is that both Tony and I have spent a lot of time trying to develop and enhance that relationship. That dialogue was necessary because part of the US lead demilitarization process of MRBMs and IRBMs . U.S. has been committed to this process of engagement for a number of years now.

However, that process of engagement has not trickled all the way down to the bottom of where it needs to go for the democratization and the development of the society at large. I am struck by Bill Gertz’s discussion about what we did and didn’t know about the Afghan’s. I am surprised that he doesn’t know about the other collaborative security arrangements we have with the Central Asian Republics.

We actually knew a great deal about what was going on in Afghanistan in those days. So, I would just say to you that you can’t become isolationists. If you have a policy that says you are unilateral and you ignore your allies, your traditional allies, with whom you have common goals, common values, then you do it at great peril. As you move forward with our new friends and allies, whether it is in the Mid East or Central Asia you can’t do that on an ad hoc basis.

It has to be a systematic, day-to-day, engaged activity and you have to visit them. You can’t ignore them because when you really do need them, they will ignore you. For someone who lives outside the United States, I will tell you that over the last 10 years I am confused as to what the U.S. strategic interests are in different parts of the world. I am confused as to what the process is because I don’t see the consultative process taking place.

Truly there are requirements for reform within the NATO process as there are requirements for reform in the U.S. But you cannot go it alone, first off, because as Jacky said, you need over flight rights you need land base rights. And I would argue the case, the reason we have the base rights today in Central Asia was because of the work that we started five years ago with the Central Asian Republics.

And had if we had listened to the inter-agency process and worried about the balance of power between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban, we’d be still on the outside looking in.

Questions and Answers

Welham: Wing Commander Duncan Welham from the British Embassy. What the panel has been talking about to my mind is the important part that the military has to play in the reconstruction of countries, being aware of other countries. Do you think it is time, then, that the term nation building should be taken back into the military lexicon?

Davis: Since we have a fair amount of time, I am going to ask the panel to respond to each question as asked. And then at the end, of course, I will ask each to make a final set of closing comments. So, who would like to respond to that. General Zinni?

Sheehan: I will start it off. Nation building is an expensive evolution that the military can do some basic work in but it really takes an international effort. Let me give you a case in point. When I went to work in Kazakhstan, we were building a processing plant/oil refinery. I had 6 thousand people that worked of me. They were Uzbecks, Kazakhs , Turks, Georgians, and a number of others.

For every person that I hired, they supported seven people back in the village. In the work force I had 54 tea girls who basically served tea to the office staff. Of those 54, 38 of them were doctors. I had a painter who had a Ph.D., in mechanical engineering, they did this because they couldn’t find work in their profession.

And so returning to the point that I raised earlier about why we went into Central Asian Republics to help them with their demilitarization of their nuclear weapons; what didn’t happen was all the subsequent institution reforms that were necessary and plus the trickle down effect from money that was coming from the oil and gas business, trickling down to the people who needed it at the akim level and the village level.

It was stopped by the central government. And corruption as you know is a big issue. I think that when you talk about nation building, the military can provide immediate life support activities. Long-term development on the part of a nation is something that takes generations. So, it is an engagement process through the state department, AID, foreign office, whoever have you, and even the companies that are doing business in those particular countries.

So, I am not for creating a cadre of people who do this as a primary occupation. It is a Civil Affairs Reserve function, short term. For the long-term it has to be through international monetary assistance, Asian banks, development banks, EBRD, whatever have you. Tony.

Zinni: I think we need to get serious about nation building. Nation building and nation rebuilding is a fact of life. The trouble is we stick the military with the problem. And it is not just a military problem. As Jack said, the military has a role to play, a significant role. In our own government, other government agencies have a role to play. I think there is an obligation in businesses to support this, private enterprises that should become more involved.

And actually I am seeing that in Afghanistan. There is an attempt to involve American businesses and others in helping with the reconstruction in some way, which actually become mutually beneficial. And I think we need to work on an international approach to nation building, not just a U.S. approach to nation building.

What should be the way we collectively come together and look at the political, economic, social, security, reconstruction and structures that we need to put in place. I go back again to we did a pretty good job in Europe at the end of the Second World War. We did a lousy job at the end of the Cold War. There was actually a half-hearted attempt at a Marshall Plan at the end of the Cold War.

And I actually participated in that. Secretary of State Baker tried to provide the incentives for the international community to come together. It never got off the ground. And so a part of the world that had collapsed what left to self-order. And we can see the results not being that great. So, I think we need to find a way.

Maybe the U.N. is a mechanism or something like that to decide how would we come together as an international community and do reconstruction on all those levels.

Davis: Hank, do you want to say anything.

Stackpole: Yes, I do agree with that also. But recognize that the military is primarily good at complex human emergencies and once they are able to stabilize the situation, it has to be handed off to those who have the ability. In terms of NGOS, for example, if you are doing a humanitarian assistance disaster relief mission or even a peacekeeping one, make sure that you have an NGO with you.

“Don’t leave home without it” is the old American Express card because they are very positive NGOs who so a lot of work. But then there is the international community as a whole that has to respond. Can you do civic action projects along the way? That was one of the things that helped in dealing with the Abu Sayyaf and with the Moral Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines.

We went into a number of civic action situations in concert with the, in the Mindanoa area, in concert with the Philippine forces but no intention to stay. And that is always one of the important things because fear’s always that it is a U.S. presence coming to be permanent on your soil. And in this day and age, it is still a friction between globalization and nationalism and they really want to have that sense of being able to be independent in their own efforts.

Davis: Thank you. Next question. Yes, sir.

Boaklen: Steve Boaklen(?), United States Army War College Faculty. My question is to General Zinni. As a member of the faculty last week, I went to New York with the class and we had the opportunity to visit the U.N. and when I went to one of the Middle Eastern country’s U.N. mission, and I was privileged among our group to have the opportunity to sit down and talk with the ambassador from that country.

And he shares your opinion that, if the Palestinian-Israeli issues could be resolved, U.S. relationships in the region would improve immeasurably over night. He maintains that the United States has the power to bring peace to the region. I’d be interested in your opinion, sir, and the other members’ opinion. Does the United States have that power and if so, why do you think we are reluctant to use it?

Zinni: Well, I think that we maybe are guilty of trying to walk back and, we always fight the last war. In many cases we try to come back and reestablish the last peace process. I think ever since the second intifada began, we have been trying to get back to Camp David. And we structured a way of getting back there, a sequential process that I thought was a good plan and, for the time, made sense.

It just became overcome by events. The sequential process had security first then confidence building measures then some political measures taken then final status agreements, Camp David, Taba, and then, eventually, the political objectives for both sides to achieve peace. There were two ingredients that weren’t in Camp David that were major factors that got lost in the shuffle.

One was our President going to the U.N. and saying there should be a Palestinian state, made he case, the first time a President making that commitment, very significant. The second was Crown Prince Abdullah’s bringing 22 Arab nations, saying, if we can get peace we will recognize the state of Israel. The trouble is the intifada and the problems that were created, a whole other set of issues, that overwhelmed the ability to sequentially get it done and made obsolete the idea that a short mission, a Zinni mission, a Tenet mission, or a Mitchell mission was going to set the spark.

It was all there. The plans were agreed to in principle. All you have to do is ignite the fuse and you are on the way. I realized in my third mission there it would not work. We have gotten to the point now where it is so bad, not that those were bad plans, but it is going to take more than that. There is international recognition that only the United States could lead a path to peace.

In my mind you would have to put a major U.S. delegation on the ground with a permanent address, not coming and going short term missions. It would have to get off the sequentialism and deal with the political, economic security issues, and put monitoring mechanisms in place at the same time. It would have to commit to sticking it out through thick and thin.

It will have to dictate to both parties changes and enforce those changes. If those changes require things like reform the Palestinian authority, then we have got to get in there along with the international community, the EU, the U.N., tell them what reform means, give them the structure and push them to implement it. If it means stop building settlements, then we have got to get in and put pressure on, that settlements stop or are frozen or that they stop building them.

Things that need to be done to move the process to catch the spark. And there are many others. And I just mention a few. And certainly not the least of which and the most important is the cessation of terrorist acts and the need to control that. The international community, the quartet, the major parties involved, the U.N., the EU, Russia, the United States, all the other members and others like Japan who have delegations on the ground look to us.

Every single day they come to us for their matching orders. Where do we go next? What do you want us to do? We are the only ones that can step up to that plate. If you look back at the best of times in this region, regarding the peace process, you will find it is when the United States had a policy that seemed contradictory but worked.

On one hand we maintained a very special relationship with Israel. On the other hand we maintained a very special relationship with the Arab world. And I used to mention it to my counterparts out there, the sharing of technology, the largest military exercise in the world, a number of other things we did in cooperation with our Arab allies. When we were full bore on both commitments and then created a third relationship, that of balanced mediator in the peace process, that was the best of times.

When we have throttled back on any one of those, that is when we have had problems. And right now we are throttled back, in some way in all three but certainly in two in a major way. And I think the United States has to make a commitment. That commitment, putting our energies and our resources into that one issue, will do more than anything else to help curb the anti-Americanism and help stabilize the region.

The region needs a lot more than that, don’t get me wrong. But that is the catalyst. That is the thing that can set the path correctly and defeat the extremists in recruiting the people that feel the sense of disenfranchisement or oppression or injustice.

Davis: Next question. Yes, sir.

Tighe: General Zinni, to follow up from the previous question. Gene Tighe from Rockwell. Have you thought about or has the whole issue of personalities in the region come up, the relationship the administration on the whole has with Prime Minister Sharon versus the relationship with Arafat?

Zinni: I made a promise to myself that I would not make personalities the issue. You don’t make peace between personalities. You make peace between peoples. I was not out there to make peace between Prime Minister Sharon and Chairman Arafat. I was out there to try to find a way to get peace between the Israeli people and the Palestinian people. If you attempt to deal with personalities and get over focused on them, I think the trouble is you are going to get short-term solutions that won’t last. They won’t be enduring.

Or you will get temporary solutions or problems that you have to look past to deal with it. And if you get hung up with personalities, as you see now, it can stop you dead in your tracks, if you let one individual become a stumbling block to proceeding forward. I think you have to blow past the individuals. And this goes not only for the participants, it goes for the mediators, too.

I would get off this idea of Zinni missions and Mitchell missions and Tenet missions. We ought to have a mission out there. If you need an individual to come out for a certain purpose, look George Tenet serves. He is trusted by both sides and works the security issues extremely well. Fine. But it isn’t the Tenet mission.

And his individual comings and goings shouldn’t signal things. Look, I came home for my daughter’s wedding. The said the process had collapsed. Zinni is leaving. You know, you can’t get overly focused on those kinds of personalities or whether Arafat can’t make the peace or Sharon can’t make the commitment.

Those are the kinds of things that if you get it going, if have progress on the ground, the people will commit to it and they will make the political changes necessary and the leadership to get you there, I am convinced having been on the ground and talked to the people and knowing who the others are behind the leadership. And so I believe what we need to do is get off this idea of trying to deal with individuals, acceptable, not acceptable, making peace between their two positions as opposed to something more enduring or comprehensive.

Davis: Next question. On my left. Anyone. Yes, sir.

Wilkinson: Paul Wilkinson, University of St. Andrews. Could I congratulate the moderator on the panel on an outstanding presentation? I would like to pick up a point that Lieutenant Stackpole mentioned about failed states. I wonder whether the panel wouldn’t agree with me that really in an area like Southeast Asia, the problem is not so much states that have completely failed but rather weak or very fragile states, which simple cannot control certain parts of their territory where criminal gangs, terrorists and others can take root and can exploit the use of these areas.

In those circumstances, the policy of bilateral cooperation perhaps should be considered as an excellent model and there are some successful examples of this. The Law Enforcement Assistance Program of the United States does a magnificent job in helping countries to improve the performance of their police services, judiciary, and so on, and particularly in the problem of encountering terrorism.

But I note that it is a mainly American commitment at the moment. Would the panel agree that this is a function, which could be usefully assisted by getting allies to contribute much more help of that nature? One thinks of the Japanese giving financial help in the Cambodian case, the British taking a very burden in Sierra Leone with success. This is a model that we should be encouraging allies surely to undertake.

This is something which can make a practical contribution to increasing security and peace in regions that are under threat. Would the panel agree with that?

Davis: I think everyone wants to say something.

Sheehan: Well, I absolutely agree with your premise, a classic case in point in Central Asia, is the use of the Turks. When we built the Central Asian peacekeeping battalion we used Turkey as a medium, first off because it is a Muslim state, a secular Muslim state, there is a common language among them and they have a long history in the area.

What is interesting is that when we tried to do this through the Council in NATO, because the Turks were perceived as being difficult, most of our initiatives were stopped. But yet, today, the strongest country in Central Asia that does allow the activity you speak about is Turkey. I think that as we evolve, the example you used of UK and Sierra Leone, is an excellent case in point that these states that are in transition, they clearly don’t have the financial resources to upgrade their educational system, police force, health and security delivery mechanisms, they clearly need support from the outside.

And I would just strongly encourage using Turkey, for example in the Central Asia republics. They have got a great history there. They are tremendously effective. We should, in the international community, assist them with financial resources. They will put the people on the ground and make it happen.

Davis: It doesn’t help, though, when the EU doesn’t invite them to become a member.

Sheehan: Well, it wasn’t just the EU. NATO, itself, I don’t want t say it is anti-Turkish, but clearly at that time the Turks were undervalued.

Davis: Hank

Stackpole: In the Asia-Pacific region we have a couple of things that are going that do involve nations other than the U.S. There is the International Law Enforcement Academy located in Bangkok, which has reached out to all of the Asians and is a multi-national funded and it helps, although the U.S. is pretty much the dominant element in it. In addition to that we have had the G-8 and we have also had ASEON start to commit to assisting in those areas particularly.

As you know, Mahathir was approached by Secretary Powell on establishing counter-terrorism center in Kuala Lumpur and that also would be at least regional, certainly not international. So there is an effort underway.

Japanese funding continues in a number of areas. And there has been a great deal of support for East Timor but, of course, that is a nation in the making and it, too, has its problems in being aid-based until such time as they can develop the fossil-fuel capabilities that they have.

Davis: Tony, do you want to say anything?

Zinni: I would just add one thing. Of course I agree. I think one thing we have to always remember as Americans is sometimes there are requirements that other nations meet best because they have a capability that we need on the ground that we don’t. I will give you one example, a national police force. We don’t have in the United States a national force like a carbinieri or a la Guardia Seville or something like that.

So if there is a need to create something like that, there are countries with unique capabilities that could complement what we bring or, in some cases, should take the lead, and I think we saw that in East Timor and elsewhere, that have more regional influence and regional understanding and knowledge. And the U.S.’s role in that may be more supportive in that case.

And I think you have to craft the strategy for each region that brings out not only those outside the region with influence that can help and resources, but those within the region that can help, that you build collective capabilities to help incapable states around some stronger countries. I saw this in our work in East Africa with the Kenyans who actually brought the East African community with Tanzania, Uganda, and stretching out for others, as a potential element for helping keep the peace and helping some of the weaker participants or members.

Davis: We have time for one or two more questions. I know it has been a long day but this is a unique opportunity. Yes, sir.

Kidd: Hello, Richard Kidd from the U.S. Department of State. Earlier today we were urged to think creatively and to develop solutions that cross inter-agency barriers and across country barriers. General Zinni has called for a new Marshall Plan to structure our international engagement. What about something akin to a Manhattan Project to change this nation’s energy consumption equation, switching from Mid East oil to renewables and other sources of energy?

If this were to be successful, how would it change the security equation, and would it be worth the investment?

Davis: Jack, do you want to take that?

Sheehan: Since I am in the energy business, let me give you some numbers. It takes less than $2 dollars to produce a barrel of oil in Saudi Arabia. Heavy crude oil out of Canada is about $30 dollars production per barrel of oil. Alternative fuels need to be in the $30 to $35 dollars a barrel to be kind of economically feasible. That is a commercial decision that the Shell, Exxon-Mobil, Chevron-Texacos have got to make.

Right now alternative fuels are not commercially viable it does not produce enough revenue. The question then, does the government step up and funds that activity? I don’t think that will happen. I think what you see happening, though, in this U.S.-Russian dialogue and the development of Caspian energy is an alternative to Mid East fuels.

As you know the real issue in the Mid East is, the swing production capability that exists out of Saudi Arabia. If you create that capability in international marketplace then you lessen international dependence on Saudi oil. I think that that, like Tony’s point, has to be put in a much larger strategic framework and discussion. If you just deal with it as, how do I take this Saudi swing production off the marketplace and replace it with Russian’s Caspian, then I think you are sub-optimizing your bigger problem.

So, in terms of an energy policy, one, I don’t think the major oil companies are going to make the investment unless oil gets up to about $35 dollars a barrel, which I don’t think is going to happen in the near term since we are already paying a war premium. And two, I think that it has to be put in a much larger security context, strategic context rather than just anti-Mid East oil.

Zinni: I would infer from your point that you are assuming that if we could get rid of our dependence on energy, then the region be damned. We don’t have to worry about it. And I would say for the reasons that General Stackpole brought up of globalization, migration, the way instability and problems and WMD development happens, those days are over.

That if we don’t need your product, we don’t need to worry about you, we can just isolate ourselves from you. So, I am all for a better energy program. I think it will take a 50, 60 years even if you started now, to make it efficient and effective and lose the dependency. But that aside, it doesn’t get rid of the requirement to stabilize this region in my mind. I think the problems of the region are going to get to you not only because of your energy dependence on the region, that is just one facet of it.

Stackpole: And I would like to add that you are talking about a worldwide situation, because of the limited time, of course, I didn’t bring up India or China, which is in our area or responsibility. And both of those countries, if they had the road network that we had, would drive us out of fossil fuel, and they all had cars, in a very short period of time.

So there is an imperative but it is not moving fast because of cost, as General Sheehan said, but there are a number of technologies out there. There is hydrogen fuel cells, but that takes a little work to get it to where they want to. There is the use of plasma melting enhanced systems to take our trash, which is with us as much as death and taxes and convert that into energy forms.

So there are a number of other things out there. But it is going to take a lot more from the industry. One thing our government is doing is providing incentives and tax breaks for those who are exploring those particular technologies.

Davis: We have time for one final question. Yes, sir.

Mahalek: Tom Mahalek from the U.S. General Accounting Office. I wanted to know, and this is a question for the whole panel, in terms of the Russian perception of the U.S. presence in the near abroad, particular with basing in the ‘Stans’, we had a speaker earlier say that the new relationship with Russia has transformed cooperation with Russian and those perceptions with the Putin government.

However, when one reads the Russian press and perceptions, what could the panel, perhaps, say about the long-term impact of the U.S. presence in the near abroad as the Russians view it.

Davis: Jack.

Sheehan: First, I think it is very much a transitional question. If you had said to me eight years ago was stationing U.S. forces in Central Asia possible, I would have said not only would it have run into a great deal of opposition here in the U.S. but it would have been a very difficult political issue because the relationship between Russia, NATO, the west had not matured. I think as a result of the Partnership for Peace Program and the strategic NATO-Russian relationship, those barriers are gradually going down.

I think the issue then becomes the question which nation are you talking about stationing forces in whether it is in the trans-Caucus or the Central Asian republics, I get concerned about Iran not Russia. It looks increasingly like we are encircling Iran on the west and east and so I think, again, it gets to the biggest strategic issue, as Tony said, what is our plan from Indonesia through the Babel Mandeb Straits in terms of a strategic viewpoint.

Russia is a partner. Three weeks ago I was Bautino in Kazakhstan. If you don’t know your geography it is in the southern part of the Caspian. There was a Russian-Kazakh joint exercise going on because the Iranian gunboats were in the Caspian. There were four Mig-29s, four attack helicopters, and a motorized rifle division. There were operating right next to where we were.

So I think that there is a dialogue that is taking place. I think it is a maturing dialogue. I think the NATO-Russian piece, the Russian-European piece is very important. But it gets back to my original point that we cannot disengage from the dialogue of both, with Russia, with NATO, with the European Union, and anybody else who has a stake in this issue.

Because as soon as you go unilateral, you will screw it up.

Zinni: I think it is important to think of Russia as a potential partner in this. You can’t exclude their influence I this region. They could actually use our presence to justify taking action themselves under their anticipatory self-defense and that might work against us. They have issues with Georgia and other places there that they might use that as an excuse. I think you want to bring Russia under the tent in this region and you want some sort of cooperative relationship.

Our presence should be transparent and clear to them why it is there so it is not threatening. I think they should be seen with us. In the CENTRASPEB(?), the Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalion effort and our initial stages that were started by General Sheehan, we had Russian troops that participated and came down. And I thought what that showed was our attempt to be transparent, our attempt to show that we weren’t trying to influence the region but rather create some kind of force for stability.

They participated with us in the Balkans. And, you know, it was difficult but I think that is the kind of model we need, not that our presence should threaten them or they should be excluded. If anything else I think we need to get them understanding what we are doing and keep a handle on what they may try to do and justify under whatever we are using as justification for our actions.

Stackpole: I am working in a joint program with the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies with the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford. And we have an involvement with Russian, China, India, Pakistan, and ourselves looking at everything that is being talked about here, the recovery of Afghanistan to the community of nations, the viability of Pakistan where it is, the situation versus the Stans.

And so, in one sense the whole issue of what was brought about by 9/11 has helped us to re-engage, if you will, with China, Russia in a dialogue that I think is a very, very essential item because one of the things that we constantly run into with the fellows who come to my program is U.S. position relating, for example, to China in this case, although I am moving it away from your Russian comment, because Russia attends our program also. But they say, “Look, you look at China. China looks at you. We look at your relationship. Don’t make us choose sides.”

It is as simple as that. So, the more interactivity that we have, the better off. And we are seeing this kind of thing with Russia being an aid to us in our relationship with China.

Davis: I think I saw a burning question.

Stump: Gordon Stump, the Adjutant General from Michigan. We also have a state-partnership program with the country of Latvia. With the expansion of NATO, they are looking up to six of seven nations getting in, and the idea that one nation can have veto power over some decisions that are being made within NATO, and the three countries just got in, do you think that the expansion of NATO is going to make it a more effective organization or a less effective organization. Is this a positive or a negative?

__: In terms of NATO enlarging, I happen to think it adds to the security especially in that particular part of the world. The reality is, in NATO, even when we are at 16 there were only four nations that decided. That is the grim reality, what really happened. The great thing about the NATO process is that we politically work together. We militarily work together. So there is an automatic response to the process, whatever happened, whatever the issue that was occurring.

The Trans-Atlantic Charter that created NATO is primarily a political instrument. It has a military component. So anything that increases that dialogue, I am for, as part of this process. And so I think would Latvia veto something, the answer to that is no they will not. I think their voice, though, in the Baltic issues is very important. And so I am not the least bit concerned about enlarging the club.

A number of Europeans are. But they will get over it. It is part of the evolutionary process of the strategic framework of what NATO does. But I think the big issue is can NATO as an institution get away from its Article V focus and be a force for peace beyond where they are currently right now. And I think that debate is still very much open.

Davis: Did that spark any other questions? Well, with that, I would like to turn once again to the panel members just to ask you if you have a final statement you wish to make. We will go in the other order. Okay. Tony.

Zinni: No.

Davis: Jack.

Sheehan: No.

Davis: Well, it remains for us to thank the panel for their very frank remarks.

[Applause]