Previous IFPA-Fletcher Conferences

The 33rd IFPA-Fletcher Conference
on
National Security Strategy and Policy

October 16-17, 2002
The Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center
Washington, D.C.

Transcript Session 3: Allies and Coalition Partners

Implications of the Broader Asia-Pacific Area for U.S. National Security Strategy
ADdress by Lieutenant General Henry C. Stackpole, USMC (Ret.), President, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

There are some things that we need to approach in the Asia-Pacific region that I think actually fit and flow from what both Jack and Tony have said. And one of the areas I would like to call your attention to is what we have been talking about, the doctrine of dominance. There is another section in the National Security Strategy and that is Section Seven that talks about expanding the circle of development by opening societies and building an infrastructure of democracy, something that he was just talking about a few moments ago.

And there are a lot of good words in there. I am not sure how we would pay for all of that. But the Asia-Pacific region as a whole is a vast area in terms of distance and in terms of time to travel. And in many instances here in Washington it seems to have sort of a view of the area as monolithic. And we all know the diversity of culture, the diversity in terms of the agrarian cultures that exist there, the great gap between rich and poor are factors that must be overcome or the continue to the Petri dish that will provide terrorists, which have been an everyday situation in the Asia-Pacific region.
And I think that is an important thing to remember. What has changed since 9/11 in the Asia-Pacific region? Not very much with the exception of now the finding, of course, of the cell in Singapore, which was a shock, and of course what happened in Dempasar and Bali has given a rather large wake-up call to those who might have been complacent about whether or not it was an ability for global terrorism to reach out and touch them.

Now I have as string of statements I have to back up the area of the seventh chapter or seventh section, and I am just going to go ahead and throw those up quickly. First our logo from the Asia-Pacific Center. That has something to do with the vastness. Each of the scrolls around the edge shows the area of responsibility for CINCPAC and of course that is Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Indian Ocean, the South Pacific and North America.

And it is all water with littorals and archipelagos. Sounds like it is made to order for Marines. I had to get that in. If we go to the-- Next slide, please. America’s commitment to Asia is what I am trying to point out that came out of the national strategy. We are a Pacific power. But that Pacific power means that we have to have mutual respect for each of the countries and where they are in this particular moment. The distances, I mentioned, are vast. Next slide.

And this came from the quadrennial. Secretary Powell. Next slide. And there is the quadrennial review portion of it. And then Richard Haas’ comment on April 22nd of this year-- Next slide. Those who have been left out, that is the story of the Asia-Pacific region. Right now as we sit here there a tectonic plate, if you will, a ring of fire that works from, although there is some hope right now in Sri Lanka, that runs from Sri Lanka on down through Indonesia, on into Mindanao across to the Solomon’s on up to Fiji. And these are people who for one reason or another are having kinds of difficulties in which there are disenfranchised people operating.

They have all been impacted by something that we saw a few moments ago when Tony couldn’t find his phone to answer it, globalization. This information technology has reached out in such a way that no one is immune. And what we have in terms of what that globalization means is what Asia is wrestling with and we have to understand that and how it impacts them. And at my institution we did a little run down on trying to get some definitions of globalization because it is like beauty in the eye of the beholder.

And we came up with the following five elements that impact directly on Asia but also the rest of the world, but for us in the Asian area, it is particularly critical: one, unprecedented economic interdependence driven by cross-border capital movements, rapid technology transfer and real time communication and information flows; two, the rise of new actors that challenge state authority, in particular non-governmental organizations, NGOs, civic groups, multi-national corporations and global production networks and financial markets.

This was before, long before, Al Qaeda rose up to be that kind of NGO that we were talking about challenging state authority. Three, growing pressure on states to conform to new international standards of governance particularly in the areas of transparency and accountability-- It is no accident that since the ’97 meltdown in the Asia-Pacific region financially that we now see as part of the strategy of the major lending institutions, the IMF, the World Bank, the Asia Development Bank, not only economic development as far as infrastructure is concerned but also two other primary strategies.

Human development, which brings into consideration human security, the dimension that was brought into bas relief for us, but has been a problem throughout the rest of the world for a long period of time, the ability to protect your people, the ability to allow growth in education, medical care and all the other things that a nation should provide for its people. Because what happens if it doesn’t?

It begets frustration, frustration begets anger, and anger begets the violence cycle that Tony was talking about just a few moments ago. And in democratic societies, the primary existence of the military and civil-military relations is to control violence not to unleash it. And that is a very difficult thing to do when we are looking at the rule of law, unleashing of the violence without a good reason.

Now I come back to the next, the emergence of growing pressure on states, this is number three, to conform to new international standards of governance, particular in the areas of transparency and accountability. The third element in those bank strategies is good governance. And we have seen changes happening in the Asia-Pacific region in leadership, which are critically important.

Those changes have been, of course, according to democratic processes, although there may be a hiccup here or there. And that is in Indonesia and, of course, what happened in the Philippines. Now the Philippines situation is an interesting one because it is the nation in terms of our bi-lateral relationships where we were able to put the most help in their war on terrorism. While there may have been an Al Qaeda linkage, what was there was there along time ago, Abu Sayyaf and, of course, the Islamic Moral Liberation Front—

And we have seen a significant assistance in both the training and in the technology that was necessary for that nation to take on the responsibility itself. Not yet out of the woods. Number four, the emerging of an increasingly western dominated international culture, a trend, which in many countries has raised the concern about the erosion of national identity and traditional values.

And that is a big one in terms of the Islamic world. It is a matter of pollution of their environment. And we aren’t the good guys from their perspectives. And that is something we have to understand. We were talking about truths here today from a number of people who spoke, “Well, that is our truth and I believe in that truth.” But the perceptions and the cultures of other nations have their truths also important to them.

On one hand we had our president clearly saying that our cause is right and just and it is our truth and we will prevail. By the same token we had this madman who would kill innocent human beings, named Saddam Hussein, saying exactly the same words for the purpose of the Islamic world. So their perceptions are their reality and we must remember that.

The last is the rise of severe transnational problems that require multi-lateral to resolve. As we sit here right now, it is not nuclear Armageddon that is reflected in the attitudes of the people of Asia, because they have thousands dying of water-borne diseases. They have HIV rumbling down the track like a runaway freight train in China, problems in Thailand that are significant and impacting the armed forces of that nation.

We have human smuggling, drug smuggling, internal migration, illegal immigration, on and on it goes as the lexicon of human misery still exists on an everyday basis where people are in a subsistence existence. And even our national strategy talks about two dollars a day being the average living amount of money across the spectrum of the Asia-Pacific region.

What are our relationships at the moment? They are founded very, very strongly and CINCPAC of course follows this in working with our bi-lateral relationships with Thailand, with Australia, with the Philippines, with the Republic of Korea and with Japan. But there are significant changes in attitude that exist even there at this particular moment.

And we find our commanders, both in Japan and in Korea, finding themselves under tremendous political pressure as we watch the shrinking of training ranges so our angry iron can’t be laid on target, so that we can be ready for anything. We find ourselves with a shifting situation in which we are moving inexorably from being the lead in these two nations for security to being the supporter and that will happen in time.

But there are two things that are absolutely necessary for us to be forward deployed. The nation must want us and we must be able to train, fundamental. General Jones has been grappling with Okinawa. The fact of the matter is the issue in Okinawa isn’t the U.S. Marine, it is the difference between the Okinawan government as a prefecture, the poorest and last in Japan, with the central government. And the U.S. Marine has become the lightening rod.

The rape was a heinous situation. But they have 0.6 of 1% crime among all the crime. Yet if you went into the street of Washington or the street of Honolulu and you said, “What is the biggest problem in Okinawa?” They would say, “The presence of the Marines.” A total falsehood. But those are issues that are changing. Now, do we still have the support of the government? Of course we do. And we are there because there is a recognition that without us there wouldn’t be stability.

Is there a likelihood of war on the Asia mainland? Not likely. Even though we are having troubles with North Korea now, North Korean now has moved more into the light from being the hermit kingdom in the last two years than it has in all the time before. And our good friend Robert Scalapino, whom many of you may know, certainly a wonderful man in his own right and truly an expert on Asia, when asked, “Don’t you think the behavior of the North Koreans is irrational?” And he said, “Absolutely not. It is totally rational for a 17th century Asian kingdom.”

That is the problem. That is where we are and we have to recognize and know that they are not going to respond to the kind of stimuli that we lay on them. And we are still waiting to see what the fall out from Jim Kelly’s visit was after the success of Koizumi and the unusual opening up on the part of the North Koreans.

So something has got to give there and we are all waiting for the election shoe to fall in South Korea. But what has made it different and why is that no longer at threat for World War III to us in that region? It is the recognition by China of the Republic of Korea and normalization of relations and telling the North that China had the right to do that.

It is the Perry process and the agreed framework that acknowledged the existence of the North because their whole purpose was to continue life of that regime. And it is the collapse of the Soviet Union, which is now an ally in trying to create a positive set of conditions to bring the north out of its isolation, a failed state, which for years to come will be aid-based in its existence.

We cannot afford failed states. It costs too much. And that is one of the other issues. And Japan. Japan is ratcheting down as the giant, financially, of the world. It is a very important element. But they have wanted to be a normal nation and they have gone into normalization in a way that they are now standing and being counted, as we know, from the very, very unusual rapid passage of the special measures that allows them to support what is going on in the Indian Ocean, at least logistically.

But they are very, very important to the future in terms of maritime and aviation operations because inter-operability and standardization is inherent in the forces of Korea and the forces of Japan with the United States as a result of our many years of relationship. And those two relations are things that we have to keep and we are going to stay with it for sometime to come. The lion is not ready to lay down with the lamb at this point.

On the other side of it, as we look to our other countries in terms of the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia, they are the basis for us to go into multi-national and multi-lateral efforts in dealing with the non-war fighting aspects of security. In my last years of service, I saw more lived saved in Asia than we ever took. We responded, and I am sure this is a story you don’t know, we responded to volcano, to flood, to fire, to drought, constantly providing the technology and assistance that you have to use in war.

Command, control, communications, logistics, transportation, medical, refugee planning, all an inherent part of what it is when you go into an area and you have to make sure that you can take of the complex emergency until the NGOs and the international community can respond. That is the environment in the Asia-Pacific region at this point in time.

Human security I mentioned earlier and I’d just like to close with something that I think is most important as we look ahead. The multi-lateral approach is a necessity for us to recognize and to respond in a way that shows mutual respect to these nations and their culture. Each of the nations in the region is inexorably moving toward democratic government at their own speed economically, politically and wrapped in the chrysalis of their culture.

We have to understand that. We have to understand their pace. It will not be instant gratification. The multi-lateral approach in time of crisis, globally, is the key to enhanced regional comprehensive security cooperation. One certainty that has emerged is, the role of military power has, obviously, as we have heard here today, changed significantly over the span of history since the nation state first appropriated it.

Cooperation and integration of capabilities among states has become a necessity in the interest of human security. We have a tool kit out there in the region, that has been constantly bringing these nations together so that we can work in dealing with non-war fighting aspects of peacekeeping, peace making, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.

In the development of national security strategies, the threat of force inherent in the traditional roles of the military, that is, deterrence, compellence and defense, remain a foundation for interaction within the international system. We have witnessed, as we have already heard, Gulf War, Balkans, Afghanistan, and by the way, I want to go along with Tony because I read something that said Afghanistan must be brought back to the community of nations, and it is a long way from being there.
We cannot claim victory yet. I agree with that wholeheartedly.

The sharing of technology and integration of capabilities in the interest of others in the region will enhance the security for each nation’s most precious resource, its people. We are seeing that precious here being taken out by a shooter and right now we see terrorism and it is living even if it is a minor type of situation. It is not to those being killed any means or the families that are being impacted. So we realize that right here in Washington. Clearly, though, I want to say that military power also has its limits. The long-term efforts by civil law enforcement agencies and the work of international NGOs are necessary to restore infrastructure, rebuild institutions and sustain the basic needs of societies as we are seeing trying to come about in Afghanistan today.

It is only in this evolutionary process that peace and stability can be brought to marginalized countries. Only eight of the 44 countries in the Asia-Pacific region under the unified command plan responsibility of the Pacific commander are considered developed countries by the World Bank per capita income index, only eight. Who are they? Canada, the United States, Brunei, Singapore, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Australia, New Zealand and that is it. It is vital that the positive forces of globalization, whether on an international or regional basis as the case may be demand are used for human security. There is no greater example of this however, than the war on terrorism, which now transcends and effects nearly all cultures. Narrowly conceived unilateral interests have to give way to global necessities, which proclaim that while borders may define the territory and identity of 190 nations, including Timor, our common bond is our humanity.

Questions and Answers

Welham: Wing Commander Duncan Welham from the British Embassy. What the panel has been talking about to my mind is the important part that the military has to play in the reconstruction of countries, being aware of other countries. Do you think it is time, then, that the term nation building should be taken back into the military lexicon?

Davis: Since we have a fair amount of time, I am going to ask the panel to respond to each question as asked. And then at the end, of course, I will ask each to make a final set of closing comments. So, who would like to respond to that. General Zinni?

Sheehan: I will start it off. Nation building is an expensive evolution that the military can do some basic work in but it really takes an international effort. Let me give you a case in point. When I went to work in Kazakhstan, we were building a processing plant/oil refinery. I had 6 thousand people that worked of me. They were Uzbecks, Kazakhs , Turks, Georgians, and a number of others.

For every person that I hired, they supported seven people back in the village. In the work force I had 54 tea girls who basically served tea to the office staff. Of those 54, 38 of them were doctors. I had a painter who had a Ph.D., in mechanical engineering, they did this because they couldn’t find work in their profession.

And so returning to the point that I raised earlier about why we went into Central Asian Republics to help them with their demilitarization of their nuclear weapons; what didn’t happen was all the subsequent institution reforms that were necessary and plus the trickle down effect from money that was coming from the oil and gas business, trickling down to the people who needed it at the akim level and the village level.

It was stopped by the central government. And corruption as you know is a big issue. I think that when you talk about nation building, the military can provide immediate life support activities. Long-term development on the part of a nation is something that takes generations. So, it is an engagement process through the state department, AID, foreign office, whoever have you, and even the companies that are doing business in those particular countries.

So, I am not for creating a cadre of people who do this as a primary occupation. It is a Civil Affairs Reserve function, short term. For the long-term it has to be through international monetary assistance, Asian banks, development banks, EBRD, whatever have you. Tony.

Zinni: I think we need to get serious about nation building. Nation building and nation rebuilding is a fact of life. The trouble is we stick the military with the problem. And it is not just a military problem. As Jack said, the military has a role to play, a significant role. In our own government, other government agencies have a role to play. I think there is an obligation in businesses to support this, private enterprises that should become more involved.

And actually I am seeing that in Afghanistan. There is an attempt to involve American businesses and others in helping with the reconstruction in some way, which actually become mutually beneficial. And I think we need to work on an international approach to nation building, not just a U.S. approach to nation building.

What should be the way we collectively come together and look at the political, economic, social, security, reconstruction and structures that we need to put in place. I go back again to we did a pretty good job in Europe at the end of the Second World War. We did a lousy job at the end of the Cold War. There was actually a half-hearted attempt at a Marshall Plan at the end of the Cold War.

And I actually participated in that. Secretary of State Baker tried to provide the incentives for the international community to come together. It never got off the ground. And so a part of the world that had collapsed what left to self-order. And we can see the results not being that great. So, I think we need to find a way.

Maybe the U.N. is a mechanism or something like that to decide how would we come together as an international community and do reconstruction on all those levels.

Davis: Hank, do you want to say anything.

Stackpole: Yes, I do agree with that also. But recognize that the military is primarily good at complex human emergencies and once they are able to stabilize the situation, it has to be handed off to those who have the ability. In terms of NGOS, for example, if you are doing a humanitarian assistance disaster relief mission or even a peacekeeping one, make sure that you have an NGO with you.

“Don’t leave home without it” is the old American Express card because they are very positive NGOs who so a lot of work. But then there is the international community as a whole that has to respond. Can you do civic action projects along the way? That was one of the things that helped in dealing with the Abu Sayyaf and with the Moral Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines.

We went into a number of civic action situations in concert with the, in the Mindanoa area, in concert with the Philippine forces but no intention to stay. And that is always one of the important things because fear’s always that it is a U.S. presence coming to be permanent on your soil. And in this day and age, it is still a friction between globalization and nationalism and they really want to have that sense of being able to be independent in their own efforts.

Davis: Thank you. Next question. Yes, sir.

Boaklen: Steve Boaklen(?), United States Army War College Faculty. My question is to General Zinni. As a member of the faculty last week, I went to New York with the class and we had the opportunity to visit the U.N. and when I went to one of the Middle Eastern country’s U.N. mission, and I was privileged among our group to have the opportunity to sit down and talk with the ambassador from that country.

And he shares your opinion that, if the Palestinian-Israeli issues could be resolved, U.S. relationships in the region would improve immeasurably over night. He maintains that the United States has the power to bring peace to the region. I’d be interested in your opinion, sir, and the other members’ opinion. Does the United States have that power and if so, why do you think we are reluctant to use it?

Zinni: Well, I think that we maybe are guilty of trying to walk back and, we always fight the last war. In many cases we try to come back and reestablish the last peace process. I think ever since the second intifada began, we have been trying to get back to Camp David. And we structured a way of getting back there, a sequential process that I thought was a good plan and, for the time, made sense.

It just became overcome by events. The sequential process had security first then confidence building measures then some political measures taken then final status agreements, Camp David, Taba, and then, eventually, the political objectives for both sides to achieve peace. There were two ingredients that weren’t in Camp David that were major factors that got lost in the shuffle.

One was our President going to the U.N. and saying there should be a Palestinian state, made he case, the first time a President making that commitment, very significant. The second was Crown Prince Abdullah’s bringing 22 Arab nations, saying, if we can get peace we will recognize the state of Israel. The trouble is the intifada and the problems that were created, a whole other set of issues, that overwhelmed the ability to sequentially get it done and made obsolete the idea that a short mission, a Zinni mission, a Tenet mission, or a Mitchell mission was going to set the spark.

It was all there. The plans were agreed to in principle. All you have to do is ignite the fuse and you are on the way. I realized in my third mission there it would not work. We have gotten to the point now where it is so bad, not that those were bad plans, but it is going to take more than that. There is international recognition that only the United States could lead a path to peace.

In my mind you would have to put a major U.S. delegation on the ground with a permanent address, not coming and going short term missions. It would have to get off the sequentialism and deal with the political, economic security issues, and put monitoring mechanisms in place at the same time. It would have to commit to sticking it out through thick and thin.

It will have to dictate to both parties changes and enforce those changes. If those changes require things like reform the Palestinian authority, then we have got to get in there along with the international community, the EU, the U.N., tell them what reform means, give them the structure and push them to implement it. If it means stop building settlements, then we have got to get in and put pressure on, that settlements stop or are frozen or that they stop building them.

Things that need to be done to move the process to catch the spark. And there are many others. And I just mention a few. And certainly not the least of which and the most important is the cessation of terrorist acts and the need to control that. The international community, the quartet, the major parties involved, the U.N., the EU, Russia, the United States, all the other members and others like Japan who have delegations on the ground look to us.

Every single day they come to us for their matching orders. Where do we go next? What do you want us to do? We are the only ones that can step up to that plate. If you look back at the best of times in this region, regarding the peace process, you will find it is when the United States had a policy that seemed contradictory but worked.

On one hand we maintained a very special relationship with Israel. On the other hand we maintained a very special relationship with the Arab world. And I used to mention it to my counterparts out there, the sharing of technology, the largest military exercise in the world, a number of other things we did in cooperation with our Arab allies. When we were full bore on both commitments and then created a third relationship, that of balanced mediator in the peace process, that was the best of times.

When we have throttled back on any one of those, that is when we have had problems. And right now we are throttled back, in some way in all three but certainly in two in a major way. And I think the United States has to make a commitment. That commitment, putting our energies and our resources into that one issue, will do more than anything else to help curb the anti-Americanism and help stabilize the region.

The region needs a lot more than that, don’t get me wrong. But that is the catalyst. That is the thing that can set the path correctly and defeat the extremists in recruiting the people that feel the sense of disenfranchisement or oppression or injustice.

Davis: Next question. Yes, sir.

Tighe: General Zinni, to follow up from the previous question. Gene Tighe from Rockwell. Have you thought about or has the whole issue of personalities in the region come up, the relationship the administration on the whole has with Prime Minister Sharon versus the relationship with Arafat?

Zinni: I made a promise to myself that I would not make personalities the issue. You don’t make peace between personalities. You make peace between peoples. I was not out there to make peace between Prime Minister Sharon and Chairman Arafat. I was out there to try to find a way to get peace between the Israeli people and the Palestinian people. If you attempt to deal with personalities and get over focused on them, I think the trouble is you are going to get short-term solutions that won’t last. They won’t be enduring.

Or you will get temporary solutions or problems that you have to look past to deal with it. And if you get hung up with personalities, as you see now, it can stop you dead in your tracks, if you let one individual become a stumbling block to proceeding forward. I think you have to blow past the individuals. And this goes not only for the participants, it goes for the mediators, too.

I would get off this idea of Zinni missions and Mitchell missions and Tenet missions. We ought to have a mission out there. If you need an individual to come out for a certain purpose, look George Tenet serves. He is trusted by both sides and works the security issues extremely well. Fine. But it isn’t the Tenet mission.

And his individual comings and goings shouldn’t signal things. Look, I came home for my daughter’s wedding. The said the process had collapsed. Zinni is leaving. You know, you can’t get overly focused on those kinds of personalities or whether Arafat can’t make the peace or Sharon can’t make the commitment.

Those are the kinds of things that if you get it going, if have progress on the ground, the people will commit to it and they will make the political changes necessary and the leadership to get you there, I am convinced having been on the ground and talked to the people and knowing who the others are behind the leadership. And so I believe what we need to do is get off this idea of trying to deal with individuals, acceptable, not acceptable, making peace between their two positions as opposed to something more enduring or comprehensive.

Davis: Next question. On my left. Anyone. Yes, sir.

Wilkinson: Paul Wilkinson, University of St. Andrews. Could I congratulate the moderator on the panel on an outstanding presentation? I would like to pick up a point that Lieutenant Stackpole mentioned about failed states. I wonder whether the panel wouldn’t agree with me that really in an area like Southeast Asia, the problem is not so much states that have completely failed but rather weak or very fragile states, which simple cannot control certain parts of their territory where criminal gangs, terrorists and others can take root and can exploit the use of these areas.

In those circumstances, the policy of bilateral cooperation perhaps should be considered as an excellent model and there are some successful examples of this. The Law Enforcement Assistance Program of the United States does a magnificent job in helping countries to improve the performance of their police services, judiciary, and so on, and particularly in the problem of encountering terrorism.

But I note that it is a mainly American commitment at the moment. Would the panel agree that this is a function, which could be usefully assisted by getting allies to contribute much more help of that nature? One thinks of the Japanese giving financial help in the Cambodian case, the British taking a very burden in Sierra Leone with success. This is a model that we should be encouraging allies surely to undertake.

This is something which can make a practical contribution to increasing security and peace in regions that are under threat. Would the panel agree with that?

Davis: I think everyone wants to say something.

Sheehan: Well, I absolutely agree with your premise, a classic case in point in Central Asia, is the use of the Turks. When we built the Central Asian peacekeeping battalion we used Turkey as a medium, first off because it is a Muslim state, a secular Muslim state, there is a common language among them and they have a long history in the area.

What is interesting is that when we tried to do this through the Council in NATO, because the Turks were perceived as being difficult, most of our initiatives were stopped. But yet, today, the strongest country in Central Asia that does allow the activity you speak about is Turkey. I think that as we evolve, the example you used of UK and Sierra Leone, is an excellent case in point that these states that are in transition, they clearly don’t have the financial resources to upgrade their educational system, police force, health and security delivery mechanisms, they clearly need support from the outside.

And I would just strongly encourage using Turkey, for example in the Central Asia republics. They have got a great history there. They are tremendously effective. We should, in the international community, assist them with financial resources. They will put the people on the ground and make it happen.

Davis: It doesn’t help, though, when the EU doesn’t invite them to become a member.

Sheehan: Well, it wasn’t just the EU. NATO, itself, I don’t want t say it is anti-Turkish, but clearly at that time the Turks were undervalued.

Davis: Hank

Stackpole: In the Asia-Pacific region we have a couple of things that are going that do involve nations other than the U.S. There is the International Law Enforcement Academy located in Bangkok, which has reached out to all of the Asians and is a multi-national funded and it helps, although the U.S. is pretty much the dominant element in it. In addition to that we have had the G-8 and we have also had ASEON start to commit to assisting in those areas particularly.

As you know, Mahathir was approached by Secretary Powell on establishing counter-terrorism center in Kuala Lumpur and that also would be at least regional, certainly not international. So there is an effort underway.

Japanese funding continues in a number of areas. And there has been a great deal of support for East Timor but, of course, that is a nation in the making and it, too, has its problems in being aid-based until such time as they can develop the fossil-fuel capabilities that they have.

Davis: Tony, do you want to say anything?

Zinni: I would just add one thing. Of course I agree. I think one thing we have to always remember as Americans is sometimes there are requirements that other nations meet best because they have a capability that we need on the ground that we don’t. I will give you one example, a national police force. We don’t have in the United States a national force like a carbinieri or a la Guardia Seville or something like that.

So if there is a need to create something like that, there are countries with unique capabilities that could complement what we bring or, in some cases, should take the lead, and I think we saw that in East Timor and elsewhere, that have more regional influence and regional understanding and knowledge. And the U.S.’s role in that may be more supportive in that case.
And I think you have to craft the strategy for each region that brings out not only those outside the region with influence that can help and resources, but those within the region that can help, that you build collective capabilities to help incapable states around some stronger countries. I saw this in our work in East Africa with the Kenyans who actually brought the East African community with Tanzania, Uganda, and stretching out for others, as a potential element for helping keep the peace and helping some of the weaker participants or members.

Davis: We have time for one or two more questions. I know it has been a long day but this is a unique opportunity. Yes, sir.

Kidd: Hello, Richard Kidd from the U.S. Department of State. Earlier today we were urged to think creatively and to develop solutions that cross inter-agency barriers and across country barriers. General Zinni has called for a new Marshall Plan to structure our international engagement. What about something akin to a Manhattan Project to change this nation’s energy consumption equation, switching from Mid East oil to renewables and other sources of energy?

If this were to be successful, how would it change the security equation, and would it be worth the investment?

Davis: Jack, do you want to take that?

Sheehan: Since I am in the energy business, let me give you some numbers. It takes less than $2 dollars to produce a barrel of oil in Saudi Arabia. Heavy crude oil out of Canada is about $30 dollars production per barrel of oil. Alternative fuels need to be in the $30 to $35 dollars a barrel to be kind of economically feasible. That is a commercial decision that the Shell, Exxon-Mobil, Chevron-Texacos have got to make.

Right now alternative fuels are not commercially viable it does not produce enough revenue. The question then, does the government step up and funds that activity? I don’t think that will happen. I think what you see happening, though, in this U.S.-Russian dialogue and the development of Caspian energy is an alternative to Mid East fuels.

As you know the real issue in the Mid East is, the swing production capability that exists out of Saudi Arabia. If you create that capability in international marketplace then you lessen international dependence on Saudi oil. I think that that, like Tony’s point, has to be put in a much larger strategic framework and discussion. If you just deal with it as, how do I take this Saudi swing production off the marketplace and replace it with Russian’s Caspian, then I think you are sub-optimizing your bigger problem.

So, in terms of an energy policy, one, I don’t think the major oil companies are going to make the investment unless oil gets up to about $35 dollars a barrel, which I don’t think is going to happen in the near term since we are already paying a war premium. And two, I think that it has to be put in a much larger security context, strategic context rather than just anti-Mid East oil.

Zinni: I would infer from your point that you are assuming that if we could get rid of our dependence on energy, then the region be damned. We don’t have to worry about it. And I would say for the reasons that General Stackpole brought up of globalization, migration, the way instability and problems and WMD development happens, those days are over.

That if we don’t need your product, we don’t need to worry about you, we can just isolate ourselves from you. So, I am all for a better energy program. I think it will take a 50, 60 years even if you started now, to make it efficient and effective and lose the dependency. But that aside, it doesn’t get rid of the requirement to stabilize this region in my mind. I think the problems of the region are going to get to you not only because of your energy dependence on the region, that is just one facet of it.

Stackpole: And I would like to add that you are talking about a worldwide situation, because of the limited time, of course, I didn’t bring up India or China, which is in our area or responsibility. And both of those countries, if they had the road network that we had, would drive us out of fossil fuel, and they all had cars, in a very short period of time.

So there is an imperative but it is not moving fast because of cost, as General Sheehan said, but there are a number of technologies out there. There is hydrogen fuel cells, but that takes a little work to get it to where they want to. There is the use of plasma melting enhanced systems to take our trash, which is with us as much as death and taxes and convert that into energy forms.

So there are a number of other things out there. But it is going to take a lot more from the industry. One thing our government is doing is providing incentives and tax breaks for those who are exploring those particular technologies.

Davis: We have time for one final question. Yes, sir.

Mahalek: Tom Mahalek from the U.S. General Accounting Office. I wanted to know, and this is a question for the whole panel, in terms of the Russian perception of the U.S. presence in the near abroad, particular with basing in the ‘Stans’, we had a speaker earlier say that the new relationship with Russia has transformed cooperation with Russian and those perceptions with the Putin government.

However, when one reads the Russian press and perceptions, what could the panel, perhaps, say about the long-term impact of the U.S. presence in the near abroad as the Russians view it.

Davis: Jack.

Sheehan: First, I think it is very much a transitional question. If you had said to me eight years ago was stationing U.S. forces in Central Asia possible, I would have said not only would it have run into a great deal of opposition here in the U.S. but it would have been a very difficult political issue because the relationship between Russia, NATO, the west had not matured. I think as a result of the Partnership for Peace Program and the strategic NATO-Russian relationship, those barriers are gradually going down.

I think the issue then becomes the question which nation are you talking about stationing forces in whether it is in the trans-Caucus or the Central Asian republics, I get concerned about Iran not Russia. It looks increasingly like we are encircling Iran on the west and east and so I think, again, it gets to the biggest strategic issue, as Tony said, what is our plan from Indonesia through the Babel Mandeb Straits in terms of a strategic viewpoint.

Russia is a partner. Three weeks ago I was Bautino in Kazakhstan. If you don’t know your geography it is in the southern part of the Caspian. There was a Russian-Kazakh joint exercise going on because the Iranian gunboats were in the Caspian. There were four Mig-29s, four attack helicopters, and a motorized rifle division. There were operating right next to where we were.
So I think that there is a dialogue that is taking place. I think it is a maturing dialogue. I think the NATO-Russian piece, the Russian-European piece is very important. But it gets back to my original point that we cannot disengage from the dialogue of both, with Russia, with NATO, with the European Union, and anybody else who has a stake in this issue.

Because as soon as you go unilateral, you will screw it up.

Zinni: I think it is important to think of Russia as a potential partner in this. You can’t exclude their influence I this region. They could actually use our presence to justify taking action themselves under their anticipatory self-defense and that might work against us. They have issues with Georgia and other places there that they might use that as an excuse. I think you want to bring Russia under the tent in this region and you want some sort of cooperative relationship.

Our presence should be transparent and clear to them why it is there so it is not threatening. I think they should be seen with us. In the CENTRASPEB(?), the Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalion effort and our initial stages that were started by General Sheehan, we had Russian troops that participated and came down. And I thought what that showed was our attempt to be transparent, our attempt to show that we weren’t trying to influence the region but rather create some kind of force for stability.

They participated with us in the Balkans. And, you know, it was difficult but I think that is the kind of model we need, not that our presence should threaten them or they should be excluded. If anything else I think we need to get them understanding what we are doing and keep a handle on what they may try to do and justify under whatever we are using as justification for our actions.

Stackpole: I am working in a joint program with the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies with the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford. And we have an involvement with Russian, China, India, Pakistan, and ourselves looking at everything that is being talked about here, the recovery of Afghanistan to the community of nations, the viability of Pakistan where it is, the situation versus the Stans.

And so, in one sense the whole issue of what was brought about by 9/11 has helped us to re-engage, if you will, with China, Russia in a dialogue that I think is a very, very essential item because one of the things that we constantly run into with the fellows who come to my program is U.S. position relating, for example, to China in this case, although I am moving it away from your Russian comment, because Russia attends our program also. But they say, “Look, you look at China. China looks at you. We look at your relationship. Don’t make us choose sides.”

It is as simple as that. So, the more interactivity that we have, the better off. And we are seeing this kind of thing with Russia being an aid to us in our relationship with China.

Davis: I think I saw a burning question.

Stump: Gordon Stump, the Adjutant General from Michigan. We also have a state-partnership program with the country of Latvia. With the expansion of NATO, they are looking up to six of seven nations getting in, and the idea that one nation can have veto power over some decisions that are being made within NATO, and the three countries just got in, do you think that the expansion of NATO is going to make it a more effective organization or a less effective organization. Is this a positive or a negative?

__: In terms of NATO enlarging, I happen to think it adds to the security especially in that particular part of the world. The reality is, in NATO, even when we are at 16 there were only four nations that decided. That is the grim reality, what really happened. The great thing about the NATO process is that we politically work together. We militarily work together. So there is an automatic response to the process, whatever happened, whatever the issue that was occurring.

The Trans-Atlantic Charter that created NATO is primarily a political instrument. It has a military component. So anything that increases that dialogue, I am for, as part of this process. And so I think would Latvia veto something, the answer to that is no they will not. I think their voice, though, in the Baltic issues is very important. And so I am not the least bit concerned about enlarging the club.

A number of Europeans are. But they will get over it. It is part of the evolutionary process of the strategic framework of what NATO does. But I think the big issue is can NATO as an institution get away from its Article V focus and be a force for peace beyond where they are currently right now. And I think that debate is still very much open.

Davis: Did that spark any other questions? Well, with that, I would like to turn once again to the panel members just to ask you if you have a final statement you wish to make. We will go in the other order. Okay. Tony.

Zinni: No.

Davis: Jack.

Sheehan: No.

Davis: Well, it remains for us to thank the panel for their very frank remarks.
[Applause]