Previous IFPA-Fletcher Conferences
The 34th IFPA-Fletcher
Conference on
National Security Strategy and Policy:
Security Planning
and Military Transformation
December
2-3, 2003
U.S. Chamber of
Commerce Building
Lafayette Square, 1615 H Street, NW
Washington, D.C.
Address by Lieutenant General Edward G. Anderson III, USA, Deputy Commander, U.S. Northern Command
Introduction by Captain Peter M. Swartz, USN (Ret.), Director, Strategic and Operational History Studies, CNA Corporation for Strategic Studies
Captain Peter M. Swartz: I'm Peter Swartz. I'm from the CNA Corporation, where I'm an analyst. And I want to thank Captain Mangold and Admiral Mauney and Dr. Pfaltzgraff and Dr. Davis for inviting me here. This is all to show you that jointness not only is the way the military does things, but also the way we do things in academia and think tanks. Because I went to SAIS, not Fletcher, and I work at CNA, not IFPA, and they're allowing me to moderate this panel.
We've heard from the commentators and the thinkers. We've heard from the planners and the policymakers, and from one doer, Admiral Ellis. And now we come to a whole panel of doers, actually, not just doers, but experienced warriors. But what are they doing, and how are they doing it, and how are things changing? And those are some of the points that we're going to explore on this panel.
The organizers of the conference, IFPA, the Navy, and so on, have put together a series of topics which we should be discussing here, and they're in your program. But I think it would be useful to set the stage by going through them a bit. Command priorities in essential mission areas: What are they for the Combatant Commanders, and where are they headed, more importantly? Sealing the seams: working through cross-regional issues. Third, as Admiral Green pointed out in his remarks this morning, the President has said that his top priority is prosecuting the global war on terror. What does that mean for combatant command planning? I think more importantly, what does it mean for combatant command operations? Because the three panelists we have today are not sitting, waiting for a balloon to go up. The balloon is always up, every day, for their commands. Re-balancing forward presence and support infrastructure. We heard from Secretary Hoehn this morning about that, and perhaps we'll hear some more from the panelists today. And then finally, synchronizing CONUS-based capabilities for regional contingencies.
We've got three distinguished panelists today: General Hill, the Commander of the Southern Command, Vice Admiral Olson, who is the Deputy Commander of the Special Operations Command, and Lieutenant General Anderson, who is the Deputy Commander of the US Northern Commands. And General Anderson is no stranger to those of you that attend these conferences. He was here, and played an important role last year. And you can read his remarks in the program that's available outside.
Captain Swartz: Batting cleanup, both for the panel and the day, is General Anderson. Lieutenant General Edward Anderson-- Edward G. Anderson III, actually-- US Army, is Deputy Commander, as I said before, of the US Northern Commander, and the Vice Commander of the US element of NORAD, the North American Aerospace Defense Command. Prior to this appointment, he served as Director for Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff. Other assignments included Commander of the US Army Space and Missile Defense Command. General Anderson's awards and decorations include, among other things, the Bronze Star Medal and the Bronze Star Medal with a V Device. He's a graduate of the United States Military Academy, the British Higher Command and Staff Course. He also has an MS in aeronautical engineering from Georgia Tech, and an MA in national security and strategic studies, in true joint fashion, from the Naval War College. General Anderson.
Lieutenant General Edward G. Anderson III: Thanks, Peter. Let me begin by first of all saying congratulations to Dr. Bob Pfaltzgraff and to Dr. Jackie Davis, and IFPA and the Fletcher School for organizing this very, very important conference to address issues that are absolutely critical and important to the nation. Another job well done. I also note that DTRA and the Navy are cosponsors of the conference, and I want to make sure I don't pass up the opportunity to make sure, in deference to the cosponsors, and my partner to the right here, beat Navy.
__: In your dreams.
General Anderson: Maybe I should say, beat somebody.
__: Some other year, Ed.
General Anderson: Yeah, okay. Maybe next year. Okay, I got it. Okay. Well, anyway, on behalf of General Ed Eberhart, who is the Commander of US Northern Command, as well as NORAD, and the men and women of NorthCom, we thank you all for including us and inviting us to participate in this session, in this conference, and certainly for the opportunity to be a part of this very distinguished panel.
As you know, US Northern Command is the newest regional combatant command in the nation. A lot of exciting things have been going on out there over this past year. And I'd like to take a few moments to just share some of those things with you, and so, next slide, please. This is how I've organized the briefing. I'll tell you a little bit about how we got to where we are, a little bit about what we're doing today, and then just a little bit about where we're headed. And then, obviously, we'll open it up to questions for you. Next slide, please.
But first, what I'd like to do is I'd like to begin with the mission statement. As you look at this mission statement, the first bullet there about the "deter, prevent, and defeat" is basically a common element of a mission statement of any of the regional Combatant Commanders. We all have that responsibility for our AOR. But it is the second bullet that distinguished NorthCom from the other regional Combatant Commanders, and that is to do what we refer to as MACA, military assistance to civil authorities, when directed by the president of the Sec. Def. As I say, that makes us a little bit different.
To look at it, perhaps, or characterize it in a slightly different way, you could also look at it by saying the first part is the homeland defense mission, and in that mission, we would be the lead federal agency here in the United States, whereas the MACA mission, the second part of our mission statement, we would be doing that in support of another lead federal agency, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, whoever it may be. But I want to emphasize, in support of. We would not be the lead for a military assistance to civil authorities activity. And as you'll note at the bottom of the chart there, on 9/11 of this year, the Commander declared that we were fully operationally capable of executing this very complex and important mission, and I'll talk a little bit more about that a little bit later. Next slide, please.
Just like any Combatant Commander, SouthCom, PACOM, CENTCOM, whatever, we have an area of responsibility, and it is outlined in black on this chart. Now, this is another difference between us and our fellow regional Combatant Commanders. And that is the fact that our homeland is in our area of responsibility. And as such, what that does is that creates a much different operating environment that we have to work within than our other Combatant Commanders. And so, for example, when you talk joint in our area of responsibility, in addition to the traditional definition of joint being several services come together, it also, for us, the way we define joint, is that it also includes the interagency, for they are very, very key players in our area of responsibility.
So, as you can see, there are a couple of things here that are a little bit different. You should note, also, that in addition to the homeland, we also have the approaches the homeland, and that includes Canada, for the land approach in the north, and Mexico, for the land approach to the south. And certainly we have the maritime approaches, so our AOR boundary extends at least 500 miles from our shore, and does include part of the Caribbean. What it does not include is it does not include Greenland, which is part of UCOM. It does not include Hawaii, which still falls under Pacific Command, but we are a supporting commander to Pacific Command for homeland defense of Hawaii. And it does not include Cuba, which still falls under the responsibility of SouthCom.
So, the other point I'd like to make to you here is, you'll see on the chart two areas defined as forward regions. So in addition to the area of responsibility, which is very specifically defined, our area of interest, much the same as SOCOM's, is global. And the basis for that is that we believe-- Not believe. We know, and you know, that the vast majority of threats to this nation will originate outside of our AOR. And so we are very, very interested in what's going on in the other regional combatant commands. You saw the chart that General Hill put up there with regard to the terrorist organizations in SouthCom. That is something that we track very, very closely.
So, with that as background, let me just briefly now take a look at how we got to where we are today. Next slide, please. The road to FOC is the road to fully operationally capable. In the first year of our existence, that consumed a vast amount of our energy and efforts, were achieving FOC. When the command was established, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman directed the Commander, General Eberhart, to achieve full operational capability no later than 1 October of this year. So, our plan at that point was to bring the personnel into the command, and staff the command, and organize the command, and then to train those personnel, and then to conduct the exercises necessary, do the assessment, and make the adjustments, in terms of bringing the command on.
However, in retrospect, as we look now at where we've been during that first year, we would say that there are three capstone events that really shaped the way the command has emerged over that period of time, and really served as the enablers for us to achieve full operational capability. Two of those events were planned event. One was an unplanned event. First of all, with regard to the planned events, the preparation of the work to get us to initial operational capability was intense. It was a great job that was done by the planning team, and by Joint Forces Command, who assist us. And we received great, great support from the services and the Joint Staff. And without all of that, we absolutely could not have been ready, on the first of October of '02, to declare initial operational capability, with all of about 175 people on board at that particular point, about eight months after the decision was announced about the formation of Northern Command.
The next planned event was an exercise called Determined Promise '03. It was always intended to be what we referred to as our graduation exercise. It was designed to stress the command with multiple and simultaneous homeland defense and MACA events, and it did that. And JFCOM (?) served as the independent evaluator for us. We had some very, very specific tasks, and it gave us the ability to assess our readiness for full operational capability. But another very important element was done as a part of that exercise, which we were able to capitalize on as well. And that is, we were able, for the first time, to exercise with all of our partners in homeland defense and homeland security, specifically the Department of Homeland Security, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, both of which were formed, or became operational in March of this year, and then as well as, of course, Northern Command, and any other organizations.
But in the exercise of Determined Promise, we also had the opportunity to work with state officials, specifically from Nevada, which was where one of the major bioterrorist incidents was simulated, as well as local officials at both the county and city level in Las Vegas. I can tell you, this was a tremendous learning experience for them, all of them, and certainly was a very, very significant learning experience for us, which had tremendous payoff for us.
The third event, which was the unplanned event, was Operation Iraqi Freedom. And as you know, the theme of the conference is to examine security planning and military transformation since Operation Iraqi Freedom. And this event was very important for us, in this way. As I say, we did not know at the time of IOC that the nation intended to invade Iraq in March. I'm not sure anybody knew at that particular point. But as we saw this developing, and as we started doing the analysis of the threat, it was clear that there could be a threat to this nation if Saddam chose to use it. And so, what that then forced us to do was to go into the battle staff organization, if you will, to organize ourselves accordingly. But more importantly, it put a mindset and a culture on the command. It made us understand that homeland defense was real, and the importance that NorthCom brought. And so, that has served, as I say, as a shaping event for NorthCom, and showed us that homeland defense was no longer just an exercise. In fact, it was a reality. And the stark reality of how important it was came to us very, very clearly. Fortunately, as you know, nothing happened. But that's okay. That's the way it should be.
So, those were three capstone events. There were obviously many, many other things that we did during that period of time. But in less than a year, the Commander was able to declare, on 9/11 of this year, than the command was fully operationally capable. So, with that as a little bit of background on how we got to where we are, let's look at where we are today. Next slide, please.
And what I'd like to begin with is the threat. And at the risk of sounding like an alarmist, I would hope that there is no doubt among any of you out there that there are those out there who have as their intention to bring great harm to this nation, the institutions of this nation, and the people of this nation, on the same scale as 9/11, and probably bigger. No doubt they are there, and they are preparing for it. They are smart, and they are determined. We must not underestimate this enemy. Time is not a concern to them. Effects are what they are trying to achieve, and they will take as long as they need to so that they can make sure they achieve the affect that they want to accomplish. And weapons of mass destruction continue to be their preferred means. They may not have it now, but that doesn't mean they have not stopped determining that that is their preferred choice.
So, we absolutely must make sure that we do not let our guard down. And we in US Northern Command are working 24/7, along with all of the other homeland defense partners, Department of Homeland Security, and a multitude of others, so that we can make sure that we in fact do the "deter and prevent" part of our mission. To us, that's the most important. If we can deter and prevent, then obviously we don't need to defeat. We're prepared to defeat if that's what's necessary, but we've got to take the steps to deter and prevent.
So, what are some of the things we're doing? Next slide, please. Now that we've achieved full operational capability, our intent in the command is to get better, to be better at doing our business. And so, we're refining many of the operational procedures that we inherited. Many of those operational procedures were put in place to address natural disasters years ago, or the invasion of Russia, or the attacks by Russia, or whatever. But now we are in a new operating environment, a new threat environment, a new strategic environment. And so we are examining the operational processes that are there. You see Operation Noble Eagle. That is the domestic portion of the global war on terrorism. We have responsibility for that. We do that in conjunction with NORAD, who does the air portion of Operation Noble Eagle, our sister command, of course. And I want to make it clear, NORAD is not a subcommand of NorthCom. They are two distinct and separate commands.
We are working with SouthCom and the Joint Staff to address the maritime security issues. We have quick reaction forces and ready reaction forces that are identified and on a state of alert every day. And we will exercise those through deployment to a wide variety of different places. We have a futures group which we have established with Sandia Lab, which enables us to take a look at the future environment, and some of the threats that we may face, and to identify full spectrum solutions to include technology, so that we can remain ahead of our potential adversaries. And certainly one of the key parts for us, in terms of our ability to do our mission, is through our relationships. And we must make sure that we are strengthening and exercising those relationships. One of the vehicles for doing that is, we are involved with DHS in the development of a national exercise plan, which is in its early stages at the moment. And we are doing deliberate planning for, of course, Operation Noble Eagle, but contingency planning as well. Next slide, please.
This is not an eye chart. There will be no test on this chart. I just want you to see that, starting at the top, we are working with NORAD, National Guard Bureau, and US Coast Guard, many organizations who have had a very strong history of doing homeland defense. Obviously we have our traditional service component commanders, not their organizations, but just their commanders. So you see up there, NORTHAF, North Command Air Force, R-North (?), and so on and so forth. But what's a little bit different here, and what has come about as a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom, is what you see in the light blue, where we have established functional command. So you see what is referred to as the JFLCC, Joint Forces Land Component Commander, Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander, and Joint Forces Air Component Commander. Those are normally constructs that are established when you are engaged in conflict. And so we established those organizations as a part of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and we have stayed in those configurations. We do not have many forces assigned to us. You'll see Joint Force headquarters, homeland security up in the right, and JTF-6 and JTF Civil Support. Those are really our only assigned forces, but we know where to get the forces if they were necessary. In our view, we are at war today in this theater. We're not waiting for the war to begin. Next slide, please.
These are our priorities that the Commander has established. Each one of these could be a separate briefing in and of itself. I won't go through that with you all. All I really wanted to show you is the wide spectrum of issues that we are addressing in the command. Note that missile defense is right at the top of that, and that will be-- We will be the operators of the missile defense system for North America, and for the United States, effective 1 October. And we're working with STRATCOM and the Missile Defense Agency to make that a reality. Next slide, please.
In addition to that, we have established our vision. You can see it here. We're looking for a layered and integrated defense across the full spectrum of domain, air, land, sea, and cyberspace. Obviously, what we want to do is we want to be able to anticipate events and provide sustained and responsive, as well as seamless support for military assistance to civil authorities. We must develop a capability to manage information, and then share information, particularly with our interagency partners, which is a little bit of a challenge for us here, early on. And then of course, working with our neighbors to achieve continental security. Next slide, please.
The way we are implementing the vision is that we're, number one, going to transform the way we're operating. We have established a combined intelligence fusion center. We are not intelligence or information collectors. We take the products of collection agencies and fuse them into information and intelligence that is important for us here in our area of responsibility. I say again, we do not collect. We are establishing a Joint Force headquarters for the national capitol region here, to better be able to do the mission that we have at hand. We are changing JTF-6, which has for 13 years been responsible for counter-narcotics support to law enforcement agencies, primarily along the southwest border. We are using in part the model that General Hill described earlier, with JIATF South, so that we can-- And we'll build a JIATF North. And then we are establishing a standing Joint Force headquarters. All of the regional Combatant Commanders have to do that.
In the context of continental security, we are working with Canada and Mexico. Of course, Canada is no problem whatsoever. We have a very, very strong relationship with them, in large part by virtue of our sister command, NORAD, and of course their presence there. So, that's not a problem. The Bi-National Planning Group that you see there is intended to fill the void between NORAD, which is responsible for aerospace defense-- The Bi-National planning group also works land, maritime, and civil support. And by December of next year, a year from now, a determination will be made as to whether or not we continue with the Bi-National Planning Group, or, an option is that if it's politically acceptable to perhaps establish a NORAD that is a North American defense command, not just a North American aerospace defense command, in other words, has the full spectrum of responsibility. And then, we believe that there is a major role to be played by the reserve components in homeland defense. We have undertaken our own study, independent study, to examine some of those options, and we're participating in a variety of other studies with other players as well. Next chart, please.
Some final thoughts. Deterring is, as I say, one of our very, very important challenges, and we tried to do that through plans and exercises with the many partners that we have. And we looked, as best we can, to support operations in those forward regions, in other words, so that we can get to the threat before it gets to us. Next slide, please. Final thoughts. This is a busy time for us in US NorthCom, and has been. But I'll tell you, we are blessed with highly dedicated and motivated people there, and they really do make the difference. We all know how important these missions are, not only for us, but for the nation. So, 24/7/365, you have people there who are doing homeland defense and military assistance to civil authorities. And we will continue to be better, to get better. That is our goal. We are totally focused. We know how important this is to our nation, and to the people of this nation, and we cannot and will not fail. Next slide, please. And I look forward to your questions. Thank you very much.
Questions and Answers
Audience: Rick Middle with the Dallas Morning News. I wanted to ask you, General Anderson, your-- One of your slides suggested that another terrorist attack of the sort we had on 9/11 is inevitable. Do you really think it's inevitable? And why do you think we haven't had something similar happen yet? Is it because you folks are so good, or is it because al-Qaeda is not up to it, or are we just lucky?
General Anderson: First of all, I do think that another attack, or another attempt at an attack, is inevitable. Let me say that. Because I'd like to believe that we'll have sufficient indications and warning that we'll be able to, if not see it coming, and if we do see it coming, to defeat it. And I think the reason why-- Or, there are many reasons, perhaps, why we have not seen anything yet. I think part of the reason has been the success of SOCOM, the global war on terrorists, and the other regional combatant commands. There's no question that we have somewhat disrupted the command and control of the terrorist leadership out there. But, I would caveat that by saying, as you saw in the chart there, that the point I made that these folks are adaptive. And so, it's a case of measure, countermeasure, measure, countermeasure, in trying to stay ahead. And so, that's why I believe that, in fact, inevitably they will try again.
Audience: Joe Shirey from Air Force Air Combat Command. General Hill, I appreciated that briefing. Especially encouraging to see the results in Colombia. Your comments about some of the activities that were going on there, where you sent your sergeant major down, and he worked with the enlisted corps, were consistent with some of the earlier panel comments about things we should be doing out there in the future as the military works in post-OIF Iraq. Recognizing that this might be a little bit of a stretch, given that Colombia is not Iraq, I wonder if you've thought any about how the successes in Colombia might somehow apply to Iraq or Afghanistan, given the theme of the conference.
General Hill: Well, we share, inside the military, daily, lessons learned across the different combatant commands, and across the different services and the training events. So any of the things that we're doing have some translation. But there is a translation that does fit more closely to the war on terrorism, and that is what is going on in terms of the organization, and how the integration of intelligence in Guantanamo could be applied to some of the intelligence levels going on in Iraq today. That would be a closer fit.
Audience: For General Hill. I'm Jim Garamone (?) with American Forces Press Service. Last year, I think it was, Secretary Rumsfeld went down to Santiago and proposed a couple of regional initiatives for a maritime force and a peacekeeping force. I was just wondering what kind of progress there has been made on that. And a second question I'd pile on if I could, sir, is, Uribe is the real deal, you said. What's going on with all the resignations in his cabinet?
General Hill: To the first part, what Secretary Rumsfeld talked about in Santiago was working regionally to combat ungoverned spaces, and that goes on at a bilateral and a regional basis daily, in discussions. Also talked about a maritime initiative called Enduring Friendship. And we have been progressing on that, and in fact, we'll run an exercise under the banner of Enduring Friendship later this year in the Caribbean as a model for that.
Along that same line, I was in Chile last year, and in a discussion with the Chilean Chief of Naval Operations, he remarked to me that Chile was the fourth largest user of the Panama Canal. And I said, "That's terrific. What do you do to help defend it?" And he looked at me blankly. A very good man, a very bright guy. And I said, "I didn't mean to stab at that." I said, "But if it's important to you, then we ought to do something regionally to work with it." So, this summer, we ran an exercise with the Chilean Navy and the Panamanian naval forces, a counterterrorism operation to defend the Pacific approaches to the canal. It was a great exercise called Panamex. We're going to expand that next year, and that's some of the regional stuff that's going on in that same regard.
As to the hostages, we do not know where the hostages are. We continue to look with them, with all the intelligence level that we have. And if we can pinpoint them and where they are, then we'll take what appropriate measures as e can. That's really about all I can say about that.
Audience: Ed Bruner from the Congressional Research Service. A question for Admiral Olson and General Anderson. The question involves counterterrorism within the United States by special ops forces. Is that decided, which of you does that, is it not decided, or are we not supposed to know?
Audience: Mazur Sleeman (?), analyst, Global Media. A question about special operation, regarding the experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the future operation in Iraq right now. We heard a lot about special operation against the remnants of Saddam Hussein's regime, and his regime, the task 120 (?), or different names. We heard about regional special operation command in Jiputi (?). What kind of coordination with the regional states special operation is having in success in coordinating their effort with US special operation in that region?
__: The relationship between the special operations forces and the regional national forces varies country by country. It depends on the history of our relationship with them, and their desire to work with us, our desire to work with them. I think what we're seeing in particular now in Iraq-- And there are coalition special operations organizations. These organizations, people with whom we've worked in special operations for many years, some of who have now come together on the battlefields of Iraq. But we're seeing a transition, if you will, from the special reconnaissance direct action piece of special operations back more towards the unconventional warfare piece of special operations. The Iraqis will tell you proudly that the second largest force in the coalition today is the Iraqis themselves. And so we are finding ourselves back in the classic unconventional warfare, work with the indigenous force in order to enable it to fight its own campaign in Iraq. I think that's what you'll see the near to mid term future play out.
Captain Swartz: How about some graduate students or junior officers or something? How often do you get a chance to grill some general flag officers?
Audience: Major Dave Filer from West Point.
Captain Swartz: Close enough.
Audience: Beat 'em, sir. Sir, this is a question for General Anderson. Sir, should Congress look at changing posse comitatus?
General Anderson: Say that again?
Audience: Should Congress look at changing the law of posse comitatus?
General Anderson: We don't think so. We are comfortable with posse comitatus as it currently is, with the changes that have been employed in that, and we see no need for any changes at this time.
Audience: Sir, second question for you. Could you comment on what NorthCom's relationship is with the governors of the 50 states?
General Anderson: Yeah. The relationship with the governors of the 50 states is primarily exercised through the National Guard, and specifically the TAGs. As you know, each state has an adjutant general. You saw the chart here, the organizational chart there that showed the connection to the National Guard Bureau. So, we would exercise, through those organizations. Now, the way the system works, if a crisis occurs, whether it's natural or manmade, in a state, as you know the local folks are the ones who are expected to immediately be on the scene and try to correct the situation. If it exceeds their capabilities, they go to the state. If it exceeds the state's capabilities, which include the National Guard, then that governor would go to the President, and the President would probably go to DHS, Governor Ridge. DHS would then determine whether or not they have sufficient capability, or we in the military have some unique capability that can be used to apply against the crisis. And if that is the case, then Governor Ridge would request Sec. Dev. to use those capabilities, and Sec. Dev. would approve it, and it would come to us. We would then plug back in through the emergency operations center there, but work primarily with the TAG. But it is conceivable that we could work with the governor as well.
One of the things, however, that we are trying to undertake is a campaign to educate governors through the National Governors Association, and various other fora that exist, on our capabilities, and what it is that we would be able to bring for them. So it's a team effort in doing military assistance to civil authorities, let there be no doubt. And we recognize that.
Audience: I'm Colonel Jim Holzerith (?), the Canadian military attaché. I'm sorry I'm not a graduate student nor a junior officer, but I'll pose a question, regardless. Gentleman, I'd like to come back to the question of intelligence, and intelligence fusion, as it applies to the Joint Interagency Task Force, the Center for Special Forces, and the Joint Intelligence Fusion Center, I believe, and it's obviously key across all three of your command operations. And my question really comes to the area of, what areas of improvement, or are there obstacles in terms of sharing, particularly interagency, and practical problems in terms of gathering from the variety of censors worldwide, and the fusion of that, in terms of timely and relevant analysis for execution?
Admiral Olson: Clearly, in today's technologically advanced world, we've got more data and more intelligence than we can fuse and analyze on a daily basis. I mean, it's jus there. there's just so much of it. And you have to continue to work at that, to figure out better ways to sort it. In Guantanamo, we have developed a system that gets us into everybody else's databases, and shares the data that we have with everybody else's intelligence database. That has led, in my opinion, to some significant intelligence gains in the last six months. But it's a process that's got to continue. And we've got to continue doing better interagency sharing of intelligence, and national sharing with our friends and neighbors.
__: I would certainly echo that. I believe that the collaboration of intelligence efforts now is far greater than it's ever been. I mean, we have seen a passion over the past couple of years to improve the intelligence sharing across the board, interagency and internationally. It's changes of liaison officers, the opening of doors that had previously been closed. Some--
Admiral Olson: -- moving toward. Across the board are these intelligence fusion centers in which many different organizations are represented, all of whom have pipes laid back to their headquarters, so that we don't need everybody's database in our system. We just need access to the person who can access their database. And that's led to a much more rapid machining, if you will, of intelligence to make it a product the operators can use.
General Hill: Can I add to that too? Because I think that what you said, Eric, is right on the mark. This intelligence sharing is kind of like jointness. The United States military became joint in 1986 at the point of a Congressional gun. And clearly we're not as joint today as we should be, but we are more joint in just the last two years than we were. We are certainly doing better intelligence sharing, interagency-wise, than we were two years ago, and we'll be better two years from now. But it's been an iterative process, and one that visionary people are pushing every day.
__: The challenge for us, as you know, is the fusion of intel (?) in law enforcement information. And intel has not been a problem. I mean, we have worked very closely, and have established relationships, and exchanged personnel, so on and so forth, with the traditional sources of intel, CIA, DIA, NRO, and that kind of thing. So, we have those for looking outside our borders. However, the other element is the law enforcement piece, and that's the new piece. And so we are making progress. I would say we are probably at about seven on a scale of 10 in terms of information sharing. We've made tremendous strides, as has been alluded to here earlier.
But there is still work to be done. Part of that is, of course, the fact that some of these organizations are just getting established, TTIC and other organizations. And so as they get established and undertake to do what they do, our responsibility is to make sure that we work with them, and explain to them what it is that we can provide them, and solicit from them their assistance. And that's all, I think, coming along very, very well. But it's not a technological problem for us. It's a cultural problem. I mean, there are just barriers, cultural barriers, that have been developed over the years. And every time we come across one, we break it down, and the leadership of those various organizations are right there to support it, and it works, and it happens.
But we are very careful. In the Combined Intelligence Fusion Center, we have included in there a legal section, to ensure that we are not violating any responsibilities, laws, rules regulations, in the context of intelligence oversight. And we train our people very, very carefully, to make sure that we don't inadvertently do something that is illegal. Because we can't. So, we're very, very cautious there about that.
Audience: My name is Brice Harris , OSDC 2 Policy. My question is for you, General Hill. I wonder if you could tell us, how important do you believe it is, strategically, that the Chinese are becoming, and in fact to a great extent already have become figured so prominently in the Western hemisphere, particularly in such places as Panama, and in Cuba?
General Hill: Well, it's an excellent question. I think that it's important that we continue to monitor that. The Chinese have made inroads throughout Latin America. They do it, I think, for two reasons. One is because a lot of Latin America countries are still recognized from Taiwan. And they want to get a wedge in on that. And the other things is, they want to make sure that we're not left in our own front yard, front porch, with the sole power moving around the area. They are there. Every place I go, the Chinese have made visits into the countries, have invited militaries to go visit China. They're there. So we watch it on a very careful basis.
While I've still got the floor, can I do one thing? And it's a totally different issue.
__: It's nice to have four stars.
General Hill: Thanks. But I want to go back to the question back here, on the hostage issue in Colombia. I gave you a factual, crummy answer. What I'd like to do is give you a little bit better answer. We do not know where the hostages are specifically. And the reason is because if you take a look at Colombia, if I asked, if I went out on the street, and maybe even in this room, to describe Colombia to me, you'd probably describe El Salvador. In point of fact, though, Colombia is the size of Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Arkansas, and a little bit more. About one-half of it is complete jungle, very much similar to the jungle triple canopy that I wandered around in Vietnam, to where if I was walking right here, and there was 100 people where the flag is, we would not see each other, and we could pass, and just go our separate ways. That is the area where the hostages, one, were taken, and where they are, in some size area we believe them to be today. We just simply can't pinpoint it.
It goes back to the intelligence piece, too. There are lots of things we simply can't do. One of the great things of being thought of as having all this technology is when you simply don't have it, or you're not omniscient in it, that people don't understand that in point of fact, you cannot look down through triple canopy jungle and find stuff. And that's where they are.
But the Colombian response was terrific on this. They were over our guys within 30 minutes. They had 7,000 people in the jungles out there looking for them within a matter of days. They stayed out there. We think we bottled them up between 45 and 60 days, in a pretty good little box. We simply couldn't find them, and rescue them. And then, we knew that if they ever got out of that box, they would in fact be very, very, very difficult to find, one, and incredibly difficult to go rescue. And therein lies the dilemma that we're in right now. So I hope that's a better answer than the quick, factual one I gave you before. And as I thought here and thought about it, I almost was flip on that. And I would not be flip with those lives. They are a major priority to us. They are important to us. And we are doing everything we can to find them, and when we do, we will take what steps we can to rescue them. Is that better? Thanks.
Audience: Natalie Wisseel with Crescent Investment. I have a question regarding the unprecedented levels of opium production that's taking place in Afghanistan right now, which is bringing in billions of dollars of revenues that is now the primary source of funding for the neo-Talibans and the al-Qaeda elements that are operating in Afghanistan and around Afghanistan. Is the United States military getting involved in this, and doing something about it, or are they kind of leaving it to the international forces and the international community?
__: We seem to not know the answer to the question about the level of US military involvement in that. I'll tell you, the United States Special Operations Command is not necessarily involved in it.
Audience: Alan Zinn from Johns Hopkins. Commentators have mentioned a great deal about the permeability of our southern borders, you know, hundreds of illegals crossing the border on a daily basis. Does NorthCom consider this to be a threat? If so, is there any area of responsibility that NorthCom can place to help stem this tide?
__: Protection of our borders is a DHS responsibility, as I think you know, with the border patrol and the Customs folks, and so on and so forth. Through JTF-6, specifically on the southern border, when requested by the law enforcement folks, we do provide support to them in a variety of ways, which for operational reasons, I just can't go into detail for you. But as I mentioned, one of the things that we are doing is to take JTF-6 and expand its charter so that it goes beyond counter-narcotics and in fact is intended to address transnational threats, which would include terrorists coming across the border, weapons of mass destruction, and narcotics, for that matter, because that is considered to be a subset of the transnational threat, so it's an expansion of their charter.
Now, we have to do that in partnership, as I indicated as well, that what we're looking at is a JIATF North, Joint Interagency Task Force North. It's the interagency piece that is the operative there, and that's where we are working with DHS to bring that about. Our expectation is that we'll start to see that come about probably next spring, the initial stages of that, and then go from there.
Audience: My name is Martin Burkhart. I'm the US correspondent for a newspaper in Denmark. A question to General Olson. I wanted originally to ask you whether the Iraq war was not a distraction for the war on terror. There is a widespread view, I think, in Europe and other places, that it was. But then I heard you say that special ops are active in Iraq, fighting along with indigenous forces. And I suppose that you were saying that they were fighting the guerilla fighters, who then would be labeled terrorists. So I wonder, what kind of terrorists are you actually fighting? Because I suppose that in about 60 or 70 countries around the world, there are sleeper cells. In Afghanistan, you had, before the war, camps that trained terrorists, but they're gone. And so the fight that you have to fight is outside of Iraq, would have to be a fight that's very, very difficult. Because it's basically, as you said-- I think you mentioned six or eight people in a house who may be planning some type of attack. But you don't have any camps anymore. So, it's a bit of a mystery to me, besides Iraq, what you actually do. Could you kind of elaborate on that.
Admiral Olson: Let me answer what I think the question was. United States Special Operations Command has responsibility for planning the war on terrorism on a global level. And we are engaged in that planning. We are engaged in some activity against terrorism in certain areas of the world. In addition to that, US Special Operations Command is fulfilling its traditional role of conducting special operations across the nine mission areas of special operations in support of regional Combatant Commanders. And there is a war in Iraq. There is a fight in Iraq. There are people whose intent is to harm American soldiers who are in Iraq, and the United States Special Operations Command are serving the Commander of Central Command in prosecuting his campaign in Iraq. And so a method of doing that, a classic special operations mission, is to work with indigenous forces, in this case the Iraqi forces who are becoming their own Army, in order to enable them to better prosecute operations in their territory for their purposes, which also serve ours. Does that answer the question?
Audience: You know, I talked recently to an assistant to the Secretary of Defense about the whole question of, how do you actually fight this war on terrorism if it's a war not against people who gather in military camps, but basically, it's an invisible enemy. Are you involved in that kind of activity?
Admiral Olson: Again, I'm not sure I heard the question clearly. Is your question, how do we fight a war against an invisible terrorist enemy?
Audience: Yes, because as I said, before the war in Afghanistan, it was a rather clearly definable enemy, in that Osama bin Laden had camps, and you could hit them with a missile, as Clinton did. But they are not there anymore. So, how do you deal with that kind of enemy?
Admiral Olson: Well, that's the very difficult challenge. And it's an intelligence-driven solution. And so we are striving to gain the intelligence in Iraq on who the enemy is, where they're located, what they look like, so that we can take some actions against them on behalf of the geographic Combatant Commander who is running that campaign. There is no easy answer to finding the enemy in Iraq, certainly, and that's one of the reasons that we are accepting the fact that we are in a marathon campaign, not just a sprint through Iraq.
Captain Swartz: Two of our panelists can stay on for a bit more, for a couple more questions. General Hill has got another engagement and has to leave. Thanks very much, sir.
General Hill: Thank you very much.
Captain Swartz: Yes, sir, and I hope your question wasn't for General Hill.
__: I hope it was.
Audience: Ray Stuchel. I'm a graduate student at Catholic University. And my question was in part for General Hill, but the Navy is still here, so we can handle it, sir. General Anderson mentioned money laundering is one of his concerns, and General Hill mentioned flow of cash to the drug cartels. I think we probably all recognize that drug cartels, like terrorists, are easily transportable from one area to another. If we cut off the drug pipeline from Colombia, they'll move to Vietnam. The terrorists would probably do likewise. My question is that I believe the way to decapitate both of those organizations is by cutting off the flow of money, and I wonder if you have any ideas that haven't already been put to use on how to stop the flow of money to those organizations.
__: From a NorthCom perspective, I would tell you that that's not something that we address. We depend upon the other federal organizations who have that responsibility, the United States Interdiction Coordinator, Roger Mackin (?), and some of the other bodies, to address that issue. So, we do not look at that in NorthCom. That's not to say it's not important to do. It's just that we don't do it.
Audience: Dale Caruthers (?) with Systems Planning and Analysis. This is for the panel. We heard earlier this morning, in one of the sessions, from Bob Kaplan that in his discussions with the men in the fields, that one of their biggest concerns was freedom of action, that the burden of the layers of the decision making process were causing targets to get hit 72 to 96 hours late. I was wondering if the panel agreed wit that assessment, and if so, what was being done to correct it, and what are the future capabilities in freedom of operations?
General Anderson: I'm not going to say anything about how they feel over there. That's the CENTCOM Commander's responsibility, as to whether or not they are layered or whatever. But here, as I mentioned to you in the briefing, because of our area of responsibility, and specifically being the homeland, we do have a different operating environment that certainly that exists within CENTCOM, for example. But we have not, at this point, experienced any difficulty in terms of responsiveness or delays in the processes of approving requests, and so on and so forth. You heard me describe a little bit earlier the process that brings our support into a local crisis, whatever that may be, whether it's a hurricane or terrorism. And as much as that sounds heel to toe, and rather lengthy and bureaucratic and so on and so forth, it can be handled like that with a phone call. And that's all it takes. And we've done it. General Eberhart will call the Secretary of Defense and request authority to do this or whatever, and the Secretary of Defense will make a decision, if that's what's required at that moment, and we go from there. So we really have not had that much of a problem here in NorthCom.
Audience: McVaden, IFPA. It seems to me that we've set an example for the world, in jointness, special operations, and now homeland defense. And I wonder whether our allies and friends are keeping up with us in such a way that we can hope to cooperate and so forth. You know, we worry about the area of technology, and getting so far ahead of them, and so forth. So I wonder, is the gap growing? Does it matter if they keep up with us? And then on the other hand, is anybody else getting good in these things who are not friends and allies, so, you know, for example, Chinese, North Korean special operations forces. Are they any good now, compared to us?
__: I haven't trained with them, so I don't have firsthand knowledge of their capabilities. Certainly the special operations capabilities of our potential adversaries is a concern to us. We track it, and special operations capability in general, across the world is increasing. There is a renewed energy, I think, in most of the countries that we observe, in enhancing their special operations capability. I'll tell you, the countries that we do work closely with are moving very quickly, in terms of both special operations capability and jointness. We're seeing our influence take hold in the countries with whom we work closely. And it seems the more closely we work with them, in a grand way, the faster the migration of concepts is. I'll tell you, I'm very encouraged by what I see in the nations with whom we work closely in both of those areas. Certainly there's a gap, and the gap is going to take a long time to close, if it ever closes. That has a lot to do, frankly, with the level of resources being invested. But I think in general the trend that we're witnessing is a good one.
General Anderson: In NorthCom, with regard to, as I mentioned in the briefing, the ones we are primarily affiliated with are Canada and Mexico. And certainly, the Canadians are just absolutely fantastic. We enjoy a very, very good relationship with them, as I mentioned. And they, by virtue of establishing the Bi-National Planning Group, have recognized the importance of homeland defense, and being a part of that. And so I think ultimately they'll be moving in that direction, along with missile defense, as they've indicated.
On the other hand, Mexico we're still working with. We don't have the foundation with Mexico that we have with Canada, and so we've got to establish that foundation, and we'll do that. And ultimately, we'll come to it. But it would be interesting, I think, to see at some point in the future, whether that's five, 10 years from now, whenever it may be, to see a tri-national NORAD, where you had Canada, United States, and Mexico providing true North American defense. And I would say, don't dismiss that as a possibility. But there are some hurdles that we're going to have to get over, and a lot of work that's going to have to be done. But we'll do that.
Captain Swartz: We have one more, and then we've got to get out of here. There was a hand over here. All right, you're it.
Audience: Sir, Lieutenant Colonel Dahl, US Army. I'm a National Security Fellow. All three panel members mentioned interagency effort at the Center for Special Operations, 100 LNOs, and of course in homeland defense in the NorthCom, and also General Hill. We've created a very, very high demand requirement for experts from the other government agencies and departments. My question is, are you unhappy with the quantity and the quality of support you're getting, outside of DOD, for this effort? Or should our national security transformation be looking at creating greater capacity in the other branches of our government to support that?
General Anderson: From a NorthCom perspective, we're pretty satisfied that in fact, with the reorganization and specifically the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, that that is the right move. I mean, it's the same thing for the federal organizations responsible for homeland security that we have done in NorthCom. We've brought them all unity of command, in our parlance. And so that I think is a good step. Now, it's going to take time. I would tell you the Department of Homeland Security has a bigger challenge than we did. We started from scratch. They've got about 22 different cultures that they're going to have to try to realign into a single culture. And I would say that Governor Ridge and those folks are making great progress.
But I think where we gain a lot is through the exercise program. I mean, when we have the opportunity to work together, and we identify where those seams are, if they exist, and the operating procedures, and so on and so forth, and we develop a sense of trust amongst each other, and so on, it just pays tremendous benefits for us. And so that's why we are such strong advocates of this national exercise plan, because, of course, being in the military, all of you who have been know the benefit of exercises, and what you gain from that. And now we can extend that to this very important area of homeland defense and homeland security. And it truly will be a great step forward.
Captain Swartz: Well, you've been an aggressive and intelligent audience. It's been fortunate that we've got combat veterans up here who could hack it. It's been an excellent session, I think. How about a hand of applause for them? Once again, please remember to take everything that belongs to you, and your papers and so on, at the end of the session. Thanks very much.