Previous IFPA-Fletcher Conferences

The 34th IFPA-Fletcher Conference on
National Security Strategy and Policy:
Security Planning and Military Transformation

December 2-3, 2003
U.S. Chamber of
Commerce Building
Lafayette Square, 1615 H Street, NW
Washington, D.C.

Address by Dr. Paul Bracken, Professor of Management and Political Science, Yale University

Introduction by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., President, IFPA

Dr. Pfaltzgraff: Our next speaker is Paul Bracken. He is professor of management and political science at Yale University. His expertise includes global corporate strategy and business uses of new technologies, operations research as well. He offers courses on such subjects as international strategy and organization, global technology management and innovation, and building competitive advantage through information technology. But he also is the author of many publications, which is where I have become acquainted with his work, in the areas of military strategy, including work on military power in Asia, work on nuclear strategy and weapons, and command and control of nuclear forces, and European security. So it is with very great pleasure that I welcome Paul Bracken to this panel. Paul? And you may use the podium if you wish. Actually, use that podium over there. That would be even easier for you, because we have a television monitor in front if you need it.

Paul Bracken: Thank you very much, Bob. And I'm really delighted to be here, especially because I've run across a lot of old friends I haven't seen in a while, and that's really one of the fun things about going to events like this. So I'm really delighted to be here. Thank you very much. Again, this is a very distinguished panel. I will try to hold up my end as the academic. Speaking of which, my wife when I was first tenured at Yale, went to one of the first faculty teas. And this seems relevant, since there are some sort of semi-academics on the panel. But I'm really, like, full-time tenured and stuff. And Nan said, after she left the tea, that she had never met anyone with tenure who didn't need it.

With that as an introduction, I'd like to skip gears, and go to some structural issues. And let me begin by saying that one of the courses I teach now is a core course in the MBA program called "Strategic Environment for Management," where the basic argument is that we need to teach managers, which is everybody in this room, how to do their own environmental scans quickly, because there's a tendency to think that environmental scanning, telling how the world's going to go, that's something that the CEO or the President of the Secretary of Defense, or Dr. Rice, that's their job. I just follow orders. But let me just mention why this is important, in kind of a methodological way.

A very hot area of economics and politics research right now is what's called behavioral economics, where we get students, and we put them around a table, and they play games, like Prisoner's Dilemma, or a game where there's certain probabilities of success and failure, and they can bet money on certain military or business strategies, acquisition programs, and they'll do well or poorly. And one of the reasons for doing these games is that it has demonstrated clearly what the really important factors are in how people choose strategies. We're led to believe that people choose strategies at a kind of expected payoff, managed by the risks.

That's what theory says. That's not what people do. The studies show, of this behavioral economics, that the biggest factor of how people choose real strategies is context, which is the name of the first panel. That is to say, if I took this table down here, and I had them play a little game with chips, and the amount of money and the risks were held constant, and I told them it was a grocery promotion game, to get market share for your grocery store chain, they would play it one way. If I told them, using exactly the same payoffs, and exactly the same risks, that it was a game of military patrol in a counterinsurgency, they have radically different strategies. The biggest determinant of what strategies people really choose is the context, not the payoffs. And that has really interesting implications for all of our strategies.

Let me turn to sort of why we should all think about the environmental scanning as something we do, and not something the head of the organization does. On a substantive basis, I've been playing around with this idea of looking at the future security environment in the way people look at the future business environment, through structural analysis and industrial organization theory. It's pretty simple. It just says, look at the US automobile industry from 1950 to the present time. What are the big changes? The big changes are, there's huge structural changes in the 1970s, when Japanese car producers came into this industry. It increased the number of players from the big three in the United States, to something like six or seven major competitors. Moreover, it brought in new personalities who saw their environment very differently from Ford or General Motors. And Ford and General Motors had a great deal of difficulty figuring this out.

Let's apply this to the future security environment. And the overall framework is basically what I call the second nuclear age, which is what we are getting into right now. The first nuclear age was of course the Soviet/American competition. The second nuclear age is the weapons of mass destruction proliferating to other powers. It's hard to date when this begins, because we look at proliferation as, say, when China tested their shot in 1964, as part of the Cold War. I would contend that when historians of the later part of this century look back, the Cold War will be diminished in importance, and the spread of high technology system to countries particularly in Asia will be one of the most important trends.

But let's look at the emerging second nuclear age of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, and see if we can paint kind of a structural analysis of it in just a few minutes. There are several features that stand out. First of all, number one, it has more players interacting. The first nuclear age was a two-player game. Now, I realize that France and Britain had nuclear weapons. I would maintain that never in any serious way did they impact Soviet-American calculations, even to the level of psyops targeting. They were not taken seriously by either side, Washington or Moscow. Today, you have a situation where Israel, Pakistan, India, China, Syria, if you count chemical and bio, North Korea, probably.

And what can we say about a multiple player game? Well, game theorists have developed this idea of a multiple player game. And what they say is that the complexities build up so much faster than in a two-player game that nobody can understand it. That is to say, if all sides had perfect command and control, and perfect intelligence, the complexity swamps the decision-making system, still, whereas it would not in a two-player game. A very easy way to think about this quickly is, if you are in a two-player situation, and you have weapons of mass destruction, you can either fire them, or not fire them. Not firing them is better. It's called stable deterrence if both sides do that. But if you have a three-player situation, and one side waits while the other two are firing, it takes on the obvious, much more ominous interpretation that they're waiting to clean up as the first two sides kill each other off. So, I would maintain that one of the key features of the second nuclear age is a huge increase in complexity that our two-player standards of deterrence and escalation control really are very inadequate for.

Second major difference is that the nuclear weapons programs in many of these countries are thoroughly related to their concept as a nation-state. To take the Israeli nuclear program, if you read Avi Cohen's (?) book on that, it would barely be only a slight exaggeration to say that Israel decided to go nuclear somewhere around 1911. That is to say, from the very origins of the Israeli state in the late 1940s, they decided to go nuclear. And I think there's a comparable impetus in other countries in Asia, as they try to jettison these huge, post-colonial armies, which were built for nation-building purposes as much as for war fighting, and they're shifting to more higher technology forces. These really are relevant, because as Andy pointed out, it's one thing for the Department of Defense to win on-the-ground terrorism wars, but the Department of Defense has a major responsibility to prevent major wars. They're very different things. Fighting, winning, losing small wars, good or bad-- A big function of the role of the Department of Defense, I would maintain, has been since its creation to prevent great power war or rivalries.

Third area where these are very different, in a structural way, from the first nuclear age, is that these countries are poor. Israel is an exception. But they're poor. And unlike the Soviet Union and the United States, where we could build up very expensive, robust conventional forces, which acted as a kind of shock absorber for escalation control, and each side could posture and bluff by putting forces forward in Europe, and you could have notions of a conventional war, and escalation control, what's happening in India, China, Pakistan, I would maintain even Israel, is that they're robbing their conventional forces to pay for these higher technology forces. And they're not thinking through the relationship of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, to their conventional posture. Because they don't think about these things. I mean, they're sort of at, like, 1949 in the learning curve. And in the case of the United States and the Soviet Union, most of what we learned, we didn't learn by doing studies. We went into crises, and we said, "Oh my God, that's obvious, but I didn't think of it in advance."

Fourth area where they're very second nuclear age is what I would call Asian roots. It is no coincidence, comrade, that all of the nuclear proliferation countries we're talking about are in Asia. They're not in South America. They're not in Africa. Libya may be, possibly, an exception. But this introduces, like, to an extreme degree, when Toyota and Nissan came into the US automobile industry, radically different personality types that we really don't understand. And I would agree that we have to understand their language, but we have to understand a lot more than that. It was very easy to understand the Soviet Union, because we were both countries that came out of the enlightenment, and were European based. It was really a civil war of the Enlightenment. We had a certain view of mankind. The Soviets had a very different view. But the terms of the debate were common.

In the Asian roots, we have extreme nationalism from Israel to North Korea. In no crisis of the first nuclear age was there screaming mobs out on the Mall in Washington or in Times Square, demanding that the President annihilate the Soviet Union. If nuclear war had broken out, we would have not begun it with brass bands marching down 5th Avenue. It was sort of a dreadful thing, where mass opinion had very little impact on presidential or Soviet leadership decision making. It is only too easy to imagine mass mobs demanding annihilation of a lesser people in India, with respect to Pakistan, in North Korea with respect to her neighbors, or, dare I say, in a different forum, even in Israel with respect to her neighbors. There is rampant nationalism which did not exist in the US-Soviet case, I would maintain. And finally, there is historical timing differences, which is to say, there was nobody to sit on the United States and the Soviet Union to prevent them from doing the things they did. The United States is the 800 pound gorilla, so that if you are North Korea or Israel, you have to think about the consequences of what the United States is going to do.

Now, one of the mechanisms that people have devised to sort of think about what going on is that the nuclear option today is a lot like what on Wall Street they would call a call option. That is the right to buy a security at a certain price, but not the obligation to do so. So, if you worked at Morgan Stanley, you could buy a call option for Euroyen, which would last for six months, or two years, or five years, at a strike price. And you wouldn't have to buy it, but you'd pay a certain amount to have enough to reserve the option. A lot of countries-- the obvious ones, India, North Korea, etc., but others-- really have developed their nuclear programs as call options. That is to say, they want to have the infrastructure in place, the knowledge of the scientists, enough of the technology, so that if the international security situation worsens, they can quickly execute that option. I would say very much Japan has a call option on a nuclear program.

What do the studies say when you have financial games with call options? Well, what you find is long periods of equilibrium, and then sudden disequilibrium, as when there's a sign that the situation is changing, the security environment is changing. Then countries all of a sudden strike this call option and go nuclear. They buy the Euroyen and the Wall Street analogy. And so the long periods of stability and good relations can disguise an inherent danger which has been institutionalized in the system, simply from the point of view of having these call options.

Well, as I said, I was here to sort of develop this notion that environmental scans are very, very important, and they should not be left to the leadership of the organization, and that it's very important to think about heuristics and frameworks and tools, so that you and your middle managers can look at the international security situation and make your own judgments. I would argue the job of top management is to harvest that knowledge, rather than to go out and hire gurus to go out and tell them what the future is. A lot of the problems I see in the industry are that they don't actually harvest the knowledge in their own company, that their middle management sees going on environmentally.

And the substantive point I want to make is that we really are moving into a second nuclear age. I haven't predicted the future as much as I've divined a structure which is useful for generating different kinds of scenarios. So, that's what I wanted to leave with you this morning. And again, I'm very delighted to be here. Thanks so much.

Dr. Pfaltzgraff: Thank you very much, Paul, for bringing the nuclear dimension into this panel, and talking about the second nuclear age and environmental scanning. In fact, that's what this whole panel is, environmental scanning, if you look at it.

Questions and Answers

Dr. Pfaltzgraff:We're still missing Mansoor Ijaz, but I think we should begin the discussion. Let me just give you the basic ground rules. Please keep your question brief. We're looking for questions. If there's a statement you need to make, make the statement, but make it brief. Secondly, please identify yourself. And thirdly, please wait for the microphone after you're recognized for the question. So, who would like to be the first questioner? Who would like to go first? Yes, right here.

Audience: I'm Ed Rowney (?), your former friendly arms controller. My question, I guess, is mostly to Bob Kaplan, but maybe to some others. And that has to do with this mindset-- Maybe the other speakers can chime in on this. Why is it that the leaders of the Islamic faith, the mullahs, don't recognize that this extremist group could possibly bring about their downfall? Why don't they speak out against them, and excommunicate them? Why the timidity of the mullahs?

Robert Kaplan: The Middle East is a laboratory of pure power politics. Soft power is not very well understood. Remember that we operate in a world of legality, of laws, and regulations, where if you have a fight with someone else, you have courts to resume to. But in the Middle East, though there are laws on the books, in all these societies, it's driven by pure power and intimidation of one sort or another. And if some of these others, more moderate groups, thought that they had the power to overcome the others, they might in fact operate that way.

But there is another thing. As Mansoor said, al-Qaeda and its spin-off viruses is the most dynamic element today in Middle East society. You know, it doesn't require country clearances, travel orders. It doesn't have to write CONOPs. It's not totally snarled in bureaucratic paperwork the way the postindustrial age West has become, or with big organizations, the way we have become. You know, it's the ultimate postindustrial kind of centerless corporation. It's run on an informal basis, and we think of informal, medieval institutions as backward. In fact, they're far forward than us, because the most effective power is informal power and influence. And these people have really developed a very dynamic, centerless cluster of organizations that conveys itself, that conveys its power.

And there's something else. Islam is the best of the three religions for poor people. If you're poor, and downtrodden, Islam is an austere voice. It's a religion that's willing to fight. It's a simple message. It's kind of like early Christianity was in the second and third centuries of Rome. If you read about the various Christian cults who rose up against Roman rule in Tunisia and what is today western Algeria, you'll see a great similarity between them and some of the radical Islamic cults.

And then there's something else, and then I'll push it on to the other panelists. If you look at a map, and you look at these towns, and these tribal agencies of Pakistan, like Parachinar, Miramshan (?), Wizeristan (?), they look like small towns, and they were, 10 or 15 years ago. But when you get there, they're slums. They're inner city slums, with narrow warrens, five, six stories, many families packed in tight. The regime in Pakistan has done nothing for them. As one of them said to me, "We don't care if it's Noar Sharif (?), Benazir Bhutto, Musharraf, whether it's democrat, it's an army coup. It makes no difference. The people in Islamabad hate us. We're not really part of the country." And the radical mullahs are the ones who say, "Stand up and fight."

Dr. Pfaltzgraff: I think that Mansoor Ijaz would like to comment on this question as well, and any other member of the panel is welcome to do so. But Mansoor, you in particular

Mansoor Ijaz: I think the way I would put it to you, very simply, is that the rulers are afraid of the monsters that they created. They created the monsters by suppressing the natural capacity. Who is bin Laden, at the end of the day? What is the phenomenon of this man? He basically wanted to combat and rise up against his fascist father, and he couldn't do that. Then he wanted to rise up against the state, and the state was in such a state of affairs that he wasn't able to do that. And so he said, "Let me go and strike out at those who support my state." And when the state stripped him of his citizenship, they stripped him of his dignity, and that caused even more-- It's what I call the trampling of the ego. In the infamous memo that many of you know about, that I wrote to Sandy Berger (?) in 1996, I said to him, "Sandy, we cannot achieve anything in the Islamic world by trampling the egos of their downtrodden. If we do not do more to raise them up, their disaffected up, they will surely come to our shores to tear us down."

In the end, it comes down to a war of not intellects, not minds. It's a war of what's going on in your heart. Because every human being's heart beats the same way. And these leaders have not provided for their people. And then on top of that, they've taken orders from us. That's the perception, at least over there. We've got to stop making them give orders, and they've got to start providing for their people. Otherwise, that large, silent majority that exists in the Muslim world will never rise up against these fanatics and contain them from within, and that is the only ultimate long-term solution that we ought to be trying to get at, because nothing else will work.

Dr. Pfaltzgraff: Anyone else on that question? In that case, let's go to our next questioner, the gentleman right back here. And then this next one will be back there. So, let's start right here.

Audience: Wooston Lee (?) from the Department of Defense. My question is mainly to Mr. Hoehn and Mr. Kaplan. I was wondering if you felt the last presentation, regarding the creation of a two-division structure, was a viable option, given what you have observed thus far, and the work you're doing on transformation.

Andrew Hoehn: I think it would be a mistake to think that transformation is only about the major combat elements of our defense establishment and war fighting structure. In fact, what I hear from this panel, and frankly, what we have been thinking increasingly, is that the type of challenges that we're going to see in the years and decades to come are going to be more in terms of the low end asymmetries that you heard the panelists talk about, and the high end asymmetries that you heard Professor Bracken speak of, and frankly, somewhat less of the traditional kinds of warfare that we are both skilled at, but frankly have dominated. And hence, that's why we see war fighting moving more to the ends of the spectrum, and away from the middle.

So, in light of that, the work that Hans Binnendijk has been doing, and others, in terms of thinking through what kinds of organizations, what kind of structure, what kind of training, what kind of doctrine do we need to deal with the challenges are exactly the right ones. And so, I applaud the initiative that he has put forth. And I think he would be the first to admit that it isn't so much whether that specific option is the one that gets adopted. I think the real issue here is, do we have within our armed forces the capacity to deal with the problems of stabilization and reconstruction? And I think what I take from his proposal is that there is a deficiency in this realm, and that we need to be looking to build some viable alternatives. And he is offering one. Whether it's that one or something similar, or even something quite different that addresses that set of problems, that's the real issue here, is, do we have the capacity, the capability, if you will, to deal with that problem set, and to do so in the most effective ways that we can.

Dr. Pfaltzgraff: I wanted to give Bob Kaplan the next opportunity on that question, but I think, Hans, you ought to have the last word on this question as well, since it's your proposal that is being discussed. So, let's go with Bob next.

Robert Kaplan: Let me answer that with an example that I was speaking to Secretary Hoehn about. We have this issue about tribal militias in Afghanistan. You know, our policy is to build up a national army there, and the tribal militias are an impediment in that. They're more warlord-focused. But when you actually get to Afghanistan, and you speak to the majors, and the lower ranking officers, and you go out, you find that in some parts of the country, supporting the ANA (?) is right, but in other parts, if you withheld support and weapons for the tribal militias, the Army special forces fire bases might even be overrun. It varies from one locale within a province to another. Therefore, these are not issues, I wouldn't even want Washington discussing, let alone deciding upon. These are issues that I wouldn't want decisions made at anything higher than the lieutenant colonel or the battalion level in the area.

And the problem is that Washington tends to identify the problems correctly, but it often deals with it by creating a new organization. And I think future is just cutting away vast amounts of organization here, and having much more people at the NCO level spending more time in Monterey at the language institute, and spending their whole lives in places like western Nepal, and the Horn of Africa, and places like that. It's like Secretary Hoehn said. Get more people out to the edges, and give them increasing autonomy. Because if not, if we don't watch out, we'll be like Gulliver, tied up by the Lilliputians.

Hans Binnendijk: If this proposal focuses primarily on organization, and one tends to think of it that way, two divisions, then probably that's the wrong way to present it. I think this is much more about training. It's much more about the synergies that are created by bringing together various kinds of units. It's not intended to create a lot of layers. It's certainly not intended to put this problem back into Washington's lap. It is trying to do, on the ground, what we ought to be doing, but better, because we pull together these capabilities, and create these synergies.

Now, what is the viability of this? I think much will depend on the Army. The Army is going to resist this. Why? Because they think it's going to cut into one or two of their 10 fighting divisions. And if it does, it would be a mistake. I don't envision this as replacing an Army division. The analysis that we did indicates that most of these capabilities are around, and it's again a question of reorganization. You can do that in a way that you don't cut into the existing 10-division structure of the Army.

Now, I think, finally, what is likely to happen is that rather than the large structure that we suggested, where we'll be going, at least in the next several years, is that smaller groups will be created along this pattern, but not the division size groups. And they will be more deployable, more modular. That's not a bad starting place.

Dr. Pfaltzgraff: Unless there's anyone else on the panel who would like to comment, let's move on to the next question. There was a hand back here that I had said we would recognize. Yes, please, right there.

Audience: Jeremy Harrington (?). I'm a first-year student at the Fletcher School. I'd like to ask a question about the role and the performance of the intelligence community in illuminating the context of security planning, particularly the issues raised by the panel of the threat of non-state-armed groups. I'd be interested in Mr. Kaplan's observations, from his experiences being embedded at the grassroots level, what observations he has on what the intelligence community needs to do differently. And I'd also be interested in the views of Mr. Ijaz, in particular. Thank you.

Dr. Pfaltzgraff: That's a question for a conference in itself, actually. But it's very important, and we'd like to get your reactions to it. Bob?

Robert Kaplan: One of the challenges I face as a journalist is, I often know where our intelligence people are by where I'm not permitted to go, or what fire bases I'm not permitted to visit. So I actually don't know as much about that as I would like to. There was one fire base I wanted to visit-- I won't say where-- where I was told, "No, you can't go there, because the OGAs, the other government agencies, i.e. the intelligence, owns that fire base, not the Green Berets." So, there's a lot going on that, frankly, I don't know about. But I think I would emphasize-- And this is what people in the intelligence community will always tell you, I think. We Americans are very good at signals intelligence, on the technological aspects of it. But where it falls down, where we really have to depend on friendly foreign intelligence agencies, is on human beings who can ferret out intentions, who have embedded into groups for long periods of time, overseas. And that, I think, is the great challenge. It's a big challenge in Iraq. It's a big challenge in Afghanistan, in Yemen, in many different places.

And I'll give you an example. Mansoor spoke earlier about the danger of international shipping. Well, one of the best opportunities for terrorists-- and this was written about in my magazine, The Atlantic Monthly, in a cover story, was about piracy of big tankers, and how much piracy there is, and how a number of tankers are actually run by ghost crews, because the real crew was killed at the high seas, and it's now being run by a ghost crew. And this is like a perfect petri dish for groups like al-Qaeda to take advantage of. And this is really where the rubber meets the road, where so much technological intelligence will be less helpful than two or three human beings who know exotic languages, who are in place, and who are with the right people.

Mansoor Ijaz: I think all that I'll add to that is that we have to ask ourselves in this country, why is it that we are not willing to resurrect what the CIA's great capacity was during the Cold War? Why is it that we're not willing to do that? What has happened to the ethos of this society that we're not willing to take the risk to go out and protect ourselves by engaging our own citizens? I mean, I do this out of a sense of moral obligation to my fellow countrymen, because this country gave me more than anyone in the world could ever imagine you could get as an opportunity. I was born and raised in this country, educated in the best institutions, worked on a farm, worked as a busboy in a delicatessen, and have the opportunity to give back something to society. But there's not that many of us around that speak different languages, and understand the cultural identities that you have to understand to be able to get inside these organizations.

Until we as a nation are willing to ask that hard question, and ask our political leaders to answer it, and then give the directive to our intelligence apparatus to go out and do it, I think there's very little chance that we're going to be able to infiltrate to the extent we need to to be able to diffuse the threats from inside.

Dr. Pfaltzgraff: I would ask any other member of the panel to comment on this question as well, if you would like to do so. I would simply say that, given the diversity of this country, it seems to me puzzling that we haven't been able to do what Mansoor is talking about. I shouldn't depart from my role as moderator here, but it seems to me, with a country with the diversity that we have in it, we ought to be able to tap into people who have loyalties to this country, as you pointed out here, who would help us to improve that human part of the intelligence picture. But that's just my own personal opinion.

Anyone else on this panel who would like to talk about that? Then, let's go on to one or two more questions. And what I'd like you to do is to ask your question very briefly, because we're going to have to end the panel at 11:45 promptly. So, one quick question over here. Dick, I can see you back there. You have that.

Audience: ...[inaudible] semantics point of order with Robert Kaplan. I think you're giving the term CONOPs a bad rap. CONOPs, in its simplest form, tells what the relationships are between, who the players are, and what the mission is. And it's not doctrine, and it's not prescriptive, and it doesn't tell you what range, and what weapon, and what circuitry to use. We've never done it as well as the Brits, who have boiled it down to "Stop the Bismarck," or "Sink the armada." But I think if you get the CONOPs right-- and we're making tremendous efforts to get the joint CONOPs done first-- you will cover all those points that you made, that the NCOs can make decisions from advance bases, and the colonels can stay in Leavenworth, and be available for reach-back. But I think you're talking about doctrine, not about CONOPs.

Robert Kaplan: Can I respond?

Dr. Pfaltzgraff: Yes, please, a brief response, Bob.

Robert Kaplan: That briefs well, but the reality is that the document is used for people at the higher levels to dilute, to play around with, to change the mission. And the ultimate result, every day, on the ground in Afghanistan, is that permission is given to hit compounds, to search various mud-walled forts, 72 or 96 hours later than they should, and the result is dry holes, rather than bull's-eyes. It's another method that gives control higher up, which goes completely against the trend I think we have to go in.

Dr. Pfaltzgraff: We have time for one or two more. Right back here. Yes, please. If you could stand up so they can see you when they bring you the mike.

Audience: Yes. Vivek Dubay (?) from Los Alamos National Lab. This is mainly a question for Professor Bracken. There's been a lot of talk about organizational transformation, but implicit and inherent to that is cultural transformation within the defense business and the national security business. Can you offer additional insights from the business world as to how successful companies have time and time reinvented themselves? How can we accelerate the rate of cultural change to get to the transformation we need to get to?

Paul Bracken: I think it's a mistake to look at technological transformation, and then people will say, "But we have to change the organization. There's too much focus on technology." Just for example, in this last go-round, I think the whole distinction between technical intelligence and human intelligence is 20, 30 years out of date. So to get to your point, the question, I think we have to think of strategies in terms of congruences, alignment, so that when you change your personnel system, and your culture and your people, you have to see if it matches your technology, if it matches your strategy.

And if you look at the great, really pioneering works in organization theory done years ago, like Joan Woodward's (?) Industrial Organizations, her whole point is that managers need to think in terms of these alignments. I changed my technology. Did I change the culture? Because if you only change one, you're not going to get the payoff. But if you look at it in a holistic way, which I think we know a lot better how to do from the late 1990s-- I mean, there's this view that bureaucracies don't change. Well, look at AT&T. Look at Enron. They were big bureaucracies, and they went under dramatic change. Oh, you said you wanted successful change? That's a different thing. That's a harder thing. But we have examples of that too. We have a wider range of experiences we can absorb.

And one of the things I believe, is that the DOD and the services need to do kind of an executive program, pooling the experiences of Hewlett Packard, and JetBlue, and IBM, and Enron and AT&T, for these alignments and congruences. When they changed the technology, did they change the people?

Dr. Pfaltzgraff: Well, unfortunately, time has run out. I wish this panel could go on for another hour, frankly. There's so much to talk about here. I think we have looked at these issues in holistic fashion, to use a point that was just made by Paul Bracken. I think that we have covered an immense amount of the security landscape. We have certainly seen at least various parts of the anatomy, or at least touched various parts of the anatomy of the elephant, using the proverbial blind person/elephant metaphor here. I think as a result of this, we have learned a great deal about the context of national security within which we must plan, and within which we must think about and carry out the complex tasks of transformation. So, on our collective behalf, I would like to express our thanks to this panel for an outstanding opening session, and for helping us to think through many of the issues that we will be dealing with as we proceed to this afternoon and to tomorrow.