Previous IFPA-Fletcher Conferences

The 34th IFPA-Fletcher Conference on
National Security Strategy and Policy:
Security Planning and Military Transformation

December 2-3, 2003
U.S. Chamber of
Commerce Building
Lafayette Square, 1615 H Street, NW
Washington, D.C.

Address by Mr. Ovidiu Dranga, Deputy Secretary of State for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Defense Policy, Ministry of National Defense, Romania

Introduction by Dr. Charles M. Perry, Vice President and Director of Studies, IFPA

Dr. Perry: Let me welcome you to our last panel of the day, on the topic “Coalition Operations and Alliance Transformation.” Now, as we have already had more than once in this conference, we continue to enjoy an embarrassment of riches this afternoon, with five, highly-prominent speakers from diverse regions, all deeply involved in shaping the defense policies of their respective countries, including their approaches to coalition planning and alliance adaptations for the 21st century.

Now, as you may have guess, I say five because we’re only slightly less rich than we had expected, since unfortunately, Secretary Richard Lawless had to be drawn off to another meeting that competed. He sends his apologies, and we also regret his not being here, but that’s said. We have, as I said, an ongoing embarrassment anyways, with the wonderful people we have here before you.

You have their individual bios in your program, so I won’t read them here. But just to be sure that everyone knows who’s who, I’ll just introduce the speakers in the order that I’ve asked them to speak, beginning with General Wagner, Deputy Commander of the U.S. Force Joint Command. There’ll be Tony Brenton next, number two of the British Embassy here in Washington. Third will be Ovidiu Dranga, who’s the Deputy Secretary of State for Euro-Atlantic affairs—NATO affairs—the Romanian Ministry of National Defense. Next will be Nobukatsu Kanehara, who is now the Political Counselor at the Japanese Embassy here in D.C., but was most recently also Director of the Japan-United States Treaty Division in the Foreign Ministry, so deeply involved in these issues. And last, but far from least, Brigadier Mark Kelly from the Royal Australian Army, who also is now detailed to CentCom and will be speaking from that perspective today, as well as from his national perspective.

With that introduction, it’s horribly—I’ve taken something of a modified regional approach, beginning first with our U.S. Command, that has responsibility for this entire issue of integrating U.S. forces, training them for transformation, but also integrating them with allies and coalition partners, and then moving to Europe, and in the Euro-Atlantic and NATO region, and then moving to Asia, with our most important ally in that region, Japan, and then finally, again, to Brigadier Kelly, who will speak a bit about his national experiences from the Australian point of view, but also speak about CentCom as the region which really begins to bring together all the new allies from Europe and from Asia, at least from an operational sense. And it may continue to do for some years more, as we’ve been speaking about this last day and a half.

Before turning the floor over to General Wagner, let me just make three very quick points about the basic theme and topic of this panel that we might all keep in mind as we listen to the presentations, and think about what we might want to ask each of the panelists.

I think the first point to make is just simply to underscore, as many have at this conference already, the importance of coalition and alliance planning to future military operations of the 21st century. For even though we’ve been bombarded in recent months by near-constant commentaries regarding the American impulse in unilateralism, and despite the fact that United States can, and sometimes must, take the lead and act alone, the simple truth of the matter is that, more often than not, we have acted as part of a coalition, rather than alone, both by choice and sometimes by necessity—maybe at all times by necessity. Certainly depending on the circumstances, the coalition might be smaller or larger, and it may be more active in one phase of the operation as than in another, but it is a coalition nonetheless and that’s what we need to be planning for.

The second point follows from this first one, and it relates to how we think about and define coalition and coalition operations. And again, simply put, when we think about coalition operations, I think we need to think about much more than just the contribution of combat troops to combat operations, as important as that is. Keep in mind that the allies and the coalition partners can, and do, bring to an operation a broad range of assets and capabilities, material, and otherwise, and they can, and do, do just that across the rather wide spectrum of time, ranging from pre-conflict to the actual conflict, and as we now are seeing, at least some(?) are post-conflict phase.

So, apart from military forces, they can bring, among other things, crucial diplomatic support, important intelligence, access to key on-route facilities, and, not to be forgotten, vital insights into the nature of an adversary or a combat environment based on their own experience that we don’t have and we need to have access to. So, all of this will be as crucial in the future as it is today. We need to keep that. Bottom line is, we need to think about coalition and alliance planning in a larger context, and we have to think about wider range of options and a number of different time frames and keep those in mind, I think.

And the third and final point I’d leave you with is just to remember that coalitions of the willing are really just that, voluntary associations that we can’t just assume will be there, ready and available when wanted and needed. Indeed, as recent U.S. consultations, even with old friends, regarding potential contributions to the effort in Iraq confirms there’s often a good deal of diplomatic work and in-country political wrangling that needs to be done before a decision to join a coalition will be taken. And even after that decision is made, there’s generally a good deal of additional training and organizational work that needs to be done, before deployment can actually take place.

So, in other words, we need to be working very closely, very intimately, every day with good friends and allies well ahead of any contingency for which their help might be needed, or that help might never come, or at least not in a very timely and effective way. Fundamental point, again, is that transformation, with transformation—and probably even because of it -- the alliance and coalition dimension of military operations will remain vital, and it will require an enormous amount of advance coordination and joint preparation to get it right.

So, with those brief introductory comments, let me pass it to the real experts, who are doing just that work.

Mr. Dranga: First allow me to thank Professor Folger([?] for inviting to this conference, which is a challenge in itself for me because it seems I’m the only one representing New Europe. [laughter] So, I’ll try to turn this challenge into an opportunity. And, as I’m representing a country that has been invited to join NATO—last year—I’d like to share with you some thoughts on the future of the North Atlantic Alliance.

This conference comes at a very important moment, I would say—one year after a historical summit—the summit in Prague. I think we can recall NATO’s transformation was not a topic among others. I think it was the topic of the meeting and, one year after, it deserves our full attention. Since the early 90s, we have been discussing about new threats and challenges the Alliance has to cope with. The summit in Prague brought in a new message we should not forget. It made clear that change is a challenge in itself, perhaps the most difficult of all. Moreover, since almost everybody admits that NATO is the key foundation for Euro-Atlantic peace and security, the summit emphasized the need for common effort by members, invitees, aspirants, and NATO partners to meet that challenge. In my brief presentation, I will talk about how Romania will contribute to this effort, aiming to prove that it can live up to expectations associated with its new status.

First, by speeding up the reform of our military. As decided before Prague and confirmed by the Strategic Defense Review we started this year, our objective is to defend Romania and undertake NATO missions with smaller, better-equipped, deployable, and better-trained armed forces. It is already a commonplace that planning for the previous war is always easy, and unfortunately, it is still happening in many countries. We cannot afford to be among those countries anymore. Heavy-territorial forces belong to the past; expeditionary capabilities are the future.

The invitation to join the Alliance confirmed that the decision we have taken towards enhancing our strategic airlift capability was correct. Future conflicts require increased deployability and sustainability, and we must be prepared to defend national security interests thousands of miles away from home. Security now depends more than ever on developments beyond our borders. We will devote appropriate resources to airlift capabilities and inter-operable communication devices.

But what the invitation also confirmed—and I think this is a very important element—was the validity of our decision to grant specific attention to personnel training and education. Romania has now deployed almost two thousand troops in three different theaters of operations around the world. All participation in Bosnia and Kosovo, in Afghanistan, and Iraq would not have been possible without the skilled people manning our LAVs or our C-130s.

This achievement enables us to expect Romania will meet the requirements raised by the Prague Capabilities Commitment and NATO Response Force. If Romania is successful, NATO is successful because preparation for NATO membership speeded up transformation of our military. The spillover effect of our reform success story in Southeastern Europe and beyond would be significant. Others could learn from our experience, avoid our mistakes, and bring forward our achievements.

END OF SIDE B, TAPE 3.

SIDE A, TAPE 4.

Mr. Dranga:—offices, Romania has acknowledged the virtues of defense diplomacy as an instrument to promote change of mentality, openness, trust, and organization throughout the defense military establishment. Exposure to military cooperation in the PfP framework played a crucial role in this respect. Developing regional initiatives based on regional ownership, promoting multi-nationality as the organizing principle for pricing(?) management, have provided tangible benefits for regional security and stability as well. Romania is now ready to further share its experience in chairing the OSC, the Southeastern Defense Ministerial, the C(?) group, especially with experience to NATO membership, but also with other countries.

I came to Harvard after two years of Southeastern Defense Ministerial chairmanship, and I was perceived as an optimist when I said Southeastern Europe has a strong chance to recover. I told my friends that Romania’s participation in original initiatives has paid off its investment many times over, making us more predictable, more responsible, more capable, and more reliable. Romania is currently hosting, for the first time in its history, the headquarters of a multi-national brigade, C(?) brig, that is technically ready to participate in peace-support operations. Our regional behavior has actually enabled us to counter spillover of instability and associated convulsions. It will continue to do so in the future, and allow us to assume new NATO missions.

Third, by exercising political will and use military capabilities to affectively address new security challenges, Cherez(?) in particular. As shown by recent polls, Romanians are aware that they are joining the community of values and the community of action, and that NATO membership is also about responsibilities and commitment. September 11th triggered a new approach on security as the war in former Yugoslavia, and now in Iraq, did too. Following smooth and streamlined political decision-making processes and procedures, Romania stood side-by-side with NATO during the Kosovo crisis, allowing light forces to better operate against Milosevic’s repression machine. The same happened after the attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. And when we stood side-by-side with the United States, in all cases we recalled what happened before and during our revolution in 1989, when we realized that freedom is not for free.

Ever since, shaping and enhancing military and, in particular, non-military capabilities—including intelligence and civil emergency planning—to cope with non-conventional threats has been a keen investment in our future’s safety. And this approach made possible our participation in former Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Afghanistan with troops from different services and different branches —infantry, military police, engineers, strategic airlift, psychological operations, instructors, and staff officers.

Fourth, by advocating a strong transatlantic link and acting as a strategic bridge between Southeastern Europe and the enlarged Black Sea area. Romania has contributed to the implementation of various NATO or EU-led political military projects aiming at shaping up a better and predictable segued(?) environment in Euro-Atlantic area. Romania strongly believes that NATO is the embodiment of meaningful transatlantic defense cooperation. NATO and European Union have successfully cooperated in bringing peace, stability, and prosperity to the Balkans.

In a recent article, Ron Asmus argues that, rather than perceiving the United States and Europe as strategically incompatible, one should contend that no two parts of the world have more in common or are more integrated, and Romania shares this view. It has been said that Romania may extend the hand of cooperation across the Black Sea. And I think that strengthening the transatlantic link and enhancing security and stability in the Black Sea area—and maybe in central Asia—are compatible, provided the common vision on regional insecurities is promoted and implemented. We believe that further promoting cooperation patterns(?) successfully tested in Southeastern Europe and the spirit of a renewed partnership for peace, seen as a network of networks, is an achievable goal.

Future out-of-area operations could include combined joint NATO-EU hard and soft security preemption measures. It might be a topic for a new NATO-EU Common Security agenda in the years to come. Since in today’s strategic environment, military, political, and economic challenges have become too intertwined to be met by a single institution. This might be the key to self-sustainable peace and stability and objectives still to be achieved in some parts of the continent, including Southeastern Europe. Romania, for example, is ready to explore with allies and partners the need for a Black Sea security forum, with the aim to trigger a reflection on how to implement cooperative security and expand this additional(?) security cooperation in that region.

Fifth, by preparing qualified and dedicated people to work for NATO in a challenging international environment. Manpower has been crucial in implementing the reform. More than a thousand of Romanian military and civilians have been trained in NATO countries on security and defense issues. Over the years, many have been trained at home according to NATO standards. We are currently staffing key positions in the Public Administration, introducing new management instruments and mechanisms across the entire defense establishment.

And also, very important, a new mentality—a mentality that makes easier for us to accept change, to absorb change, and also to promote change. As we speak, a new training program of unprecedented scale run by NATO’s study center in Bucharest has concluded its first successful year. The regional PfP training center in Bucharest, where dozens of officers from neighboring countries have been trained, recently celebrated its fifth anniversary. Efforts to reach a higher commonality of mind with our allies and partners in terms of training level have bared fruits. Romania is, today, executed(?) education provider.

And last, but not least, by forging a fundamentally new public security awareness and enhancing our capability to generate ideas. We did not paint(?) lagiana(?) roles for our population to support Romania’s efforts to join NATO. The efforts required for joining NATO, the incumbent responsibilities, tradeoffs, and difficulties, have been subject for public debate and civil society’s scrutiny. It is now much easier to obtain public support for up-keeping promises and assuming NATO-related responsibilities, including operations in remote areas.

The Alliance, its new missions, and its new shape are now more familiar to the academic community in my country. Romania is able to contribute conceptually in a credible and concrete way to NATO’s transformation. The Southeastern Europe Common Assessment Paper on Security Challenges and the Partnership Action Plan proved that valuable ideas could come from Bucharest just as they come from London or Madrid.

Now, we all know that the last year was a year of troubled transatlantic relations. For us in Central Europe and Southeastern Europe, both EU and NATO are giants in terms of economic wealth and military power, and together, they represent an unique example in terms of political stability, multifaceted cooperation, and deep integration. Mutual reinforcements could emerge as the overarching principle of NATO-EU cooperation in the field of security and defense. And this development could be a new capability in itself.

Lord Robertson predicted that the Transatlantic Partnership would be alive in 2015 and that there is no alternative to Europe and North America working together. I have full confidence in his prediction. The best hope for Europe and the United States to overcome the threats and challenges they are facing together, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, is indeed to reinforce transatlantic cooperation. This is exactly the speed(?) of the Prague summit meeting on Iraq—staying united in our commitment to take effective actions against those who defy U.N. Security Council resolutions.

Three weeks ago, Romania has lost two soldiers in Afghanistan. We now know from our own experience that NATO membership is about capability, contribution, and responsibility, but also about risks. We are fully prepared to contribute to NATO’s strength and flexibility in undertaking new tasks imposed by the new security environment. NATO is defending peace, democracy, and security in the Euro-Atlantic area, and we are ready to play our role in shaping the future of the Alliance. A part of this future is making cooperation more attractive than confrontation throughout the entire Euro-Atlantic area. We cannot afford any black holes or fail-states; we cannot afford unpredictable developments, and we have to do something about it. Thank you.

Questions and Answers

Dr. Perry: We have some time for questions now, and I’m sure we’ve got some questions out there to these presentations, all very interesting and compelling. Right here, first question?

Audience: Peter Sharpen, Mider [?] Corporation. General Wagner, one of your slides indicated that, in the retrospective on Operation Iraqi Freedom, one of the areas where we need to do better is coalition information sharing. Could you discuss a little bit the directions in which you think we might move to do that better?

General Wagner: Well, certainly, it is a frustration, not only to the United States forces, but also to our allies and partners who we attempt to operate with. In the past eleven months, I’ve had the opportunity to host twenty-two MoDs—Ministers of Defense, or Chiefs of Defense—from other nations, and, endurably, we get to that topic. In fact, in talking to Australia, their comment was, “We want to be by your side when the war fights start, but we can’t be there unless we’re part of a planning upfront—enabled to see the planning, see the information, and share in the development of it.” That is just one country, who would say the same thing. And in fact, many of our operating forces have had to figure out ways on their own, where they can figure out how to share the information because our systems don’t allow us to do that.

Really, we do think that there are technologies solutions to this. A large part of our information—Of course, we do a lot of our work and a lot of our planning on secure nets—a secure net which has more information on it than you want to share. And so, the question is how do you allow partial access. And there are technologies now that will enable us to do this. Plus, as you know, perhaps, that DEP STEP DEF(?) is just recently authorized, and written provided guidance set(?) enables us to do more information sharing. So, it’s a question of policy, and it’s a question of technology.

This certainly isn’t a question of a lack of desire on the part of either(?) the United States forces or our allies, who we’re working with to share the information. But it is a question of setting the rules, and the business rules, that allow us to share that information. And I think we are making progress, and I think we have reason to be optimistic. This is an issue that is—the importance of which we share it(?) at all levels. And we do have some technologies that we’re working on, that allow us to have somebody have access to the computer and limit the access to where they can go within the information that’s available. So, I think there’s reason to be optimistic, and I think that the DEP STEP DEF(?) has made a first, good step along that line, and I think we’ve got some technologies solutions.

Dr. Perry: There are two questions, back there on that table.

Audience: Wendy Jaffe, General Accounting Office. With the U.S. Army investing in future combat system and network-centric operations, provide through network-centric operations, how is this going to affect U.K. forces and Australian forces, in terms of inoperability?

Dr. Perry: ...[inaudible] who the question is directed to?

Would you care to address it from your standpoint?

Mr. Brenton: The issue goes slightly wider than network-centric operations. The U.S. is spending—It’s a fascinating fact about U.S. military spending. The U.S. are now spending more on Defence R&D than any other country spending on its entire defense budget. And this is obviously a challenge for those countries that expect to be working closely with the United States in future campaigns, to ensure that we can. And the trick has to be, as these systems evolve, to be involved ourselves, to evolve parallel systems or to have a share in the systems, and to ensure that our doctrines and practices, and equipment, develop in parallel with those in the United States. I quoted the example of joint strike fighter —it’s exactly an application, that sort of approach.

Dr. Perry: Anyone else like to add to that, or—?

We had another question at that same table—one more?

Audience: Ray Stuchohl, a student at Catholic University. In the last three year, there have been several occasions when the U.S. worked hard to involve ally partners throughout the world in operations or goals. One that I can think of is missile defense, then, of course, operations Enduring Freedom and Iraq. General Wagner just mentioned information operations as a possible lesson learned. Can you tell us some other lessons learned for the future, that we might want to look into?

General Wagner: Other areas to look into -- and I’m sorry, into which area? Can you--

Dr. Perry: Other lessons learned from the combined operations of the--

General Wagner: Would combine?

Mr. Stuchohl: ...[inaudible] Sorry. More in getting the allies on board to support us, particularly some of the errors that might have been made with First Missile Defense, and then with convincing other countries to work with us on Iraq.

General Wagner: I think that the first thing I would say, for OIF, would be the phenomenal amount of cooperation and support that was provided by other nations in many different ways. There was information sharing; there was logistical support. There was basing. There were nations who were riding the one aircraft that they had or the one courier(?) that they had. There was a tremendous amount of support that did come from other nations, so the first thing to do would be to acknowledge the tremendous amount of cooperation and support that we did get from many other nations, not least of which was seen at CenCom in the planning and the support there.

I think there’s also a lot of operational sharing of how to do things, how to operate in an urban area. There are other forces that have been operating with terrorist forces for a long time. Their forces have been operating in the build-up areas against an organized crime. So, there’s all sorts of information that’s been shared, and tactics and procedures that have allowed us to operate more effectively and to, in fact, save the lives of the soldiers of all countries, as they are operating on the battlefields. So, I think that there are many, many successes, far more so than become a current from what we would normally read in the newspapers. A very strong partnership has been mentioned by General Kelly, not just in CentCom, but on the battlefield, and the support from the nations that we have operated from.

Now, specific other aspects besides the information sharing —Clearly, we were able to engage targets with our aircraft. With the information that we share, we can use precision munitions together. There are many aspects of the battle fight that have been fought, and are very much of a coalition aspect, with absolute sharing of the same training techniques.

And one of the aspects that we’re trying to do is through our joint national training capability, that soleverage(?) the same experience that we found in Iraq, in our training. If you were to take the map of the world and you put on it, Iraq, where do forces come from to fight? They never got together at a given stage, and based and planned. They came from all around the world, and they came to fight on the battlefield. That’s where they first joined for the operational forces. They launched from bases all around the world, and they came to fight. That’s the way we fight. We don’t get together—all gather together at Fort Benning and have a big conference to decide how we’re going to fight. We come from all the bases around the world, whether the naval, ground, or air assets(?), and we join on the battlefield to fight. And that’s what we’re trying to replicate with a global-national training capability, where we replicate that on our training fields, around the world.

So, we feel that we’ve learned a lot and are willing(?) to work together. We have done extraordinarily good job of doing that, but we want to build--
Audience:—and how—what, perhaps—is going on between your forces and U.S. forces or other coalition forces, or might go on, that would improve the chances for coalition combined operations?

Brigadier Kelly: We shouldn’t underestimate the benefits of the ongoing exchange programs that many of us share, in a bilateral sense and also multilateral sense, and the joint combined exercises that our forces participate in, at a variety of time.

If I look back at our experience before going into East Timor in September of 1999, we had done a series of activities with U.S. forces from the Pacific—by naval, marine, and air force—as well as from USARPAC in Hawaii. And in a series of command post exercises and other planning activities that were totally unrelated to the events of September 1999, we actually then had similar personalities come and join our team in that combined force headquarters for the Internet operations. So, the fact that we understood, knew these people, we shared common procedures—these are things that allow you to meet in the dark night before going into an operation and actually work through things in a very balanced way.

But that means that we need that time to continue that sort of remediation training, when we are fully committed to ongoing operations, which global war on terrorism actually presents at the moment. So if we’re dealing with nations that have small defense forces, they need time to remediate themselves; they can’t sustain a level of operation. So, we have to be able to pace ourselves, as I said, and, indeed, Admiral Olson mentioned it yesterday. We’re involved in a marathon, not a sprint. So, our planning has to actually be able to articulate to our coalition partners potentially how long this effort is required, and they may be able to identify certain events in the timeline where they can contribute another niche capability which will actually relieve the pressure from another senior partner.

So, all of that is within the same sphere of the planning required, but also, the relationships that develop during those combined exercises that we’re fortunate to participate in, as well as the exchange programs and the exchange of officers at our respective command and staff colleges.

Dr. Perry: Anyone else? Question, here, in the front.

Audience: Jason Sherman, from Defense News. My question is directed to Kanahara-san. Near the end of your talk, you outlined a seven point initiative that you said reflected your personal views for a set of modernization and policy initiatives that the Japanese self-defense forces might do well to adopt. I’m wondering if you might be able to offer us any insights into the ongoing National Defense Program Outline, the NDPO, that the Japan Defense Agency is undertaking, that is expected to inform new thinking and new decisions in terms of how the Japan military is organized and any new modernization initiatives they may undertake.

Mr. Kanehara: To be clear for everybody here, the Defense Program, ours, is based upon five years programs ...[inaudible] continuous. We are now in the fourth year of that chairman and we have to make a new one next 2005. For several mid five years program, we set big policy guideline that is defense outline, and that will be changed for we are facing new threats and new missions. And debate is going on, in December, I think a decision could be made, but I don’t know, really. This is really hot issue, and my government is working on this very hard. I’m not allowed to discuss anything here; I’m sorry. [laughter]

Audience: ...[inaudible] to discuss enhanced cooperation with the U.S. missile defense capability and a small ...[inaudible] strategic air ...[inaudible]. Are any of those things being discussed and debated? Can you tell us some of the things that are being debated?

Mr. Kanehara: I can give you some basic line of thinking. As I said, our forces are based upon the exclusively homeland defense posture, and this defense posture will not change, because we are still in alliance with the United States. U.S. is a spear, and Japan is a shield. That is our basic concept of our defense.

But, because of that, we have no long legs(?), cargo planes for example. When we started our peacekeeping operation in 1993, we sent our air forces to Rwanda, in Kenya, to have strategic transportation there. But we had only C-130s—still have C-130s only—and our Chief of Air Staff went to Rwanda, made six stopovers. And we think it’s too obsolete; we have to have new cargo planes to have new missions. That does not mean that we’re going to have huge, power-position capabilities like U.S. It’s not our intention. But we have more international missions that were not conceived in 1960s, 1970s, and to cope with these new missions, we have to have suitable instruments to deliver these missions.

Our threats too—the ballistic missiles were luxurious weapons for ships of powers. But, these days, they’re proliferating and the concept of deterrence has changing. It’s no longer the way to defend itself by pointing guns and—but through(?) here. But we see now many people having guns; why not putting bulletproof here? So the concept is changing. We have to prepare new threats and new defense concepts. But, what would be the final decision of the governments is top secret; sorry, can’t tell you.

Dr. Perry: We’ll be waiting for December.

Question, here ...[inaudible]

Audience: Ed Bruner, from the Congressional Research Service—direct a question to General Kelly. I was very much unaware of your coalition planning group, but I applaud the apparent promise that this approach would hold, and wonder if you might share with us a coalition perspective that the group perhaps developed and presented to the commander?

Brigadier Kelly: Just a ...[inaudible]

Mr. Bruner: A coalition—You said, one of your missions was to incorporate the coalition perspective under the overall planning. I’m just curious if you could offer us a type of coalition perspective that might have come out of that process.

Brigadier Kelly:One of the products that we produced on behalf of command of Central Command is a quarterly area of responsibility-wide estimate, which is a bit of a rugged check. It was formerly done by an element within the J-3 Operations Directorate of the headquarters. It’s now solely done by the Combined Planning Group. So, it’s a refreshing perspective for the commander. It looks at his full area of responsibility, not just specific sub-theaters that are active at present, and it provides him with a view drawn from a variety of sources—but quite often, open sources—and gives him just a view as to where we are. It may inform or influence other planning efforts, but it’s presented to his senior staff and himself; it’s an internal document. And he’s certainly been challenged by the view, which is now done by a twenty plus team of coalition officers versus a uniquely U.S.-only product, as it had been done prior to December, last year.

So, that’s one example. The other is within some of the courses of action being developed within the review of the campaign plan. Again, we are drawing on a wide variety of experience, a wide variety of national, cultural, religious, and regional perspectives, and so, different militaries have different ways of dealing with the problem. And so, some of the solutions will be different from a U.S.-only planner’s perspective to the way to conduct the operation. And that’s what this group is being acknowledged as providing other ways of doing business.

Dr. Perry: Question, here.

Audience: Colonel Jim Holzerith. I’m the Canadian Military Attaché here in the Canadian Embassy. My question actually goes back to Admiral Cebrowski’s notions this morning, that he introduced on interdependence versus interoperability. And, I think he introduced to them the joint context, but I would extend it to the multination(?) and coalition arena as well. And I guess, it really does tie back into the notion of design—joint—or design with interoperability in mind, in the first set. My question really is, is to what degree are we able to do that? Perhaps beyond concept development and experimentation, collaborative planning upfront, to truly get to an interdependent or at least a stage of coalitions where you can burden-share and plan on specific capabilities or leverage specific capabilities within a coalition.

Dr. Perry: General Wagner, do you want to--

General Wagner: ...[inaudible] from the standpoint of ally command transformation, NATO, and the operations that are going on there, and say that—I think that that is exactly what you will see happen. That is exactly what should happen. We’ve heard Japan talk about the fact that they don’t have the long legs, but they need the long legs. They have the willingness to participate, but they don’t necessarily need to buy everything they need to do that. We need to share, in doing that. And so, that is an interdependence, just as within our own military. The Army does not need to buy their own transports. We are dependent upon the Air Force for the transport.

That same sort of a concept is what you will see come out of the work that’s being done with ally command transformation and NATO, as they look to the capabilities that they need to collectively and figure out who’s going to buy which piece of the part that is required for the whole. And so, I think you’re 100% right in your direction as to where things will go—is that they will go to a direction of interdependence, not just interoperable. And they should be; it’s an efficiency, and it’s an effectiveness. It’s a partnership and it’s a trust. And I think that we are there to the point where we can do that, and will do that.

Dr. Perry: Tom, perhaps time for one more question? Another one, anyone?

Okay, I think that will do it for this afternoon, and I want to thank all the panelists for wonderful contributions. And, I would ask that—[applause]

I would ask everybody, please, to just stay where you are for a few minutes, so Dr. Pfaltzgraff and Admiral Green can come up and make a few closing remarks.