Previous IFPA-Fletcher Conferences

The 34th IFPA-Fletcher Conference on
National Security Strategy and Policy:
Security Planning and Military Transformation

December 2-3, 2003
U.S. Chamber of
Commerce Building
Lafayette Square, 1615 H Street, NW
Washington, D.C.

Address by Mr. Andrew Hoehn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy

Introduction by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., President, IFPA

As we begin this opening session, which is entitled, "The Changing Context of Security Planning," I would make just a few brief introductory remarks about our various speakers. As I mentioned, the topic, of course, of this opening panel is to survey the landscape, and to discuss the changing context of security planning. I begin with the basic assumption that by this time it has become commonplace to assert that 9/11 had a defining impact on our security planning for the 21st century. Furthermore, it is this changing context that we're discussing this morning that includes terrorists, as we know. It includes the use of weapons of mass disruption, and the possible use of weapons of mass destruction. It includes issues of proliferation, issues of failed states that furnish so much of the geographic setting for terrorist training and terrorist operations being launched from. We face, as we see every day in our media and elsewhere, the potential for further terrorist attacks, here and abroad. This opening panel, therefore, provides a unique opportunity for each of us to benefit from the expertise and wisdom, indeed the knowledge and information, that is represented by the distinguished group of speakers that you have arrayed before you, that we have arrayed before us, here.

In choosing the speakers, we have endeavored to encompass the broad range of perspectives that we believe are essentially as we set the stage for the various sessions that will follow. Let me introduce our first speaker, who is Andrew Hoehn. He is Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy. He has held a variety of staff positions in the office of Secretary of Defense since 1989. Most recently, they include Principal Director for Strategy. He has authored numerous publications on defense and security issues. He is a contributing author of the Secretary of Defense's annual report to the President and Congress. So it is with great pleasure that I welcome you, Andy, as our first speaker. Now, you may choose to speak sitting down, or you may choose to use the other podium. And I leave that to the panel to decide how you want to proceed. You have your choice, so whatever you wish to do.

Mr. Hoehn: Thank you very much for the kind introduction, and also for the opportunity to join this group in the opening panel of this conference. The remarks we heard in the introduction, I think, were an excellent setting for the types of topics that we should engage in in the next couple of days, and certainly in the course of this panel. I think, as Dr. Pfaltzgraff has said in the opening, we do have a new context. We know that. We understand that. But yet, we still grapple with the implications of it. Admiral Green's comments of, when he discussed various changes that are underway in terms of command structure, and organization, and operational context, I think illustrate that even though we are some two years away from the events of September 2001, we really are at just the beginning of how it is that we see ourselves organizing and operating in a very different context, and in a very different world.

We have been involved in a whole host of issues in the Department of Defense, surrounding this mega-topic, if you will, called transformation. And transformation is not something that began, by the way, just two years ago. I think it is clearly something that has been underway for some period of time. And we saw the results of this transformation of our military forces, saw early results of that, in Kosovo. We saw it again in Afghanistan, and we saw it dramatically in operations in Iraq. What we're experiencing, in terms of how our forces are operating in the world, and how they're responding to a host of new challenges, is, I think, a type of operation that is increasingly characterized by knowledge, by speed, by precision, and certainly lethality, and even surprise. These are all appropriate, given the type of circumstances that we have today, given the new challenges that we find.

Indeed, what we see is that we have, in our military forces, small or smaller units performing functions that were once the domain of much larger formations. But as we look at how the world is changing, how our relationships are changing, how the challenges-- how we come to understand those challenges, we also understand that that transformation that we talk about too frequently, very frequently, is still quite incomplete. Indeed, to reap the real fruits of this transformation, and to adjust to those circumstances that Dr. Pfaltzgraff described, we also need to reassess the types, locations, numbers, and capabilities of our military forces worldwide. In short, what we really need to embark upon here is a transformation of our global military posture.

I think it goes without saying, but perhaps not, but I would argue that the global military posture that we have today is not what it needs to be. In fact, what we see, and where we're operating, are still very much legacies of the Cold War, and not yet a reflection, or at least, not yet a full reflection of the challenges that we confront in today's world. We still have vast concentrations of our forces in western Europe, in northeast Asia. And it's not to say that those forces are irrelevant, but it is to say that they may not be configured and placed and operating in the areas where they really will need to be. In short, I think I would argue that the posture that we have of our forces today is not agile enough, not lean enough, not fast enough to deal with the kind of challenges that we heard in the opening today, the challenges of terrorism, the challenges of weapons of mass destruction, the challenges of rogue states, and a whole host of new threats, where we find that the fault lines of conflict are not so much at the borders of countries, but within societies themselves.

In fact, what I will argue today is that the change in the global posture that we need to undertake really needs to reflect a fundamental shift in our thinking, and how we expect our military forces will operate. What that fundamental shift is is that our forces are no longer expected to fight in place. That is to say, we don't locate forces in today's world with the expectation that they'll fight in that location. Rather, what we will be doing is calling upon our forces to project into areas that may be close or may be distant. And so as we think about the global posture of our forces, we need to bear in mind that it is positioning forces so that they can move to where they may need to operate, not that they'll be operating in the place where they're necessarily located.

So, what do we really mean when we talk, in the Defense Department, about global posture? In the first instance, we're talking about footprint; that is, infrastructure abroad, to which we have access either for station forces, rotational forces, or logistics or support, and so on, the footprint being the worldwide infrastructure, both in the United States and abroad, that allows and provides support for how our forces will operate. In the second instance, we're talking about the presence of our forces, that is, those capabilities, in those locations, that are there either to provide reassurance to allies and partners, or to deter and/or dissuade those that would challenge the United States, our allies or partners, and our interests. The third element of our posture, in addition to the presence of forces, is the pre-positioning of equipment and supply. If we go back to the fundamental shift that says we don't station forces necessarily to fight in place, but what we are trying to do is build viable options to contend with those challenges that might arise, then the location of equipment and supplies that can facilitate movement in forces in time of crisis will be critical to how we think about the positioning of our forces worldwide.

And then, two last comments on posture, or two last elements. One is the notion that we will source forces globally and not just regionally. This too reflects a very important change from the past, in which we thought about regional forces, we thought about forces that were assigned to regional commands, and largely were left with regional commands. In this era, it's our view that we need to think about the assignment of forces globally, and the movement of forces to where and when they are needed. And then, the final important complement to this is something that Admiral Green raised in his opening comments, and that is the ability to surge forces in time of crisis.

So, in light of those elements, how is it that we think our posture will change as we look to undertake this important element of the transformation? One important change is that it is our view that in this era of uncertainty and of very quickly developing crises, we need to establish standing, joint command and control in forward areas with associated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. That is, we can't afford to have pickup games in this era. What we need to do is have the standing command and control apparatus that is both planning and guiding and responsive to the challenges that may well arise.

We also view in this era that the forward forces need to be the early arriving forces. That is to say that those forces that are used earliest in crisis need to be positioned such that they can arrive in the times when they are needed. And here I refer not just to traditional capabilities, but also emerging ones like missile defense, that if we were to assume that early in a crisis, that threats such as missiles will be an important part of the challenges that we'll confront, then we need to array our missile defense capabilities appropriately so that they are responsive in the time that they're needed.

We also believe we need to position new capabilities, the cutting edge of our transformation, if you will, forward, so that our allies, our friends, our partners, not only get to see and operate, but potentially emulate some of those capabilities. So as new capabilities like Striker come online, we believe it is important that they be positioned in forward areas, to be responsive, but also available for allies and partners to have a sense of how our own forces are changing. I mentioned pre-positioning earlier. It is our view that in this era, we don't pre-position assets necessarily for anticipating a particular circumstance, but what we want to do is pre-position assets along major transportation routes to facilitate movement to the fight. And that, too, will require some important changes in how we organization our forces.

In the area of infrastructure, or footprint, it's our view that you'll see less emphasis on large US bases with station forces, and increasingly more emphasis on the development of warm (?) facilities, and austere (?) infrastructure. Again, the goal here is to provide flexibility to contend with the uncertainty that we think characterizes this environment. And then the last and important element here is to have much more attention in the surging of forces, what Vice Admiral Green referred to as the Navy's fleet response plan being an important element, but the surging of the forces, including heavy ground reinforcements, from the United States to those areas where they are needed.

A week ago today, the President made an announcement on the transformation of our global posture. And in that announcement or that statement that he gave, he noted that we have been planning this for some time, but we're now about to embark on the very important element of discussing intensely these issues with our allies and partners. Those discussions are underway this week in Europe, as part of the NATO ministerials. They will continue with our allies and partners in Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere in the weeks and months to come. It's our view that this transformation of our posture is not only important for how we operate, as I said, as military forces, but it's also critical for putting our alliances and partnerships on a viable path to meet the kind of challenges that we see coming in the years and decades ahead. And so, these views that I've discussed with you briefly this morning will be an element of those discussions that we'll have with our allies and partners as we look to understand what the kind of changes that we and they see are needed for how we operate abroad, and how we plan accordingly to be able to position our forces to meet the range of challenges that we see coming. Thank you very much.

Dr. Pfaltzgraff: Thank you very much, Andy, for this very important introduction and overview. Many of the issues that you have discussed in your presentation of course will be further considered as we proceed over the next few days.

Questions and Answers

Dr. Pfaltzgraff: We're still missing Mansoor Ijaz, but I think we should begin the discussion. Let me just give you the basic ground rules. Please keep your question brief. We're looking for questions. If there's a statement you need to make, make the statement, but make it brief. Secondly, please identify yourself. And thirdly, please wait for the microphone after you're recognized for the question. So, who would like to be the first questioner? Who would like to go first? Yes, right here.

Audience: I'm Ed Rowney (?), your former friendly arms controller. My question, I guess, is mostly to Bob Kaplan, but maybe to some others. And that has to do with this mindset-- Maybe the other speakers can chime in on this. Why is it that the leaders of the Islamic faith, the mullahs, don't recognize that this extremist group could possibly bring about their downfall? Why don't they speak out against them, and excommunicate them? Why the timidity of the mullahs?

Robert Kaplan: The Middle East is a laboratory of pure power politics. Soft power is not very well understood. Remember that we operate in a world of legality, of laws, and regulations, where if you have a fight with someone else, you have courts to resume to. But in the Middle East, though there are laws on the books, in all these societies, it's driven by pure power and intimidation of one sort or another. And if some of these others, more moderate groups, thought that they had the power to overcome the others, they might in fact operate that way.

But there is another thing. As Mansoor said, al-Qaeda and its spin-off viruses is the most dynamic element today in Middle East society. You know, it doesn't require country clearances, travel orders. It doesn't have to write CONOPs. It's not totally snarled in bureaucratic paperwork the way the postindustrial age West has become, or with big organizations, the way we have become. You know, it's the ultimate postindustrial kind of centerless corporation. It's run on an informal basis, and we think of informal, medieval institutions as backward. In fact, they're far forward than us, because the most effective power is informal power and influence. And these people have really developed a very dynamic, centerless cluster of organizations that conveys itself, that conveys its power.

And there's something else. Islam is the best of the three religions for poor people. If you're poor, and downtrodden, Islam is an austere voice. It's a religion that's willing to fight. It's a simple message. It's kind of like early Christianity was in the second and third centuries of Rome. If you read about the various Christian cults who rose up against Roman rule in Tunisia and what is today western Algeria, you'll see a great similarity between them and some of the radical Islamic cults.

And then there's something else, and then I'll push it on to the other panelists. If you look at a map, and you look at these towns, and these tribal agencies of Pakistan, like Parachinar, Miramshan (?), Wizeristan (?), they look like small towns, and they were, 10 or 15 years ago. But when you get there, they're slums. They're inner city slums, with narrow warrens, five, six stories, many families packed in tight. The regime in Pakistan has done nothing for them. As one of them said to me, "We don't care if it's Noar Sharif (?), Benazir Bhutto, Musharraf, whether it's democrat, it's an army coup. It makes no difference. The people in Islamabad hate us. We're not really part of the country." And the radical mullahs are the ones who say, "Stand up and fight."

Dr. Pfaltzgraff:I think that Mansoor Ijaz would like to comment on this question as well, and any other member of the panel is welcome to do so. But Mansoor, you in particular

Mansoor Ijaz: I think the way I would put it to you, very simply, is that the rulers are afraid of the monsters that they created. They created the monsters by suppressing the natural capacity. Who is bin Laden, at the end of the day? What is the phenomenon of this man? He basically wanted to combat and rise up against his fascist father, and he couldn't do that. Then he wanted to rise up against the state, and the state was in such a state of affairs that he wasn't able to do that. And so he said, "Let me go and strike out at those who support my state." And when the state stripped him of his citizenship, they stripped him of his dignity, and that caused even more-- It's what I call the trampling of the ego. In the infamous memo that many of you know about, that I wrote to Sandy Berger (?) in 1996, I said to him, "Sandy, we cannot achieve anything in the Islamic world by trampling the egos of their downtrodden. If we do not do more to raise them up, their disaffected up, they will surely come to our shores to tear us down."

In the end, it comes down to a war of not intellects, not minds. It's a war of what's going on in your heart. Because every human being's heart beats the same way. And these leaders have not provided for their people. And then on top of that, they've taken orders from us. That's the perception, at least over there. We've got to stop making them give orders, and they've got to start providing for their people. Otherwise, that large, silent majority that exists in the Muslim world will never rise up against these fanatics and contain them from within, and that is the only ultimate long-term solution that we ought to be trying to get at, because nothing else will work.

Dr. Pfaltzgraff:Anyone else on that question? In that case, let's go to our next questioner, the gentleman right back here. And then this next one will be back there. So, let's start right here.

Audience: Wooston Lee (?) from the Department of Defense. My question is mainly to Mr. Hoehn and Mr. Kaplan. I was wondering if you felt the last presentation, regarding the creation of a two-division structure, was a viable option, given what you have observed thus far, and the work you're doing on transformation.

Mr. Hoehn: I think it would be a mistake to think that transformation is only about the major combat elements of our defense establishment and war fighting structure. In fact, what I hear from this panel, and frankly, what we have been thinking increasingly, is that the type of challenges that we're going to see in the years and decades to come are going to be more in terms of the low end asymmetries that you heard the panelists talk about, and the high end asymmetries that you heard Professor Bracken speak of, and frankly, somewhat less of the traditional kinds of warfare that we are both skilled at, but frankly have dominated. And hence, that's why we see war fighting moving more to the ends of the spectrum, and away from the middle.

So, in light of that, the work that Hans Binnendijk has been doing, and others, in terms of thinking through what kinds of organizations, what kind of structure, what kind of training, what kind of doctrine do we need to deal with the challenges are exactly the right ones. And so, I applaud the initiative that he has put forth. And I think he would be the first to admit that it isn't so much whether that specific option is the one that gets adopted. I think the real issue here is, do we have within our armed forces the capacity to deal with the problems of stabilization and reconstruction? And I think what I take from his proposal is that there is a deficiency in this realm, and that we need to be looking to build some viable alternatives. And he is offering one. Whether it's that one or something similar, or even something quite different that addresses that set of problems, that's the real issue here, is, do we have the capacity, the capability, if you will, to deal with that problem set, and to do so in the most effective ways that we can.

Dr. Pfaltzgraff:I wanted to give Bob Kaplan the next opportunity on that question, but I think, Hans, you ought to have the last word on this question as well, since it's your proposal that is being discussed. So, let's go with Bob next.

Robert Kaplan: Let me answer that with an example that I was speaking to Secretary Hoehn about. We have this issue about tribal militias in Afghanistan. You know, our policy is to build up a national army there, and the tribal militias are an impediment in that. They're more warlord-focused. But when you actually get to Afghanistan, and you speak to the majors, and the lower ranking officers, and you go out, you find that in some parts of the country, supporting the ANA (?) is right, but in other parts, if you withheld support and weapons for the tribal militias, the Army special forces fire bases might even be overrun. It varies from one locale within a province to another. Therefore, these are not issues, I wouldn't even want Washington discussing, let alone deciding upon. These are issues that I wouldn't want decisions made at anything higher than the lieutenant colonel or the battalion level in the area.

And the problem is that Washington tends to identify the problems correctly, but it often deals with it by creating a new organization. And I think future is just cutting away vast amounts of organization here, and having much more people at the NCO level spending more time in Monterey at the language institute, and spending their whole lives in places like western Nepal, and the Horn of Africa, and places like that. It's like Secretary Hoehn said. Get more people out to the edges, and give them increasing autonomy. Because if not, if we don't watch out, we'll be like Gulliver, tied up by the Lilliputians.

Hans Binnendijk: If this proposal focuses primarily on organization, and one tends to think of it that way, two divisions, then probably that's the wrong way to present it. I think this is much more about training. It's much more about the synergies that are created by bringing together various kinds of units. It's not intended to create a lot of layers. It's certainly not intended to put this problem back into Washington's lap. It is trying to do, on the ground, what we ought to be doing, but better, because we pull together these capabilities, and create these synergies.

Now, what is the viability of this? I think much will depend on the Army. The Army is going to resist this. Why? Because they think it's going to cut into one or two of their 10 fighting divisions. And if it does, it would be a mistake. I don't envision this as replacing an Army division. The analysis that we did indicates that most of these capabilities are around, and it's again a question of reorganization. You can do that in a way that you don't cut into the existing 10-division structure of the Army.

Now, I think, finally, what is likely to happen is that rather than the large structure that we suggested, where we'll be going, at least in the next several years, is that smaller groups will be created along this pattern, but not the division size groups. And they will be more deployable, more modular. That's not a bad starting place.

Dr. Pfaltzgraff:Unless there's anyone else on the panel who would like to comment, let's move on to the next question. There was a hand back here that I had said we would recognize. Yes, please, right there.

Audience: Jeremy Harrington (?). I'm a first-year student at the Fletcher School. I'd like to ask a question about the role and the performance of the intelligence community in illuminating the context of security planning, particularly the issues raised by the panel of the threat of non-state-armed groups. I'd be interested in Mr. Kaplan's observations, from his experiences being embedded at the grassroots level, what observations he has on what the intelligence community needs to do differently. And I'd also be interested in the views of Mr. Ijaz, in particular. Thank you.

Dr. Pfaltzgraff: That's a question for a conference in itself, actually. But it's very important, and we'd like to get your reactions to it. Bob?

Robert Kaplan: One of the challenges I face as a journalist is, I often know where our intelligence people are by where I'm not permitted to go, or what fire bases I'm not permitted to visit. So I actually don't know as much about that as I would like to. There was one fire base I wanted to visit-- I won't say where-- where I was told, "No, you can't go there, because the OGAs, the other government agencies, i.e. the intelligence, owns that fire base, not the Green Berets." So, there's a lot going on that, frankly, I don't know about. But I think I would emphasize-- And this is what people in the intelligence community will always tell you, I think. We Americans are very good at signals intelligence, on the technological aspects of it. But where it falls down, where we really have to depend on friendly foreign intelligence agencies, is on human beings who can ferret out intentions, who have embedded into groups for long periods of time, overseas. And that, I think, is the great challenge. It's a big challenge in Iraq. It's a big challenge in Afghanistan, in Yemen, in many different places.

And I'll give you an example. Mansoor spoke earlier about the danger of international shipping. Well, one of the best opportunities for terrorists-- and this was written about in my magazine, The Atlantic Monthly, in a cover story, was about piracy of big tankers, and how much piracy there is, and how a number of tankers are actually run by ghost crews, because the real crew was killed at the high seas, and it's now being run by a ghost crew. And this is like a perfect petri dish for groups like al-Qaeda to take advantage of. And this is really where the rubber meets the road, where so much technological intelligence will be less helpful than two or three human beings who know exotic languages, who are in place, and who are with the right people.

Mansoor Ijaz: I think all that I'll add to that is that we have to ask ourselves in this country, why is it that we are not willing to resurrect what the CIA's great capacity was during the Cold War? Why is it that we're not willing to do that? What has happened to the ethos of this society that we're not willing to take the risk to go out and protect ourselves by engaging our own citizens? I mean, I do this out of a sense of moral obligation to my fellow countrymen, because this country gave me more than anyone in the world could ever imagine you could get as an opportunity. I was born and raised in this country, educated in the best institutions, worked on a farm, worked as a busboy in a delicatessen, and have the opportunity to give back something to society. But there's not that many of us around that speak different languages, and understand the cultural identities that you have to understand to be able to get inside these organizations.

Until we as a nation are willing to ask that hard question, and ask our political leaders to answer it, and then give the directive to our intelligence apparatus to go out and do it, I think there's very little chance that we're going to be able to infiltrate to the extent we need to to be able to diffuse the threats from inside.

Dr. Pfaltzgraff:I would ask any other member of the panel to comment on this question as well, if you would like to do so. I would simply say that, given the diversity of this country, it seems to me puzzling that we haven't been able to do what Mansoor is talking about. I shouldn't depart from my role as moderator here, but it seems to me, with a country with the diversity that we have in it, we ought to be able to tap into people who have loyalties to this country, as you pointed out here, who would help us to improve that human part of the intelligence picture. But that's just my own personal opinion.

Anyone else on this panel who would like to talk about that? Then, let's go on to one or two more questions. And what I'd like you to do is to ask your question very briefly, because we're going to have to end the panel at 11:45 promptly. So, one quick question over here. Dick, I can see you back there. You have that.

Audience: ...[inaudible] semantics point of order with Robert Kaplan. I think you're giving the term CONOPs a bad rap. CONOPs, in its simplest form, tells what the relationships are between, who the players are, and what the mission is. And it's not doctrine, and it's not prescriptive, and it doesn't tell you what range, and what weapon, and what circuitry to use. We've never done it as well as the Brits, who have boiled it down to "Stop the Bismarck," or "Sink the armada." But I think if you get the CONOPs right-- and we're making tremendous efforts to get the joint CONOPs done first-- you will cover all those points that you made, that the NCOs can make decisions from advance bases, and the colonels can stay in Leavenworth, and be available for reach-back. But I think you're talking about doctrine, not about CONOPs.

Robert Kaplan: Can I respond?

Dr. Pfaltzgraff:Yes, please, a brief response, Bob.

Robert Kaplan: That briefs well, but the reality is that the document is used for people at the higher levels to dilute, to play around with, to change the mission. And the ultimate result, every day, on the ground in Afghanistan, is that permission is given to hit compounds, to search various mud-walled forts, 72 or 96 hours later than they should, and the result is dry holes, rather than bull's-eyes. It's another method that gives control higher up, which goes completely against the trend I think we have to go in.

Dr. Pfaltzgraff:We have time for one or two more. Right back here. Yes, please. If you could stand up so they can see you when they bring you the mike.

Audience: Yes. Vivek Dubay (?) from Los Alamos National Lab. This is mainly a question for Professor Bracken. There's been a lot of talk about organizational transformation, but implicit and inherent to that is cultural transformation within the defense business and the national security business. Can you offer additional insights from the business world as to how successful companies have time and time reinvented themselves? How can we accelerate the rate of cultural change to get to the transformation we need to get to?

Paul Bracken: I think it's a mistake to look at technological transformation, and then people will say, "But we have to change the organization. There's too much focus on technology." Just for example, in this last go-round, I think the whole distinction between technical intelligence and human intelligence is 20, 30 years out of date. So to get to your point, the question, I think we have to think of strategies in terms of congruences, alignment, so that when you change your personnel system, and your culture and your people, you have to see if it matches your technology, if it matches your strategy.

And if you look at the great, really pioneering works in organization theory done years ago, like Joan Woodward's (?) Industrial Organizations, her whole point is that managers need to think in terms of these alignments. I changed my technology. Did I change the culture? Because if you only change one, you're not going to get the payoff. But if you look at it in a holistic way, which I think we know a lot better how to do from the late 1990s-- I mean, there's this view that bureaucracies don't change. Well, look at AT&T. Look at Enron. They were big bureaucracies, and they went under dramatic change. Oh, you said you wanted successful change? That's a different thing. That's a harder thing. But we have examples of that too. We have a wider range of experiences we can absorb.

And one of the things I believe, is that the DOD and the services need to do kind of an executive program, pooling the experiences of Hewlett Packard, and JetBlue, and IBM, and Enron and AT&T, for these alignments and congruences. When they changed the technology, did they change the people?

Dr. Pfaltzgraff:Well, unfortunately, time has run out. I wish this panel could go on for another hour, frankly. There's so much to talk about here. I think we have looked at these issues in holistic fashion, to use a point that was just made by Paul Bracken. I think that we have covered an immense amount of the security landscape. We have certainly seen at least various parts of the anatomy, or at least touched various parts of the anatomy of the elephant, using the proverbial blind person/elephant metaphor here. I think as a result of this, we have learned a great deal about the context of national security within which we must plan, and within which we must think about and carry out the complex tasks of transformation. So, on our collective behalf, I would like to express our thanks to this panel for an outstanding opening session, and for helping us to think through many of the issues that we will be dealing with as we proceed to this afternoon and to tomorrow.