Previous IFPA-Fletcher Conferences

The 34th IFPA-Fletcher Conference on
National Security Strategy and Policy:
Security Planning and Military Transformation

December 2-3, 2003
U.S. Chamber of
Commerce Building
Lafayette Square, 1615 H Street, NW
Washington, D.C.

Address by Dr. William Schneider, Jr., Chairman, Defense Science Board

Introduction by Dr. Stephen M. Younger, Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Dr. Younger: Our next speaker is Dr. William Schneider, Chairman, Defense Science Board, and president of International Planning Services, Inc. His previous positions include being a member of the Rumsfeld Commission, the commission to assess the—

END OF SIDE 1, TAPE 3

Dr. Younger:— Dr. Schneider.

Dr. Schneider: Thank you. And as J.D. has associated sitting at the table with being an academic, as a former academic, I don't want to be accused of recidivism, so I'll use the podium.

It's a great pleasure and a privilege to be here with such a knowledgeable audience, as well as fellow panelists, to discuss a subject that is perhaps emblematic of the transitions the current administration has undertaken. In the first six months of 2001, I was involved in the transition activities in the Department of Defense. And this was the third hostile takeover I had participated in, having previously been involved in the transitions of the Reagan and Nixon administrations. And working on this particular subject, that is, how to deal with the strategic systems of the US, and how to modernize them or reform them or indeed transform them, it struck me that it would be instructive to look further back to the history of how these things came about.

And I was particularly struck by the parallelism between the transition activities in the Eisenhower administration 50 years ago and the efforts that were made and have matured through the Nuclear Posture Review and the associated documents. The Eisenhower administration, like the Bush administration, had a fundamental change in threat. Our World War II ally, the former Soviet Union, had become a mortal adversary. The technology environment in the 50s had changed fundamentally as well. The technology of World War II that had largely been mechanized infantry and tactical air, and naval forces, had evolved, where the technologies of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, communication satellites, naval nuclear propulsion, and computation had intruded into military affairs to the point where the technological environment had evolved from a change in degree to a change in kind.

And the third aspect of it was also interesting, although in some ways opposite, where the US had, in the early 50s, developed a refined appreciation of the mortal threat the former Soviet Union posed to the US, and undertook a posture to rapidly optimize US forces against that threat. And to a considerable degree, the posture adopted by the Eisenhower administration in that period was the underlying theme of the way we adapted to the Soviet threat during the Cold War.

In the post-Cold War period that the Bush administration addressed, the circumstances in that respect were precisely the opposite. We're unable to predict the shape of future threats, and as a consequence, we had to look to wholly new ways of organizing military forces so they would be able to cope with threats that we could not now foresee. This required a very substantial change in the way in which we managed our strategic capabilities. As Admiral Ellis has suggested, the strategic forces of the US are now no longer a force sort of separate and apart, and sort of uniquely dedicated to supporting the deterrence mission. They are now not only much more integrated with the overall scheme of national defense, but operate in a much more coordinated way, or at least need to. The notion of a system of systems is wholly appropriate, and an operative term in terms of the kinds of strategic forces that we need to develop.

And the Defense Science Board has undertaken a study of this, very ably led by retired Admiral Denny Blair (?), now president of the Institute for Defense Analysis, and Vince Fitto (?), who is the president of the C. Stark Draper Lab. And this study will be published later this fall. But in looking at what kind of capabilities we need for this strategic strike system, we now really need to tailor to a much broader agenda. I think J.D. Crouch went through the aspirations to deal with getting out of complete dependence on deterrence, and recognizing that we want to dissuade countries from even going down this path, from electing the path of acquiring weapons of mass destruction. That tends to affirm the Sun Su maxim of not having fought the battle, but in some ways go beyond it in having a sort of diplomatic dimension to it, and trying to deflect the path in which conflict is supported through getting nuclear weapons, and especially nuclear weapons, but other weapons of mass destruction as well, off the table.

In order to do that, it's required a much more integrated system of capabilities. And these capabilities are mutually reinforcing. The ability to conduct what the DSB study refers to as pre-boost, sometimes called preemptive, but it's beyond the traditional concepts of preemption. But to be able to hold these assets at risk from the pre-boost phase through, if they are missile delivered, through the boost, descent, midcourse, and terminal phases, and to be able to do this in a highly integrated way. The C4ISR system that is associated with achieving such capabilities is a very formidable one indeed, but one that builds off the kind of capabilities that have emerged on the scene with such force in recent years. That is, the technologies of information that are now making this kind of capability practical in a way that could not have been imagined two decades ago, and perhaps not even a decade ago.

And all of these capabilities have to be integrated in a way that, as I suggested earlier, reflect the fact that we do not have a specific adversary against whom we can optimize our capabilities. But saying that these are the kind of things we need, what we currently have is a considerable distance from that. And there will need to be some considerable process of optimization to try and improve the capabilities that we lack. And I'll just summarize a few of the points. For example, in the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance business, we will need persistent, global, on-demand surveillance. We will not just be able to get by with the episodic reconnaissance, and hope that the sample of what we pick up is good enough. We need to be able to have a very comprehensive and near-real time understanding of the damage done by particular strikes, so that we can make an assessment of how the conflict can be managed. We have to deal with the vulnerability of some of our key space systems, the global positioning system being among the most conspicuous, but by no means the only one.

The communications system that connects all of these components needs to be highly robust, and because so much data is being transferred on these systems, the capabilities need to be well in advance of any of the kind of things that we've currently had to deal with. Indeed, the demands of this system probably exceed the demands placed on the civil system. That is, the electronics are good enough to check the validity of your credit card in 15 seconds. That is not good enough for this kind of capability. And it's probably the case that we have not seen since the 50s, where aspects of defense technology are going to be well ahead of civil sector requirements.

I'd just like to note a couple of things about the nuclear posture. We have a paradox of having substantially reduced dependence on nuclear weapons for deterrence, and indeed, the capabilities that nuclear weapons offer that are unique have a much narrower range of applicability. But the nuclear posture and the nuclear capability remains central to the effectiveness of this strategy. And so we have to look to perhaps new ways of modernizing our nuclear posture as well. The paradigm that we've had during most of the Cold War period of incremental modernization of nuclear weapons with an evolving suite of delivery systems is giving way to a more nuanced strategy that will look to more just-in-time kind of developments of nuclear weapons that meet specific operational requirements, such as the hardened, deeply buried targets of the sort that we described, but in conjunction with other non-nuclear capabilities that will, when taken together, produce the desired effect throughout the entire kill chain that will ultimately lead to the effects of dissuasion and deterrence.

Finally, a couple of notes about delivery systems. Most of the angst during the Cold War about the strategic posture focused around the development of delivery systems, new bombers, new submarines for submarine-launched ballistic missiles, new cruise missiles, and land-based ICBMs. The delivery system problem is less urgent in the sense of the long life of these assets, and the ability to extract long-term economic value for the performance of these missions with legacy systems. However, the needs of having a capabilities-based approach does drive us to a requirement to have a very effective path for the modernization of our platforms. And this path needs to emphasize the diversity of the platforms to be able to perform these kind of missions. And hence, you may see circumstances where ICBMs are delivering non-nuclear payloads, and tactical platforms may be capable of delivering nuclear payloads. These changes in the way in which platforms can be adapted to meet these kind of requirements, so as to produce the desired effects, I think is likely to be a hallmark of how this system of strategic strike is modernized to meet the demands of the policy that's reflected in the Nuclear Posture Review.

However, I think the prospect looks considerably better for being able to be successful in this aspiration to diminish the importance of weapons of mass destruction in international politics. The technology is going in the right direction. That is, the component technology of active defense, advanced conventional weapons, and nuclear systems is going in such a way that it is beginning to pose a real barrier to any aspirations an adversary might have of success in heading down the trail of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. So, I think we are on the threshold of achieving what many had hoped when the multilateral agreements were put together during the Cold War period. It's just that in the environment of the 21st century, it will be likely to be achieved a lot differently, but perhaps with a much higher probability of success. Thank you.

Questions and Answers

Dr. Younger: We have time for questions, if the people with questions would identify themselves, and please wait for the microphones.

Audience: Thank you. It seems that the idea of deterrence by—

Dr. Younger: Could you identify yourself, please?

Audience: I'm Carey Mullis (?). And I don't really belong here, but I got invited, and I've been really enjoying it. But I'm involved in trying to solve the bioterrorist kind of problems from the biological side. But the thing that occurs to me, the idea of deterrence by blowing up the whole country, or setting up a really large bomb in a country, that worked fine when we were talking about a country that we were going to perhaps go to war with. But it seems like a lot of times in the present, we're really just mad at the guy who's running the place, right? And we've sort of gotten over this notion that it's illegal to assassinate somebody, right? But if we had a way to irritate him worse and worse every day until he did what we wanted him to do, it would be better, in my opinion, than saying, "If you don't do this, we're finally going to have to run out of patience with you and blow you up."

For instance, if we could have heated up Baghdad by one degree centigrade every day, by having mirrors like the kind that Gerard O'Neill (?) proposed that we build years ago in space that would focus light on little generators and make—I mean, this might sound crazy, but we have the capacity to do that. We could focus light from space on some palace, and say, "It's never going to get dark there until you do this, until you let us do our inspections. Every night, you're going to have a sun, what's going to look like a sun, and your place is going to get hotter and hotter. Your place, not the whole city, but your place, or some other place. We've decided we don't like this building. We want to see what's inside of it. We're eventually going to burn it up." I mean, I think we should think in terms of, some of the time, we're not really against the whole country.

Dr. Younger: I'm wondering if you can get to a question, please.

Audience: Oh, the question? The question I had, I guess, was, why, instead of just concentrating on what sort of nuclear deterrence we could have, is, how can we exert powerful influence on people, decision makers, in various countries that we're having problems with? I guess that would be the question. I'm just suggesting a few.

Dr. Younger: Who would like to address that. Keith?

Dr. Payne: Without commenting on the specific proposal about heating up Baghdad, let me just suggest that your basic question was, why, instead of concentrating on nuclear weapons, should we not be concentrating on a broader array of approaches to deterrence, to influence behavior? What you have just described, in this latter part of your question, is exactly what one of the points that the NPR recommends, and is widely recognized as a new approach to thinking about deterrence in this post-Cold War period. As I said earlier, as Dr. Crouch pointed out earlier, one of the recommendation of the NPR was to put together and integrate a much broader array of threat options, conventional and nuclear, so that whatever the local conditions require with regard to deterrence, we're more likely to have the type of threat option that's most effective for deterrence on that occasion. So, the heart of your point is, why don't you look at broader approaches than just nuclear? All I can say is, in fact, we are, and that's at the heart of the NPR.

Audience: John Kayes [?], National Defense University. Al-Qaeda with a nuclear weapon is viewed by many people as a nightmare scenario, mainly because, as many believe, it's not deterrable. If they get it, they'll attempt to use it. You can try to prevent them from using it, but to persuade them not to attempt to do it, many consider not doable. Admiral Ellis, you expressed a lot of confidence that deterrence works, as a general statement, including against non-state actors. Do you think in fact there are ways to deter this type of scenario? And if you have any specific ideas in that regard, I'd be very interested in them.

Admiral Ellis: Well, with apologies to my fellow panelists, the point to be made here is that, as I talked in general terms about IO and the real opportunity we have to bring together all elements of national influence, the idea that the act that you described could occur in complete and total isolation I think probably is not one that most of us would believe possible. In other words, there's got to be some element of support. There's got to be monies transferred. There's got to be at least a sanctuary of some type identified and supported, either openly or tacitly, by leadership and the like.

My point is not to make a blanket pronouncement that deterrence will always work. I just think it's inappropriate to write it off. I kind of follow the Keith Payne school here, that it may work, and it may not, and we need to have an understanding of that. I think there are broader elements to it, and that's the point I would raise. And so, the idea that we would influence and shape those who support this on a nation-state basis, those who offer sanctuary, those who fund and resource—But it's even broader than that. I mean, when you think about it, there are societal and cultural issues that are in play as well, that people who subscribe to suicidal efforts and the like have some image of rewards that await them, if not in this world, certainly the next. And how do you disabuse them of that through mechanisms that address on a more reasoned scale what the world's religions are really all about?

Those types of things that build a part of a more complete and comprehensive campaign are the elements that I was alluding to when I said, "Let's not be too quick to write off deterrence." It is broader than just the narrow focus that I would argue we have pursued, as Dr. Payne described, during the Cold War. And while the tools are not all in place to do that, nor are the mechanisms to coordinate it, I think it has tremendous potential. And it's that effort that needs to be aggressively pursued.

Audience: Alex Ellerman [?] from Systems Planning and Analysis over in Alexandria. This is the second time this week I've heard somebody talk about putting a conventional warhead on an intercontinental ballistic missile. And I have a question about that, which is, how do you fire a conventional intercontinental ballistic missile at Pyongyang without having the Russians thinking that it's a nuclear weapon headed for Vladivostok, or the Chinese thinking that it's a nuclear weapon headed for, say, Dayang (?)?

__: There's a number of ways that you can do that. The most obviously, of course, is to communicate with the Russians so that they know what they are doing. I mean, you can imagine using, say, a D-5 missile with, say, a 25,000-pound front end of high explosive. It won't have a long range, but it may turn out to be an excellent bunker buster that would be useful against hard and deeply buried targets, and it would have a much different trajectory than an ICBM that was flying at ICBM distances. So, there's a number of ways in which that problem can be managed. But the nature of the relationship with Russia is now drastically different, and that I think makes it more practical to have a force that will more seamlessly mix advanced conventional and nuclear capabilities, so that they can be used depending on the requirements of the circumstances.

Audience: Thanks. David Roof [?] with Global Security News Wire. This is for the panel, but in particularly Admiral Ellis. Do you believe, as J.D. Crouch has suggested, that in the future the US is going to increasingly be the initiator of conflicts, and that our strategic forces that we're developing now, including missile defense and whatever, will better enable us to do that?

__: I'm no better at predicting the future than anyone else, and so I certainly wouldn't go down that path. As we talk about capabilities, as we talk about the options, and the flexibility, and the broader spectrum of tools that we can provide the nation's leadership, I think that's the direction we're going. Given that we can't predict the future, just as we cannot predict accurately the success or lack thereof with regard to deterrent concepts in and of themselves, I think it would behoove us to hedge our bets against an alternative future which may not be the one that we anticipate.

The other thing I tell the War College is, we will plan for 100 contingencies, and fate will deal you the 101st. And it is how you reassemble the elements and the preparation that you've gone through in satisfying the needs of that first 100 that allow you to respond appropriately, adequately, proportionally, and in a timely manner to that 101st contingency. And so that's what we're talking about here. A broader range of options, more non-nuclear and even non-kinetic options, a more pervasive ability to know what's going on, and to act appropriately and precisely, those are the types of capabilities that we're looking for for future systems across the full range. And the future in which we see them serving is as much your guess as it is mine.

Audience: Bill Jones from Executive Intelligence Review. A related question. There was much discussion about a year ago with regard to the introduction to the so-called mini-nukes as bunker busters. This is an idea that has been around for at least a decade, but has gained some momentum with the Nuclear Policy Review, and raised a lot of questions with people. Particularly, I'd like—Dr. Younger had mentioned the fact that battlefield nuclear weapons do not exist. We don't have them today. It's a good thing we don't. But by introducing the mini-nukes into the active armory, does this not set a bad precedent in terms of the many other nuclear powers that now exist today, not all of which are rogue states? They also have to make decisions: At what point do we use our nuclear weaponry if the United States sets kind of a precedent, saying "We can do this with these smaller nuclear weapons—"

END OF SIDE 2, TAPE 3

TAPE 4

Audience: —form of a nuclear weapon in a conflict situation. Does that represent a problem or not?

Dr. Younger: No, I don't think so. What I said was, I don't believe in the concept of usable battlefield nuclear weapons. I think any nuclear weapon is strategic by its very nature. I don't believe that the introduction of lower yield systems would reduce the nuclear threshold. Indeed, as I said at the beginning, I think if anything the nuclear threshold for the United States and all countries should be going up for the simple, practical reason that the United States will prevail in any conventional conflict. So it's in our best interest to keep nuclear weapons off the table. So I don't see the introduction of lower yield systems making nuclear weapons more usable. And I find it curious that people will object to the introduction of less destructive systems, and insist that we maintain high yield systems that were developed for quite a different time. I'm missing that logic. We should apply the appropriate force in terms of achieve the objective, always recognizing that crossing the nuclear threshold is an enormous step.

Audience: Eric McVaden [?] with IFPA. Dr. Payne, you painted a very complex picture of deterrence. It dawned on me that the picture may even be more complicated than you suggested, because what I'm thinking of are—We have now certainly put deterrence into the minds of, maybe in a more serious way, of many, many other countries who are now looking to deter us. And I wonder if that complexity—I'm thinking all the way from China to North Korea to Iran and so forth. Is that truly, as it has just struck me, an added dimension to this, or am I making something of nothing?

Dr. Payne: No, it's a good point. And what it means is that that deterrence function that you just described may be more of a challenge than the deterrence functions we hope to fulfill during the Cold War. In fact, Dr. Crouch touched on this earlier. In fact, one of the questioners said that Dr. Crouch was proposing that we will be the initiators of conflict, and that wasn't the point at all. It fits right in with this particular question. The notion is that, in the past, the United States was in the guardian role of deterring attacks on allies and deterring attacks on ourselves. In the future, it may well be that the United States is compelled to deter escalation by a regional aggressor as the United States is confronting that aggressor in its own territory. That's not initiating conflict. That's trying to deter an aggressor from escalating while we are in that area possibly defending our allies and defending our interests.

Does that make deterrence more of a challenge? You bet it does. Because what it means is that, instead of in the past our threatening escalation as we did to the Soviet Union under flexible response, we may be in a regional contingency where our goal is to protect an ally or protect our interests. And that may cause us to have to be in a confrontation or a war with a regional aggressor, and actually deter that regional aggressor's escalation simultaneously while we are combating them conventionally. That's a very tough deterrence challenge, and it's a new challenge for this post-Cold War period.

Audience: Admiral Ellis, in the not-too-distant past, there was some discussion on deconfliction of authorities between the Combatant Commanders with regard to theater, regional, as well as global missile attack. Does your new mission as the global missile defense czar, so to speak, resolve that problem?

Admiral Ellis: I think to a large degree, it has. The role that we fulfill is one of creation of the architecture, the integration, the assessment, and the provision of those capabilities to the regional Combatant Commanders, so that they in turn can execute their statutory responsibilities for the defense of their area of responsibility. It's that simple. We are charged with operationalizing this. MDA is doing a magnificent job, but it's called Missile Defense Agency, but it might as well stand for Missile Development and Acquisition Agency, because that's what they're doing. How we operationalize that, I think, is going to be critically important. And somebody needs to do that so that it's consistent from one AOR to another, that there aren't operational concepts and plans and communication architectures and procedures that differ from one AOR to another.

There's a logical global element to this, and indeed, the Secretary of Defense has noted that there is no such thing as theater missile defense anymore. There's only missile defense on a global scale, and with various elements and layers of that. So our role is relieving Ron Kadish [?] of that burden of operationalization, and providing those capabilities in a timely manner to the regional Combatant Commanders, and they welcome that level of support. But I certainly would defer to other panelists who have had considerable experience in that discussion as well.

__: One quick thing I'd add to that. I agree that I think it has resolved a lot of those problems. But we are about, let's say, a year from now to have the first missile defense capability to defend the United States since, I think, what, 1975. So I would expect that while it has resolved problems, we're going to learn a lot between now and then, and indeed, that capability is going to evolve. And when it evolves, as we add to it and change it, we're going to have to change the relationships. For example, how does space-based ISR fit into that architecture, and who controls it, things like that. So I think a lot of those things are being worked out, but this will be a work in progress for many years.

Audience: Thank you. Sharon Weinberger (?) from Defense Daily. My question would be mostly for Dr. Younger. Returning to the question of low yield nuclear weapons, could you address for a minute how low yield nuclear weapons would fit into deterrent value? How would it provide more of a deterrent, for instance, in the current nuclear arsenal, and what would be the basket of targets that a low yield nuclear weapon would be aimed at, for example.

Dr. Younger: First let me say that I believe that nuclear weapons are weapons of to be used only in extremis. That is, if you have no other solution to a problem, and the problem is imminent, and the consequences of that problem are unacceptable, that's when a nuclear weapon can be considered. If you were in that situation, you would still like to use the least amount of force possible. And that is the driver for looking at lower yield systems. There is a concept that's been bandied of self-deterrence. That is, our weapons are of sufficiently high yield that he adversary believes that we would never use them. It is an implicit part of deterrence that the adversary believes that we might use them if we are pushed too far. So, does that make them more usable in a battlefield sense? No. Because you want to keep that threshold high. But at the same time— and unfortunately in human affairs, contradictions often reign, and this is a case where that happens—it is also true, where you want the adversary to believe that if he did drive you into a corner, that you would have a weapon suitable to remove the threat.

Audience: Kurt Canelli (?), National Defense Fellow at Harvard. In light of where our world's headed, much more global, does the concept of combatant command divided by regions make sense, in light of global strike and ISR, for Admiral Ellis?

Admiral Ellis: I think it does. There are clearly some tremendous benefits from a regional perspective that can't be replicated any other way. I mean, the presence there, the relationships, the exercises, the regional planning, even for contingencies and the like, the long-term efforts such as recently were undertaken in Iraq and elsewhere, all of those are appropriate for regional addressal (?). So in no way is it an either/or proposition. And we talk very candidly at STRATCOM that it's not about ownership. It's about providing a capability to the nation's leadership that it needs for scenarios that are likely to confront us in the future. And whether we are supported or supporting is immaterial, as long as we've got mechanisms that clearly enable us to do both. So, that's the important thing. What kind of capabilities do we need to address for this new world?

Because quite frankly, there are things that are global in character. We have capabilities as a nation that are global in character, and they lend themselves to oversight in a global manner, even as they are provided and applied with a regional focus when that's appropriate.

Audience: My name's Bryce Harris (?). I'm with OSD Seed Sue Policy (?). My question is for Admiral Ellis. You mentioned earlier that as we approach success in warfare that it's important that we certainly not only achieve success, but that we be perceived as winning in war. How do you reconcile that in an age where we are increasingly employing precision munitions, short of doing a demonstration with a larger munition such as a daisy cutter, MOAB, or certainly a nuclear weapon.

Admiral Ellis: Well, I don't think we ever would want to get into a situation, much as Dr. Younger was addressing on the nuclear side, and certainly applicable on the conventional side, where we fail to understand and appreciate the need for proportionality in the efforts that ultimately we might be called upon to undertake in the nation's defense. So, again, you don't want to colloquially blow a bigger hole just so it's more visible to everyone. My remarks were more linked to the realities of today's environment. I mean, the proof is in recent conflicts, whether it's in my experience in Kosovo, or the recent experience in Iraq. Very little goes on that is not known very quickly on a global scale. Very little, if it's of sufficient interest, remains tactical for very long. It quickly becomes operational, and sometimes strategic and political. My point is, in this networked environment in which we operate, it's not just us that are operating, our forces that are operating in a network-centric environment. Indeed, the world is. It's one of the consequences of globalization, and the omnipresence of the communication nodes and the like. So, I don't think that it would be necessary to shape the weapons on a general scale for visibility rather than effectiveness and proportionality.

Audience: My name's Eric Kerr (?). I'm a Brookings as a National Defense Fellow. Admiral Ellis, General Everhart (?) defends the air, and he pretty much works with FAA, has his own radars, pretty clear lines. Information operations with FCC, Commerce, Treasury, Justice, where does that stand? Are you the guy who has the button to defend our communications infrastructure?

Admiral Ellis: Well, my lane in the road is pretty broad, but it's not that broad. Remember, I characterized it fairly carefully as Department of Defense information operations, is the portfolio that we were handed by the president on the 10th of January this year. For those of you that are not aware, that's very precisely defined in Department of Defense documents. It includes computer network attack and defense. It includes psychological operations. It includes electronic warfare. It includes operational security. And it includes military deception. Those are the pillars, if you will, of Department of Defense IO. I believe personally, as I think I said in my remarks, that IO is obviously much broader than that. In fact, I joke with, again, the War College classes, no matter how you define it, it's not broad enough. It ought to involve everything that we can bring to bear as a nation.

Someday, I believe, as IO tools mature, and those capabilities and coordination mechanisms mature, we will reverse the way we do business today. Today, we write IO annexes to military war plans. I believe that someday we may write military annexes to IO plans, which may put things in perspective.

Dr. Younger: Other questions? Okay. If there are no other questions, then we will declare victory. I thank the panelists, and I thank the audience for your attention.