Previous IFPA-Fletcher Conferences

National Security Strategy and Policy:
Planning for and Responding to Threats to the U.S. Homeland

October 28-29, 2004
Ronald Reagan Building
and International Trade Center
Washington, D.C.

Lieutenant General Edward G. Anderson III, USA (Ret.), former Deputy Commander, United States Northern Command

Relating Homeland Defense to Homeland Security

Introduction By: Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis

Lieutenant General Edward G. Anderson, III: Thank you very much, Jackie. My name is Ed Anderson, I approve this message. [Laughter] Although I may say that facetiously, at the same time I am serious because as Jackie Has indicated, I do have a previous connection with Northern Command, and I want to make it clear right up front that my remarks may not necessarily reflect exactly how Northern Command may think or say about this at this particular moment.

Dr. Steve Flynn in his remarks this morning certainly related the confusion that is associated with the distinction between homeland defense and homeland security, and I'd have to say that I agree with Dr. Flynn, and as a matter of fact I'd almost suggest that because of that confusion that exists between what is homeland defense and what is homeland security and, more importantly, who has the lead for a number of different activities, what we may find is that we have developed an operational seam. And as we know, there is a tendency for our adversaries, as we heard this morning, to take advantage of any seam that they may find, and particularly an operational seam.

The homeland security joint operation concept, which was written by NORTHCOM and approved by the Secretary of Defense in about January of this year, did try to explain the relationship-- or did explain a relationship between homeland security and homeland defense, and basically the difference, as it is described in the joint operation concept, is that the national homeland security strategy focuses on terrorism in this nation. Whereas, homeland defense stresses a wider spectrum of the threat of which terrorism is a subset. So you do have, if you're doing the Venn diagram approach to this, an overlap there that suggests that there is a basis, if you will, for DHS and NORTHCOM to work together.

Furthermore, it states that for homeland security activities, particularly those kinds of things that are within our borders, DHS Is the lead, they are the ones who are in charge, and DoD and specifically Northern Command will support. But when it’s homeland defense activities, and generally described as activities that emanate from outside of the borders, then homeland defense’s preeminent and in that situation Department of Defense-- and in the case of NORTHCOM, NORTHCOM would be in the lead.

So this is an explanation, but the fact is that confusion still exists, as evidenced by the fact that it is an agenda item at this particular conference.

Too often, today, the distinction between homeland security and homeland defense is often driven not by operational issues, but rather by resource issues. Who’s going to pay becomes the current or the bottom line of all of that. And most frequently, it is driven in discussions and during planning in the context of the “response” function of homeland security and homeland defense. In other words, when the crisis occurs, how do we respond, who responds, who’s in charge, and so on and so forth.

So “responding” is a reactive approach to homeland defense and homeland security. Actually, this approach is pretty well defined and often exercised. If you look at the National Response Plan, it lays out very specifically who has responsibility and who is in charge. And the scenario-based exercises -- for example, Determined Promise ‘03 and Determined Promise ‘04 or the TOPOFF series of exercises that have been conducted by both DHS and DoD -- basically they do create the situations in which local, state, federal and military folks do have to operate together, and the command relationships, if you will, are well defined and well established. So when the states need federal assistance, and as they normally do in the case of a major terrorist incident, there is no doubt from the military perspective the Department of Homeland Security is in charge. They have the lead through their Principal Federal Official, and NORTHCOM will be in support.

But I would tell you that that is where the clarity ends, if you will. And, yet, I think there is the need for increased clarity beyond just the response piece, and this is what I'm talking about. We, as Secretary McHale mentioned this morning, need to make sure that whatever strategy we undertake for homeland defense and homeland security, that it is in fact a proactive piece of work. What we tend to not take a look at in the context of these discussions is the other functions associated with homeland defense and homeland security, specifically referring to detect, deter and prevent. As a part of prevent, obviously preempt is a piece of that as well.

These are the proactive elements of the homeland defense/security missions, and these are not areas that I think are clearly articulated in the context of who has responsibility. I would tell you that I think this is exactly where we find ourselves in today. The primary homeland defense and homeland security functions that we’re accomplishing or should be accomplishing are the detect, the deter and the prevent functions. All of us have seen the reports many, many times of the potential threats and the fact that we are being targeted now because of the election process. It’s the Madrid scenario that we’re all very, very familiar with.

When there is a clear indication of an attack or an intent to conduct an attack on the United States, then what should become preeminent in that particular time is the deter function of the mission. Or, if we are able to glean from whatever sources the specifics of how, when, where, who, any of those -- not all of those, any of those -- then the prevent function becomes preeminent, and may lead to the preemption function; in other words, taking the operational initiative. Of course, the detect piece contributes to all of those and is ongoing all the time.

But today, with the absence of specific information on who, when, where and how the adversary is going to attack the United States, we should be in the deter phase, if you will, or the deter function of the mission. Local, state, federal and military all have something that can be contributed in that phase or performing that function of homeland defense and homeland security. But who is in charge? Who is the one who is synchronizing, coordinating, identifying the requirements and integrating the efforts of all of those various organizations in order that we may be proactive as opposed to being reactive, and that we can ultimately take the operational initiative. Who is putting together the common operating picture in a timely manner? Who is developing the courses of action of the coordinated responses if for some reason deterrence fails and preemption becomes necessary.

Now, I know that in each of these organizations, the local organizations, the state organizations, the federal organizations, military, all of them are doing something and in some cases all of them are doing a lot. But they're all doing them independently. They share information, there is no question about that, but the coordination and the synchronization and the integration of the efforts just simply is not there.

And without someone in charge, how then can we tell whether we are doing enough, or, more importantly, what else should we be doing? And the fact is that the American people, and we heard it this morning in one of the presentations, expect that their government will utilize every available resource to include the military when there is a potential or a clear indication of an attack on the United States. And we must go do the deter, the detect and, if necessary, the prevent.

So this is not anything about resources. It is about the protection of our people in the United States, and it is about the protection of the great institutions that constitute this great nation.

So what can be done during this election period? Using military terms, I would suggest that perhaps what could be put together, and may have been put together, a standing taskforce comprised of representatives from all of those various organizations. It doesn't have to be physical representation, IT certainly can be virtual representation. And then basically coordinating the efforts of all of those folks, both in the context of information and intelligence gathering efforts, developing those common operating pictures.

Someone who can develop and execute the deterrence plans. I’ll give you an example of perhaps a couple things where the military could be used in the context of deterrence. If, in fact, there were to be some threat thread that indicates that al-Qaeda or some terrorist group wants to target the subways, do you think the American people would take some comfort in perhaps seeing some uniformed National Guard personnel in subway stations, say for about a week? Maybe in New York City one week, the next week maybe down in Washington, DC, wherever; something to disrupt the planning cycle of the threat.

What if we just did an interdiction of a ship? There’s a lot of training benefit to be gained from all of that, I guarantee you, but at the same time it’s a deterrent. It throws off the potential planning of the threat. Whatever deterrent actions are undertaken, they should be driven by some indication that there is a potential threat. And when it the deterrent plan is developed, it should be done considering the use of local forces, state police, as well as with federal forces, military forces---all of the nation’s capabilities. There are a large number of options that can be done, that need to be done if we know that the nation is under the threat of an attack. We need to take those kinds of deterrence actions, and yet we have not done that, and we clearly have not indicated who should be in charge, and I would suggest to you, Department of Homeland Security should be in charge. They are the ones. Not the Department of Defense, even though it may involve the use of the military.

And I would suggest to you that one of the concerns we should have is that once this current election period passes, the American public will feel that the risk is over. I would contend that that is not the case; as a matter of fact, I am not convinced that the Madrid scenario in fact applies to our election, but that’s a subject of another presentation. Point is that I think this standing taskforce or organization, whatever you may call it, should be a permanent organization because the threat of attack on the United States is enduring.

Bottom line is this: This is the global war on terrorism. War on terrorism in our homeland should be under the lead of the Department of Homeland Security and all capabilities should be made available to include the military -- local, state, federal and military -- in a coordinated fashion to allow for the synergistic application of these capabilities. We must be proactive, we must work to detect, deter and prevent, because obviously if we’re successful with those efforts, we will not need to respond; the response function is not required, obviously.

But I do think we are ready to respond. There are a number of activities under way. That’s not to say that everything has been done that needs to be done in planning and preparation to respond. But I do think that corresponding emphasis on detecting, deterring and preventing is lacking. We need much more effort in those areas if we are going to be totally successful in homeland defense and homeland security. We owe it to the American people. Thank you very much. [Applause]

Questions and Answers

DR. DAVIS: Well, we’ve had four very interesting and provocative presentations. It is time now to open the floor to questions. We have about 15 minutes for questions. Yes, right here in the front row. Please identify yourself.

SHARON HODGE: Sharon Hodge. I write for a publication called Inside the Pentagon, and my question is to the panelists with defense background. What is the probability and over what period of time might Mr. Duncan’s suggestion of complete reorganization of Armed Forces to accommodate homeland defense actually become a reality?

DR. DAVIS: Ed, do you want to take a stab at that, and then Steve? Tim?

GENERAL ANDERSON: That’s a good question. The probability, I think, is pretty good, if I were to give you a guess, primarily because there is such emphasis on homeland defense and homeland security and the need for bringing together all of the various elements and participants of that business because we just simply cannot afford another crisis, and I'm preaching to the choir here on that. So I do think the probability of that happening is probably pretty good.

When is really the key question, and what is going to be the forcing function for that to happen. I'd like to believe that it will not take another 9/11 to be the forcing function, primarily because for obvious reasons then I think the next 9/11 Commission will dictate what the solution’s going to be and I think we’ve got the capability to come to the solution right now, and then to take the bold step and implement it.

So probable, yes; soon, I hope so.

MAJOR MOREA: I'm Major Morea from the US Air Force Doctrine Center. For the panel, when functioning in the support role outside the mission of homeland defense, is it conceivable that OpCon, operational control of military forces would ever come under the authority of a component-like commander of a lead agency other and a component commander from DoD? And if so, would that possibly be done maybe under the model similar to the way the Air National Guard provides forces to the DoD?

DR. DAVIS: Ed, it sounds to me that that’s for you.

GENERAL ANDERSON: Before you turn the mike over, let me just have a little dialogue with you here if I could, please. Could you expand upon the model again that you're referring to, the Air National Guard model?

MAJOR MOREA: Similarly, how the Air National Guard provides forces right now under the operational control of a component commander, could that similarly be done if we had to provide forces over to another lead agency such as FBI, or whoever it might be, for whatever situation it might be. Just a thought there on that model, but overall the operational control is really the question.

GENERAL ANDERSON: Wow, that would be a tough one. My inclination is I don’t see that that’s anything we have looked at. I don’t suppose that it’s impossible and perhaps should be looked at, given the environment that we’re looking at for the future, as Secretary Duncan is referring to here, perhaps breaking some glass and thinking in new ways, but at the moment I really don’t see that as a model.

Now, where I do see that there is some application and extension of a model that has been demonstrated by the Air National Guard in the context of NORAD has been the use of hip pocket Title 10 orders. I know that Tim Lowenberg and his group, along with NORTHCOM, have been looking at the possibility of the application of that concept to the land component to be able to provide capability for both federal and state use as driven by whatever the situation may be.

DR. DAVIS: Jim, would you like to weigh in?

GENERAL LOWENBERG: I don’t disagree. I'm struck by the question in recognizing that there are essentially two groups that are authorized to kill in the course of their duties, as a primary focus of their duties -- executioners and members of the military. The circumstances obviously have to be appropriate for the rules of engagement and the rules for the use of force, but ultimately the person exercising that unique authority in our society, I think, needs to be held accountable within a military chain of command, not responding to a civilian official. So I would just throw that out as a word of caution as we’re taking a look at this philosophical doctrinal proposition that you’ve thrown out.

GENERAL ANDERSON: I think one of the fundamental issues that we have at the moment with regard to military forces for Northern Command and is perhaps even a driver in these discussions of homeland defense and homeland security is the concern for mission creep, for the active force in particular, into doing homeland security kinds of activities.

I can understand the concern there. We’ve seen and experienced that before, but I think there is a solution to use of the military in the homeland defense/homeland security roles, and it is embedded, as my good friend Tim Lowenberg says here, in the Reserve component. I think that’s where-- but it is going to take a relook, if you will, at the construct that we have in the Reserve components, much as was alluded to this morning in one of the earlier briefings.

DR. DAVIS: And perhaps the upcoming QDR is a place to start.

GENERAL ANDERSON: Yes, that would be one.

DR. DAVIS: Next question; there’s a question back there.

LARS WARKENTIEN: Lars Warkentien, Battelle National Security Division. My question is to the panel. There’s been a lot of discussion today about deterrence as a primary measure in homeland security/homeland defense. Those of us who have worn the uniform know that through the anti-terrorism force protection program with the DoD 2000 directives and instructions, there is a program referred to as Random Antiterrorism Measures. And for the panel, I'm wondering whether or not those procedures that we use in the military to do RAM could also be applied across the civilian sector in private and public.

DR. DAVIS: Ed?

GENERAL ANDERSON: I think yes. The obvious answer is certainly yes. Whether or not they would be the same elements, certainly somebody would have to take a look at that. But the concept, I think, is absolutely the right concept, is an element of deterrence. Now, I don’t want to suggest that’s the total piece that constitutes deterrence, because it is not; there should be much more. But random activities, as I suggested in my comments, can help offset the advantage that the adversary has in his planning process. One of the things I think that is fairly well established has been that the adversary we are working against holds success as the supreme goal, not timing. So anything that can be done to introduce some element of uncertainty of achieving success, is important. And random measures could absolutely contribute to that uncertainty.

That’s what I was talking about when I talk about putting Guard troops down in a subway station in New York for a period of a week, or something like that; that’s a random measure. But there are others as well.

DR. DAVIS: Andrew, is there something that private industries can do?

MR. HOWELL: I guess the one thought that I have on the random measures piece is I would remind everyone about the caveat of random measures, the caveat that General Anderson made, being knowing there is a looming threat, because random measures just for random measures’ sake is destabilizing in a lot of ways. I can envision a way in which random measures for random measures’ sake would be economically destabilizing.

You would need from the private sector perspective to not necessarily do them in conjunction, but have a shared vision on how such a random measures strategy would work, because you would want the private sector to employ such random measures as well, and you would theoretically want to find a way to incent the private sector to, in shopping malls, increase guard presence on a Wednesday as opposed to a Thursday of an odd-numbered week and an even-numbered month, for example,

You’d also want to know what the strategy is. You’d want to know there is a strategy and that there is a plan, and that it’s developed collectively. That would be my reaction or my caveat.

GENERAL ANDERSON: I think that’s a very, very good point, and I think it goes back to, again, the earlier point of establishing some sort of an organization that has representation from all players---local, state federal and military. And I failed, but you just appropriately corrected me, that in addition to local, state, federal and military, the private sector has to be represented.

__: There’s another aspect to that question, and that recognizes the contribution that the Department of Defense and all of the military components can make to the civilian community in transferring some of those tactical approaches and some of the skills that have been refined and matured in the military, and once those are imported to non-federal state and local officials, you’ll quite often find meaningful integration of private sector representation in there where you get the collateral benefit of some of those tactics being embraced by the private sector because they’re being presented in a non-threatening way, in an appealing way, in a way that actually contributes to their strategy for continuity of business operation.

MAJOR CHRIS WHITMIRE: Major Chris Whitmire from the Air Force Counterproliferation Center. I’ll throw the question and the statement out to anyone who would like to jump on it. The comments on Posse Comitatus, I take it personally quite refreshing compared to earlier today, but ultimately we are bound by the law. The national strategy for homeland security does address using all of our defense mechanisms, including Department of Defense, and legal reform where needed. So ultimately the Title 32 and the Hip Pocket Title 10 self-initiated orders that I've heard of from some of my friends-- I'm a ... (inaudible) airline pilot, so I keep up with a lot of the guys who are flying the ... (inaudible) and what have you. It seems to me like a temporary band aid for now, and we really need to make that a whole better than it is.

So ultimately, I think a start would be, as wearers of the uniform we so often, especially when it comes to subordinancy to civilian control, we err tremendously to the conservative so we’re not breaking any of the rules, and we sort of culturalize, or institutionalize restraints and they sort of grow and grow, and maybe Posse Comitatus has a lot of exceptions, and that’s already been voiced; ultimately I think something that needs to be started at the mid-level ranks and what have you, just some general education to the people in leadership positions starting at the mid-levels and maybe even earlier on what the true Posse Comitatus restraints and exceptions are.

But ultimately, I think, from a proactive standpoint, because when things occur, such as 9/11, and future 9/11’s, God forbid, but inevitably we’ll probably get them, ultimately that too-hard-to-do tasking many times falls on the Department of Defense, and so that we’re not behind the 8-ball, I would really like for someone to entertain some solutions, especially legal reform, in regard to Posse Comitatus and what can allow the military to be more proactive sooner, because terrorists do strike at their time and place; it’s usually not ours.

GENERAL ANDERSON: No. [Laughter] First of all, legal reform, I think, is a good idea. There is no question about it. I think when you undertake a legal reform, it’s a reform that has to address not just Posse Comitatus, but the wide variety of legal or legislation that’s out there that all constitute, in one way or another, guidance for the employment and use of the variety of different players that are available.

Posse Comitatus, I think, although it has been said that it should not be changed, I think the position that they had in NORTHCOM for quite some time was until there proves to be the need for change, then it doesn’t need to be changed. It didn’t say that it didn’t ultimately have to be changed, just said that we haven't seen the need yet for it to be changed.

Now, you could make the case, I think, that suggests that, okay, we really haven't stressed the system to the point yet where we fully have examined whether there is a need to change, and certainly I think perhaps some of the ideas that Secretary Duncan has put forward here with regard to trying to get some new thinking, if you will, into some of the approaches to homeland security might bear fruit to the point where it does require that we need to reexamine in a more forceful and more dynamic and more thorough and comprehensive way whether or not change is necessary.

Since this is my last minute, I would like to just take one minute to offer congratulations to IFPA with the assistance of NORTHCOM and DTRA for just another outstanding convention here. You guys do this so superbly, nobody does it any better. Well done, as evidenced by this morning, and as evidenced by this, and I'm sure will continue to show. So congratulations to Bob and Jackie and Polly, and everybody involved.