Previous IFPA-Fletcher Conferences

National Security Strategy and Policy:
Planning for and Responding to Threats to the U.S. Homeland

October 28-29, 2004
Ronald Reagan Building
and International Trade Center
Washington, D.C.

Oscar Rocha
President, The Joaquin Amaro Foundation for Strategic Studies
Mexico City, Mexico

Introduction By: Ambassador Stephen W. Bosworth

Oscar Rocha: I would like to talk about how Mexico relates to US homeland defense and homeland security policy. In order to do that, I start with a question -- does Mexico have a homeland security policy of its own? I would argue that we don’t and that we do. I’ll start with the first part.

We don’t, because Mexico, and it is something that probably is surprising to many of the people in this room who think and talk and live by the issue of counterterrorism on a day in and day out basis, and don’t because Mexico has not yet internalized the terrorist threat. We do not feel threatened. That does not mean that we are not threatened, which I will come to later.

A gentleman from Canada yesterday at lunch was mentioning how the Air India terrorist attack in ’85 provided them with the rationale for counterterrorism, and of course, here, I think that if you go back to September 10 of 2001, you would not have imagined many of the things that you yourselves are doing in counterterrorism.

We have a saying in Mexico that it’s very difficult to learn in somebody else’s head. Of course, we cannot allow the, let’s say, luxury of waiting for a terrorist attack to involve us or affect us in order to wake up. So it is a policy challenge between the national security establishment in Mexico and the wider Mexican public and political system.

There’s also a number of items or things that we have to talk about to give you a context of why we do not feel threatened yet. One important one is that Mexico has been very far always from international security issues for decades. And what that does is that a conference like this one, which is on its 35th occasion, would be something completely unheard of in Mexico. We don’t have a community of professionals, of academics, of people who are continuously thinking about international security implications.

In a more precise manner, President Fox had a very lukewarm and timid reaction to 9/11. That was a dismal leadership failure. Failure because he was unable to take the opportunity to explain to the Mexican people why this mattered. Then came Iraq, and outside of the US, I think it’s very important for this audience to understand that for a lot of people in a lot of countries, Iraq confused the counterterrorism argument. It introduced a geopolitical agenda and a lot of skepticism. The shifting rationale of why the invasion was carried out, the fact that no weapons of mass destruction were found only fed on that. It was very interesting to me, yesterday, to listen to Secretary McHale give his very interesting and very detailed talk about counterterrorism and only mention Iraq one single time and not really relate it to the subject.

So we go back to the question, why are we threatened, why is Mexico threatened? And this goes directly to the “yet” part that I mentioned earlier. The first reason is that as it becomes harder to act directly in the United States, al-Qaeda and copycats will find it more attractive to use adjacent territories. And the second, which is not that obvious, but we have to continuously think about is that Mexico could become a target of opportunity for attacks against US interests. And I'm thinking particularly of the tourism industry and the fact that so many Americans visit Mexico on a yearly basis.

So what is at risk, really? What is at stake in the bilateral relationship if something, God forbid, were to happen? We have a very intense trade relationship that would definitely be harmed. There is a very sizeable population in the United States of people of Mexican origin, be it US citizens or resident aliens or undocumented workers, and this very large group of people carry out a continuous interaction with Mexico.

There is, of course, the border--

END OF SIDE A
SIDE B

--anybody that has been at the border knows that those pairs of twin cities really live of each other; they do really need each other. I recall talking to a Canadian some time back; he was describing a little bit of the same relationship Canada with the northern US border, and he said, “Well, the US at 9/11 was the first country to impose on itself a trade embargo following an attack.” You shut down. And that’s memory that Canadians and Mexicans share of what happened on 9/11, and of course that would be a very understandable reaction in the future.

Lastly, but not least, we have to safeguard our political relationship. A former boss of mine, Mexican Ambassador here in the US, said, “Well, we’re neighbors and I don’t think anybody’s planning to move.” [Laughter] We’re basically stuck with each other.

Yesterday, Mr. Flynn was making a very interesting remark about the need to think globally, but I would argue that in order for counterterrorism and homeland security policy in the US to acquire that global dimension, the first step is to think regionally, and the amount of things that move across the US and Canadian and US and Mexican borders really provide us with a very strong argument to think of a North American perimeter. Of course, how do we build that?

Right now, the counterterrorism cooperation that comes out from Mexico I would characterize as fragile. Why? Because it’s something that happens inside government agencies, agencies that do understand the risks. But there is a very small, or non-existent effort really, to politically articulate the reasons for that cooperation. It brings me back to memories of counternarcotics cooperation where people used to do things, and if something happened and came out in the press, they could walk away from it. We cannot allow that luxury, the reason being that counternarcotics was a game, or is a game of stemming a flow that is continuously coming into the US market, and counterterrorism, you have to be right each and every time. So ad hoc doesn’t work anymore, and you're not just trying to do your best. So that is a very strong reason to think of a different rationale for the bilateral cooperation.

I would say that we could group the obstacles to cooperation on this matter in three areas, which I would call bias, sovereignty and drugs. The bias part comes from the fact that threat perceptions are driven -- everywhere, but I'm talking about the US in this particular case -- driven by institutional jurisdictions. We heard yesterday several instances of how different agencies put the emphasis on what they're responsible for.

From our point of view, I think it would seem more likely that the following, let’s say, attack that al-Qaeda would like to do would be more like Madrid or Oklahoma than what happened on 9/11. And, still, we have the creation of TSA and this very large bureaucracy that makes airline travel fairly safe.

So that emphasis, which is a major part of the discussion in this conference, outside the US translates into a number of preferences that do not necessarily match with our own threat perceptions, and this is particularly relevant when we think that with limited resources we have to be very mindful of where we put our money. That’s, I think, a very strong reason to keep that part in mind.

Sovereignty has been an issue in the bilateral relationship for a long time. Why? Because it colors the way that we interact. For Mexico, I'd say that it is the cornerstone of our national identity. That simply means that we have to feel that we can control our destiny. That’s what makes us Mexicans. A lot of people here in the US, and this is a little bit of an anecdote from my time here at the Mexican Embassy in Washington, was that the interaction that most Americans have with Mexicans here in the US is with people who have wanted to come to the US, and maybe live here and become Americans. There’s a very large group of people in Mexico who, those thoughts are not in their minds. I'm a little bit of a reverse case. My grandfather migrated during the Great Depression from the Polish community in Massachusetts to Mexico. So there are other stories there.

And on the sovereignty part, we also have this US geopolitical interest factor. In the bilateral interaction, there is often the question when something is proposed from the US side -- What it the catch? Is there a catch here? Is there something back there that I'm not seeing right now? And we have a history of, I would call it asymmetrical cooperation. During the relationship on the drug war, let’s call it, there were requests for overflights and a number of other authorizations coming from Mexico. But at the same time, when Mexico came up with the idea of saying, “Well, if the issue is having better radar coverage and you are continuously asking me to give authorization for your Customs P3 aircraft with airborne early warning radars to come into Mexican airspace and cross over it, well, I think I'd like to acquire one of those.” And that was denied.

So we have to think that a relationship of this nature, in order to really bring out commitment, has to be done more or less on equal footing. We have to feel a part of that relationship, not just somebody who is performing a job.

With regards to drugs, which is the last part, I have mentioned several parts, but it is also a story in which a lot of the strategies developed and applied during those last 15, 20 years have been presented by the US as the right strategies. I was thinking when I was listening to Secretary Duncan yesterday, that I saw another part of that movie in my time. And part of that movie in this particular case was the certification process, which created a lot of ill will, that poisoned a lot of the relationship between the two countries. And the fact that those strategies were not successful, that is something that we kind of like brush under the rug, but we have to be mindful of that, that all of those initiatives, of converting Mexican territory into a virtual battleground, chasing drug kingpins and having all of these very visible acts, they have to be done in a way, but the argument was, “We are going to be successful,” and 15 years after that we weren't. None of us. So that also is something that weighs in on whatever can be done in counterterrorist cooperation.

I would then go back to my initial question -- is there a Mexican homeland security policy? And here I would say, yes, there is. There is, but it’s different from how it’s been described in the US. We are very concerned about our law enforcement; how do we make our law enforcement more efficient? How can the Mexican state provide better security to its people? That is like the prime issue of concern for Mexican voters.

Second, related to this, this is more a policy issue, perhaps not worded in such a way in public opinion, is how can we bring down the amount of drug money that fuels corruption in Mexico? That had to do with being, for instance, much more efficient in drug interdiction so that there is no need, let’s say, to “invest” on corrupting Mexican law enforcement.

The third one, I already mentioned a bit of it, is safeguarding our sovereignty. Anything that we do, that’s a paramount concern.

And the fourth one is that, of course, we are worried, even though at this more government level, to avoid any attack on the US or on US interests that have to do anything with Mexico.

All of this has brought about a, I think, a commitment, and the acquisition of some capabilities, mostly for the counternarcotics area, but with the good news that they can be used also for counterterrorism. This involves something that, for Mexico, is a leap, an incredible leap forward in capabilities, is the acquisition of airborne early warning aircraft of our own. In the air force side, they're fairly modern phased array radar systems. On the navy side, they're used. Maritime patrol aircraft, which basically did not exist in Mexico, are coming into services on both sides, too. We have fast combat boats that can interdict boats at 50 knots all over the country, 60 of them. That is a unique capability the Mexican Navy is putting to very good use. And all of is new. It has changed our mindset of our ability to do things. Very different from what used to happen on the drug wars.

So if I could offer some, let’s say, rules of the road to find common ground, I would start with the following: For a bilateral security cooperation to make sense, it has to incorporate Mexican security interests. This is probably an oxymoron, but you can never tire of saying that. That’s the only way that Mexico is really going to buy into that cooperation.

This agenda has to be jointly developed. The language has to be “I'm worried about this, what are you worried about? What are your concerns?” And that’s, I think, in the benefit of both countries, moves us from this sort of passive cooperation, what I call a taxi stand cooperation, which is just pick up the phone, “where do you want me to go?” and change it into a very proactive, almost militant cooperation in which you internalize the threat perception and then you go out hunting with your own vision of your country, your territory, your society, looking for threats. That’s a huge difference between one thing and the other. I'd say this is the power of the convert, the one that really becomes a true believer in what he’s doing.

The second suggestion I would make for both countries is that counterterrorism cooperation has to be framed inside a broader bilateral agenda. We cannot isolate the thing and hope that it does well. It really goes to the core of our relationship. What are we about? I mean, we have NAFTA. We have this very, very strong trade relationship. We have a very strong, let’s say, social relationship because of these populations. But where are we going? Are we going anywhere? I think those questions have to be asked in order for this other more, let’s say, discrete counterterrorism to be fully addressed.

Thirdly, I would say that security cooperation has to be seen as a bilateral risk management agreement. What I mean by that is that it has to have political backing to become solid, to avoid the risk of people walking away. And this, for us, is not easy because in this process of democratic accountability, the national security operators do not know yet how to explain politically what they’re doing. And politicians in Mexico have the responsibility to do that. That is one of their prime democratic responsibilities.

Fourth, I would say that we have to acquire what I would call a confidence-building rationale. Start with things that build trust, that transmit the message, and here I would say that, let’s call it the apple pie strategy would be, for instance, go for weapons of mass destruction consequence mitigation. Who could argue against that? Of course, you have the knowledge, you have the technology, you have the experience. If something of that nature were to affect Mexico, knock on wood, we wouldn’t really know what to do. That is something that could form, I think, a very substantive and interesting basis for cooperation.

Then there are, of course, other related issues, bioterrorism and broader things. There’s also the issue of airspace. We are intrigued about this NORAD mechanism with Canada. But at the same time, we’re like, “Well, how do we touch that thing?” I think knowledge is probably the best way to start.

My favorite topic, which comes to what I’ve come to mention in other forums, the true measure of American love, which is export licenses. I think that is one very significant way in which the US tells apart who is a true friend and who is a social friend.

So there are a lot of things there that can be done. That doesn’t mean necessarily that we’re into a buying spree. No, it means that you put on the table real measures of trust. I remember when there were these excess defense article transfers to Mexico some seven, eight years back, and DoD people would tell us in a very clear way, “We are restricted only to things that have to do with counternarcotics.” So it was like, well, are we only good for that? Don’t we have any legitimate defense needs? Do you think we would like to have a word about that?

Those are things that it would be important for the national security establishment in the US to think about. And I would leave it at that. Thank you very much. [Applause]

Questions and Answers

AVON WILLIAMS: My name is Avon Williams. I'm the General Counsel of the US Army. I want to commend all of you on your excellent and informative presentations, and greet my old boss and long-time mentor, Ambassador Bosworth. I've often heard the sentiment echoed by Mr. Rocha, that the Coalition action in Iraq has confused and diminished international support for US counterterrorism initiatives unrelated to the Operation Iraqi Freedom. But I very rarely have heard, if ever, any specific examples of worthy, cooperative, counterterrorism initiatives that have not or could not take place in this climate.

I was wondering, you suggested that a lot more could be done to build consensus on how to fight terror if we weren't in Iraq. Can you elaborate a little bit? And anyone else who has any comments that help me understand? Thank you.

MR. ROCHA: What I was referring to at that moment was that in the climate, after that very, let’s say, unfortunately ill-articulated period between 9/11 and the, let’s say, Iraq votes at the UN, remember that Mexico was part of the Security Council at the UN at that time, so the discussion was more relevant than it would otherwise have been inside Mexico. Given that the opportunity to, let’s say, explain fully to the Mexican people why it made sense, and why it really affected us, too, this counterterrorism issue. When Iraq came in, it became like the overriding factor, and then the discussion was, if it was in the Mexican interest to cooperate with the US with regards to Iraq. And I think that it took away, let’s say, the focus on a more important issue, I would argue, which is the cooperation between the two countries on counterterrorism.

So this moved cooperation to sort of the government agency arena, and you’d be surprised to listen to some of the questions that are posed to government officials about cooperation, because one thing gets immediately mixed up with the other. A couple weeks ago, or ten days ago, the Mexican secretary of defense, General Vega, was in the Mexican congress, one of the first times that he goes, and he tries to explain what the policy inside the defense ministry is, and the headline was “Never Mexican Troops Under US Command,” that was the headline. Why? Because that is a concern, and that was directly related to Iraq. But then how do you connect that to the practical relationship between the Mexican military and NORTHCOM?

hat was my point that I was trying to make, that the, let’s say, political dimension of Iraq is kind of like standing in the middle between the two countries being able to work around a working and successful and mutually beneficial working relationship on counterterrorism.