Previous IFPA-Fletcher Conferences

36th Annual IFPA-Fletcher Conference on
National Security and Policy
Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Forces in 21st-Century Deterrence: Implementing the New Triad

December 14-15, 2005
Grand Hyatt Washington Hotel
Washington, D.C.

December 14 - Session 4

Address by Dr. Barry M. Blechman, Founder, President, and CEO, DFI International, and Member, Defense Policy Board

Well, thank you. I was one of the original two speakers, so I have about 45 minutes worth of material here, but I will skip through most of it in the interest of us all getting to the reception. [laughter] The question posed is whether the New Triad strengthens or weakens nonproliferation. My answer is that it certainly does so, in principle, but that it requires a much more effective implementation than we’ve seen to date to truly gain these advances.

I think it’s essential to put this question and all other questions related to nuclear issues in perspective. We must understand that nuclear, and all other weapons of mass destruction are weapons of the weak. They’re emphasized, pursued, sought by nations in weak strategic positions. That has been the case since their invention, essentially. When the U.S. relied on nuclear weapons to help deter Soviet aggression in Europe, it was because we were weaker than the Soviets conventionally. And if you look at when countries have decided to acquire nuclear weapons, it has always been when they’ve seen themselves to be in weak strategic relationships. Nuclear weapons are perceived as the great equalizer.

Given U.S. conventional military capabilities, the world’s dominant military capabilities now and as far as we can see in the future, it’s certainly a first principle that our interest lies in reducing as much as possible the role of nuclear weapons in world affairs and in the perceptions of countries about how to defend their security. Therefore, I think President Bush was certainly correct in making reversal of proliferation a central element of his foreign policy. He’s had a number of successes. In Libya, in Iraq. The Proliferation Security Initiative to develop cooperative multinational capabilities to interdict weapons of mass destruction is accomplishing a great many things in terms of getting countries to learn to cooperate with one another, and in terms of some actual interdictions and exchanges of information.

Potentially, the US strategic posture, the New Triad, is also a great contribution to limiting proliferation. There's certainly a clear relationship between a nation’s unilateral actions and its diplomatic initiatives. Unilateral actions can not guarantee success, but they can certainly strengthen or weaken a diplomatic posture. If we take an action, on the one hand, and on the other hand tell other countries not to take the same action, it obviously weakens the effect of those statements.

By greatly reducing the number of deployed weapons and by halving, essentially, the size of the U.S. stockpile of nuclear warheads, the U.S. has taken a major step toward fulfilling its commitments under the NPT; these acts thus strengthen our non-proliferation position. More importantly, in my mind, by elevating conventional global strike and defenses as equal legs of the triad, the Nuclear Policy Review implicitly reduced the importance of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy and could be used to help dissuade potential proliferators. Unfortunately, and mysteriously to me, both the White House and the DOD, except for people charged specifically with these issues, seem allergic to discussing these questions. There's been very little said, very little done to promote what is a very far-reaching change in American policy. And, as a result, we’ve received less credit for it than we might have.

In thinking of the world we live in, we need to consider what role, if any, nuclear weapons may be able to play vis-à-vis terrorists and vis-à-vis small, hostile nations that may support terrorists. Certainly, nuclear weapons don’t have a role against, and nuclear threats don’t have a role against, suicide bombers, but it is conceivable that threats of massive destruction could have a role against the leaders of terrorist groups preparing a nuclear attack of one kind or another. And it is certainly conceivable that nuclear threats could play a positive role for the US in dissuading national leaders from helping such terrorist groups, or even in persuading them to move actively to shut down such activities that are taking place on their territory.

How about the actual use of a nuclear weapon to preempt against a WMD threat from a terrorist group or a small hostile nation? We need all kinds of capabilities to act successfully in such preemptive scenarios, from brilliant intelligence, to rapid decision making processes, to global and prompt conventional strike, to effective defenses. Do we need nuclear weapons for those preemptive roles? And, particularly, do we need new, special kinds of nuclear weapons that might be able to penetrate hardened defenses and deeply buried systems? Candidly, I find it very difficult to imagine a President taking a decision to utilize a nuclear weapon in this kind of role, to preempt a planned, or what we believe is a planned, terrorist attack. The first use of a nuclear weapon, any nuclear weapon, no matter what its yield or potential fallout or consequence, would be an extremely difficult decision, particularly with intelligence always being uncertain and so forth. And I just find it unimaginable that a President would authorize an initial use of a nuclear weapon in such a scenario. I don’t think the technical qualities of the weapon matter all that much in that kind of decision. Decisions like that are taken on first principles, not on uncertain estimates of how many thousands of casualties might result from the strike.

When it comes to preempting against hostile, small nuclear armed states, which we’re likely to see more of in the future than we see now, nuclear forces can play a deterrent role, but of course only a very small force is needed. They might also be able to play a compellent role in terms of compelling such countries not to aid terrorist groups and provide support to them, and particularly not to provide support for any WMD programs. We need to give some thought to these roles and what their implications are for our doctrine and operational planning. But, again, in terms of using a nuclear weapon in a preemptive strike against such a country, I find that slightly more imaginable than against a terrorist group, but still a very, very difficult thing to imagine happening. It may justify research into the question of whether new types of weapons might have very significant, technical benefits in such scenarios, but beyond very basic research, I’d personally be reluctant to see us move ahead.

Structurally I think there is no question that it’s in the U.S. interests to reduce the influence of all WMD in world affairs. And to do that, we should articulate the goal of eliminating all WMD of all kinds from all nations. I recognize that this goal won’t be accomplished, at least in our lifetimes, but we should still work diligently to try to make it happen, and working diligently would in itself strengthen our nonproliferation and counterproliferation policies.

We’ve articulated the goal of eliminating WMD, but we’ve never taken it seriously. Every President since Jimmy Carter has turned a blind eye on Pakistan’s nuclear program, to cite one example, and we’re now paying the price for that, both in North Korea and in Iran. We have always had other priorities, perhaps because the threat of nuclear attack is so abstract and longer term than the other threats we've seen at the time. We have always given a higher priority to these other concerns than to stopping nuclear proliferation and we are now paying the price for it.

To conclude: To me, U.S. nuclear weapons have potentially some utility in remote contingencies in the near term. They certainly still play a small role in defining our basic security relationships with Russia, and they will continue to do so with China over the mid term. But, overall, we should see nuclear weapons more as a threat than a benefit and do all we can to minimize their importance in fact and in policy, and to build alternative capabilities so that we’re not dependent on them and so that other nations understand that we’re not dependent on them, and that they do not guarantee security. Thank you.

Questions and Answers

Audience: Thanks, David Roop from Global Security Newswire. Regarding comments that Mr. Carter and Mr. Miller made about how our nuclear—The suggestion that our nuclear arsenal doesn’t really play into the calculations of potential adversaries, I think Mr. Miller’s elaboration on that was that nuclear proliferation is driven by regional tensions. But can’t you say that the U.S., because we’re a global power and have a presence in the Middle East and right on the border of Iran, is a regional concern in that area? Hasn’t the U.S. been North Korea’s preoccupation for the last 50 years? And isn’t Iran concerned about our intentions now?

And then sort of the broader point is we’re trying to negotiate disarmament with North Korea and the Europeans are trying to negotiate disarmament with Iran or stop their development. And doesn’t what we do in terms of our doctrines that we’re telegraphing out and the types of systems that we have in development undermine those efforts? Thanks.

Dr. Pfaltzgraff: Henry, would you like to comment, and anyone else on the panel who would like to get into this fray would be welcome to do so.

Dr. Blechman: I thought Congressman Schiff identified, described the relationship between what the U.S. says and does about its nuclear arsenal and our ability to restrict proliferation better than I’ve ever heard it described before. Of course, there is no direct correlation between what we do and what a proliferator like North Korea does in action, but what we do has a very important effect on our ability to persuade other countries to join us in diplomatic efforts and to take strong diplomatic positions in trying to rein in or at least delay these programs. The U.S., on the one hand, is reversing 40 years of policy and cooperating with India on civilian nuclear power—India, a nation that refuses to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty. On the other hand, the US is saying that Iran cannot have civilian nuclear power. Obviously, this greatly weakens our case.

As a result, democratic governments that we’re trying to get to take strong positions against Iran are put in a very weak position. Their internal opposition says, “How can you go along with the United States, which is hypocritical,” and so forth. These indirect relationships exist and affect diplomatic success or failure. There's certainly not any direct correlation between what we do and what others do, but it’s the totality of our posture and our posture towards all countries which needs to be made a lot more consistent. I mean, I like and can endorse Henry’s ideas about strengthening the NPT, but it needs to be applied universally.

Dr. Pfaltzgraff: We now have time for only one final comment, and this will be from Barry Blechman.

Dr. Blechman: Thank you. I’ll be very brief. I want to agree with Ash about the great seriousness of the threat from North Korea and from North Korea’s nuclear weapons and the tremendous failure of UIS policy in permitting the continuing advance in North Korean capabilities over the past five years. This is not just a threat of North Korean materials or weapons getting into the hands of terrorists, but it’s a threat pertaining to the possible chaotic situation in North Korea itself, and even to the deliberate use or threat to use nuclear weapons by North Korea, emboldening Pyongyang to cause difficulties on the Peninsula.

However, I have to disagree with the possibility of ending this threat through any kind of coercive option at this time. If you follow the South Korean actions and postures in the negotiations with regard to both North Korea and the Chinese, it clear that any type of military coercion is out of the question. Now, it’s certainly possible to isolate North Korea to a greater degree than we have financially, politically, economically. But the solution, plan B, has to be a negotiated path, with the great assistance, if not lead of the Chinese and a more forthcoming U.S. position in a bilateral side conversation within the context of the Six Nation talks.