Previous IFPA-Fletcher Conferences

36th Annual IFPA-Fletcher Conference on
National Security and Policy
Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Forces in 21st-Century Deterrence: Implementing the New Triad

December 14-15, 2005
Grand Hyatt Washington Hotel
Washington, D.C.

December 14 - Session 4

Address by Mr. Frank Miller, Vice President, the Cohen Group, and former Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council

Thanks, Bob. And it’s good to be here, it’s good to see many old friends. I feel sometimes if my life is passing in front of me when I come to conferences such as this. And to those of you who heard me speak at the Carnegie Endowments panel a few weeks ago, you might as well leave now, I really haven't changed my views. So I apologize in advance. [laughter]

And before I get to sort of the main topic, I must say that it is important with Ash up here to note in passing that where we are today, however one does not like the situation that we may find ourselves in with respect to proliferation of nuclear weapons, we would be in enormously worst straits were it not for the work that Ash started on implementing the Nunn-Lugar program and assisting the reduction of four Soviet nuclear states into one. And the work in the counterproliferation area, which again he brought to the Pentagon in 1993 and which most of us piggybacked on as we helped to build up counterproliferation capabilities. So there's an intellectual foundation here in this action plan that owes a tremendous debt to him.

Dr. Carter: Thank you, Frank. And you all know that Frank was my deputy in all that, Elaine Bunn and so forth.

Mr. Miller: When you think about the question, does the New Triad affect positively or negatively proliferation concerns, I think the question that we’re really asking is to what degree do U.S. nuclear weapons and U.S. nuclear weapons policy affect proliferation around the world? And that begs the fundamental question, what role do they play, U.S. nuclear weapons today, and what role will they play in the first several decades of the 21st century?

And it is my view that U.S. nuclear weapons and British nuclear weapons serve the key ability to deter attacks on our vital interests and on the vital interests of our allies. The end of the Cold War did not eliminate potential military threats to ourselves, to our allies, and it did not eliminate the knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons. And as a result, U.S. and British nuclear weapons guarantee not only the security of those two nations, but by guaranteeing ally defense, they undergird international security and alliance cohesion and reassurance. I do believe that this can be done at levels much lower than we have today, or even levels lower than those called for in the Moscow Treaty, but they currently play an essential role.

Nuclear weapons are not an all-purpose deterrent, they never have been, and there is no such thing as an all-purpose deterrent. This country needs and must have robust advanced conventional forces and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. But conventional capabilities alone can never fully replace the role as played by U.S. nuclear forces. And without U.S. and British nuclear forces and our willingness and ability to extend those over our non-nuclear weapon allies, those allies could either be subject to nuclear blackmail, or they would feel the need potentially to consider beginning their own nuclear programs. They have, in many cases, both the expertise and the material. And the U.S. umbrella eliminates both alternatives.

The positive diplomatic and nonproliferation effects of this are often overlooked, but they are nevertheless real and important. And the notion that the United States is not fulfilling Article VI commitments and that provides a reason or an excuse for countries to build their own nuclear capabilities is just simply false.

If you look at what Article VI is all about, it contains three challenges. One is to end the nuclear arms race: that happened 15 years ago. The second is to work towards nuclear disarmament. And if you look at the direction that we’re moving in, we will be at dramatically lower levels in 2012 than we are today, and we’re dramatically lower today than we were 10 years ago.

And last is to work on a treaty for complete disarmament, and I'm not aware that there's any work going on on anybody’s part on that score. So we have fulfilled the first two key elements of Article VI. The United States and our nuclear capabilities are not the cause of any nuclear proliferation which has occurred in the last several decades. For the sake of argument, if anybody wants to get into the question of did the U.S. nuclear arsenal in its nascent stages provoke Russian and British and Chinese and French responses, you can have that discussion, that's not particularly interesting to me. But as Ash said, the point is nuclear proliferation occurs in regions and it occurs because of regional tensions, it does not occur because the United States has 10,000, 5,000 or 2,000 nuclear weapons. There is no connection. And it’s a disservice to try to create those kinds of linkages.

It's also, I think, a completely wrongheaded question to say will the replacement or modernization of our nuclear weapons serve as a catalyst or impediment to proliferation? The right question is whether or not you believe there is a role for nuclear deterrence in the future. If you believe there is no such role, then we don’t have to talk about modernizing or replacing the arsenal. You have a position. I think it’s wrong. If the answer is yes, there is a role for nuclear deterrence in the future, then the question is how do we insure that we have an effective deterrent in the decades ahead? The notion that we are going to rely in the future on nuclear weapons the youngest of which is over 20 years old, is simply not credible. And so rather than having this false debate, “should we have a robust warhead?” we should have a real debate. And the answer is yes we need a robust, new warhead because the old warheads at some point no longer be reliable.

The other issue which I think is a useful one to discuss, and it’s on the agenda, is whether low collateral damage has an effect on a President’s decision to use a nuclear weapon. That is a false issue. It has always been a false issue. It is an easy headline. “Killer neutron warhead buried in ERDA budget,” 1977. But the notion that any President of the United States is going to make the decision to use a nuclear weapon for the first time since 1945 because the yield is five kilotons instead of fifty kilotons is completely wrongheaded. The position is all about crossing the threshold. If the situation is serious enough, the President will use the nuclear weapons, the weapon of choice that's in the arsenal at the time. And any notion that because you built a neutron bomb or you built a bunker buster, that this makes the decision easier because collateral damage is lower and fallout is reduced simply is inconsistent with the way this country operates and the way political decisions are made. I really wish that issue would go away because in the 26 years that I served in either the Department of Defense or the White House, I never heard anybody say, “this is a more usable weapon.” That's a completely false proposition.

I also think it’s important for us here to begin talking about the nonproliferation treaty providing benefits to the non-nuclear nations. Once again, we have this debate at times framed as because the United States and the other major nuclear powers haven’t gone to zero, it’s in the interest of non-nuclear states to spend treasure which they don’t have to build nuclear weapons so that they can prompt their neighbors to build nuclear weapons and everybody’s going to be unsafe. The bargain for the non-nuclear states is quite real. They don’t build nuclear weapons, their neighbors don't build nuclear weapons, the United Nations plays more or less a watchdog role. The notion that that is not in their interest is palpably false. And so this linkage that says unless the United States goes down to zero, other countries should be encouraged to build nuclear weapons, is a complete false argument.

Again, let’s talk about the nonproliferation treaty for the benefits that it brings to the signators. And let’s talk about the fact that many of the non-nuclear weapon states don’t have nuclear weapons because we have them. I think rather than getting into the missile defense question, I will close on that note and turn to Elaine and let you come at me or any of this during the Q&As.

Questions and Answers

Audience: Thanks, David Roop from Global Security Newswire. Regarding comments that Mr. Carter and Mr. Miller made about how our nuclear—The suggestion that our nuclear arsenal doesn’t really play into the calculations of potential adversaries, I think Mr. Miller’s elaboration on that was that nuclear proliferation is driven by regional tensions. But can’t you say that the U.S., because we’re a global power and have a presence in the Middle East and right on the border of Iran, is a regional concern in that area? Hasn’t the U.S. been North Korea’s preoccupation for the last 50 years? And isn’t Iran concerned about our intentions now?

And then sort of the broader point is we’re trying to negotiate disarmament with North Korea and the Europeans are trying to negotiate disarmament with Iran or stop their development. And doesn’t what we do in terms of our doctrines that we’re telegraphing out and the types of systems that we have in development undermine those efforts? Thanks.

Questions and Answers

Dr. Pfaltzgraff: Well, who would like to address those questions? There are several embedded in that comment. Ash, do you want to begin?

Dr. Carter: Yeah, I do. As far as North Korea is concerned, I think we have everything to do with their motivation. But I don't think it’s the details of our nuclear posture that motivate them or that tip them one direction or another. I think as far as Iran is concerned, we’re the biggest factor, but they have other fish to fry regionally as well. And I really stand by what I said. I think if you look for the high leverage items in protecting us against weapons of mass destruction going forward, manipulating our own nuclear arsenal is not a high leverage item. Now, Congressman Schiff’s given some important “buts” to that, which are not regional in nature, but he was very clear in saying global in nature.

And so if you want to do what Henry and I, and I think Congressman Schiff and maybe other members of this panel want to do going forward, which is to make the NPT more relevant and useful by having it capture fuel cycle matters as well, that's a diplomatic job. But we may find that some aspects of our own nuclear posture amending them, improve to have leverage in those negotiations, I don't rule that out. But the high leverage things, I think, are elsewhere in our policy and in the circumstances in the world.

And the other thing I really want to say is to second what Congressman Schiff said also, which is it is not the possession of nuclear weapons by other states that is in my estimation principally alarming about the spread of nuclear technology or nuclear weapons. It’s falling into the hands of others that are not states. So Henry’s diagram, frightening as it is, is about the connections among coherent governments. But you can’t guarantee that governments will remain coherent, or that nongovernmental parties don’t get a hold of nuclear weapons. And that takes you into Congressman Schiff’s world, and I'm very glad he raised that on this panel. It’s not really the subject of this panel, but it is the subject of the nation’s security. Which just makes my point again. If you're starting with our nuclear forces, that's a very important subject in its own right. But if you're starting with threats to the United States from proliferation or weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, it’s a long way back to our—I wish—To our arsenal. I wish by manipulating our own conduct with respect to our nuclear forces we could solve these other problems. I wish, because then the solution would be within our grasp.

But it’s not that way. It has the character of what my good friend, Bob Herman, the former NRO director, calls a proctoscopic tonsillectomy. [laughter] You can get there from here, but it’s not the most direct route. The most direct route to stopping nuclear terrorism is to corral fissile material and attack terrorist groups. The most direct route to counterproliferation is to go to each of these circumstances like North Korea and fix it.

Dr. Pfaltzgraff: Okay, Frank, would you like to comment on at least part of that statement?

Mr. Miller: Let me endorse everything in that statement, including Bob Herman. But I think the question is important because it clarifies a critically important point. I never said that U.S. power or the position of the United States or our global capability didn't affect what proliferants thought about doing. I said our nuclear arsenal did not. You know, 1990 as the North Koreans are beginning their nuclear program, we had about 10,000 strategic nuclear weapons. And there was no real Iranian nuclear program then. In 2005, we still have the North Korean nuclear program and we’re down about two-thirds from those 1990 levels, and we now have a vigorous Iranian nuclear weapons program. There's no correlation. Not between our nuclear weapons and what proliferants do for their own purposes, that is trying to affect the actions of our conventional forces in the region or to intimidate their neighbors.

And that's critical. One has to understand there's no linkage there. And bringing up the NPT in that context, waving the bloody flag on Article VI, is just completely wrong, and I appreciate the opportunity to have that clarified.