Previous IFPA-Fletcher Conferences

36th Annual IFPA-Fletcher Conference on
National Security and Policy
Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Forces in 21st-Century Deterrence: Implementing the New Triad

December 14-15, 2005
Grand Hyatt Washington Hotel
Washington, D.C.

Session 5 - New Nuclear Weapons for Deterrence

Vice Admiral Robert R. Monroe, USN (Ret.) former Director, Defense Nuclear Agency and Member, Nuclear Strategy Forum

Introduction by Dr. Charles M. Perry

Good morning. I’m honored to be a participant in this conference, doubly honored to be on a panel with these distinguished gentlemen. The downside, of course, is what can you say when you follow Johnny Foster on nuclear weapons? [laughter] But here goes.

Let’s start with two basic fundamentals that are often lost in these discussions. First, nuclear weapons exist, they aren’t going away, ever. There are tens of thousands of them in the world today, many of which are inadequately secured. More states possess nuclear weapons today than ever before in history. More than half the world’s population lives in states which have nuclear weapons. Many other states and terrorist groups are determined to acquire them and use them.

Second, U.S. action to shape our nuclear strategy and weapons for the future must be pushed with great urgency. The future is absolutely unknowable, but it’s almost certain to involve use of nuclear weapons. New and unexpected threats will appear on very short notice, as they have throughout history, but it will take us about 20 years to make any significant change in our stockpile. We must start the transformation. We’re already 15 years late.

Now let’s talk about deterrence. It’s probably the most misused and misunderstood word in the entire national security vocabulary. It’s fashionable today for political leaders to say that we maintain our aging stockpile of nuclear weapons for deterrence. These politicians may mean well, but they just don’t understand how deterrence works. Deterrence isn’t about nuclear weapons, deterrence is about fear. We deter someone from taking an action against us by instilling fear of the consequences. The most critical element of deterrence is credibility. If our deterrence is to be effective, our adversary must believe beyond the shadow of a doubt that if he proceeds with his actions, the consequences for him will be intolerable. We will destroy his most valued assets rapidly and irrevocably. But our existing nuclear weapons simply don't pass the credibility test. They're virtually useless in deterring today’s adversaries.

A classic example of nuclear deterrence that worked was the Cold War. The Soviets threatened to destroy America with their nuclear weapons. We deterred this every day for 40 years by the poised readiness of thousands of nuclear weapons targeted on those assets the Soviets valued most; their leadership, their nuclear weapons, their military forces. But our simply possessing nuclear weapons wouldn’t have deterred the Soviets at all. To insure continued credibility, this Cold War deterrence had to be tailored with exquisite precision. We had to modernize our nuclear weapons and their delivery systems unceasingly to meet ever-changing threats. We had to test our nuclear weapons frequently so we and the Soviets would have no doubt about their effectiveness. We had to regularly adjust our targeting to match the values of changing Soviet leaders. Our military forces had to exercise constantly in the realistic use of these weapons, and our national leaders had to declare frequently our absolute determination to respond to any attack with overwhelming nuclear force.

Effective deterrence always requires this type of intense tuning and emphasis. The Cold War results, of course, were spectacularly effective. Nuclear deterrence worked flawlessly. Our nuclear weapons prepared for instant launch prevented for 40 years the use of even a single nuclear weapon anywhere despite countless crises and many hot wars. Now, contrast this with today. America faces an equally serious threat, not just from nuclear weapons, but from biological and chemical weapons as well. Our current adversaries are not monolithic superpowers, but rogue states, failed and failing states, terrorist groups in sanctuary states. And the principle action we must deter is not the launch of nuclear weapons, but the acquisition and possession of weapons of mass destruction. U.S. nuclear weapons can be just as effective in deterring today’s adversaries from acquiring weapons of mass destruction as they were in a totally different Cold War deterrent role. But achieving this deterrence will require an entirely different nuclear strategy and totally different nuclear weapons.

This should come as no surprise. We haven’t taken the first steps towards transforming our U.S. nuclear weapons capability. For 15 years, we’ve been frozen in time looking backwards at a deteriorating Cold War stockpile of massive retaliation weapons which have no credibility for deterrence in today’s world. Now, this is not to say that nuclear weapons would be our first choice as a deterrent, they’d be our last. But if diplomacy, economic sanctions, conventional forces prove ineffective in deterring belligerent states from proliferating, we urgently need an effective last resort if we're suffering nuclear, biological and chemical attack.

The general characteristics of our new nuclear weapons, I believe, are quite clear; four capabilities will be common to most variants. Greatly increased accuracy, very low yield, greatly reduced residual radiation, and extremely high intrinsic security to prevent use by terrorists. These characteristics are within our capability to achieve and by vastly reducing collateral damage, they’ll go a long way to changing a non-credible deterrent force to a credible one.

But in addition, other specialized capabilities are urgently needed to deter unique threats such as improved earth penetration to defeat hard and deeply buried targets. And the ability to neutralize biological and chemical agents. Each specially tailored capability would be needed only in small numbers. And these later weapons will also have the four general characteristics previously mentioned. However, nuclear deterrence isn’t a one size fits all proposition. Our weapons must be specifically tailored for each adversary. And finally, a key point, these new weapons which achieve new capabilities through new designs will require a resumption of nuclear testing.

Now a few comments about non-proliferation, which is another misused and misunderstood word. First, preventing proliferation is an absolutely vital U.S. objective. Second, the global non-proliferation regime supported by the United Nations and most of the states of the world has little interest in preventing proliferation. Their focus is nuclear disarmament, starting with the U.S. Their activities, this global non-proliferation regime, are generally contrary to our national interests. Third, the actions I suggest are in full accord with the non-proliferation treaty, the cornerstone of the world’s attempts to prevent proliferation. This treaty explicitly recognizes the United States and four other states as “nuclear weapon states.” The treaty places no restrictions on these states continued designing, testing, and production of nuclear weapons.

Fourth, there's no evidence whatsoever that U.S. nuclear testing and U.S. development of new nuclear weapons will contribute to proliferation. There's not one single instance of this since the dawn of the nuclear era. Fifth, the U.S. appears to have two clear choices with North Korea and Iran. Accept their acquisition of nuclear weapons or prevent them by military force. The former would lead to galloping proliferation by both adversaries and friends; the latter would be greatly strengthened by a credible nuclear deterrent.

Sixth, the U.S. has led the world in compliance with Article VI of the non-proliferation treaty in the past. The program outlined here, which would result in a smaller stockpile with a vastly reduced total yield, continues that compliance.

And finally, over the long range future, the world’s best non-proliferation hope is through concerted action by the five internationally approved nuclear weapon states, to stop proliferation, absolutely by force if necessary. For 15 years, we’ve been pursuing non-proliferation through weakness. It hasn’t worked, it isn’t working, and it won't work. Let’s pursue non-proliferation through strength. So what should the U.S. do today? Five actions. Terminate the unilateral nuclear test moratorium. Testing is the very heart of the scientific method and it’s essential to our nuclear weapons transformation.

Establish a robust R&D program for advanced nuclear weapons technology. In this, the U.S. must lead the world. Design, test and produce new nuclear weapons to deter current adversaries. We must maintain continuing programs in all three designing, testing, production. Prevent proliferation primarily outside the U.N. through coalitions of the willing, such as in the case of the Proliferation Security Initiative. And as a very long range initiative, start discussions with the other four internationally approved nuclear weapon states on forming a five nation policing coalition to prevent proliferation.

How should we proceed with this? Just as we did in the Cold War, DOD must initiate the change, as Dr. Foster has said. They must convince the President of the need to reestablish America’s nuclear deterrent. The President must explain to the American people, persuasively, why a new nuclear strategy is essential and why it will require new design nuclear weapons. These points must then be expanded by the SECDEF, the Joint Chiefs, STRATCOM, under combatant commanders, other administration leaders, in a vigorous national debate. There'll be opposition, of course, but the President’s program will gain strong public consensus and bipartisan support in Congress, as did our nuclear weapon programs during four decades of Cold War.

In sum, we are at a critical moment in history. Nuclear weapons are just as vital to our security in the future as they were in the past. We’ve been asleep for 15 years. And lead times are so long, we must move out now to regain our nuclear deterrent. Thank you.
[Applause]

Questions and Answers

Audience: I’m Amy Wolf from the Congressional Research Service. I have two questions, one is from the beginning of Dr. Foster’s presentation, and one from the end of Admiral Monroe’s presentation. Dr. Foster, you began by saying that given we’ve given up biological and chemical weapons, nuclear weapons remain as our only potent deterrent, and I do believe you used the word potent, to weapons of mass destruction but from other nations. Yesterday, Barry Blechman referred to nuclear weapons as the weapons of the week for those who were seeking an equalizer for an adversary of the superior conventional weapons.

I don’t see anywhere in here where there's any mention of the role that our superior conventional weapons might play in our deterrent strategy. And I understand they can’t destroy a hardened and deeply buried targets, but certainly as a deterrent to weapons of mass destruction or as a contributor to our national security, our superior conventional weapons must have a role to play here, and I was wondering if you could comment.

Admiral Monroe, I'm really puzzled by your distinction between soft and hard non-proliferation. I understand what you mean in the difference between soft and hard, but you began by saying that the soft approach can lead to galloping proliferation because countries won’t take us seriously. But that doesn’t quite comport with where we are right now. And clearly we’re worried about Iran, and North Korea, there's been a little bit of other proliferation, India, Pakistan, Israel. But the number of hard cases and problem countries hasn’t grown that rapidly while we’ve been doing soft non-proliferation. If anything, it’s shrunk. Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons, South Africa gave up nuclear weapons. Brazil, Argentina, Libya backed away from nuclear weapons programs, so I'm not sure the results of soft non-proliferation are so bad, and I certainly don’t understand the process of hard non-proliferation through strength. In your formulation, would this be military attacks on nations acquiring nuclear weapons? Should we have attacked Pyongyang 12 years ago, attacked Natanz now? Who blows up the facilities in India and Pakistan because they're not—I'm not sure how it would work. And about Israel, they have nuclear weapons, does someone get to go in and blow—I'm not sure if we’re only going after the countries that—We worry about North Korea or Iran, or anybody other than the current five would be subject to this strong non-proliferation.

Dr. Perry: Okay, thank you. So you first. And did you have the things you need for—

Admiral Monroe: Amy, I didn't really quite understand all of your question, but I can start with an answer and then you can—

Admiral Monroe: Amy, I believe you question to me related to non-proliferation and my comment that we’ve been pursuing non-proliferation through weakness and that didn't work and let’s try it through strength. Is that right?

Audience: Yes. How does the strength model work? Basically ... [inaudible].

Admiral Monroe: The U.S. created non-proliferation almost as son as early as we created the first nuclear weapons. Bernard Baruch, others led, tried to lead the world into non-proliferation. We allied ourselves with the U.N. and most of the nations of the world in negotiating and signing the non-proliferation treaty, which took a decade and a half. It went into effect in 1970, I think there were 44 nation signatories, of which the U.S. was one. Now there are 188 or 189 signatories, I think 188. At that time, it was a non-proliferation treaty. It talked a great deal about how this commitment by all signatory nations, except five, not to have nuclear weapons, to agree to forego nuclear weapons. And over the years, nation after nation signed under those conditions. It also allowed five nations to have nuclear weapons and to continue designing them, testing them, producing them in any number and in any variety. Now, as a near final article, Article VI, the treaty said everybody else, all parties to the treaty, both the five nuclear weapon states and all the others, the non-nuclear weapon states, agree to negotiate in good faith on three things: on ending the Cold War, which we did. On working towards an ultimate treaty on nuclear disarmament and really working toward a treaty on general disarmament, those latter two were linked, speaking from memory, the latter two were linked. And it was to be done under—to be verified under strict international controls.

Very shortly after this treaty was negotiated and signed, it ceased becoming a non-proliferation treaty and became a nuclear disarmament treaty, and the entire emphasis, or virtually the entire emphasis, over the last 35 years, it’s easy to know how long because we just finished the seventh review convention this last May, and they're held every five years. The entire emphasis has been on nuclear disarmament and on test bans which term doesn’t even appear in the treaty. So we have, America has, been trying to play the game and to meet our obligations under Article VI in spades. But meanwhile, we’ve been trying to energize the rest of the world to focus on stopping proliferation and taking effective action which would include military force, if there seemed to be evidence of proliferation. We failed in this, we’ve been ineffective. And we have over the succeeding decades, pretty much had to pursue proliferation ourselves.

And as someone mentioned yesterday, just like we used to talk about are we provoking the Soviets in the Cold War when we built up our force, and someone very aptly said when we build, they build. When we stop, they build. Well, it was this same way in the non-proliferation role. The more things we gave up, and the less effective the sanctions seemed to be, and we saw test bans violated by China under Russia, we saw, I believe Russia, we saw Pakistan and India develop nuclear weapons. Now, we’re five years or so into the business of watching North Korea and Iran acquire a nuclear weapons capability. And my point was that with a more muscular approach to proliferation prevention, would the—It doesn’t seem likely we’ll get the support of the U.N. in this, but we’ll certainly get the support of other willing nations, coalitions of the willing, such as the proliferation security and the global—I don't have the exact word—The NATO oriented group in which have been subscribed to by many, many nations, and are seeming to become quite effective.

So I believe we can do better if—We really need to decide, are we going to let North Korea and Iran acquire nuclear weapons, or are we going to stop them by military force? Those are the real two choices.

Audience: Steven Young, the Union of Concerned Scientists. One quick question for Dr. Monroe, Admiral Monroe, and a question for the panel. Admiral Monroe, you said basically words to the effect that America today faces an equally serious threat that it faced during the Cold War. I think that's simply patently false. In the Cold War, every single American could die in 20 minutes. So that's not the whole point of your case, but I don't think it’s not true that we face the same threat we faced during the Cold War.

The question for the whole panel, on the RRW, basically, how did it become essentially the flavor of the month? Two years ago, it wasn't in the military budget, it was put in by Mr. Hobson and now it’s everywhere for everything. Where was it two years ago when you were asking for money for the Reliable Nuclear Earth Penetrator, how did it become flavor of the month? Thank you.

Admiral Monroe: I believe I owe you an answer on my comparison of the threat that our nation faces today from weapons of mass destruction by saying it was just as serious as that during the Cold War. I should have qualified that and said that is my opinion. I suspect of the 250-odd people here today, each person would have an opinion that it was much greater, much less, the same, 87 ½ percent the same and this sort of thing. But I lived through every day of the Cold War, actively involved in that military confrontation and I see what we're facing today, and to me this does appear just as serious. Thanks.