Previous IFPA-Fletcher Conferences

36th Annual IFPA-Fletcher Conference on
National Security and Policy
Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Forces in 21st-Century Deterrence: Implementing the New Triad

December 14-15, 2005
Grand Hyatt Washington Hotel
Washington, D.C.

Session 2 - Operational Requirements for a New Mix of Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Strategic Forces

ADdress by Dr. William Schneider, Jr., President, International Planning Services, Inc.; Chairman, Defense Science Board, U.S. Department of Defense

Thank you, Jackie. It’s likewise a pleasure to have an opportunity to participate in this discussion and it’s been a subject I think has had too little discussion since the end of the Cold War, really. And so I think the conference serves a very constructive purpose.

I'm dealing with a more pedestrian dimension of the subject relating to the mix between nuclear and non-nuclear forces in this activity. I will, owing to its pedestrian nature, I will forego the opportunity to inflict more photons on you and I will just speak from notes. There'll be no complex matrices or whatever. [Laughter]

In my remarks, I’d like to just address three main points. The first, I want to discuss briefly the linkage between this question of the mix of forces and capabilities based planning, which has become an important dimension of the transformation of U.S. forces to address the kind of threats we’re likely to face in the 21st century. Then the second issue will be relating to some issues pertinent to the integration of nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities into a transformed set of military capabilities. And finally, then identify some requirements for a 21st century mix that might be appropriate, or at least a way of helping to understand what that mix should be. And if time permits, I’ll just mention a few observations about some specific dimensions relating to the types or the characteristics of nuclear weapons that might be useful in this mix.

First, one of the, I think, important innovations in the current effort to try and transform the U.S. military capabilities has been the recognition that the way in which future threats need to be addressed cannot rely on the 20th century model of threat based planning. The fact that we are unlikely to be able to predict our adversary far enough in advance to be able to optimize the mix of weapon systems and military forces, in general, makes it desirable to revisit how we structure the forces and the aspiration has been increasingly invested in the DOD planning process to address future threats on a capabilities basis so that we would, in fact, have a set of forces that would be designed to cope with capabilities in the hands of an adversary that we are not yet able to predict. And I think it’s pretty apparent that the emphasis has shifted to the C4 ISR layer, recognizing that as the most flexible and the one that is most adaptive and can be changed or can indeed absorb changes in the threat so that we don’t have to recapitalize the inventory of weapons on the same scale as the change in the threat posed by adversaries.

And looking at the defense program in this way enables the focus of what is concentrated on to emphasize outputs rather than inputs. That is, instead of focusing on the massive forces that are generated and supported by a given level of resources, what is much more important is the effect these forces can create, an output measure. And this approach leads to a number of different ways of doing business that are very pertinent to this question of optimizing the new mix, and I’ll say a little more about that later.

If you look at the three main vectors of modernization that have characterized the forces that we have built up, they are speed, meaning the speed of the transaction, not the platform, precision and stealth. And it’s the combination of these that are bringing in appropriate technologies that in turn are permitting the creation of a full range of effects that are designed to couple to the kind of purposes Keith Payne was referring to in trying to understand the results that we’re trying to achieve at the political or policy level.

And these output based approaches are really a much more constructive way to be able to come at the mix. And that is, I think, part of this process where we now can contemplate not treating nuclear and non-nuclear forces in such a vastly different way that the nuclear forces are relegated to the sort of loss of vision that we have suffered from for the past ten years or so. The emphasis on these effects based operations does make considering the mix particularly important. The effect that needs to be achieved is the dominant characteristic and then one asks what effect needs to be delivered in order to be able to achieve the political aspiration achieved? And it’s in this context that it’s much easier to address the problem of what unique effects do nuclear weapons offer? And I think it’s well understood, extraordinary energy density, thermal and ionizing radiation are unique characteristics of nuclear weapons.

And the in considering the effects desired, under what circumstances do those particular effects seem to be supplied by no other element of the arsenal and hence deserve consideration as part of effects-based operations. This kind of exercise I think has a lot more utility, even though it’s clearly recognized that the scope where these unique properties of nuclear weapons is much narrower than was the case, say, 20 or 25 years ago simply because the nature of the target set has changed. But also, the impact of speed, precision and stealth have so vastly multiplied the opportunities for non-nuclear forces. But considering the effects jointly is a very constructive way, I think, to be able to get at the problem. And the focus, as I mentioned earlier in the C4 ISR system and modernizing the C4 ISR layer and coupling the platforms to networks so that the performance of the network is the decisive metric of military performance, it gives the policy leadership a much clearer way of understanding what their alternatives are and a much more finely graduated way of addressing the way in which they would respond to particular threats.

So I think the opportunity that's created by capabilities based planning is offering some new opportunities to be able to much more effectively optimize the mix and to manage it in the kind of fine grained way that Keith Payne’s presentation suggested we are likely to need. But if that's the aspiration, what kind of requirements might be laid on the defense establishment as far as trying to be able to create such a set of alternatives for national leadership?

Well, I think one of the dimensions surely is moving from merely having a good intelligence system to needing an exquisite intelligence system. One of the characteristics of the way in which the need to do capabilities based planning has emerged is that the characteristics of the C4 ISR system need to move from a focus on the order of battle to individuals, objects and activities. It requires a much different orientation as far as the intelligence community, but it’s only with that kind of knowledge that you can expect to be able to achieve the aspirations described.

Because of this extraordinary need for intelligence, this needs to be disseminated in a way that leverages the network forces in the most effective manner, and this requires a global, multi-layered C4 ISR system that is not substantially bandwidth constrained. This seems to be technically achievable, but it’s a formidable aim to achieve, and it is an extraordinary institutional problem to try and implement it in the setting of global operations where you have multiple forces, both U.S. and allied on a worldwide basis. It’s a very demanding requirement.

Similarly in the mix of forces, it’s likely that, in particular, because of the more limited scope for the application of nuclear weapons that more ill use platforms are desirable. Platforms that can deliver both nuclear or non-nuclear weapons, the ability to get maximum value from the investment in platforms, coupled with the ability to increase the flexibility of use of those platforms tends to affirm the desirability of having or retaining a significant dual use capability.

And finally, a need for fewer but more appropriate nuclear weapons. The ones that we currently have were designed for a specific purpose, they served the purpose very well but they will not necessarily serve the purposes that I’ve described. And just take a minute to be suggestive about the kind of characteristics that one would like to see in a much smaller inventory of nuclear weapons, but an inventory that would be more appropriate to this kind of policy environment. We’d like to see future weapon designs that are focused on low maintenance systems. The current systems are very expensive to maintain and the need to maintain them is a technically demanding task that more appropriate designs may mitigate.

The ability to manipulate effects from the weapons is also a desirable characteristic, again to contribute to the greater flexibility in producing support for effects-based operations. Further, the complex that designs and develops weapons needs to be more flexible in line with a much smaller inventory, but one that can be much more responsive to evolution in future threats, something along the line of just in time development and manufacturing concept is likely to be more appropriate.

Also, having warhead designs that can operate on different platforms so that we’re not faced with the problem with the existing nuclear weapons inventory that are very platform specific. Also would like to move to much higher levels of safety and reliability, but designs that don’t have, say, are not tied to specific delivery systems. And unlike the circumstances that we have faced in the past where nuclear weapons in an operational sense have been quite separate from conventional weapons in the manner I’ve described of this effects based operations, they need to be much better implemented.

So I think that the opportunities now exist for a much more rational allocation between conventional and nuclear forces and the use of the legacy platforms we have in a way that will actually contribute substantially to the underlying aims of deterring, dissuading, assuring and defeating where necessary. The opportunities to use this force in a manner that will have a much greater impact on the proliferation problem than the current force is, I think, now within reach. Thank you.

Questions and Answers

Audience: Thanks, David Roop from Global Security Newswire. We’ve heard several arguments so far from speakers leading to the conclusion that we need to broaden our strategic capabilities including possibly nuclear capabilities, global strike. But it seems like there's an issue that’s hidden behind the big curtain that isn’t being addressed, and that's the possibility that pursuing such capabilities could actually increase instability, encourage proliferation, and perhaps the risky behavior that we're trying to avoid from potential foes that seek to use their capabilities before they lose them. Could the panel please address this potential, is it a potential?

Dr. Schneider: I think that during the ‘90s when we were allowing the focus on the nuclear weapons program to fall into disuse, we had a Niagara of proliferation coming from some of the poorest countries on earth. I think the measures that have been recommended by, I think, all of the panelists have the property that they contribute to persuading or dissuading a nation or even a sub national movement from trying to acquire nuclear weapons because they can’t gain anything from it. And so I think these measures are positive with respect to stability.

Audience: With respect to, say North Korea, not wanting to leave a paper trail, what about the issue of a nuclear device being brought in on a cargo container? Which doesn’t seem to be addressed real well ... [inaudible]?

Dr. Schneider: Just a footnote about the need for exquisite intelligence. As I mentioned, the C4 ISR system is evolving from focusing on order of battle, let’s say, of a missile launch regiment to individuals, activities and objects. And this is a dimension of this national effort that would contribute to being able to detect such an activity as a clandestine nuclear weapon whether it was smuggled through commerce or through the criminal infrastructure or by some other means.