

**Lt. General James F. Amos**  
**Presentation**  
**IFPA-Fletcher Conference**

**GENERAL JAMES F. AMOS:** I've got two slides. Let me make an anecdotal comment here. I heard rumors when I walked in, I was kind of drinking that Gucci water in the blue bottle out there that the Marine Corps can't afford. I'm wondering how the Navy can afford that. [laughter] I don't know why you'd be seen in public carrying something that in uniform, to be honest with you.

But my office, my desk has chopped this maritime strategy more times than I'd probably care to, but I've seen that baby from the beginning to the end, and I know you've had a host of panelists up here. Did you have Jake Shuford up here already? You know, Jake, if he didn't get up here and talk about it, shame on him. I'd wire brush him if he was out here right now. And you had Admiral Morgan up here, but all these people had been part authors of this thing. And I'll tell you, my sense is you don't know that it's very near signature. In fact, my boss, the commandant, has seen this. He's seen it many times. We've chopped it, brought it into him, went through the whole thing. I tell you, it's a powerful and it's a great document. And I know that's kind of what the theme of the entire conference has been, is how do you operationalize the maritime strategy?

And it picks up where the naval operated concept, where Admiral Mullen and Commandant Hagee signed some time ago, and this is a powerful document. In my estimation, at least what I got this morning, it's ready to be signed. They've got a small dilemma in the United States Navy while we kind of wait for the new CNO to come in, so I don't know how that signature's going to take place. But I'll tell you, I think it's terrific. It's had a lot of vetting over the last nine months across this country. And I think it's a powerful document and I think it will outline a clear path for the way to go.

Now, on my first slide up here, I just came from the NRAC, the Navy Research Advisory Committee, and we presented them about an hour and a half on what we thought the world was going to look like in '25. And it's important because as we take a look at the maritime strategy, it really nests in there. There were two separate efforts being worked in parallel, but not necessarily linked. And as I look back at just having gone through this brief now and having been part of that effort for the last six, seven months, the maritime strategy really fits with where we think the world's going to be and where we think the issues of the United States of America are going to be.

I've got two things up there. I've got access and influence, and below those I've got preventing wars and winning wars. The preventing wars and winning wars, quite honestly, are the cornerstones of the Naval Maritime Strategy. That's the general reason why we have the United States Navy. We don't have it so that we can go out and ship all around the world and carry cargo and freighters and stuff. We have it so that we can prevent wars and we can win wars when it's time to have it. So the strategy talks about that. But there are two imperatives in that strategy. One is access, and the other issue is influence.

And I'll tell you, we are in strict competition right now for access around this world. If you just go back to where we were with the fight over Kosovo and Serbia and the access challenges we had, and we had a fair amount of runways we flew out of. We flew out of the United Kingdom, we flew out of Italy, we flew out of several bases in Italy, as a matter of fact, plus we had the carriers out there. So we had a fair amount of access. But think about what happened as we rolled into Operation Iraqi Freedom. You know, we lost access out of Turkey. We wanted to bring the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division in through Turkey, and we couldn't do it. So access will only continue to be a problem over the next 15 to 20 years. So we need a capability to have access when we want it.

When we went into Afghanistan with Task Force 58, access was an issue. They came across the beach at night so as to now rile the Pakistani people. And that was a decision

that President Musharraf made. And it was the right decision, but access was an issue and we flew 350 miles to go to Kandahar.

The next one is influence. The strategy will tell you that the way you prevent wars is to be forward deployed and bearing your influence out around the world. So access and influence are kind of the operational imperatives of the maritime strategy and helps us with the idea of winning and prevent wars. Next slide.

How do we do this? I'll tell you that, you'll see at the bottom of this slide, sea basing. I came into this job a year and about two months ago from Camp Lejeune and the fleet Marine Force knowing a little bit about it, not necessarily being sold on it, mostly out of ignorance. I will tell you that sea basing and the whole concept of having a sea base offshore 15, 25, 50 miles offshore, maybe 100 miles offshore, a floating air field, a floating base where you bring forces in and you consolidate them. A floating base where you run your supplies from, and you sustain whatever kind of operation. It can be a humanitarian assistance or disaster relief operation, but it can and should in the future come from the sea. Sea basing, I think, is probably the single most powerful new concept, and people out there that will take me to task and say it's not new. It's not, but we have the ability now to bring sea basing together. To transfer equipment, supplies, sailors, marines, soldiers. It needs to be a joint sea base. It will facilitate the access and solve the access issues for us in the future. A sea base treads very lightly on our friends, our neighbors, our allies, and it treads very lightly even on our adversaries that we're not necessarily at war with.

So if you take a look and you kind of go around that slide and you start thinking about the maritime strategy that talks about influence, and I know General Natonski was here before, he talked about security cooperation and MAG TFs and he talked about forward presence. But you take a look at that and you think about those security cooperation MAG TFs and coming out of the sea base. You think about the global fleet stations that came out of Admiral Mullen's mind, and he's absolutely right. And you need to think about, what could that be made of? We tend to think, well, it's going to be an LST or an

LPD or an LHD. No, it can be an LCS and it can have some special forces on it, it could have marines on it. But it's forward deployed forces influencing in phase zero operations.

You continue going around that slide up at the top and you find yourself in a forcible entry operation and that's the kind of standard thing we know today. But I tell you, it will be different in the future because in the lower right hand corner, we talk about maritime pre-position future, and we're trying to figure that capability out right now within the Navy and the Marine Corps. And we hope to have it put together by December, present it to the CNO and the commandant of the Marine Corps and the leadership of the two services and then say, "Okay, this is it. This is what this capability's going to have." But it will be able to aggregate forces at sea, you'll be able to transfer logistics and supplies at sea. You'll be able to launch a force from the sea using maritime pre-position future. It's not your mother's MPS, it has significantly larger capabilities, some of which technologies are being developed right now. But I tell you, MPS will form the basis, the hub of sea basing. Sea basing is our nation's, I think, contribution and solution to the maritime strategy and access and influence around the world. And that's all I have, I'll be ready to take your questions when you're done.

#### **Q&A for the Entire Panel**

**GENERAL HOWARD:** I'd like you to do me a favor, for two reasons. I'd like to give General Amos a hand because I moved onto the next speaker before we could. And also, I think I've attended 10 or 11 of these conferences over a number of years, and sir, you gave the most succinct presentation that I have ever heard.

**GENERAL AMOS:** You told me to.

**GENERAL HOWARD:** So could you give him a round of applause?

**GENERAL AMOS:** I don't need a round of applause.

**GENERAL HOWARD:** And you might compliment the whole panel because they came in right at the right time, so give them a hand. [laughter] We have about a half hour for questions. However, General Amos has to leave in exactly 17 minutes. So if you do have questions particularly for the General, would you raise your hands and we'll entertain those first?

**GENERAL AMOS:** Oh, great, I'm out of here.

**GENERAL HOWARD:** Now, questions for the entire panel. I don't recognize names from here, I'm a little sight-impaired, but yes, ma'am?

**AUDIENCE:** Paula Gordon, Gordonhomeland.com. My question is about China. I was very pleased by the comments that both Mr. Work and Mr. Cropsey made. And I wonder if you would comment on Constantine Menges' book, *China: The Gathering Threat*, which was published after his death. I wonder if you are aware of that book, and if you know of the analysis that he gave about the extraordinary threat that is posed by China, which many people in the west seem to be totally oblivious to?

**GENERAL AMOS:** I'm not familiar with the book.

**MR. WORK:** I'm not familiar with the book, but I've read a lot—I'm neither a panda slugger or a panda hugger, I'm a navalist. And from a historical perspective, great navies always look at rising navies. It's a little known fact that the United States had a war plan to fight against the British Royal Navy all the way up through 1924, after we had fought World War I with them. So China undoubtedly is building capabilities specifically designed to deter a United States intervention in case of a miscalculation over Taiwan.

You can pick up their equivalent of *Popular Science* and it says, "How to sink a U.S. aircraft carrier." I mean, they're very open about it. And the U.S. Navy needs to think hard all the time about how to do this threat. That's why I was so pleased with Admiral Williams' comments. The Navy really has paid for those first 18 ballistic missile

shooters with MDA money, Missile Defense Agency money. The Navy really has not spent a lot of its own money on missile defense. That's going to be a problem in case of a break in against the Chinese Anti-Access Network.

So the fact that I think the Navy should think about this all the time does not mean that I think war is inevitable. I think as we put our hand across the table and try to work with them cooperatively, that's the way to go. But I do think it's prudent that we do think of the threat and how we might counter it.

**MR. CROPSEY:** ... (inaudible) with the spirit of that remark. The PLAN is showing all the correct signs of a naval organization that wants to have greater reach. Its senior officers are visiting more places, its ships are out and about the world. They're specific in their doctrine. Their ideas are directed to being able to achieve all weather night capability, extend their range, so on and so forth, building some impressive vessels. They say that they want to be a great power, and there's no reason that they shouldn't have such an ambition. And their view of a navy is entirely consistent with that and with their geographic position and their commercial interests.

And I don't think people here, especially in this room, don't take that seriously. How well that's known outside of this room, outside the national security community, outside the Navy, I'm not sure. I am sure that that understanding needs to be there. Again, not because I think there's any inevitability to war with China or enmity or anything else like that, but they're serious and we ought to take them seriously. And by we, I mean not just the people here, but the people in the United States.

**GENERAL HOWARD:** Next question. Yes, sir, right here in the fourth row?

**AUDIENCE:** Robbie Harris here. Listening to the CNO speak this morning, Admiral Shuford this afternoon and various others, I don't think it's very well hidden that the conclusion of the new strategy is going to be that the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, Coast Guard, would be more active in the future than it has been over the past decade. It will

be more places doing different things than it has over the past decade and I would be surprised if those three services don't argue that we don't have enough ships either in the Navy or the Coast Guard or enough marines to do the things that are implied by this new strategy. Mr. Cropsey seems to agree with that.

On the other hand, I think I heard Bob Work say between, or among, the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and the other democracies, that we have quite enough ships, thank you. Bob, would you like to comment on that?

**MR. WORK:** I believe we have enough ships if a threat, if an existential threat to world sea lanes came up. There's no question in my mind that all of the world democracies which generally have the next best navies would join with us to make sure—Because their stake in the globalization is as much as ours, if not more in some cases. Your point on the long war, however, I think is very good, and it all depends. I think the Marines, especially, are starting to look at, and General Amos, I'm sure, will correct me if I'm wrong, instead of sending out MEUs, just as the General said this morning, you might send one ship with a special purpose MAGTF down south, or you might put a platoon on an LCS, or you might put a reinforced company on a specially modified MPF ship that is specialized for MPS.

The Marines, I think, are starting to think in terms of distributed operations of a lot smaller packets of forces. And you have enormous leverage when you do that, because the Marines are thinking much more of fighting this war in an indirect manner than in rotational, regimental combat teams. And I believe that is exactly right, and we may not have enough ships, but we need to test first before I would say, "Wow, we really have to increase." I'd like to see the 55 LCSs, for sure.

**GENERAL HOWARD:** General, would you like to comment on that?

**GENERAL AMOS:** Well, I think it's important to kind of put all this in the context of where you think the world's going to go in the next 20 years. I do think that's important,

and that's why the comment I made about access and influence, and really the maritime strategy talks, and it does a great job of talking about it from my perspective. It recognizes that the world out there probably in the next 20 years, 20 to 30 years, is going to be a world where the population—Let me throw this figure out. By 2035, over 70 percent of the world's population will be less than 40 miles from the coastline. Now, we've said figures like 80 percent of the world's population live within 300 nautical miles of the coastline. But in 2035, it's postulated that over 70 percent of the world's population is going to live within, let's just say, less than 50 miles of the littorals.

I mean, that's significant. So you think about what power's going to be able to influence that? I will tell you parochially speaking, I think the naval services will be the best postured force. I mean, it's not the—If the Army and Air Force were in here, they'd argue with me over this thing. But naval forces will have the capability to have that forward presence that Bob Work is talking about. And we need to change our thoughts on what that forward presence looks like. Right now, our paradigm is the carrier strike group pulling off the coast on the Adriatic. It's a marine and naval expeditionary strike group made up of five ships, three amphibious ships and a couple of others. So that paradigm has got to change if you're going to be out there and you're going to influence and you're going to—You're actually going to try to prevent wars from happening instead of always reacting to wars.

It's going to take a shift of how we deploy ships. Right now, for instance, we take a marine expeditionary unit and we sail it off the west coast of the United States. And it goes on cruise for six months. It takes a little bit more than a month to get over into the Persian Gulf, it takes a month or better for it to come back. So what you have is you've got four months, at best, and probably more like 3 ½ months of useful time. And I'm not saying that it doesn't get used en route. But I am saying that we need to change the way we look at doing business if we're going to take the numbers of ships that we have, whether it be 313 or whether it grow to 400, and how we use those ships to influence the world in the future. And I don't think there's a force out there that's better than the naval force. And I agree, I think this is the time for our two services—Or actually our three

services—To come together. I think it's right, and I think the climate's ripe within the Navy and the Marine Corps leadership and certainly I believe in the Coast Guard.

But I'll tell you, the issue is how do we get out there and influence the world? And you're going to do it a different way than we're doing it right now, and you're going to have to make the decisions that are important, and I think it is. And the natural friction point, by the way, is money. You know, we sit there and I worked with it this morning through the—You know, the Marine Corps investment piece of naval shipbuilding, and it's an investment and where are we going to spend our money, and what's the threat going to look like? I'll tell you, you could probably make a case with about five or six naval nuclear attack submarines, could probably contain the Chinese fleet pretty well, I would suspect. And I'm not saying we shouldn't build, we shouldn't react and we shouldn't be prepared to go to war with China. I am saying if you just take a look at the capabilities we've got, I would say that probably half a dozen attack submarines could probably wreak havoc on any Chinese fleet. So where do we want to put our money?

**GENERAL HOWARD:** Yes, sir, right here in the middle? I'd like to challenge our microphone holders there.

**AUDIENCE:** Eric McVadon, the Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis. I want to play devil's advocate for just a moment and raise the question with each one of the speakers that I thought was kind of left unsaid. General Amos, would you address sea basing vulnerability? And Seth, in our system, can we sell both engaging and cooperating with China and being ready to deter and defeat China? And J. D., what do you say about with respect to offensive missiles, high numbers and decoys and penetration aids as far as the effect on our ability to defend against them? And Bob, I see it as not the overall power of the U.S. Navy and U.S. forces, but rather whether the Chinese can go against niche vulnerabilities.

**GENERAL HOWARD:** Sir, you want to take that? Did he ask you a question? I think you need to leave pretty quick, Sir.

**GENERAL AMOS:** You know, I think if I look at—That's a good question. In our dealings with trying to take a look at MPFF, which again I consider to be kind of the heartthrob of sea basing, I guess you could have a sea base out there somehow without MPFF, but when you think of the connectors and you think of the ability to offload and that kind of thing, you're going to have to—That's a critical part of marine maritime pre-position—Not marine, but maritime pre-position ships future. So you have to have that.

When we looked at that and we said, “Okay, not only what are we going to have, what's going to make up, but how are we going to protect it?” which goes back to your question about vulnerabilities, we've become convinced at my level, and I think the senior level of the Marine Corps, that the Navy with sea shield will form our protection for the sea base. Without sea shield, the long range ballistic missiles are absolutely going to wreak havoc in a sea base, there's no question about it. Part of the reason why we've had all this discussion in Washington over the last six, seven months about the expeditionary fighting vehicle and coming from 25 miles from the sea, was to get outside of the range of the shorter range missiles and to get out into a protected zone.

So I tell you, we're hanging our hat on sea shield because you take a sea base itself, and it's going to be made up of—I mean, it's going to have some great bottom ships, it'll have some black bottom ships in there, you'll have ships from our allies, you'll have ships from—You could easily have ships from the U.K.N.L. in there. And those are not necessarily well protected. So I think the sea base is vulnerable, but we're designing this thing, mentally at least, to be able to pull inside the sea shield protection zone. So I don't know whether that answers your question, but that's what we're hanging out hat on.

**MR. CROUSEY:** Well, again, a good question. I think that if the American public can keep two ideas in its mind at one time, that it's possible to do both, which is to say to tell people that although war is not envisioned or desired, or expected, that prudence requires taking what the Chinese are doing seriously. I think that if the American public can understand what a President means when he says speak softly but carry a big stick, two

different ideas, but they are connected with each other, that that shows an inclination and ability to grasp that. I think that if the American public can grasp what a President means when he says trust but verify, it's another indication that people are able to, if proper explanation is put in front of them, accept something which isn't immediately obvious. In other words, we're going to war next week. Or we should just simply treat them as England.

So I think it's possible, but it comes back to what I believe is absolutely critical to any kind of maritime strategy going forward, and the Navy's future. And that is being able to communicate outside of this room effectively.

**ADMIRAL WILLIAMS:** I think what you're probably asking, I assume, how would our missiles do against advanced technology missiles? Is that what you're talking about?

**AUDIENCE:** And a lot of them.

**ADMIRAL WILLIAMS:** Well, the "lot of them" is the reason why I recommended that we need at least 300 SM3s, and assuming what Bob said about the Chinese missiles, and I don't want to say assuming what you said is true, but assuming that is true, the SM3 would handle that missile. But 150 won't handle all the missiles China's building. Now, what I didn't mention very much today, which is also a recommendation, I remember when—I won't say it. I think I know who was the key guy that calls the cancellation of the Navy's terminal block 4A program back when that was done. But no matter what it was, I wrote an op. ed. piece. I think that was a national disaster because a terminal missile is the only missile to handle the short range missiles. The Navy does not have the capability against those short range missiles. It only has the SM3, will handle long range missiles.

So we need an MDA, finally, and I told them in my piece, I said, "Hey, it would take at least four or five years and several billion dollars to develop another missile." And at that time, General Kadish, "The Navy doesn't need that." Which is somewhat surprising

from a guy who headed up NDA at the time. NDA now under General Obering, has put some money in the budget to build a terminal missile for the Navy. We still don't know what kind it's going to be. We need to do that, I'd say, on the urgent basis because we may need to protect the sea base against the shorter range missiles before we'd ever get long range missiles coming at them. So we need to do that on an urgent basis so we'll have some defense against the shorter range missiles. And I would say missiles under three, four hundred kilometer range.

**MR. WORK:** The Chinese problem is really two different problems. One is a potential miscalculation over Taiwan in which we would have to go in, and unlike in the Cold War where the Navy was on the offensive and could use the mobility of its carrier forces to strike, we would be tied down to defending a specific geographical location which would rob carrier forces of much of their mobility.

And the Chinese have latched upon that with their ballistic missiles and their submarines and buying SSN27 sizzlers, which you've written much about. And they have a concept which I think most the people in this room would know is called shashoujian, I think I pronounced that pretty close, but it's kill, hand, mace, sword. It's assassin's mace, they pick vulnerabilities and they go after those very, very effectively.

And I think the U.S. Navy needs to get into the cost imposing strategy back. We're trying to push in and fight maybe three or four hundred miles from Taiwan right in the midst of their anti-access area denial, whereas I think fighting from range would maximize our defenses, would make their problem harder, would allow us to use SM3s. So how would you do that? Well, I just came back from a war game where some people said, "Hey, the way to do that is to fight the carrier from 1500 nautical miles with a system called the unmanned carrier combat air system and put submarines in close and have them do the sea add and roll back the sea add so that you could start to bring the carriers closer.

That's the type of thinking that I think the Navy is going through now. I think the Navy, admirals at PACOM get this. I think they follow the no better friend, no worst enemy

type thing where let's have transparency, join us, but we are going to demonstrate that we can pretty much overcome anything you throw at it. And I think the Navy just needs to get back into the cost imposing strategy thing rather than building \$4 billion ships and trying to catch two or three or four hundred inbound missiles. Try to throw it back on the Chinese.

**ADMIRAL WILLIAMS:** Let me add one thing. I agree with the general comments, having spent much of my time in the Navy on nuclear submarines. His understanding what submarines could do to the Chinese surface navy is right on. That's the kind of thing, one of the many things we need to think about if we ever have to go to war with China.

**GENERAL HOWARD:** Way in the back? Let us know who you are, where you're from?

**AUDIENCE:** Chris Nichols, General Dynamics. Part of the mix is what we would call capital ships, and history shows us that if you start building capital ships at the start of the conflict, they don't make it to the fight. I'd like to have the panel's views on the necessity of capital ships, your vision of what constitutes a capital ship and the infrastructure necessary to build the capital ship.

**GENERAL HOWARD:** Who'd like to take that? Seth, you want to start?

**MR. CROUSEY:** No. [laughter]

**GENERAL HOWARD:** Admiral Williams?

**ADMIRAL WILLIAMS:** Yeah, that's a good question. We all probably have different views of what a capital ship is, but having to look at the vulnerability of ships, I'm not including submarines in this because when you submerge down deeper than, I guess, the classified depth is 400 feet, but we go deeper than that, you don't worry too much about

vulnerabilities. But as far as the other ships, and I think I'm still correct, basically the larger the ship is, it's more protected. I would put a capital ship of anything over about 30,000 tons and you build a larger ship like the LHAs and like the large amphibs or carriers, that's a capital ship. And it would take a lot to sink a capital ship.

So the whole Navy shouldn't be capital ships, but you need the right number of large ships in order to fight whoever ends up being our enemy, whether it's China or eventually Russia again. Who knows? We really haven't been very good in the past of predicting who the enemy's going to be until it's too late. And I agree with your comments, if you don't start building the larger ships, it ain't going to make the war. It'll be over, and it's not going to fight very well sitting in a shipyard except it makes a good target. So that's kind of what I consider—You could kibitz about the tonnage, but it needs to be a large ship, and that's how you get your protection.

**GENERAL HOWARD:** Seth, do you want to say something?

**MR. CROSEY:** Yeah. I think that the idea of a capital ship had much more heft when the competition between navies for blue water was the most prominent form of naval competition. I would not say—I don't say that capital ships are gone, that the future is gone or anything else like that. But I think that one of the things that comes out of the changes in the world that have taken place after the Cold War clearly is diminished importance of competition between navies for blue water—For control over blue water. And I think that that has not yet had the effect on the shape and size of large ships that I expect we'll see in the future.

**GENERAL HOWARD:** Bob?

**MR. WORK:** Maybe it's in the midst of a grand transformation from what I'll call the total ship battle force, which is the way the Navy has traditionally judged itself, the number of ships in the battle force, to what I refer to as a total force battle network which

includes in national fleet scenario, Coast Guard patrol boats all the way up to 100,000 ton carriers.

In a battle network, the idea of a capital ship, as Seth said, really starts to go down. And what you have are nodes that are more valuable than others. I would think any one of the 84 Aegis VLS combatants that we have right now, I would consider being a very important node in the network. And I think the Navy made exactly the right decision in the 1990s not to go with the arsenal ship and put all of their 500 cells on six ships. They put almost 9,000 cells on 84 ships. And if you gave every one of those 84 ships the capability to go after ballistic missile interceptors, you have an extremely powerful battle network.

Your point on the—I believe that in the last two or three years, that the Navy has blamed too much of the problems on industry. That the competition strategy that the U.S. Navy has to have right now is to maintain the R&D industrial base, maintain the design base, and maintain—I mean, R&D, design and then the building base. And I believe the Navy and industry can do better, but I do believe the Navy has put too much of the burden on industry on saying, “You are the cause of the problems,” when most of the studies show that a large part of the problem is constantly changing requirements on the ships.

So as we shift to this total force battle network, it is going to these very large, 14,000 ton ships which have a lot more passive survivability but are extremely more expensive. Is that the best way to go, or is more distributed? And how do we do this to keep the industrial base hot, so if we are faced with a serious challenge, we can start to build? No answers yet, but we really need to get to that answer.

**GENERAL HOWARD:** We have time for one more quick—

**ADMIRAL WILLIAMS:** Let me add a little bit to that, and I would agree with what Bob has to say. But I think as we go to what the proper mix is, and I don't have anything to do with that now except on a minor basis, but I don't think I have a lot to do with it, but

I think it's important to keep the right number of large ships, or just what I said, to not have the vulnerabilities that a small ship has. And I agree that the right protection is a mix of smaller ships, which are LCS, and the Aegis and then you can build networks today, or the net centric warfare, really does work with that—We call it, I guess, Marine or maritime domain awareness. And that's where you get your protection, by a whole force of ships, small, submarines and Aegis, right on up the line. But eventually having had Sixth Fleet, and when I was introduced to amphibious ready groups, and I want to tell you, I wish the Marines—I guess they have some, but you want some Marine—Is having had the big helo deck carriers over there, I want to tell you, there's nothing more powerful in tomorrow's world than having a number of those ships, and I would have about the same number as I do of the carrier. What you can do with those is more than you can do with a normal carrier as far as helicopters and medical evacuations. Just all kinds of things that gives you the capability to do, what you can't do with a small ship.

So as we go into the next—Whatever the sea power strategy turns out to be—The right mix, choosing that right mix, is just as important, if not more important, than it was before.

**GENERAL HOWARD:** We're out of time. The only thing between you and a Miller Light is me. So my closing remarks will be brief, and like the General, succinct. Best quote of the day, "Spot welding can repair a ship. It wouldn't make a very good one." Think about it. If we as a nation give up our weapons procurement capabilities, if we outsource everything, what are the chances for gearing up for a major international war like World War II?

My final thing I want to say, I'd like to thank Bob Pfaltzgraff and Jacque Davis and IFPA for making this conference possible, for putting it on as they have for so many years. I know of no conference in the United States or even overseas that brings in so many high level decision makers who sit before an audience and talk very candidly about their profession and about the future. So Jacque and Bob, good for you, thank you very much. And let's thank our panel.

