

Rear Admiral Dan W. Davenport
Presentation
IFPA-Fletcher Conference

ADMIRAL DAN W. DAVENPORT: Well, good afternoon. And I'd like to also add my congratulations to the Navy for their effort to lead the development of this maritime strategy and their active pursuit of ideas and views across a full range of partners in the process to insure it leads to a meaningful and executable framework for the future. On behalf of General Smith and the Joint Forces Command, I'm pleased to be part of this discussion in the challenges facing the emerging maritime strategy.

As a global force provider, trainer, experimenter and integrator, Joint Forces Command, and especially my J9 organization, are uniquely positioned to understand and support development of the concepts that posture the maritime force to best support the Joint Force Commander. The J9 is responsible for joint concept development and experimentation. Through the collective work of the JCD&E enterprise, we find and validate solutions for the war fighter challenges identified by our customers. The combatant commander, services, OSD and the Joint Staff. Working with our partners, such as those represented on this panel, we address the most demanding problems facing the Joint Force in the near, mid and far term. We are currently involved in a number of efforts that have direct application to the development and implementation of the maritime strategy, and it's worth noting that this work is not just about technology, but also involves a complex mix of people, policy and processes and much of our effort is focused on interoperability and integration across multinational interagency, COCOM and service boundaries.

Based on the enterprise's body of work today, I'd like to provide some highlights, some insights, in three areas of particular relevance to the maritime strategy. And those are cooperative security and engagement, maritime domain awareness, and cross domain information sharing. Partnering with the U.S. European command, we are nearing

completion of a joint operating concept titled Defense Contribution to Cooperative Security and Engagement, or CSE. CSE is aimed at enhancing regional security through the integrated efforts of a broad spectrum of U.S. and international partners to prevent and mitigate crises. In an uncertain future, no single nation has the ability or resources needed to provide for the global security of any domain; air, land or sea, like the 1,000 ship navy concept that we discussed at lunch today. CSE is about partnering between governments, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and the private sector to establish shared goals for security and to counter emerging threats. The CSE concept highlights the broad effects and capabilities that will enable the geographic combatant commanders to build multilateral relationships, enhance capacity and capability of partners, and establish the mechanisms to share critical information.

It will be a key enabler to shaping countries at strategic crossroads as directed by the QDR in 2006. We expect the CSE concept to be approved this year, and soon thereafter, we will begin working to operationalize it through a series of limited objective experiments in SOUTHCOM, PACOM, EUCOM, and AFRICOM. Maritime domain awareness is a key component of our nation's active layered defense in depth. It is another important element in our ability to achieve QDR guidance to improve our ability to defend the homeland.

MDA is an area of focus within the JCD&E enterprise that brings together all stakeholders to address MDA information sharing. Stakeholders include the COCOMs, interagency, NATO and multinational partners, industry, academic institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and state and local governments. We are actively experimenting with the multinational and interagency aspects of MDA, both in our multinational experiment series and our Noble Resolve experiment series that evaluates whole government approach to homeland defense. To bring a common awareness and understanding of activities within the global maritime domain that could impact security, safety, economy, or the environment is truly a challenge. It requires effective integration and sharing of maritime situation awareness and intelligence. The information interoperability is the critical path to success.

A large portion of information vital to MDA is in open source and commercially held repositories. However, getting that information and integrating it remains one of our biggest challenges. At a recent MDA experimentation conference, an officer from one of our multinational partners held up a photo, it was actually this photo right here, and you can't see it, it's kind of fuzzy. And what it is, it's a picture of a heavy transport ship with a Russian submarine transporting it to somebody in the east. And he said to his multinational partners, "Who wants to know about this?" Think about what that question says about the current state of MDA. It brings to light a number of fundamental questions that must be answered before we can reach out for our vision for MDA. These questions include how would information like this be shared? When would it be shared? With whom, and under what circumstances and under what format?

Through experimentation, our observations on the challenges facing MDA are consistent with those included in the national MDA con ops. And three of the biggest are, first, a cultural propensity not to share. Although we are seeing progress internationally and information sharing arrangements, most are currently bilateral in nature and don't lend themselves to the global or even regional integration we need. Second, internal policy restrictions and perceived information sharing constraints. And third, limited interagency interoperability which is compounded by multiple classification systems.

As a possible fundamental premise for the new maritime strategy, MDA warrants the emphasis it's getting from DOD and interagency and international communities to insure real progress is made, to address the technology, policy, people and process challenges that face us. And the joint CD&E community and environment have much to offer in taking on these challenges.

In addition to the major experiment series I mentioned earlier, we are conducting a limited objective experiment series on sense making in the maritime domain. This series is exploring the cognitive processes and supporting capabilities required for decision making in an MDA context. We expect this effort to give us common approaches to

information sharing and decision making related to MDA. We also expect to develop a means for evaluating the organizations and systems that support MDA.

In a separate but related effort to address information sharing issues, JFCOM developed a prototype called cross-domain collaborative information environment, or CDCIE.

CDCIE provides a bidirectional, cross-domain multinational information exchange environment. That's a mouthful. [laughter] This prototype applies nonproprietary open standards to text chat and white boarding capabilities across classified, unclassified, and different nation systems. The cross-domain multi-user text chat includes language translation enabling true multinational information exchange across security domains.

Now, this discussion is not so much about the prototype, but the capability, which demonstrates that we can establish a trusted gateway between two or more networks of different security classifications to allow information sharing through numerous domains. In a number of exercises across various COCOMs, the CDCIE prototype has demonstrated the capability to permit only authorized data to transit the gateway, prevent inadvertent disclosure of information and to prohibit unauthorized users. When fully developed, this cross-domain collaboration capability could be a key enabler for multinational information sharing. It is a proven solution to reduce barriers to communication.

I'd like to close by reiterating that your joint CD&E community is charged with finding and validating solutions for the joint war fighter challenges of today and tomorrow. We look forward to contributing to the development and implementation of important bodies of work like the maritime strategy. This is crucial work for the future Joint Force. The challenges are real, the time to work on them is now and we collectively are the ones who will solve them. Thank you. [applause]

Q&A for the Entire Panel

MR. RUBEL: Thank you, General. Okay, we'll take some questions. Unless specified, I'll regard the questions for the panel as a whole. If an individual panelist does receive a

question, I'll give the rest of the panel a chance to respond if they so desire. With that, I'm looking for questions here. Phil?

AUDIENCE: To the Marine Corps, the General addressed a fundamental issue of raise, train and equip military forces and the money needed to do that. The only way I see your getting money to do what you want, and what the others want to do, is to grow the pie. What do you see happening among the services in a cooperative manner to grow the defense pie?

GENERAL NATONSKI: That's a million dollar question. I wish I had the answer. I think it's going to depend on the next administration. You know, right now we're fighting a war, and we're going to have to reset the forces before we even start thinking about modernizing and increasing our forces for the future. Those are the challenges we've got. If you look at the defense budget over time, whether we're at war or at peace, it's a sinusoidal curve, it goes up and down. And right now, we're kind of on the top end of the peak. I think it's time for this country to acknowledge that we've got challenges, as I pointed out in the beginning of my discussion, we've got some major challenges out in the world and we better address those, and we better have the means to address them in our armed forces. It really is going to depend on where we go, I think, in the future and how important this country feels the defense of this nation is going to be. I'll turn it over to any of the other panelists.

ADMIRAL SHUFORD: I'll take one hit on that. To go back to some of the things that John was talking about at lunch, I think this maritime strategy is an effort that, if it proves effective, will serve to do just that because the issue is the understanding of the folks that vote those dollars, and the Congress which apportions them. You heard John talk about the two audiences for the maritime strategy. So that's what at least the Coast Guard and the Marine Corps are doing, and the Navy is doing in that regard.

MR. RUBEL: Robbie?

AUDIENCE: A question for the General Natonski and Admiral Salerno. It's fairly obvious that this new document will serve as the strategy document for the U.S. Navy. Will this document also serve as the strategy document for the Marine Corps and for the Coast Guard?

GENERAL NATONSKI: I'll take it from the Marine Corps perspective, and yes it will. I think all three service chiefs are going to sign up to it. In fact, I want to say we were pushing it last week up to the commandant for his signature. So we're on board. Coast Guard?

ADMIRAL SALERNO: That's correct. The commandant of the Coast Guard will be one of the three service chiefs signing this document, meaning it does reflect the way forward for the Coast Guard and our national defense role. Having said that, the Coast Guard also has a separate strategy compatible with this strategy, which addresses the full range of all of our missions. Some of our missions don't necessarily fall into a defense context, for example search and rescue and environment protection, fisheries, so we have a separate strategy that covers the full spectrum of our missions. But the aspect of our internal policy that coincides with the maritime strategy discussed here is very consistent, they're on the same page.

MR. RUBEL: Yes, sir?

AUDIENCE: Commander Brink Lavonne, I'm with the Joint Staff. This question is for Mr. Carmel. Sir, where do you see your greatest risk to your industry in context of this forum?

MR. CARMEL: Probably one I kind of alluded to during my comments, are ill conceived security measures that end up putting a chink in the supply chain, stopping it. For instance, the requirement that you heard about this morning for 100 percent scanning of containers overseas. If that's done wrong, that will be catastrophically bad, and I got to emphasize if that's done wrong. We don't know how it's going to be done, but until we

see the details of that, it's certainly something that is a concern for a whole host of reasons. First and foremost, there are about 30,000 containers a day that come into the United States and how that's going to get handled is hard to say.

As you heard this morning, though, that's only about half of the containers that actually enter every day. Certainly, if the supply chain is disrupted for finished goods, it'll have a big impact on things like inflation. You can build buffer stocks to deal with disruptions in the supply chain because of security measures for finished goods, but costs will go up, inflation will go up and that will be asymmetric inflation. It will hit people like Wal-Mart and the folks that shop there harder than it's going to hit people that shop at Saks 5th Avenue.

And lastly, as I mentioned, a lot of trade nowadays is not in finished goods, ready for retail. I think someone said underwear from China. In fact, a lot of trade nowadays is intermediate goods. It's components designed for a production process. And to the extent that component level stuff designed for production processes gets impacted by this, that supply chain has no tolerance and will not accept buffer stocks and things like that to develop, they'll just go someplace else. So the giant sucking sound that Ross Perot once talked about of industry fleeing the United States will just get a lot louder as it gets harder to do business here. So those are the kinds of things I think I worry about on one level.

And second, you know, the way I started my remarks, I worry a little bit about while we have good engagement at the very senior levels, Admiral Morgan, very big thinker and I like the way he thinks. I think he understands, I know he understands what we can bring. On a tactical level, day to day discussion, it's not so comfortable. We get talked about as an object rather than a participant. And any time you're the object rather than a participant, you know, how you end up in the whole thing, little nerve-wracking.

MR. RUBEL: Yes, sir?

AUDIENCE: Eric Kulisch, *American Shipper* magazine, also for Mr. Carmel. I guess you're talking about being maybe the eyes and ears for the military out there. But Dr. Flynn talked this morning about the willingness to share information, and I know with customs and border protection, with the stowage plans and things like that, that there's information sharing talked about and also with the Coast Guard. But is there a—Can you explain to what extent some of the day to day commercial shipping transaction data that the maritime industry or the shipping lines are willing to share to aid in this maritime domain awareness? And also, when you're talking about a wiliness to assist, are you talking about Maersk per se or the world liner or the world shipping industry overall?

MR. CARMEL: Let me address the first question last. Actually, it's on two levels. Certainly, the U.S. business, the one I represent and control, that we are absolutely ready to get engaged, and we are, in fact. In fact, yesterday the Coast Guard approached us about helping them test some sort of scanning technology looking for bubbles that have been placed on the exterior of hulls, and we're certainly happy to help stuff like that. So from the U.S. perspective, we absolutely are ready to participate. But it does extend beyond that. Admiral Metcalf was just out a couple of weeks ago talking to my counterparts in Singapore and they also ordered up and said, "Sure, we're ready to help. We need to know what you want us to do, when we see the details." But on the surface of things, we certainly want to participate.

I think that's a key issue there, what do you want us to do? I get back to my differing world view issue. You can't just come to us and say, "What can you do for us?" mainly because our world view is so different than yours. So what we want to know is what we can do for you? And I say that all the time. That said, there's not a lot that we don't already share, especially in the liner business, the container liner business, our skirts are pretty wide open already. Boy, there's not too much that isn't shared one way or another now. Like I said, in the tramp business, that's a little bit different. But still, we share pretty much anything, especially with the government, anything we're asked to. We can be the eyes and ears, some of the proposals that we've talked about that the Lockheed Martin technology is designed to capture AIS and radar data that we see out there and

transmit it back. We have to be careful, we are not an overt intelligence gathering activity and we can't seem to be such or we're going to end up triggering port state control problems all over the world.

But passive intelligence or passive data gathering we certainly can do, and that's one of them. So we transmit the AIS tags in the radar information attached to it which helps paint the picture and it gives visibility into contacts that don't have AIS attached to them. So there's a number of things we'd be willing to do, I'd say the list of things that we won't do is pretty short. And in fact, right now, I would be hard pressed to have somebody come to me and say, "Here's some data that we want that you won't give to us," because we share everything there is to share right now.

MR. RUBEL: In the back?

AUDIENCE: Jatin Bains with Channel Logistics. This is again for Mr. Carmel. We recognize that the data ship industry is about 15 percent of the global tonnage, and the non-container industry is about 85 percent. And out of the 85 percent, about 40 percent are general cargo ships. So the thoughts that you had just put forward on all these initiatives and data sharing, etc., I'm sure they come from the container ship perspective. Do you have any thoughts on what are the prevailing thoughts on the non-containerized shipping industry?

MR. CARMEL: You're absolutely right, and the big reason for that, for whatever reason, is that the world is fixated on container ships. I don't think anyone ever talks about a WMD coming in underneath a couple thousand tons of oils on a tanker. It's always inside a container, and so the world seems to be fixated on that right now.

However, you're right in that's a relatively small portion of the world, although in honesty, the vast majority by value of stuff moving across the ocean surface is moving in containers, so the rest of it's high volume, high weight, low value stuff. But I think the same general comments apply. It doesn't matter what kind of ship it is, if it's a container

ship or a bulker or a tanker, you know, the eyes and ears part of it, our ability to be present and to just relay back what we see is independent of what kind of ship we are. And in fact, a lot of the areas that we work in, in places like Africa, it's less the container fleet and more the tanker fleet and folks like that. So those ships can be a big part of it and should be a big part of it, from the fleet I control anyway, will be a big part of it if we're asked.

MR. RUBEL: Right down here?

AUDIENCE: Allen Deem. General, thank you very much for taking the national, or it's going to be the Navy and maritime strategy and reducing it down to what does it mean of the people in the Marine Corps, that's wonderful to hear. I was wondering from Admiral Shuford if you could do the same for Navy. Does this new strategy imply any new skills or competencies for Navy people? And if so, what's the Navy's PME plan for the road ahead?

ADMIRAL SHUFORD: Those are the three pages that I skipped in my remarks. [laughter] You don't want me to open that at 3:45. No, the implications for developing regional expertise, cultural awareness, languages, all those things, have huge implications and they're already being incorporated into the educational continuum. The key piece in terms of the headquarters that I was talking about, the ability to concert aggregate forces and to work with diverse set of political constituencies, NGOs, all that whole range of folks that have to be involved in a whole range of theater objectives, for example, not just conflict but humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, those sorts of missions. What happened in Pakistan, the tsunami, there's just no playbook for it and you can't train to it. All of our services are oriented, have huge systems for training and extraordinary amount of resources falling into training, something that we can measure, we can understand the demand for clearly, see the output, input and output algorithms, we all appreciate. But it's not quite the same thing for the sorts of skills, competencies, genius, the expertise that you were talking about associate with operating at the global posture like the general talked about, the security cooperation MAGTF, to understand how that is applied, what

sort of effects you would expect to be able to plan for, assess. They do, those sorts of things do require different skill sets and they're not things that are delivered in a cookbook that you can formulate and pass out to folks in boot camp. It's part of an education process, yeah.

MR. RUBEL: I think we've hit the end of our allotted time. I don't know that I see any more questions out there. One more?

AUDIENCE: Commander Pat Burns. I'd like to end with a really hard question. You want to increase the size of the Marine Corps, or you are increasing the size of the Marine Corps. You want to stabilize the size of the Navy around 322,000. The Marine Corps wants 30 ships of lift capability, the Navy wants 313 ships. Sea basing still on the table, you're going to have recapitalize after the war. You have an aging Navy air wing. It seems like the perfect storm, and now you have a new maritime strategy. My question is, should the perfect storm happen and you're facing possible budget cuts, as you're on top of that sinusoidal curve that the General talked about. What is the contingency plan, Plan B, or the plan for the worst case scenario?

[laughter]

MR. RUBEL: Notice the silence.

GENERAL NATONSKI: You know, in this country we've always stepped up to the plate. I mean, I think our readiness on the eve of Pearl Harbor wasn't there, and yet we stepped into high gear and we fought World War II and we won it. I would think in the future the threats are that much greater, especially the nuclear threat. But I have no doubt that this country would rally and do what it had to do and spend what it had to do to get where we're going. My concern is we don't drop back because we're pulling Navy out of the Middle East and think we're going to recoup all of these defense dollars for social programs. You can have all the social programs in the world, but if you don't have a country left after you're attacked, what good are they? So I think we have to make a

commitment, and as the Admiral pointed out, this maritime strategy will hopefully socialize to both Congress and the people of this country, that we do need a strong defense.

You know, the al-Qaeda have a website. If you ever look on their website, they have a plan and they're patient. You know, we want instant gratification. We want the war over today. This is a long war. Their philosophy is they're going to kick us out of the Middle East, they're going to overthrow all those secular Arab countries, they're going to eradicate Israel and they're going to spread their caliphate and that's their stated strategy and that's what they want to do. And we've got to be in it for the long term and I think it's up to us to get the message out.

MR. RUBEL: Anybody else want to handle it?

ADMIRAL SHUFORD: No, very well said. You can't end on a better note than that, Barney.

MR. RUBEL: I would add some emphasis in our conversations with the country and with friends around the world, I don't recall anybody not wanting the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps and even the Coast Guard out there present in various parts of the world for various reasons. But they want us out there. We did have an option that called for bringing everybody home. I mean, we had to consider all options. That might have been a cheaper option, but there was no support anywhere for that kind of thing, either within the Navy or in the country as a whole. So adding weight to the General's remarks, I think the country expects that of us and will do what's right when the time comes.

Okay folks, I'd just also like to say that I think the composition of this panel reflects generally what happened in the maritime strategy development process. Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard worked as equal partners in it all the way. We had the joint world in on it, the commercial shipping and other commercial private sector inputs were there throughout. So I think you can have some confidence that—I know concern was

expressed that the interagency be consulted, that the private sector be consulted. Believe me, it was all in there.

In any case, I thought this was a stimulating panel. I'm very grateful for the comments of the panelists. Let's give them a hand and we're up for a break. [applause]