

# Welcoming Remarks & Panel One

## WELCOMING REMARKS

**Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.**, President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

## PANEL MEMBERS

**Chair: Mr. John McWethy**, Chief National Security and Pentagon Correspondent, Washington Bureau, ABC News

**The Honorable Avis T. Bohlen**, Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Arms Control

**The Honorable Douglas Feith**, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

**The Honorable James Inhofe (R-OK)** Senate Armed Services Committee

**Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III**, Chairman, National Commission on Terrorism

## VIDEO

This is the emerging security environment the United States and its allies face today. So is this and this. So, how can we best plan, respond and ultimately overcome these diverse threats? The 2011 Fletcher Conference will cut to the core of these challenges. We'll face clever adaptive adversaries. People will take stock of our successes as well as our failures and they'll continue to seek and exploit our perceived weaknesses. I believe that they'll use asymmetric warfare to thwart or to sap our will.

For 31 years the Fletcher Conference has convened the nation's most renowned thinkers and influential decision makers in a two-day discussion of national security issues. This year our participants will examine, debate, and advance better ways to focus our national power on the full range of security challenges confronting America in the new century. The more likely threats to our national interest will come from regional conflicts due to ethnic, religious or cultural differences or from terrorists. Within today's security environment the United States stands as the world's sole superpower with critical instruments to alter the effects of widespread disorder, diplomatic, economic, and military power.

Panel one will explore the opportunities and limitations of each followed by candid and diverse viewpoints about new ways to synchronize these instruments. The power of our military is the foundation of our national security. And in response to changing world conditions, our armed forces are currently undergoing the most significant

transformation in over 100 years. Their goal is full spectrum dominance in any mission from peace keeping to war. But while few would argue that they are the best prepared of all government agencies for crisis response, many would debate when and how they should be best employed. Complexity, I think, will be the order of the day. As a diversity of the threats and nonstate actors increases, so will the complexity of military tasks.

Panel two will scrutinize this sensitive issue by exploring a host of related topics. The essential nature of decisive force, readiness and modernization, countering a threat of ballistic missiles and the future of military operations in space. The panel will contrast the use of military power in an era where both challenges and opportunities range from high intensity conflict to ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction to peacekeeping operations. And they'll examine how our overseas presence advances our global interests.

Panel three will be a discussion of today's most prominent security challenge, homeland security and counter-terrorism. We'll examine the threat of terrorism in America, transnational threats, homeland security, and the role of the military to contribute to the ongoing campaign to end global terrorism. Still, the military alone can't guarantee favorable and enduring outcomes to the complex challenges of today's security environment. The once discreet instruments of power; diplomatic, military, economic, and cultural must merge seamlessly to produce a comprehensive security strategy or to respond to a crisis. But how?

Panel four is a frank discussion of ways to harness the individual capabilities of our various federal agencies and leverage them to a far greater effect when needed. The United States with its allies, therefore, must make certain that it has the right forces, that it has the right combinations of allies and coalitions and that it has the will to make certain that large scale conflict does not break out in places of global significance. In virtually all contemplated scenarios, the United States will not or cannot act alone to mitigate a threat unilaterally. Thus,

Panel five will take synchronization to the next level achieving a unity of effort between us, our allies, coalitions and international organizations. How do we achieve a military unity of effort, for instance, when the national self-interests of our allies differ from ours? How will the current technology mismatch effect coalition operations? How can operational diplomacy among allies be used more effectively to achieve a common cause? And, like the cold war system, the globalization system has its own rules, logic, pressures, incentives and moving parts that will and do affect everyone's company, country, community and, I might say, armed forces. For two days a coalition of national leaders will examine and advance ways to better focus our national power on the full range of security challenges confronting America in the new century. The Fletcher Conference, November 14 and 15, 2001, Washington.

**SPEAKER**

Ladies and gentlemen, please welcome Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., President, Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis. (Applause).

**PFALTZGRAFF**

Ladies and gentlemen, after that beautiful opening video, what is there to say? That was well done and it gives a wonderful overview of what we plan to do here during the next two days. This conference is the latest in a long series that the Institute

for Foreign Policy Analysis has organized with the International Security Studies Program of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Each of these conferences, held in Washington D.C. or in Cambridge, Massachusetts, has been organized with one of the military services and other official co-sponsorship. Since 1995, we have had the support of the United States Army and the Chief of Staff for five of these conferences. And in earlier years the army was several times our cosponsor.

So, we have a long history of working with the United States Army in these conferences. But we've also worked with the other services; the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps to organize meetings of this kind. This year, again, we are delighted to be able work with the United States Army and its senior leadership and also to have the co- Sponsorship, as in previous years, of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment. Incidentally, this year, 2001, is especially important to us at the Institute and at the Fletcher school because it marks IFPA's 25th anniversary and the 30th anniversary of the Fletcher School's International Security Studies Program. The theme of this conference, as you've just seen in the video, is National Security for a New Era, Focusing National Power.

This theme was developed many months ago before the tragic events of September 11 which, of course, have given new meaning to the focusing of national power to provide national security in a new era. In fact, some of the rooms in the Pentagon in which I met with our army cosponsors in July and August cannot yet again be used as a result of the terrorist attack. Although the essential theme and most of the issues to be discussed here over the next two days were developed before September 11, we have, of course, adapted our agenda to reflect the implications of the terrorist attack in our discussions as fully as possible. Although we originally framed this conference around the synchronization of all of the elements of national power, the need to achieve unprecedented unity of effort has become all too vividly apparent. At the same time, in designing this conference, we sought originally to provide a timely forum to discuss the new Quadrennial Defense Review, as well as the other recently completed or ongoing national security strategy reviews and studies. Therefore, we envisaged this conference as being especially appropriate in this setting at this time even without what came upon us on 9-11.

We have, therefore, structured the agenda to include first a discussion of the security vision and priorities for a new era - that is our opening panel this morning - followed by a consideration of the relationship between the political, the military, and the economic instruments of power. We provide an opportunity in this afternoon's sessions to survey the spectrum of military capabilities that will be required in this new security setting, followed by an examination of the principle facets of homeland security and counter terrorism. In tomorrow's sessions we will turn to an assessment of the key organizational issues that need to be addressed if we are to assure the most effective utilization of the instruments of national power. Last, but not least, there are important issues associated with the requirements for unity of effort in alliances, coalitions and other forms of international cooperation. As in all of the other panels, the Alliance Coalition dimension has been brought into sharper focus in recent weeks. Unity of effort means utilization of necessary national capabilities, but it also encompasses how the United States works with others and mobilizes support among countries sharing common interests with us.

For each of these panels we have set forth a list of issues, many of which we hope will be included in the presentations and discussions. We have assembled an outstanding group of speakers. In doing so, we have sought to bring together a mix from the present Administration and from previous Administrations. We have attempted, to the extent possible, to bring together a distinguished group of civilian and military panel members and to include Congressional and international perspectives as well. This is the largest of the conferences we have ever held. All of us who have worked on this conference, and there have been many of us, have labored, of course, in the shadow of the unfolding events of recent weeks. That we are even able to be here at this time is in itself something for which we are grateful. So, therefore, at the outset, I would like to express my thanks to the senior leadership of the United States Army and, in particular, to General Shinseki, its Chief of Staff, for their enduring support and unwavering determination to press forward in the midst of all that has taken place over the past two months. As a result, we have a unique forum in which to discuss the most important national security issues of the early 21st Century and, hopefully, to contribute to the development of strategies, capabilities, and organizational frameworks that will advance our interests and values.

From this conference we will be preparing and publishing a major report, together with other outputs, in order to give broader dissemination to its proceedings. We are also able to provide immediate video streaming of the conference as well as CD ROMs, thus expanding greatly its outreach and, hopefully, its impact. Although time is limited, of course, and we have many presentations, I hope that as many of you as possible will be able to take part in our discussions. So, on behalf of the organizers and the cosponsors, I welcome you to what promises to be a period of two days of important, informed, and timely discussions.

So again, really a wonderful warm welcome to you. I have now a couple of administrative announcements that I need to make. One is that I would reiterate that we should make sure that our cell phones, our pagers, are turned off or on vibrate. Also, I've been asked to announce that there is coffee available outside. And, if you have any problems getting around this complex building, there are many staff people - you'll see the badges - they are prepared to assist you and make sure that you don't get lost in this wonderful but very complex building. And now, I have the opportunity to welcome the members of our first panel, which will be chaired by John McWethy, who is a familiar face and voice to many of you because, as you know, he is the Pentagon correspondent of ABC News. So, we now turn to the opening session of our conference. And again, welcome to everybody. (Applause)

**VIDEO** September 11th, 2001. The day that changed the way we see our world. Once, we suspected that our adversaries might attack on any front. Now, we believe it. But why, where, and when next?

**WHITE** We live in a world that we do not fully understand, where we are continually surprised. We live in a world that we don't even have a name for.

**LUTE** The standard way we have of looking at the world on the basis of interests, capacities and threats, don't serve us very well.

**THOMPSON** I think if we've learned one thing since September 11th, it's that our concept of what war looked like in the future was missing some details.

**FINEL** We have to be thinking about clever competitors, competitors who understand their strengths, who understand our weaknesses, and who are going to be willing to try to take advantage of them.

**COHEN** I think we're just going to be in a very different environment where the objectives will be shifting, where engagements will be open-ended, where the kinds of means that we'll have to be used to using will be extremely unorthodox.

**ZINNI** It's going to involve all sorts of dimensions of our national power that we really haven't focused on much in the past.

**GERGEN** In warfare, information is extraordinarily important. How you manage information can be as important as how you manage the bombing runs. And you need to do both with great, great care.

**SHANKER** I mean, this is a kind of warfare that America has never fought before. It's not a front line; it's not trenches. It's hundreds of front lines, or it's no front lines.

**VIDEO** America's leaders are struggling to bring this kaleidoscope of change into focus, as they shape a new security vision.

**McCAFFREY** Now see, they're trying to see at the edge of technology, trying to understand the changing dynamics in the international arena, trying to think through what are the needs of the American people and security in the coming decade.

**NARRATOR** But, how do we focus our instruments of national power - diplomatic, military, economic or information - when we can barely see the future? How do we plan for and employ all instruments of national power to achieve a comprehensive vision of national security? What is that vision? And where do the American people fit in?

**NYE** The silver lining, if you can call it that, of September 11th was that out of this tragedy we rediscovered a sense of community. There is a great deal of social capital in the United States. The interesting question is how do you build on it.

**NARRATOR** How can our government nurture this resource and how deeply rooted is it? Will Americans now support prolonged conflict? Will they accept casualties in the name of homeland defense?

**BROWN** There are certain times in our history, after Pearl Harbor was one, I believe after September 11th will be another, in which the public has so strikingly experienced the realities of the risks of this world we face. But they line up behind the military to pursue a dramatic solution.

**NARRATOR** As we embrace this new reality of risks, our security vision must expand and reflect an understanding of both the opportunities and challenges for American national power. (VIDEO ENDS)

**McWETHY** Good morning. I'm John McWethy. I'm going to introduce our panel members. I'd like them to come out now. Senator James Inhofe. Bring him on out. Thank you. Doug Feith. And, I'm going to introduce each of them in detail before they speak. Avis Bohlen from the State Department and Paul Bremer. We're going to talk about the institutions of national power today. Hopefully -- go ahead and sit down, guys.

Hopefully, we will explore how these institutions should work together to better American security. Hopefully, we will also be willing to discuss how the institutions in the past have sometimes worked against the best interests of the country. Budget battles, turf fights, vested interests. Hopefully we willing to discuss how sometimes the military service's reluctance to give up some of their traditional ways of thinking need to change. Sometimes Congress's refusal to do things like shut down bases stands in the way of improving national security. And, how sometimes tensions between institutions like law enforcement and intelligence sometimes stand in the way, sometimes blind the government in its ability to fight things like terrorism. Are the institutions of government capable of out of the box thinking? Hopefully, our panel members will address that.

Clearly September 11th is driving the nation in new directions, but the question we should ask every day is, "Are these the right directions?" What level of risk is the United States willing to take to protect our freedoms and what freedoms are we willing to risk in order to better protect the nation? And finally, what are America's responsibilities in the world to lead; to intervene, when; to expend national treasure for purely humanitarian reasons; to nation build; and what are our responsibilities sometimes to say, "No", when all of these calls go out? What responsibilities do we all have in trying to answer the question that I have been asked so many times, and I'm sure you have, too Why do they hate us so much and with such passion? What do we, as a nation, do about it, think about it, and reflect about it as part of our response to September 11th.

Our first presentation this morning is going to be from Senator James Inhofe, who was first elected to the Senate in 1994. He is a member of the Senate Arms Services Committee and the Intelligence Committee. On the Armed Services Committee he has been the Chairman and the Ranking -- and is now the Ranking Member on the Subcommittee on Military Readiness. He believes that overseas military missions should serve vital national interests and is one of the Senate's primary advocates for a national missile defense system. He has had a long career of public service, dating all the way back to the Oklahoma State House. He was the mayor of Tulsa. He is the only member of the U.S. Congress to fly an airplane around the world when he recreated the Wiley Post trip around the globe. And, despite the fact he is dressed in the uniform of the Senate, he is wearing cowboy boots this morning. Senator? (Applause)

**INHOFE** Thank you very much. I appreciate being invited here to the Fletcher conference. And, I believe the topic you have chosen this year is very, very appropriate in light of what happened on September 11th. And, what I would like to do is share the Congressional perspective on this new era. I'm quick to say that my Congressional perspec-

tive isn't necessarily shared by all members of Congress. We'll cover four actions that I believe Congress must take, and they are on the chart in front of us at this time.

First, Congress must set new spending priorities and provide the resources needed to bolster our national security. Congress has got to be willing to make the sacrifices to provide for our common defense. It is difficult for any free people to focus on national security at a time of peace and prosperity, which was true in America before September the 11th. In T.R. Fehrenbach's book, "This Kind of War", he says, "But the abiding weakness of the free people is that their governments cannot or will not make them prepare or sacrifice before they are aroused." Well, ladies and gentlemen, on September the 11th, we were aroused. And we've had administrations and currently have members of Congress who honestly believe in their hearts - they won't tell you this - but they believe if all nations with stand in the circle and hold hands and unilaterally disarm, that all the threats will go away. I like it the way that Phil Graham says it. He says, "We all lust for the day when the lion and the lamb will lie down together, but when that happens I want to be the lion."

As I said, the American people are aroused. They are focused on the subject of national defense and they're asking the question, much as they did after Pearl Harbor, of "Why weren't we better prepared?" And, let me illustrate with some charts to show our lack of commitment to the national security in the past. First of all, in this chart it goes back to the percentage of GDP we as a nation have spent on defense over the last 60 years. You notice prior to World War II that we were not even thinking about security. We thought we had security. And, notice what happened right after Pearl Harbor; again, pre Korea and post Korea.

Finally, notice the trend in the GDP spending. During the Clinton Administration it reached the lowest point since 1940. I think that I mentioned that one quote that I want to mention another one of a famous Oklahoman. He said, "If you want to know when a war is coming", this is Will Rogers, one of my great heroes in Oklahoma. "If you want to know when a war is coming, just watch the United States and see when it starts cutting down on its defenses. It is the surest barometer in the world."

The next two charts I have a hard time making people believe this, but watch it carefully and take these charts, because they are in your packet, and study them because it's true; during the period of time since 1993 total defense spending amounted to \$476 billion below the rate of inflation. In other words, go back to 1993, put the figure down there, take -- just apply the cost of living increase, and at the end of this period of time it is 476 billion below. During that same period of time, using the same model, the total spending on labor, HHS, and education amounted to \$286 billion above the rate of inflation. And, I hope we get some questions about this during question and answer time. I've seen the results of this decreasing funding offhand. I spent for five years, back when Republicans were important, I was the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Readiness. I traveled around to virtually all the installations and I saw what was happening to our deteriorating ability to defend America. I can remember going seeing the substandard military housing. I was at Fort Bragg during a rainstorm when our troops were actually covering up their equipment to keep them dry. I've seen the substandard maintenance facilities they have to work in, the decreased training time. They are allocated in a simulated exercise that they use as a substitute for light fire. And, it shows that in every area except our troops'

unwavering devotion to duty and country, it has deteriorated. And, thank God they haven't because now we're expecting them to defend us in a war.

So, the first thing we've got to do in Congress is to be willing to sacrifice a little and put the necessary resources into the defense of our country. And, the question is can we do it. The answer is a resounding yes. You know, what is proposed right now in defense spending increase by the Administration as they're making that adjustment after September 11th, is still about an 11 percent increase over the previous year. And this is a time when we have \$153 billion in surplus. Now, let's go back 20 years and look during the Reagan Administration when we were faced with a similar situation. At that time we had \$128 billion deficit, and yet, the President was able to accomplish in fiscal year 1982 a 20 percent increase over the previous year.

Secondly, Congress must reexamine the national security establishment with a critical eye as to how agencies and departments interact. Today's threat now more than ever requires a focused, integrated, comprehensive approach to national security. On September 20th the President said, "We will direct every resource at our command, every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law, every financial influence, every necessary weapon of war to the disruption and defeat of global terror networks." And, this is exactly the right approach. Focus all of our resources. Congress should look seriously at the National Security Act of 1947 with an eye to updating it. This Act unified the defense establishment for the first time. This is when the NSC and the CIA came along. The organizations established a framework for the interagency process that still works today. But that was 1947, after we had learned the lessons of not having an integrated system.

New threats of today present challenges that our interagency structure doesn't adequately deal with. There is no longer a clear distinction between foreign and domestic matters, between peace and war, between law enforcement and national security. The terrorists who recently attacked America operate around the world, both in and outside of the United States. The INS, Border Patrol, CIA, FBI, Coast Guard, National Guard, states and the cities and local governments must all work together to fight the future threat. So, this is a unified approach. We must establish a type of interagency structure that allows us to fight these groups as one United States of America, not 13 separate intelligence agencies, not four armed services, 14 departments in 50 states; a unified approach. And, it may be time for a National Security Act of 2002.

Third, Congress must reexamine the intelligence community in particular and help change the culture that does not share information adequately. Our intelligence community actually does a reasonable job, but still their budget is tied to the defense budget and so they have suffered proportionately with the military. We must carefully examine, as we did after Pearl Harbor, what we knew about September 11th, who knew it, who shared it and who did they share it with, and what actions were taken and not taken, and, most importantly, how do we fix it. We don't have to wait for an analysis to take some action today. We're talking about the intelligence now. First, we have known for some time that the -- we are critically short of linguists and analysts that take this unconscionable amount of information and pour it into some type of actionable intelligence. And we can fix this now. Secondly, we need to force agencies to talk to each other. Isn't that absurd? You know, we now put language into the Defense Bill that forces them to do that. So we've already fixed that one. Third, we need to

make sure that computer systems can talk to each other between agencies. Today they can't. Fourth, we must stop the turf battles and establish a common intelligence picture. Finally, we need to reexamine who needs to know and share the information with them. I know the Administration is working diligently to bring these 13 separate agencies together in this common effort, again a unified approach. And, I think they are meeting with some success. However, these administrative efforts alone cannot change the culture that exists within these organizations. Simple things like the spelling of Arabic terrorists names are different from agency to agency. How do you know who they're talking about? We have some of the best technology in the world, but what good is it if the people who need the information can't get it?

My fourth category, I believe, is the most significant, and that is that Congress must support transformation of the military, but guard against taking unnecessary risks in the present capability. As we transform our military to face the challenges of the new era, much of what has been said applies here also. One of the key elements of transformation must be a further move towards jointness, jointness not in just how we fight, but in how we equip our forces. We must provide the CINCS with an array of tools. They must have ground forces, air forces, naval forces with different capabilities that can be applied to different nations. It reminds me of the quote by Abraham Mostel. He said, "When the only tool you have in your toolbox is a hammer, all of the problems start looking like nails." But, as you transform, keep a few things in mind. First, we are focused on terrorists today, but they may not be the threat of the future. As you transform don't lose sight of our core competencies that have served us so well. Just a year ago before our Committee we had testimony that the aircraft carrier was obsolete. And yet, every time we had one of these conflicts, we seemed to find a new need for them. They're not only launching aircraft to attack the Taliban, but they are operating as a base for Special Ops today. Likewise, we have had them say, "We'll never fight a ground war again." Well, we are fighting a ground war right now. And, they say we should transfer our army into a peacekeeping corp. And that's ridiculous. You know, we are needing our ground forces. I hate to think where we'll need them next, but we will.

So, my advice is simple: Make sure we don't sacrifice today's capabilities to become enamored with tomorrow's technology. Make sure you maintain your joint approach, do your requirements in warfighting and make sure you tell Congress what you need in spite of what the Administration might suggest that you tell them. There are those who will constantly raise the question of costs but we can't afford to allow our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines to fight with inferior equipment as they are today. We've got to buy systems like the F-22 because the F-15 and the F-16 are no longer the very best out there. We've got to buy a system like the Crusader, because the Paladin that we're using today is not as good as four other nations are making and are on the battlefield today in terms of rapid fire and in terms of range. We have to have the very best and we have to show -- get our uniformed men and women better and the more modern equipment than our potential adversaries because they don't have that today, and that will mean more money.

Finally, as we transform we must make missile defense the top priority. We must not give the future Saddam Hussein the ultimate terrorist weapon, a missile with a nuclear warhead. I often remember seeing on TV on September 11th that awful skyline of New York City, that beautiful city, and with those buildings crumbling

down. And, I thought, you know, if they had that ultimate weapon, a missile with a nuclear warhead, we would be looking at nothing but a piece of charcoal. We wouldn't be talking about 5,000 or 6,000 people. We would be talking about a million people. There are nearly 30 nations that either have or are attempting to acquire ballistic missiles today. Some of these countries can reach the United States and we have no defense against the ICBM. We're naked. And, some of these countries are trading technology and, perhaps, even systems with countries like Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, North Korea and I don't want a Saddam Hussein to say, "If you go after Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan we'll launch a nuclear missile at the United States." Let's remember what Saddam Hussein said after the Persian Gulf War. He said if we had waited for ten years to go after Kuwait, march on Kuwait, the Americans would not have been there because we'd have a missile that would be able to stop them from doing it. And here it is, ten years later today.

And, so we have asked in the Senate Armed Services Committee just who is crazy enough to assure his own destruction by doing something like deploying a missile against the United States. Well, after September the 11th, we know. The missile threat is real. I do not believe our intelligence is reliable enough to accurately predict how close some of these nations are to deploying these systems. I remember the National Intelligence Estimate of December 1995 stated that Korea, North Korea, would not be able to develop a missile that would threaten the lower 48 states for at least 15 years. Then, on August 30, 1998, they fired a three-stage *Taepo-Dong* missile.

So, in summary, I'd say first, in this new era of national security, Congress must renew its efforts to make national security our number one job because it hasn't been before. Second, we must set new spending priorities to provide the resources needed. We must re-look at the organization and the structure of our present system. Third, we must take action to strengthen the intelligence community and the cooperation so desperately needed among between and among members of that community. And, finally, we must continue to support the transformation of our military without taking unnecessary risks to our present capabilities and develop a strong missile defense system. And I once again thank you for allowing me to come here today and talk about what I consider to be the most important subject in America today. (Applause)

McWETHY

Our next Speaker is Doug Feith. He is Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. He has this broad array of responsibilities that make his presentation especially interesting. Responsibilities include the formulation of defense planning guidance and force policy, Department of Defense relations with foreign countries, and the Department's role in the U.S. government interagency process. He spent 15 years pulling together a law firm that has his name on it. And prior to that, he was also in government, a protégé of Richard Pearl. This is the guy who you can see bleary-eyed coming back from Andrews Air Force base after shuttling back and forth between Washington and Moscow. Whatever agreements or understandings President Bush and President Putin come to, they have Doug Feith's fingerprints all over them. Doug?

FEITH

Thank you, John. Professor Pfaltzgraff, General Shinseki, other members of the U.S. Armed Forces and ladies and gentlemen. When the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were attacked on September 11th, the speculative world of defense planning changed instantly into the high speed here and now, no time for theory world

of military operations. Just days before September 11th, the Defense Department completed a major reassessment of U.S. defense strategy, known as the Quadrennial Defense Review. And, in light of current events, in light of the war on terrorism, I'd like to recall a few key thoughts from the Quadrennial Defense Review, which was prepared under the direction of Secretary Rumsfeld in the six months or so preceding the war.

The first key thought is that planning should recognize that even with the best intelligence and the most careful analysis, we cannot avoid surprises. We have to take to heart Samuel Goldwin's observation that it's difficult to make forecasts especially about the future. In our planning we should prepare to handle the inevitable surprises. Now, this may seem like an obvious point, but much national security policy over the years has been based on the crucial, if not admitted openly, assumption that we can, for example, create and preserve strategic stability through arms control or otherwise know and control the future. The Quadrennial Defense Review exhorted everyone in the Pentagon to expect to be surprised, which, of course we all duly were on September 11th.

A second key thought of the Review was that we need the ability to take military action quickly anywhere in the world. We need forces that are lighter, capable of being moved quickly and easily; forces that are highly effective, that is, lethal, even in relatively small-scale deployments. The Review recognized that we won't necessarily be able to count in the future on having six months, as we did during Desert Shield in 1990, to flow around a half a million troops into a single theater. It recognized that we may have to fight more quickly with fewer and lighter units in multiple locations simultaneously.

The third key thought of the Review related to forward basing. The Review recognized that it is valuable for the United States, it is an important strategic asset of the United States, to have access to bases abroad. It also recognized the likely circumstance that we would find ourselves having to operate without bases where we need them. Both points are important. That's why the review stressed the importance of long-range precision strike capabilities.

Now, since the September 11 attack and since the start of the war on terrorism, we can note a few additional points about the role of the U.S. military. First, the importance of homeland security. The Quadrennial Defense Review noted that this is going to be an important function in the national security field. It flagged the issue of what we've referred to as emerging threats, terrorist threats, to the United States and the responsibility that the Defense Department is going to have in territorial security. Nevertheless, no one I think anticipated the -- how large, how complex and how difficult the territorial security responsibilities of the Defense Department were going to become as a result of the September 11 attack. We are just now defining the appropriate military roles. And we, I think, should not assume that the Department's role in this area is a temporary condition. On the contrary, the challenges of territorial security are going to be with us for the long term.

Second, as we see quite vividly from this morning's news and the news in recent days from Afghanistan, our armed forces are learning innovative ways of working with local forces to achieve important results. These are lessons that have implications for how we organize our forces and develop our capabilities and plan operations. We

are thinking about the best ways to take advantage of our comparative advantages and in working with local forces to change the picture on the ground. This is also a reality that is going to shape the way we deal in peace time with friends and allies abroad, and lay the basis for cooperation in war through our peacetime security cooperation policies.

Third, I want to focus specifically on an aspect of the war on terrorism, and that is the recognition that terrorist organizations, if they are to do large-scale harm over a sustained period, require a territorial base for their operations. This is why you have heard Secretary Rumsfeld and the President and other Administration officials stress so heavily the importance of state support for terrorism. If we are going to succeed in the war on terrorism, we have to fight terrorism at the wholesale level. There are simply too many terrorist organizations and cells for us to be chasing after each individually. We need a territorial approach, we need to recognize the importance that state support contributes to the operations of terrorist organizations. And, we have to see to it that other governments deny terrorists the territory from which to operate. That means that some may have to be compelled, some may have to be persuaded.

Eliminating the territorial base and state support for terrorism will also help us address the problem that was highlighted by Senator Inhofe, which is the nexus of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. I mean, it is remarkable the list of countries that support terrorism and the list of countries that are pursuing nuclear, chemical, biological, weapons and missiles are remarkably coincident. Now, as you've heard and as you saw in the film that preceded this panel, the Administration has been stressing that the war on terrorism will draw on all of the instruments of U.S. national power.

The point that I want to close with is emphasizing how these different instruments reinforce one another. We can see from this morning's news that the use of military force can create the conditions for more effective collection of intelligence, can create the conditions for diplomacy. Likewise, intelligence is crucial to the effective application of military force. And diplomacy can also be crucial to the achievement of military ends. So, there is an awareness, and I would like to encourage more thinking among all of us on the issue of how these different instruments of national power can reinforce one another, and make each other more effective.

I also want to point out that each of these instruments has its limits. And that also is important to recognize. There are limits to what we can accomplish through diplomacy. There are limits to what we can accomplish through the use of military power. In the war on terrorism, for example, we recognize that victory will be determined as much by what happens on the battlefield of ideas as on the military battlefield. And so, I will conclude by observing simply that our concept of national security policy has to take all of these instruments into account, not the least being information and the need to change the way -- to change the international environment, to change the way people think about terrorism. Thank you. (Applause)

MCWETHY

And, now for the State Department point of view. Avis Bohlen is one of the State Department's veteran diplomats. She has served all over the world, joining the Foreign Service in 1977. She was most recently Ambassador to Bulgaria during its continuing journey toward democracy, a very challenging post. She has had a number of assignments in Paris. Those are fairly suspicious, Avis. I don't know that -- Paris is

more challenging than Bulgaria. That's probably true. She has been deeply involved in arms control at many different levels, in many different positions in the State Department. She is currently Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Arms Control. She, in her long and distinguished career, she has been dealing with first the Soviets and now the Russians again in that forum. So, Avis, the microphone is yours.

**BOLEN**

Thank you very much. It is a great pleasure to be here this morning, all the more that it is rather a unexpected pleasure that I found out about it at about 7 o'clock last night that John Bolton was going to be called to join the Secretary with the President down in Texas. So, he's very sorry not to be here with you today. But it is my pleasure to be here and I will try to sound as coherent as I can about this very important issue. September 11th catapulted us into a different world or at least a different mode of thinking. But, I think if we look back over the last ten years, and even farther back in some respects, we realize that this different world has been taking shape for a long time. For a number of years now, we have been dealing no longer with an easily identifiable foe with large identifiable forces, easily spotted by our intelligence.

We are not dealing with foes who behave in ways that we find entirely rational according to tested means of national identification of national interests. Clearly, the world has moved beyond that world that we all were accustomed to for such a long time. The threats that we face today are multiple and, as has already been said this morning, quite unpredictable. And, if I could just quote a very relevant section from the Quadrennial Defense Review: "While the United States cannot predict with confidence which adversaries will pose threats in the future, the types of military capabilities that will be used to challenge U.S. interests and U.S. military forces can be identified and understood."

As in the September terror attacks in New York and Washington, future adversaries will seek to avoid U.S. strengths and attack U.S. vulnerabilities using asymmetric approaches such as terrorism, information operations and ballistic and cruise missile attacks. We no longer face a single primary threat. There is no way to calculate with any certainty the likelihood of one threat against another. And, we need to defend ourselves against the full range of threats. This requires a great deal of flexibility and it also requires a comprehensive strategy that, as both Senator Inhofe and Doug Feith have suggested, really cover the full range of U.S. government and U.S. national capabilities, and require a much better degree of integration than we have achieved in the past.

We obviously need to have the military forces appropriate to the task. I won't dwell on this. We're no longer in the era of huge tank armies, but as Senator Inhofe said, we still need ground forces. Some have suggested that missile defense is no longer necessary because it wouldn't have protected us against September 11th. I think this is clearly a false premise. It shows precisely that the threats that we will face are not predictable, and if we think how horrible September 11th was, how much more horrible it would have been if it had been a missile with a nuclear warhead. And, how could any President defend himself against the charges that he had neglected to work on the defense for this threat? But beyond the military forces and the intelligence, we need a broad range of policy responses to the challenges that we are dealing with today.

The fight against terrorism really embraces a full panoply of instruments. We spend \$12 billion a year on the fight against terrorism. It needs to cover the whole field of homeland security with the many challenges that that faces. It also extends overseas and attacking the sources of financing for terrorists and, most importantly, I think it will challenge our diplomatic skills. What September 11th and the fight against terrorism have shown us is that we need to -- that policies to deal with these multiple threats are something that we need to give a great deal of attention to. We need to begin, or not to -- one very important element will be non-proliferation. This continues to be an important part of our policy.

We need to try to persuade or induce proliferating governments to change course, to deny proliferators the supply of equipment, material, or technology from abroad. We need to use U.S. threat reduction programs to secure, eliminate WMD and missile capabilities left over from the cold war. We need to strength international non-proliferation treaties and promote new ones where they meet U.S. interests and to upgrade the means of verifying these treaties and commitments. Effective non-proliferation makes the job easier for those of us who are crafting counter proliferation and measures. Our policies seek to ensure that our forces face fewer, less capable weapons from fewer countries, so that our missile defense and counter proliferation will have smaller challenges to deal with.

We need to strengthen our diplomatic instruments. Senator Inhofe mentioned the need for linguists. There are large areas of the world where we do not have the trained resources of Pashto and Dari speakers. We need to strengthen those capabilities and we need to strengthen specialists in this area. In order to put together an effective counter terrorist strategy, we need to work on cooperation with friends and partners throughout the world. And this is what we have done. I think what the course of events since September 11th have showed us, the laying the ground work diplomatically and politically for the military actions that we have undertaken in the last few weeks was an absolutely essential precursor and I think there are some lessons here.

We need to think strategically about who our partners and friends are going to be in the world. Three months ago, we would not have thought that we would be in a close embrace with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Pakistan, but these countries have again, in some cases, in the case of Pakistan, have become very important to us and I think we would all agree that some of the problems that we're facing today lie in a decade of neglect of Afghanistan and Pakistan after we thought they were no longer as important or when we decided that the primary element in our relationship should be, as in the case of Pakistan, the nuclear one. So, we need to learn again as we did during the Cold War to think in strategic terms, to think in terms of the countries that are going to be important to our effort and this needs to be a long-term effort. It cannot just be an ad hoc alliance.

We should, above all, not lose sight of those countries that have been our friends and allies over decades. The NATO alliance, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and those partners will remain absolutely crucial to our effort to put together a good counter terrorism effort. And this is not only because of their support for what we are doing. We need their support, not just for the military effort, but where their support has been important, even where they are not participants. But, we cannot do things like cutting off the financing for terrorists without cooperation from the other developed countries whose banking systems have been used. So this is -- and we have had really

quite amazing successes to date on this front and I think this is because we have cooperation we have been able to build on the existing institutions that exist.

There are other instruments that we can use that we must use to make the diplomatic instrument more effective. Several -- both Doug Feith and Senator Inhofe talked about the need for better integration. I think this is certainly true in an area which is one of the main things that the State Department does overseas, and that is issuing visas. I'm sure you have all read in the papers of the problems that we have with our system of delivering visas. This is not an imperfection in embassies. This is because embassies are not, in some cases, given the full information that may be available to other agencies. And, I think there is a vast amount that we can do to strengthen this. We need to revive, and we are in the process of doing this, our efforts at public diplomacy. Over the past decade, our public diplomacy budgets were cut again and again and I think we are seeing that we have paid a price for this throughout the world. We need the specialists who know the areas, who know how the message will come across and we need to not just be giving the line of the day, but we need a broad gauged effort that will go at the cultural roots of what we are dealing with and that we'll try also to convey a broad picture of America. So, diplomacy remains an essential tool in this new world, diplomacy in all its many facets. And I think here we need to integrate our efforts better. We need to look where our efforts need to be improved and indeed, in some cases, plussed up. Thank you very much. (Applause)

**McWETHY**

Thank you, Avis. Now Paul Bremer, a man who has spent most of his life on the tail of terrorists, tracking them, analyzing their movements, trying to figure out how the U.S. ought to deal with it. A month ago, exactly a month after September 11th, Ambassador Bremer was named Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Marsh Crisis Consulting Company, a subsidiary of Marsh and McLennan Companies. He is also -- so he's starting up a company a month after the crisis of September 11th. He is also Chairman of the National Commission on Terrorism. He was appointed to that by then-Speaker Hastert in the House of Representatives. Paul Bremer was a Foreign Service officer serving in Afghanistan, Malawi, Norway and the Netherlands. I don't understand this, Paul. You were first appointed Ambassador in 1983 when you were what? Ten years old? It is amazing. He has completed a recent report on terrorism and in it I'm sure he will describe for you how he saw most of what has happened to the United States in the last two months. He saw it with great clarity. He saw it coming. He was knocking on the doors of various government agencies and finding it a tough sell. Paul Bremer. (Applause)

**BREMER**

Thank you, John. Professor Pfaltzgraff, General Shinseki. It is a great pleasure to be with you today. As John's introduction sort of suggested, like everybody in this room I was shocked by what happened on September 11th, but I was not surprised. And, I was not surprised because the National Commission on Terrorism, a bipartisan commission set up by Congress which I chaired, reported a year and a half ago that we would be experiencing large scale, mass casualty terrorism in the United States and we would likely see biological terrorism here, as well, in the months ahead. We made a number of recommendations to the President, then President Clinton, and to the Congress when we issued our report a year and a half ago. Not one of those recommendations was put into force before September 11th.

Now, I think, in fact, so far this morning we have underestimated the impact of September 11th. I would argue that what we saw on September 11th represents the threat to American national security for the next decade or so. And that we are now at a flex point in American foreign policy very similar to the point we were at in 1946 and 1947, when the then-postwar leaders of the United States had to find an organizing principle around which to organize American foreign policy. They came up with a policy of countering Soviet Communism, which of course was pursued over the next 50 years with great patience, resilience, relentlessness and skill, and that's the kind of strategy we need now. Why do I say that this is the new threat?

First of all, the trends in terrorism for the last decade led any serious student of terrorism to predict mass casualty terrorism. The terrorism we saw in the 1960s, 70s and 80s was terrorism which was motivated largely by narrow political objectives, often groups, particularly the homegrown groups in Europe where Marxist-Leninist groups that basically were seeking goals such as getting American bases out of Germany or attenuating American relations with our NATO allies. Or often they conducted terrorism to get their colleagues out of jail or to publish a political screed. Most of these groups, including many of the Middle Eastern groups which were active in those years, used terrorism to get the press to pay attention to their cause because they believed they had a broad cause that had public support.

And so their objective was to kill enough people to get the press present but not so many as to turn off the public. And in effect, therefore, these old-style terrorists had a self-imposed limit on the number of casualties that they would kill. Sometimes they killed hundreds, but on the whole it was a question of killing 10 or 20 people, maybe a few more in order to get the press present. Now, the West came up with a strategy under the leadership of President Reagan in the early 1980s to defeat this kind of terrorism. It was based on three simple propositions. First of all, you don't make concessions to terrorists because if you do that you start down the slippery slope of blackmail.

Secondly, terrorists are criminals. They conduct criminal acts and, therefore, we should bring terrorists to justice. And thirdly, it cannot be allowed in the international community that states use terrorism as an instrument of national policy. Those are the three pillars of the strategy developed by the West under American leadership in the 1980s. And, I would argue it was a successful strategy in dealing with the old terrorists. But what happened was by the end of the 1980s, and particularly in the '90s, we saw a shift to a new kind of terrorism. And the new terrorists are not motivated by narrow political goals. The terrorism which we started to see in the late '80s and in the '90s is a terrorism that is motivated by sometimes hatred, sometimes revenge and often ideological or religious extremism. And the occasional group is motivated by an Apocalyptic vision the future, such as the Japanese group, Aum Shinrikyo and its attack with chemicals on the Tokyo subway in 1995. Well, groups which have these kinds of motives are not self-restrained in the number of casualties that they inflict, and in fact, they may want to inflict more casualties. And this accounts for the paradoxical fact that during the 1990s the number of international terrorist incidents went down while the number of casualties went up. Also, during the 1990s, we noticed that fewer and fewer terrorist incidents were claimed by a particular group, and that an increasing percent of terrorist attacks involved suicides.

In 1998 when I was Ambassador-at-Large for Counter terrorism, I commissioned a study of terrorist incidents from 1968 to 1998 to try to find out how prevalent suicides were among terrorists and we found that in those years, less than 2 percent of terrorist attacks involved suicides. The old-style terrorists did not want to be caught. They did not want to die. The new-style terrorists are very different indeed. And, I would argue that this new style of terrorism has rendered irrelevant two-thirds of the old strategy we had. Why do I say that? Well, I still think it is a good idea not to make concessions to terrorists, but the question of making concessions to people like bin Laden and Al-Qaeda never comes on the deck. There isn't anything to discuss with him. He's not asking anything of us except maybe that we cease to exist. But there is no negotiation to be had, so there's no question. Making concessions is irrelevant.

Secondly, while it is always a good idea to bring terrorists to justice, the fact of the matter is that for someone who is willing to fly an airplane at 500 miles an hour into a building, he is not going to be deterred by the prospect of a couple years in jail. And so, the President has it right when he says we need to turn our thinking around and instead of talking about bringing terrorists to justice, talk about bringing justice to terrorists. So, we are left in effect with only one pillar of the old strategy standing, which Doug Feith hit on this morning, which is state support. And I'll come back to that in a minute. But even this, in my view, does not adequately describe why terrorism is such a threat to the United States. For that you have to look at the geopolitical environment.

The end of the Cold War left the United States in a position of geopolitical dominance, which is without equal and without comparison any time in recorded history. Sure, there have been other countries which have, at their time, been dominant. But if you look at the examples, look at Rome, dominating but dominating only the littoral area around the Mediterranean. The Tong Dynasty in China was dominant, but it dominated basically the eastern half of Asia. Even the British, who dominated the 19th century, found that there were counter-veiling forces available in Europe and in Asia to counter-veil British imperial power. American military, political, economic, and even cultural power today is without any precedent. And, while it is hard for many Americans to believe, that sets up a lot of problems for us. There are a lot of people who hate us for that dominance. There are a lot of people who resent it, and there are a lot of people who want to change it. But, if you want to attack American power in this moment of domination, how can you do it?

Well, one of the clear lessons of the Gulf War was that even a lavishly equipped conventional army and Saddam Hussein's army at the time, as many of you here know was the fifth largest army in the world, equipped with modern Soviet tanks, artillery and air force. Even the most lavishly equipped conventional army in the world was no match, not even close to a match, for American military force and that was already ten years ago. And so, the lesson is, as the Senator pointed out from the Quadrennial Defense Review, that if you are going to attack America now, you have to use unconventional means, "asymmetrical warfare", in the terms of the Pentagon. And terrorism is the ultimate asymmetrical warfare because it allows the weak to attack the strong.

Terrorists benefit from two specific asymmetries. First of all, we have to defend across the entire range of our vulnerabilities, whereas the terrorists can choose the single spot to attack. He can bring all his force to bear on one single place while we

have to defend across an entire range. And secondly, terrorism benefits from a gross asymmetry in costs. If a terrorist wants to attack an airport, he just needs an AK-47 assault rifle and a couple of clips. But, to defend that airport against that attack will cost literally millions of dollars. The best estimate of September 11th is that it cost something in the range of a half a million dollars. It has caused at least \$100 billion in damage and the number is still rising. So, terrorism benefits from a dramatic asymmetry. And, the lesson of the Gulf War suggests that not just terrorists, but other states will see that this is the way to attack the United States.

And so for these two reasons, the secular trends in terrorism and the geopolitical situation we find ourselves in, I think it is no exaggeration to say that what we saw on September 11th is, in fact, the face of the new national security threat to the United States. I do not see any country or group of countries which will be able in a traditional sense to counter veil American power for the next 10 to 15 years and, therefore, this is the threat we're going to have to deal with. Of course, we're going to have to worry about some places where conventional military force could be used against us, for example, particularly in the Korean peninsula. But from a broad point of view what we see now is what we're going to be facing.

Now, what are the implications of this analysis? First of all, we need to be absolutely clear about our strategic objective. In my view, the strategic objective now, and Doug Feith touched on it, is to deny terrorists territory. Because as he said, if a terrorist group can operate in a benign environment, such as Lebanon was in the '70s and '80s and Afghanistan has become, then terrorist groups have the luxury of training, recruiting, planning, testing their kinds of operations of the kind of elaborate operations we saw on September 11th. Deny them that territory, and they have to start worrying about police coming through the door at 2 o'clock in the morning, they have to worry about people eavesdropping on their communications, they have to worry about a lot of things that we want them to worry about. It becomes much harder to conduct the kind of elaborate attack we saw.

Therefore, we must deny terrorists territory. This is going to be a long campaign, as the President has said. It is going to take a lot of patience. And we are going to have to operate across the entire spectrum of American capabilities from military, covert action, diplomacy, public diplomacy, going after finances, the entire range of activities. We have had, I think, so far a significant success in the first phase, which is the Afghan phase of this, where we had two objectives – Defeating the Taliban and overthrowing them and killing as many of bin Laden's people as we can. And I think we've had significant successes there. But we have to move on because this is just the beginning. Next, we must move to close down the al-Qaeda cells that are located in some 60 countries of the world, including the United States. It was good news in Spain that the Spanish have wrapped up an 11 man cell in Spain that has been doing recruitment there for bin Laden's organization, and there have been similar efforts in other countries.

Secondly, we have to go after the other states that provide this benign environment for terrorists. There is a good starting point, which is the State Department list of states which support terrorism, five of which as Doug pointed out, are also states which have both ballistic missile capabilities and nuclear, chemical, and biological programs. In my view, we must after the Afghan phase start to go and have very serious discussions with these groups, hoping that we can compel those states to stop their support for

terrorism with diplomacy, but being ready to use force if we have to. I would start with Sudan, by the way, which has expressed an interest in trying to work with us on terrorism and I would say to them, "We are pleased that you want to work with us on terrorism. The test is that these six terrorist camps that are still operating in Sudan must be closed down by Tuesday midnight or we'll do it for you. And if you wonder what happens to what the President in September 20th called 'hostile regimes', here have a reference to what happened in Kabul."

I think we have to be absolutely serious about it and we have to go, in my view, beyond what the President has said. He repeated in his address to the UN that we are going to go after terrorist groups with a "global reach". I think that's wrong for two reasons. It is not enough, first of all, because in fact the group other than al-Qaeda, the group that has killed more Americans than any other terrorist group in the world is Hezbollah, so Hezbollah has to be on the list of terrorist groups we go after. But more importantly, we cannot simply have an international coalition against terrorists if we say we're only going to go after terrorists who kill Americans. We have got to be consequential in our thinking. We have to worry about the Spanish fight against the Basques, the British fight against the Real IRA and so forth, the Colombian fight against the FARC and the ELF.

So, it is not enough to say we are going after groups with a global reach. We have to say we are going to stop any states which are supporting terrorism. And, incidentally, that includes Mr. Arafat, who allows three major terrorist groups, including Hezbollah, to operate pretty much at liberty on the territory of the Palestinian Authority. That's got to stop and I'm pleased to see the President has basically said there is going to be no meeting with him until such time as he takes serious action. Sooner or later we will come to the problem of Iraq. Whether we come to the problem of Iraq because of intelligence indicating Iraqi involvement in September 11th or not, we are going to have to finish the job we left unfinished in 1991 because Saddam Hussein considers himself to still be at war with us. He has now had three years with no inspections by the UN. It is safe to assume he has reconstituted his chemical and biological programs at a minimum and perhaps his nuclear program. He has used chemical weapons against his own people and against the Iranians, so he has no particular qualms about using these weapons when he gets them. He is the major threat to regional stability after we deal with radical Islam in Afghanistan. The implications for all of this are that we are going to have to work with what I would call an a la carte coalition.

We will find, as we move beyond the Afghan phase, that some of our allies will not want to join us. Others will. Some will want to work with us on a military basis. Some will join us in diplomacy. That's fine. We should be prepared to welcome support where we can find it, but not let our foreign policy be driven by the least common denominator. It is useful to have support from other countries. As Churchill said, "The only thing worse than fighting with your allies is fighting without them." And, so it's useful where we can find allies and friends and we should look for that. But, we should not be driven off the importance of the strategic clarity of our objective

Deny terrorists territory.

The impact of September 11th, I think, is already clear on American international relations in many ways. We've seen in just the last 24 hours the culmination of a dramatic shift of Russian foreign policy, really a shift that you almost have to go back, but I would defer to Avis who's more of an expert, you really have to go back to Peter

the Great, almost 300 years, to find a Russian leader who so decisively said he wants to be part of Western civilization. The Chinese have joined us, admittedly for good Chinese reasons, in the fight in Afghanistan. India sees an opportunity to emerge and consolidate its importance in the subcontinent. We have seen both Japan and Germany in their own ways break out of the post-World War II constraints that had been placed on them with the Japanese Navy sailing for the first time away from Japanese home waters and the Germans for the first time deploying fighting forces outside of Europe.

There will also be, as the Senator pointed out, an important impact on U.S. government organization and programs. We must have a much more aggressive attempt at getting intelligence about terrorism. This was a colossal failure of intelligence and of law enforcement on September 11th and an important failure in our border security and immigration programs. All of those things now have to be fixed. I'm pleased to see that the CIA has, indeed, adopted a more aggressive approach since September 11th, that the President has announced, in addition to signing the Antiterrorism Bill, has announced yesterday the institution of military courts to give expeditious trials to terrorists who are caught, and that the Attorney General is moving with others to try to find better ways to protect our borders through more aggressive border and immigration controls. And, as Avis Bolen pointed out, the important thing here is to get a seamlessness in the intelligence so that people issuing visas overseas have access to the databases they need.

Now, we're not going to, even if we do all of these things, we are not going to eliminate terrorism. Terrorism has been around as long as mankind has been around. So, we're always going to have terrorism. But by being aggressive and denying terrorists territory, by being serious and relentless in the program we've engaged in now, both in Afghanistan and in the phases to come, we can reduce terrorists' ability to operate on the scale we have seen. And we can get it back down to a level where terrorism becomes more of a criminal problem, which can be dealt with by normal intelligence and law enforcement operations and where it does not dominate American foreign policy. Thank you. (Applause)

McWETHY

At the risk of losing everyone, I would like to do something that I think is essential after sitting in your chairs for an hour and a quarter. I'd like you to stand up and allow your blood to circulate back up to your brain so that we get into the more interactive part of this presentation. You'll notice I'm not giving you the opportunity to go to the washroom, but don't want to lose you completely. OK. Blood back at the top half of your anatomy? I'd like to give the panel members a moment to do a little interacting. It's rare that a journalist has an opportunity to do anything with a group of this esteemed nature.

I would like to ask one question of the panel, and then I will let them interact by themselves. And it goes to the issue that I raised at the beginning, and that is why do they hate us. Paul Bremer talked about it. Obviously, when you have cultural, economic, and military dominance the way the United States does, there is resentment. But, what part of the policy as we work our way through has to also address how the United States is perceived in the world and how does the U.S. do a better job of explaining its values and selling what it represents in the world, as opposed to the images which the world often has of us as created through Hollywood or the news

coverage of civilian casualties in places like Afghanistan? How do we incorporate that into a game plan? Any panel member want to take a stab?

**BREMER**

I'll start. The question -- John misstates the problem. The problem isn't to persuade other people what our values are. It is our values that they hate. I am often asked when I speak, "How could these guys who conducted these attacks have lived among us, sent their kids to our schools, gone to the Friday night football game, shopped in our malls for years, and done what they did on September 11th?" And, the answer is that these people hated us more every day they were here. Because their proposition is, and if you can just read bin Laden you'll understand it, they hate us for what our values are. They hate us for our freedoms, they hate us for our universal suffrage, they hate us for the fact that women go about unveiled and can get college educations and serve in high positions in government, they hate us for our material success, they hate us for the fact that we separate church and state, and they hate us for, perhaps most of all deepest down, the fact that our society has appealed to their young people. And so there is, as I said earlier, no negotiation to be had with those kinds of people. It is not an issue of we do something. Now, I'm all for us pursuing public diplomacy and presenting the best side of American life. I did it myself as a diplomat for more than two decades. So, I don't deny that. But, we have to be clear about what we're up against here. We're not going to persuade the people like bin Laden that he's sort of missing the point about America. He's got us. He figured us out. He knows exactly what we are and, therefore, he hates us.

**McWETHY**

Isn't there a background of support that is created on the streets of even our most friendly allies, a background of sentiment about the United States that lends support to the more fanatic end of the spectrum? And, isn't that where American efforts has to be directed at huge numbers of populations that view the U.S. in negative terms and allow people like bin Laden and his operators to freely go? Avis?

**BOHLEN**

Well, just to follow up on what Jerry says, I absolutely agree with him that there will never be any persuading of the Osama bin Ladens in this world. But, I think where we need to direct our efforts are precisely the sort of second level that you suggested. He is able to exploit a kind of vast resentment that is out there among many of the people who support him. And he succeeded in having every group attach their grievance to his star. And, I think this is something that we can influence. First of all, we can seek to analyze and understand what those grievances are, and, secondly, I think we can have a public message that does appeal to the people that are not the inner core of Osama bin Laden, but some of the people who support him in the Islamic world today.

**FEITH**

I think that what Ambassador Bremer said is -- I mean it sounds right. And, I think that much of the hatred cannot be appeased. I would though, add, just a few thoughts that I don't think are inconsistent with that point. One is there are some people among the religious extremists who are engaged in terrorism who have a fairly definite political agenda. And, that agenda is not necessarily directly focused on the United States. It is focused more on politics in the Muslim world in general and in the Arab world in particular. And, I mean in a certain sense, the United States, I think,

for some of these groups is almost like the bystander that gets damaged. I mean we are collateral damage in the attack that some of these groups are directing at their real targets which are the rulers of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt and other governments in the Middle East. And, the second point I wanted to make is that while I think that there are people who cannot be dealt with and cannot be appealed to and we simply have to defend ourselves against them and defeat them, there nevertheless is, as I referred to it in my remarks, there is a battlefield of ideas on which we have to engage, because efforts are being made by our enemies to recruit for their cause, to change the thinking of young people, especially in the Muslim world that, for example, suicide bombing is martyrdom rather than murder. And, it is in our interests to engage on that battlefield of ideas.

I think it's also worth nothing, everybody recognizes that strategy is a concept that is broader than just military action. And I think it is widely understood that morale is a crucial element of strategy. Well, I would say that one of the things we should have learned from the Cold War is that morality is crucially related to morale. And it is one of the strategic vulnerabilities of our enemy in this war on terrorism, I would argue, that the killing of innocent people is morally repulsive to decent people around the world. And so we have, I think, important strategic advantages in this battlefield of ideas, and we do have to engage there without in any way suggesting that on the battlefield of ideas we're actually going to be persuading our committed enemies. I think that that's an important point that Ambassador Bremer highlighted. We have to recognize that we're on that battlefield of ideas not to persuade our enemies, but to persuade the people that our enemies are trying to persuade to recruit into their cause. With that I'll stop.

**INHOFE**

Well, I think one thing on the list that Paul used as to why they hate us, he got close to it, he didn't quite get there, and that is they are taught to hate us. These little kids that are in school, they are taught to hate us. And, this isn't anything new. I'm old enough to remember when this was going on in the Second World War. Hitler used the same strategy. Castro, when he went to Cuba. First thing they do is get the kids and teach them we're the evil ones. They learn to hate us because they are taught to hate us. Now, that's a challenge for the information age, I think, for us to try to do something to get to these kids and show them the other side.

**McWETHY**

We have microphones out in the audience. If we have some questions from the audience, raise your hand. A microphone will come to you and I'll start on this side if there are any questions over here? There is one. A gentleman in the red tie. Wait until a microphone gets to you. State who you are and who you work for if you would, please.

**FROM AUDIENCE**

My name is Jim Longley. I'm actually a former Congressman, but currently work in the field of missile defense. I want to just pick up on your question and ask a question based on two recent facts. One is I happened to notice about a month ago that when the old U.S. Embassy in Kabul was sacked that it was broadcast live in the Middle East, which implied that, A, someone had a camera on the scene, and B, someone had the technical logistics in place to transfer that imagery back. And, it was somewhat ironic this morning to pick up the papers and read of the jubilant Muslims in

the streets of Kabul celebrating the downfall of the Taliban. Coincidentally, we'd accidentally, I gather, dropped a bomb on the local headquarters of Al Jazeera. But, to pick up on your question, I wonder whether we have yet to learn that communicating in our language, in our terms with reference to our culture or whether we understand the importance of conveying in the Middle East that Muslims themselves are disgusted with the behavior of these folks. And, I just ask whether organizationally or policy-wise we're starting to appreciate that.

McWETHY

Good question. Avis?

BOLEN

I think that is a very valid point and I think it is appreciated. And over the past few weeks I think we have sharpened up our public diplomacy efforts. We now have people who are -- one of the problems was the time lag so that we were responding to things that, for example, Jazeera might be broadcasting early in their day, but everybody was already asleep by the time we were responding. So we now have an office in Islamabad. We have an office in London that is dealing with some of those sort of technical problems. But I think more broadly, it has been part of our message from the outset, and the President himself has stressed, that there are several Islams and that the Islam -- that the face of Islam that Osama bin Laden represents is not the face of true Islam, and I think that message has found resonance everywhere. If you look at the number of countries that, as somebody was saying earlier, killing innocent people is abhorrent to every religion, including the Muslim one. So I think that is part of the message. I hope we can -- I don't know what we're doing to get the pictures of the people getting their beards shaven and the women casting off their burqas if Jazeera is not up, but I'm sure CNN will be there very quickly.

McWETHY

Those images are being broadcast. Anybody else? Question on this side? Sir, right in front?

FROM AUDIENCE

David Litt, Political Advisor from the State Department U.S. Special Operations Command. I think the State Department has been making some major changes in the way we do business over the last several months. One of the key changes that we have been able to do is to adjust the way that we organize for strategic planning. I would hope that in the future as this comes to be, that we will also be able to look out ahead as the Army, Navy, and the Air Force have done to establish a strategic visioning cell to look beyond the horizon, beyond the headlights into the dark into what are the strategic flagship capabilities that diplomacy can bring. One of them, it seems clear to me, is this whole concept of persuasion and compulsion, which we really need to be the primary front line experts on. And I guess the major question I have to you all is probably, as you all have said, Hollywood has been the major contributor to perception management about the United States. And recently, we've seen Hollywood beginning to -- or emerging and suiting up and trying to get in the game of perception management on behalf of the United States. What do you all think about that prospect?

McWETHY

We have a politician here.

**INHOFE** Well, there's no question about the impact that they have. And I -- when you were asking that question, I was thinking, I think I'm more concerned about the impact they have within our country as opposed to outside our country in terms of developing perceptions. Sure, outside our country, they talk about how brutal we are, and we see all these things graphically in front of us. But, so do our kids see this and they get to believing this is what it is all about. And, I think they say that nothing good can come from something like September 11th. I've observed and I think I might have alluded to but not specifically said that up here that it has turned a lot of these people who are elected people - Mr. Longley, you know something about that - into changing their attitudes. People who would never vote to support national missile defense and that would never vote for modernizing the F-22, Joint Strike Fighter, any of these things, are turning around as a result of it. And, I would like to think that if we can turn around Hollywood, that would be another benefit that would have come from September 11th.

**McWETHY** Anybody else want to take a crack at Hollywood? Avis?

**BOLEN** I don't want to take a crack at Hollywood, but I want to take a crack at long term strategic planning, which is something ever since I've been in the State Department, which is now getting on for three decades, it's something that we've spent a lot of time trying to figure out how to do and I am not sure we found the perfect answer. But I think it is, obviously, it is very important to look out there in the future. And, I think at the base of the public diplomacy message has to be understanding other cultures that we are talking to, understanding of why this monstrous message has appeal and you have to build your public diplomacy message on that. And, I think that is what the State Department, among other agencies, has to contribute. And, I think it has to be, as I said earlier, it has to be a long-term effort. You can't come in and out of -- what regions have turned out to be of great strategic importance and expect to either understand what is going on or to be able to have an impact. So, I think that's an important long-term message.

**McWETHY** Yes, sir? In the blue shirt.

**FROM AUDIENCE** Avon Williams. I'm with the Office of General Council for the United States Army. I noticed that, Ambassador Bremer, you endorsed having terrorists tried in courts of military justice. And, I direct this question to both you and Mr. Feith. I understand some of the legal rationale for that, but as, of course, there is also a political rationale. And I was wondering if you might speak to that a little bit more extensively, especially with respect to not only the terrorists who we might capture in our operations overseas, but also the people who are currently in custody in the United States.

**BREMER** Well, I'm not an attorney so I can't answer the second half of that. I don't know whether the Executive Order the President signed would retroactively affect people who are already in custody. I don't know the answer. Maybe Doug does. The reason I'm in favor of it is because justice, to be, you know, effective, has to be swift, and there is a precedent for this kind of military tribunal in the United States. It has been held constitutional by the Supreme Court. And, I think it can avoid a lot of the

show trial aspects of terrorist trials, which has sometimes been a problem and which would certainly be a problem in the case of some of the terrorists we're after now. So, I view it as a healthy idea. They will have full access to defense lawyers, which I might add in most of the countries they are coming from would not be the case. So I'm in favor of it.

**FEITH** I'm only half informed on the subject, so I don't want to comment on it now. Excuse me.

**McWETHY** Anybody in the back? Yeah. Way in the back. A gentleman in the last row.

**FROM AUDIENCE** I'm Bob Brannon, a National Security Fellow up at Harvard's Kennedy School. My question concerns this new and evolving relationship that we seem to be nurturing with Russia, something that's playing itself out even as we speak today. What do you think Russia wants from us? And second, what do you think the risks might be to our national security inherent in nurturing this new relationship?

**SPEAKER** You're the expert.

**BOLEN** Well, I think that I would certainly agree with Jerry Bremer that that's been one of the most important developments that we have seen coming out of September 11th on the sort of political diplomatic front. My own assessment, for what it is worth, is that Putin - and I think this is an effort that really he personally directed - made a strategic choice following September 11th. He decided that he -- this was his gateway to bringing Russia back onto the world stage in a constructive and positive way after a decade of wandering off in the wilderness more or less. I think he saw vindication for what he has been saying about the Islamic fundamentalists in Chechnya, which is I think a message that we were inclined to discount before September 11th as justification for what they were doing in Chechnya, which is reprehensible in many ways. But he was saying there are associates of Osama bin Laden with the Chechen rebels and the big threat is the threat of Islamic fundamentalism to the south. And, I think he felt that message was vindicated. But thirdly, I think emotionally he wanted to be with the West in this fight. He didn't want to be with the enemies of the West.

What does he want from us? I think he is seeking above all a kind of integration into the West broadly defined. I think he would like closer relations with NATO. I think he has responded very sincerely and what the President has said about constructing a new relationship, and not just a new strategic relationship, I think that is something that has resonated. So, he sees this as a chance to really put his relations with the West and with the United States, especially, on a new footing. And, there are a number of specific things I think Jackson-Vanik is just extraordinarily important to the Russians. They see it as a symbol of the past that still continues to exist. The risks, I think, would be that he is not able to deliver his establishment. This is -- I stress Putin's role in this because I think there are some skeptics in Russia. I think there is still a lot of old thinking around, and I think that could impact on a lot of different issues. And, I think we can't make ourselves hostage to Russian desiderata in this relationship. But, I think it is a very positive development overall. I don't know if --

McWETHY

Senator?

INHOFE

I think -- I had to jump in on this one, because I think what they really need is help in getting out of this economic problem that they have over there right now. John mentioned in his introduction I flew an airplane around the world that was reenacting the Wiley Post flight on its 60th anniversary. That was 10 years ago. And, I remember going across, all the way from Moscow all the way to Provodania but we got about half way across and you look down and you see - and many of you military guys know what I'm talking about - you look down and you see that vast wilderness, you see those natural resources, you see the wealth that's down there that's just there and it's untapped. And, of course, being from Oklahoma I'm sensitive to the petroleum opportunities and elsewhere.

Here is my concern. While they have very serious problems with their economy right now, they at the same time have been able to use their brainpower and their technology to develop systems that we haven't been able to develop. I mean right now - I mentioned in my opening remarks - we don't have the best of everything anymore. Now, you talk to some of the people in the Air Force, the best air-to-air vehicle we have is the F-15. They have the SU-27 is better in certain ways and it is on the open market today. The same I could say about the F-16 and the air-to-ground comparing it to the SU-30. Now they're developing, along with the, you know, the Euro-Fighter and the Rafael come along. They're coming along with their -- in Russia with the SU-35 and the SU-37. We've got to get ourselves modernized because if they get desperate enough they will continue to market that around the world, places where we don't want to be inferior in the sky. And, they have that capability. So, I think anything we can do to be of assistance to help them develop their resources so that they won't be dependent upon selling those vehicles places that could inflict harm on us would be to our benefit.

McWETHY

More questions way in the back on the right.

FROM AUDIENCE

David DeGiorgi, EED Systems. To the question of why they hate us. There have been dominant powers through history and there's always the antipathy of those dominated towards those who are dominant. But, it seems that the depth of this antipathy, the breadth now, is something that's almost unprecedented. And, I'm wondering if there is something in the cultural context which is behind this that's allowing this to occur. There was a caption on the cover, I think it was the cover story, of the New York Times magazine this past weekend and it spoke of a woman in one of the Middle Eastern countries in her late 30s who had asked her, as I recall, asked her husband for permission to go and train for Jihad. This is not a twenty-something radical but a thirty-something housewife. What is it that -- in their cultural context I think there is something deeper than just the dominant power.

BREMER

Well, you are right, Mr. DeGiorgi. Dominance always does provoke hatred and resentment. I think there are a couple of factors. First of all, we can't ignore the impact of the communications revolution that has been brought to many parts of the world in the last decade where people can communicate with each other through Al Jazeera, for example, or can see the parts of the American lifestyle they don't like

by just watching cable television. It is true that you cannot explain a lot of this kind of terrorism that we're talking about by focusing on the traditional so-called root causes, the economic poverty and so forth. People who killed themselves on September 11th were universally from the upper-middle class, they were well educated. So, the consequence of going after the root cause there is to say we shouldn't have any wealthy Saudis around. It doesn't seem to me like that's a very good operational way to go at the terrorism problem.

The American culture offends lots of Americans, as the Senator pointed out, and it offends lots of people. I think -- my own view is the reason we are seeing a broad move towards fundamentalism in all of the three major monotheistic religions in the world in the last decade is because many people feel disrooted, *déraciné*, from their fundamental beliefs, and they see that American culture, or what they conceive to be American culture purveyed often by Hollywood, is at the root of that particular evil. It's something that takes them away from the root of their religion. And, this is one reason why bin Laden does have a broader appeal. But, he's not just appealing to lunatics and criminals. He's appealing to people who really have a way of saying we need to turn back to the fundamentals of Islam. Now, by turning back he means really pretty far back, but it isn't, therefore, too surprising that you see that when you consider that there have been lots of people in the Christian and Jewish religions who have also said the way the world is developing, the modern world to me seems to be offensive to what I take to be the core beliefs of my religion. And, how you deal with that to me is a -- I mean this is a sociological problem of immense size that is not particularly a terrorism problem; it is a problem of how societies organize themselves. And there isn't an awful lot that any one person can do about it.

But let me make a point about Islam. The President has been careful, and so have his top leaders, to say over and over that this is not a war against Islam. And that is right. It certainly is not a war against Islam. But there is, today, a war within Islam, and it is between the people like bin Laden who want to define Islam the way that bin Laden defines it, essentially as turning back to the, what he takes to be, the roots of Islam even though they are misinterpreted, and between the moderate Islamic leaders who would not like to see him define Islam that way. And, we have a huge stake in the moderate Islamic leaders winning that fight, a huge stake, because if, in the end, bin Laden and people like him, can hijack Islam and define it the way bin Laden wants to define it, then this will become a war of civilizations. This will become a war against Islam. So, we have a very big stake in encouraging moderate Islamic leaders from Detroit to Jakarta to stand up and say what bin Laden says about Islam is wrong. These people, as Doug pointed out, are not martyrs. They are apostates. They are not going to go to heaven and enjoy 72 black-eyed virgins. They are going to go to hell.

McWETHY

Doug Feith?

FEITH

It might be useful to approach this issue of terrorism also at a different level from a different angle. And that is I think part of the reason that we see as much terrorism as we do is not simply because the world has fanatics and irrational people. I think it is because if one looks back over the history of the last 30, 40 50 years, there has been enough of a reward for terrorism to persuade even rational people that it may

not be a bad way to pursue specific political ends. And, I think it is worth keeping that in mind, also. The gentleman before who asked about strategic thinking and diplomacy triggered the thought in my mind that if we really want to be strategic in our diplomacy, it is probably a good idea to remind ourselves that the importance of certain principles. I mean I would go so far to say when we talk about using every instrument of U.S. national power in this war on terrorism, we should be aware that our principles are one of our crucial instruments of national power. And, there is a temptation often to sacrifice principle to short-term diplomatic convenience, cutting deals with terrorists to try to solve a particular problem. But the consequences that decade after decade when you are cutting deals with terrorists after terrorists, and some people, of course, they start out being terrorists and then they kill enough people over a long enough period of time that they become statesmen.

The problem with cutting deals with terrorists over a long enough period of time is that you create a significant incentive for people to engage in terrorism. And, we have had a declaratory policy about terrorism that we don't reward terrorism, we don't deal with terrorists, that it is -- terrorism is an unacceptable means no matter what, you know, the cause. We've had a declaratory policy like that for many years, but we've had, we the United States and many other countries in the world, have had a policy in various contexts of embracing, rewarding terrorists. And, this should stop. And, if we stop, and what it is going to mean is it is going to mean that we are going to have to pay the price in immediate inconvenience of not having the interlocutors that we are searching for in some places, because if you're really not willing to reward terrorists, if you are going to weed terrorists out of the community, then that means you are not going to have people to negotiate with on occasion. But, if we're going to have a strategic approach to diplomacy and a principle approach on the war on terrorism, then we're just going to have to make that sacrifice.

McWETHY

One might ask as you are doing your coalition building the United States is also making accommodation to nations that we have specifically not had relations with because we don't like, not their terrorism policy, but almost every other policy that the United States has held dear. So, when you talk about principles in this war you sacrifice one set to fight another set.

FEITH

Well, that's an interesting point. But, not every disagreement about policy is a matter of principle. And, the idea that you adjust your policies at given times to take into account, you know, the exigencies of the moment, that's national security policy. You have to have a certain amount of flexibility. And as I said, I think it would be a mistake to view every policy issue as a matter of policy. I mean as a matter of principle. But, I think it is sustainable to say that people who purposely murder innocents for political purposes have violated a principle and have disqualified themselves and should be viewed as people who have discredited rather than advanced their political causes.

BREMER

But John is quite right, that for example, we as Avis pointed out, we had a very strong dislike for the human rights policies of Mr. Karimov, The President of Uzbekistan, which we were quite rightly, in my view, willing to put aside for the time being. And, that's what diplomacy's about. You are always going to have trade offs. There are no

easy decisions. There are always going to be tradeoffs, and we made the right tradeoff in Uzbekistan in my view.

**BOLEN** You can't have a sort of one note relationship with countries.

**McWETHY** Young woman right there.

**FROM AUDIENCE** Beth Dixon, a student at the Fletcher School. My question is really for Ambassador Bremer, but I'd like to hear from all three of you possibly. You mentioned the next state you envision the U.S. working with is the Sudan, the state of Sudan. And, I'd just like to hear a little more about how you envision our relationship with them given their fundamentalist, Islamic regime and the civil war they are currently waging against the south.

**BREMER** My strategy for Phase Two, and since I don't work for the government you needn't be frightened by it. My strategy is you go after the weak links before you go after the strong links. And, what I would like to see our government do is build the momentum on the back of success in Afghanistan, which I think is within sight now, and go to the weak links. And the two weak links, in fact, among the states are Libya and Sudan, both of which are still considered states which support terrorism, both of which have indicated since September 11th an interest in trying to get off that list and get right with us. And, I would take advantage of that as a diplomatic opening. But I would give them essentially an ultimatum. I would say, "We are willing to work with you. We're willing to have you part of this coalition, but you're going to have to do X and Y, and you're going to have to do it by a fixed time and, by the way, there is no negotiation about it. And, we're prepared to act, if necessary, unilaterally and, if necessary, with all the force that America can bring to bear to be sure you comply with these requests, or we will consider you, in the words of the President, a hostile regime." And, I would try to build some momentum by knocking off some of these relatively weaker links in the terrorism international, and built momentum forward towards the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon and Syria and basically leave Iraq for the end unless there is evidence that Iraq was involved -- unless more evidence - there is evidence - unless evidence is conclusively shown that Iraq was involved, I would leave it to the end. I'd work with the small guys forward. And, with the Sudanese one of the things one would have to say is you got to stop slave trading. It is the only government in the world that I know of where the government itself actively still is involved in slave trading. You've got to stop the war in the south. But, I think there is an opportunity with Sudan and I think we ought to seize it.

**McWETHY** We have ten minutes. Wait a minute. Anybody on this side? Sir?

**FROM AUDIENCE** Good morning. I'm Bob Ivany from the United States Army War College. During the last several weeks, there has been a lot of discussion about what is the true center of gravity, that is the strategic center of gravity, in this war against terrorism. That is the one point that we should direct all our military, economic, and political efforts. I would just like to ask the panel for their view as to what that true strategic center of gravity is.

McWETHY

I'm sure Doug knows the answer to that.

FEITH

I had suggested that it is focusing on the territorial base for the terrorist operations. I think that one is not as a - as Ambassador Bremer pointed out - one is not going to necessarily be able to prevent any group of people ever from conducting terrorism. But I mean I wouldn't say that defining victory means that nobody will ever commit a terrorist act again. But, the ability of terrorist organizations to plan large scale actions over a long period of time I think depends to a very large extent on their having a base of operations that they can do kind of undisturbed work from. And, I think that if we approach the terrorist problem that way, we can avoid the problem of dividing our attention among numerous cells and organizations all over the world. I mean, as it's been put in some of the discussions by some Administration officials, we can't chase every snake. There is a value in draining the swamp, rather than trying to chase every snake. And I think that that's another way of saying the same point, that we should go after terrorism on a large scale by focusing on the territorial bases.

FROM AUDIENCE

Dick Diamond from Raytheon. I was trying to square what the panel had said about the unprecedented premier position of the U.S. with why they don't like us in the Muslim world with what Ambassador Bremer said about sooner or later we've got to get back and finish the job in Iraq. And, I was wondering about the linkage there. I was trying to think of one of those former empires that would allow a festering sore like that on it's border for 10 years with no particular protector in the world, with clearly rougish acts. And, I'm wondering what the panel thinks are the linkages between the fact that the Islamic world disrespects us for the fact that we have imposed sanctions on the Iraqi people for ten years, but have been powerless to sort of overturn the government. And, I wonder how much the fact that we have unable to deal with Saddam has allowed those countries that harbor terrorism to think that they can get away with it and be outside the reach of the U.S.

McWETHY

Any hands going up?

BREMER

I'm happy to answer it. I think you are right. I think you've put your finger on an important fact, which is that the decade of policies we've had towards Iraq have been probably the worst combination of all. We have managed to impose sanctions which don't hurt the government we're after and hurt the people and allow, therefore, that fact to be broadcast throughout the region while not having finished the job we started in 1991, which, therefore, undercuts the respect for our power in the region. It would be hard to conceive actually of a worse policy, except one which started an inspection regime and then stopped it, which is also what we did. It is a mark of the fecklessness of American foreign policy towards Iraq over the last decade that we still have to talk about it. It is a major problem we are going to have to return to. Whether we return to it as part of this campaign because it is shown that Iraq was involved in this terrorism or whether we deal with it because it is the major threat to regional security, sooner or later some American government, whether this one or the next one, hopefully this one, is going to have to deal with the threat that Iraq poses.

**BOLEN** I'd just add to that. I don't want to get into a whole discussion of this which is an immensely complex subject, but I would just point out that I don't think really that Osama bin Laden was motivated to do what he did by, or emboldened to do what he did by the lack of whatever we didn't do in Iraq. And, secondly, the same countries that are criticizing us for both for not finishing the job and for causing babies to starve will be the first to turn against us if we take more consequential action.

**BREMER** I don't agree with that at all, Avis. I think if we decide that the consequential in Iraq, we will find much more support in the region than we will in Europe. I think the Europeans will be nervous. But, I think if we show -- and that's why what we are doing in Afghanistan is so important. We need to show that America is prepared to use all that power we have relentlessly and ruthlessly to pursue our objectives. And, once we establish that fact it becomes easier to deal with Sudan and Libya, as I mentioned earlier, and it becomes much easier to deal with Iraq because people in the region will realize for once we're serious.

**McWETHY** Final question from the audience. You're it. Is there one back there? I'm sorry. Way in the back.

**FROM AUDIENCE** Scott Flower from the Association of United States Army. Thanks, Mr. McWethy. All of you have alluded to information and intelligence. I would like to ask if this was a problem that existed before September 11th and it's been brought into sharp focus. I would like to ask each of you what you would do to improve intelligence operations within the government and, without being flip or irreverent, I would like you to avoid using the word "share".

**INHOFE** I'll start off. You know, one of the criticisms I had when we were talking about our intelligence back in the early '90s when we had the problems at our energy labs and, you know, just very obvious things that could have been prevented. And I'm sure the problems that are there are problems that are overseas also. When we went through just because we thought it might be demeaning to someone, we stopped using color coded badges at our labs, we stopped doing background checks, we stopped doing a lot of the things that we had done before to stop the compromises that are taking place only to find out that there have been some 16 compromises in our labs and now the Chinese and others have almost everything that we had that we were holding in confidence. You know, I look at this and I don't know how the program is going to go from this point forward, but I'm hoping that somebody out here cares about what we're doing conventionally if you'll forgive me, John, for just deviating a little bit here.

There are some things that we can do that we ought to be doing, and they are very obvious. I mean you talk about Iraq. We allowed them to kick out our weapons inspectors. Now we don't know what's over there. We have our kids going over right now on deployments from the East Coast where they're not properly trained. We have the USS Roosevelt over there right now. They did not get live fire training because we allowed a bunch of lawbreakers to kick us out off of the live range at Vieques. We have the -- I think the JFK is going to be deployed in January, and I think we should be looking at this saying, "All right. Let's make this is a mission that we're going to

make sure that they are trained”, because when they get over there they are actually involved in combat. And people have to understand that everything that’s happening in the world isn’t all happening in Afghanistan because we’re at war elsewhere, too.

We have obvious things that we can do. Go up to the 21st TACOM. You see that they are using M-119 trucks that have a million miles on them and you could use just the amount of money you pay for maintenance every three years to buy a new fleet. You know, some of the obvious things that are out there that we need to deal with on a conventional score. And, that’s why I said in my opening remarks, let’s not sacrifice our conventional capabilities with all these theoretical things and with fighting these wars that -- against terrorism. We’ve got to be prepared for the future, but we also have to use our resources that we have right now to defend America and defend our young troops that are over there who are fighting with inferior equipment. I forgot what the question is, but that’s the answer. (Laughter)

**McWETHY** It’s a great answer. Spoken like a true Senator. More evidence of why you are where you are, Senator. (Laughter) I’d like to give everybody just a brief moment to sum up.

**FEITH** A brief moment and answer to the question would be more and better human intelligence.

**BOLEN** I would second that. I think we -- the first thing we have to do is to decide our priorities. And I think we clearly have given a low priority to this particular area where we now have troops fighting over the past couple of years and I think we need to take a look at those priorities. It means money in the U.S. government and I go back to building the cadres of specialists that can help us with language, with understanding, and that’s whether they are State Department or intelligence people. And, I’m sorry, I would like to say sharing, but...

**BREMER** You can’t have a counter terrorist policy without good intelligence. And, the only good intelligence -- really the only good intelligence against terrorist groups, is human intelligence, as Doug mentioned. The CIA, over the last two and a half decades, has evolved into a risk averse culture. A problem that was exacerbated by guidelines which President Clinton put into effect in 1995 that made the recruitment of terrorist spies more difficult and in fact disincented case agents in the field from doing it, as our commission pointed out. So, we need to have better collection. We need better analysts. A lot of talk today about better linguists. That’s -- there’s no question. And, we need better dissemination of intelligence. If you don’t like the word “sharing” then the word I’d use is we need to have a seamlessness in the intelligence and law enforcement information world where intelligence is moving back and forth across what used to be Chinese walls between these two. And, again, the Anti-Terrorist Bill that the President signed two weeks ago goes a long way to starting that process.

**McWETHY** I’d like to thank the panelists for giving time from their very busy days. It’s a wild time. Also, I’d like to make note of how many Army officers are here, and the top leaders of the Army. That’s very impressive to spend your day kicking around ideas

like this. General Shinseki, General Keane, General Meigs, all of my friends and colleagues from the Army. We are finished. This is your first go around. You'll begin again in about 15 minutes I think. (Applause)