

The Role of Military Power in a Complex Environment

PANEL MEMBERS

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VIDEO

The United States possesses the most powerful military force the world has ever known. But our adversaries have studied both our strengths and our weaknesses. In the past decade they have found ways to undermine our might and challenge our resolve with asymmetric attacks. How do we fight and win decisively? How do you respond quickly to a rapidly changing world, where we might have to use force and (inaudible) of large contingencies, but where we don't have the luxury of forward-basing or pre-positioning? We all need to have a common understanding of the role that force plays in this story because we need a common understanding of the role of the United States, at this moment in its history in this world in which we find ourselves. Military force will mean air power, sea power and troops on the ground.

But are Americans ready for the consequences? The message we've sent is that we'll do almost anything to avoid casualties. They think that means we are weak, that we'll fold if we're put under significant pressure or run a real risk of losing lives. And as long as they think that, they will continue to take advantage of us and we will continue to have difficulty imposing our will around the world. Thus, we must be willing and able to apply decisive force to ensure our national security. Peace will not keep itself, as the saying goes. It must be kept. Many of the employment of military power in the modern era, (inaudible) we're going to be looking at counter-drug operations, humanitarian operations, peace keeping, and for that matter in many cases, war

fighting in which the support of food aid organizations or religious, faith-based organizations will be an aspect in maintaining stability in the target area. You have to be bigger to be more lethal, and to be more survivable and if you want to be even faster-moving, you'd get lighter, but you sacrifice killing power, and survivability, and those are the tradeoffs.

We also need a force that is adequate to cope with the full range of contingencies we're going to we face. I think actually since September 11th all the arguments for national missile defense have been proven right, and proven again and again. If someone can run an airplane into the World Trade Center, I would want to pay attention to all the ways that people can deliver terrorism or deliver weapons against the United States of America. Fighting should come to a conclusion (inaudible.) It is very different than the fighting, should it come to it, in Iraq. And, when we took the two campaigns together, you would almost with those two campaigns alone span the entirety of the combat spectrum. But how do we find a balance between war and operations other than war? Between modernizing the force for the future and remaining ready for today's challenges across the spectrum of operations? How do we plan for unknowns and develop the set of capabilities we think we might need? I think we're also going to have to look very critically at ourselves and say, "Have we been thinking about what war is the right way?" And, I think if we do that, we have to say that we had a very limited and narrow and confined rigid view of what war is and if we are going to succeed we have to change that.

SPEAKER

Ladies and gentlemen, Dr. Robert Pfaltzgraff.

PFALTZGRAFF

Ladies and gentlemen, it is with great pleasure that I welcome our Panel Two, which will be coming on stage momentarily. I would like at the outset to make a few opening remarks about this panel and to tell you that we have prepared, as you see in your programs, extensive questions and issues that we hope each of the panels will address. And I would urge that if you have not already done so, that you read the panel charter that we have for Panel Two because we have seen all too vividly in the last two months the important role of military power and its synergism with the other instruments of power. We have this afternoon a large number of issues to address. For example, how we apply decisive force based on appropriate strategies. And forces is, of course, central to our ability to focus national power, the theme of this conference.

This panel has the greatly challenging task of surveying this important landscape and doing it in the limited time available this afternoon. We will be dealing with a whole range of topics as listed in the charter. They include how we reconcile the requirements for present day readiness with the needs for modernization for tomorrow in this broadened and complex security setting; how we develop a clearer conception of the modernization priorities that we face in light of the events of September 11th; and, how to apply decisive force as a key component of national security strategy and, in particular as discussed this morning by so many of our speakers, all of our speakers mentioned this, the role of space as well as the role of missile defense in the national security strategy that we have before us. All of these issues will be addressed by the panel this afternoon.

So, I would invite the panel to come on stage at this time. I would like to introduce the panel members in the sequence in which they will be speaking, and to remind them that we hope to keep their remarks to about 15 minutes so that we have ample time for discussion. It is with very special pleasure that I introduce the opening speaker in our panel this afternoon. He is the Honorable Curt Weldon. As I have had the opportunity on many other occasions to do, I introduce him as my Congressman, because I happen to live in the Seventh Congressional District of Pennsylvania and, as I always remind him, I call him whenever I have a constituent interest, and I had a constituent interest this afternoon, as you can see. He was elected to the United States Congress, House of Representatives for an eighth term in the year 2000. He has been a member of the House since 1987, and he has taken very important leadership roles on a whole range of issues ranging from national security to the environment. He has served as Chairman of the Military Research and Development Subcommittee. He has overseen the development and testing of key military systems and weapons programs. He has served as Chairman of the Readiness Committee. And, he now serves as Chairman of the Arms Services Procurement Subcommittee. He has worked with Russian leaders on a wide range of issues and, of course, he has been a strong supporter over many years of missile defense. So, it is with great pleasure that I welcome my Congressman, Curt Weldon, to this podium this afternoon. (Applause)

WELDON

Thank you, Bob. And, good afternoon ladies and gentlemen and distinguished panel members that I have the honor of serving with. And, let me congratulate everyone who has been involved with establishing this conference and for allowing us to come together in I think what has turned out to be a very important discussion about where we are and where we are going as a nation in terms of our military preparedness.

As Bob mentioned, I've served on the Armed Services Committee for 15 years and have now served as Chair of three of the three key subcommittees. My discussion topic is to focus on the competition between readiness and modernization. And, to set the stage, I want to tell you about a trip I took a total of 25 members of Congress on this past August. Four went with me and the other twenty-some met us at various sites. I want to see the true state of our military readiness by visiting our bases. Over a 40 day period we traveled to 15 states and visited 24 bases. When we arrived at the bases, we didn't go to the dining rooms to have a nice luncheon. We went to the very specific purpose to see the problems that exist on our military bases, not just at the bases we visited, but as examples of problems of our bases around the world. And, what we saw was beyond any of the ideas that we had as Democrats and Republicans working defense issues.

We saw military bases with raw sewage under the barracks because of a lack of funding to repair the basic infrastructure. We saw water systems and sewer lines that were inoperable. We saw a young mechanic up at a base up in Idaho working on B 1 planes where he had a backlog of spare parts that was 365 days. He had just worked six days 12 hours a day to cannibalize one B1B to keep the other one in flying in the air. We went down to some of our busiest naval stations, air stations down at Miramar and down at North Ireland and saw runways that had major problems with the potential of debris getting up into the actual plane engines and causing significant damage. It was at that same site that we saw a young sailor who was working out a

metal container that is typically used to put cargo on a ship. But, that had been his site for the previous year and a half to locate spare parts for the helicopter inventory with no electricity and no power because he had no other place to work.

We traveled to another base where we saw a young woman who was so frustrated with her room that had been assigned to her that she went out with her own money and bought caulking and a caulking gun to caulk one-inch cracks in the walls of her own room and did the same for the rest of the rooms on her floor. But perhaps the most telling signal to me about our readiness was when we went to Hunter Army Air Field in Georgia on our way back to Washington and there encountered a young Colonel, a very proud Colonel, proud of what he was doing, who had just returned from 16 months in Bosnia. And, he said to us, "You know, we're proud of what we do here and we are prepared to go" -- and they have gone by the way. He said, "But let me tell you my frustration. I just served 16 months in Bosnia. I had better housing and better food service in Bosnia than I do back here in the States.

The point is that we have short-changed our readiness over the past decade. In fact, at every base we visited where our meetings and operations accounts should run approximately four to five percent of the replacement cost value of those infrastructure plants, we didn't see one base that even approached one percent in terms of annual budgeting. So all of our infrastructure in terms of our facilities and spare parts and the readiness of our troops has, in fact, been neglected.

The second major problem that we encounter today is a ten-year period of declining budgets for research and development. During the six years I chaired the Research and Development Subcommittee, each year I would see requests to cut the S&T accounts and the R&D account lines by approximately 25 percent. Exactly the wrong time to be cutting what is, in fact, the seed core of the future. At a time when I was the chairman of the R&D Committee, I was looking at emerging threats. Four key areas: The emerging threat of missile proliferation; the emerging threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction; the emerging threat posed by narco-drug traffickers and the emerging threat of cyber terrorism. All of them involving terrorism. At a time when we in the Congress were looking at these emerging threats, all of which are high tech threats and all of which should require a significant increase in the research and development account lines, we were going the opposite way. A terrible mismatch in terms of our needs. And, so when you consider the fact that in the last 100 years or last 200 year history of the country, our research and development in the military has usually led the way for the civilian improvements in our quality of life. The first jet engine, the first airplane, the first laser -- use of laser technology, the first use of the internet; all were developed by military research. And, now with the information revolution, we see a change occurring with the private sector. In particular, information technology companies are in some cases equal to, in some cases ahead of where we are going in terms of our military and defense capabilities. And yet, during this period of time we, in fact, were shortchanging on our R&D account lines.

Well, the bottom line logical solution here is to partially look at cutting our infrastructure because of the decrease in the size of our forces. You can't keep the same number of bases when you cut your Navy from 585 ships to 315 ships, which it currently is today. Or, you cut the force levels of the other 10 services. But unfortunately, the Congress was burned by a, and what we have considered to be, a misuse of the base closing process in '96 in privatizing two bases in place, one in California and one

in Texas, even after the Base Closing Commission had recommended they be closed. But the Congress has been unwilling for the past five years to consider another round of base closing. That action, coupled with a lack of confidence by the Congress on the financial accounting methods of the Defense Department to give us good numbers in terms of savings realized when facilities are closed has caused the Congress to be log jammed and not willing to consider closing additional infrastructure sites. When you add these parameters together and couple in one other, it is in fact, in my opinion, a recipe for disaster.

That other factor is the uncontrolled proliferation that occurred in the 1990s. We have arms control regimes because they are supposed to keep the bad guys from getting the kind of technology they could not build on their own. That's why we have treaties. I monitor these treaties on a regular basis and lack of compliance with them. In fact, as many of you know, I am the point person for our relationship with Russia, and I have traveled there 27 times. I did a study through the Congressional Resource Service in 1998 that assessed 37 specific violations of arms control agreements, primarily by 11 Russia and China, over a limited period of time - six years. In those 37 cases of violations of existing arms control treaties where we saw evidence of chemical technology, biological technology, nuclear technology, missile technology, conventional arms in violation of treaties be proliferated from two countries, Russia and China, and end up in the hands of Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya and North Korea. The proliferation of that technology that should have been controlled by arms control agreements gave the bad guys and the current unstable terrorist groups in the world the opportunity to avail themselves of technology they could not have developed on their own. It was no surprise to us that India and Pakistan saved Irata with their nuclear technology and their medium ranged missiles. After all, we saw that technology flowing. We saw China send them 11 missiles to Pakistan, and Rig 9 is to Pakistan for the nuclear program. And, we saw Russia transferring missile technology to India on a regular basis.

I was in Moscow in January of 1996 when the *Washington Post* had just reported a front-page story that Russia had been transferring guidance systems, accelerometers and gyroscopes, to the Iraqis to improve their missile accuracy. When I went to Ambassador Tom Pickley in our Embassy in Moscow, I said, "What was the Russian response? That's a clear violation of the MTCR." His response was, 12 "Congressman, I can't ask that question of the Russians. That's got to come from Washington." And, the response President Clinton sent to me in April of that year, he said, "Congressman, we take the allegations in *The Post* very seriously. It would be a serious violation of the MTCR, and if it occurred, if we can prove it, we will take dramatic action. But we don't have the evidence." Well, folks, when I give speeches around the country, I usually carry the evidence with me. I carry a Soviet accelerometer and Soviet gyroscope that were clipped off of Russia Soviet SS N19 long-range missiles. At that time, one of our agencies that shall remain nameless had over 100 sets of those devices in its control. We had evidence that the Russians had been transferring technology to Iraq, not once, not twice but three times and we did nothing about it.

The proliferation regimes that we were a party to in the 1990s broke down largely because we did not want to impose the required sanctions mandated by the treaties. That's why the Congress passed their (inaudible) Sanctions Bill in 1997 despite the direct lobbying by Vice President Gore and President Clinton it would be bad for

our relationship with Russia. I was at both meetings in the White House with Vice President Gore where Joe Lieberman, Bob Kerry, Carl Levin, John McCain, John Kyl, Lee Hamilton, 12 of us sat in a room where for one hour we were lobbied to vote against the bill. The Bill passed the House with 398 votes, passed the Senate 99 to zero because the Congress was so full of a lack of trust that our arms control treaties were being enforced. We were also not told at that time that there had been a secret deal cut with the Russians in 1995 that Congress was not aware of to allow Russian entities to continue to sell technology to Iran until the year 2000. When you add those parameters together; the lack of funding of our readiness, the lack of closing down bases to free up more funds, the lack of investment in research and development, the lack of enforcement of arms control treaties, you put us in the category we're in right now.

During a time of declining defense budgets with massively increasing uses of our troops - 37 major deployments in eight years - none of them funded in advance, all of them having to be paid for out of a decreasing defense budget. When we rob money from modernization programs, when we take money from the readiness accounts, when we apply across the board cuts to research and development and science and technology, just to keep the troops operational, you begin to understand the train wreck that I think we are in the midst of. What we've now got to do is rethink the way we approach our national security. As the new Chairman of the Procurement Committee, I'll be hosting a series of out of the box hearings in the first quarter of next year because we have to do things differently. Yes, we are getting increased funds largely as a result of the American people realizing after September the 11th that defense and security should be our number one priority.

But that alone will not solve the problem. We've got to think out of the box of how to reconfigure our military, how to deal with the high tech threats of the 21st Century, how to understand the use of intelligence in new ways creating data fusion centers so that we can create profiles of the bad guys using all of the 32 classified systems that existed up until now have largely been stove piped. Only when we understand that the number one responsibility of the federal government is to provide for our national security, according to Article One Section Eight of our Constitution, and convince the American people that it requires a sustained level of funding, and only when we allow ourselves to understand we must reduce the size of our infrastructure, we must enforce arms control agreements or they mean nothing, we must support increased funding for science and technology because high tech is the future of the kind of threats we're going to face, and we must take care of the troops back home because the quality of life of our troops is always going to be the top priority. Only when we understand and address those issues, will our military be capable of 15 supporting the kind of sustained efforts that we are now currently involved in. I'm concerned as the support of our military, not because of our troops. Their morale, in spite of the readiness of our bases, in spite of the lack of spare parts, in spite of aging platforms and lack of modernization, their morale is still at the top. Our young people are ready, willing and able to do the job the Commander in Chief assigns them. But, the question is how long can that continue.

What frustrated me the most, and I say this in closing my comments, was when I traveled the country last year and did 200 speeches in 25 states. In each speech that I gave I talked about the state of our military. I talked about the emerging four threats.

I talked about the fact that we weren't paying for readiness, that we weren't dealing upfront with the need for modernization, with the need for science and technology and R&D funding. And yet every major national poll in the country last year showed defense dead last, dead last. The American people demanded more money for education, they demanded more money for health care, but they were not convinced that defense was a priority that we should focus on. We've got to understand that for us to deal with the challenges of the 21st Century we've got to also reeducate the American people.

September the 11th should not have been the wakeup call. It should not have happened that in 1993 when bin Laden bombed the World Trade Center, and I went up at that event because I also work disasters, America yawned because it wasn't a large loss of life. When a few years later when our embassies were bombed in Africa, and 200 people were killed including 12 Americans, America yawned again because we thought it would never happen on our soil. Again, it was bin Laden. And then we sent 26 young sailors home in body bags from Yemen, from the USS Cole because, again, bin Laden attacked us. And, what did the country do? We yawned, because it wasn't on the radar screen of the national media. It wasn't the kind of issue that we would correlate with an increased need to fully fund our militaries' requirements. On September the 11th, America screamed.

The country demands to know why we hadn't taken the steps to prevent and respond to this terrible act of aggression. What we have to do is let the American people understand the nature of the threats that are out there and the need for the federal government, as its number one priority, to fully fund those requirements. And that continues to require us to cut the waste and abuse out of our defense budget and it is still there. But by and large, unless we address those issues I've outlined, unless we come to terms with the reality of the broader approach to our security, we will not be able to meet the modernization needs to buy the new platforms and new equipment that a 21st century military has to have. Thank you. (Applause)

PFALTZGRAFF

Thank you very much, Curt, for this very important Congressional perspective on the issues that we face this afternoon. I wanted now to turn now to our next speaker who has had, indeed, very important and recent experience in focusing national military power, indeed in focusing international military power. As we all know General Clark, Wes Clark, was Supreme Allied Commander Euro SACEUR from July 1997 through May 2000. He also was the Commander in Chief of the U.S. European Command. In his position as SACEUR, he was the overall commander of approximately 75,000 troops from 37 NATO and other nations participating in the ongoing operations, the peace enforcement operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. He, of course, has had numerous other assignments and appointments in his distinguished military career, and he is now the author of a very fine new book on his military experience. So, it is with very great pleasure that I welcome back to this meeting, General Wesley Clark, U.S.A. retired. (Applause)

CLARK

Bob, thank you very much. It is good to look out in the audience such as I can see. It is a little hard to see from up here, but I do see a lot of old friends and colleagues out there. And, I'm just delighted to be here. I think this is an important forum. Now, I'm not in uniform. I'm standing before you as an impoverished investment banker.

And, it occurred to me when I was in England, we did a British edition of the book about three weeks ago when I was there, with -- I went to Royal Staff College down at Shrivenon . And, one of the members of the faculty said he was just a humble academician. So I put that in my list of oxymorons. You know, military intelligence, political leaders, humble academicians, impoverished investment bankers.

I don't want to talk about investment banking and the economy directly. What I'd like to talk about is our armed forces and where we are right now. We are in midst of a new struggle in a new time. Most of us here are familiar with the post-Vietnam Army at some point. For those of my generation, Barry McCaffrey and John Abrams and Monty Meigs and Jerry Hendricks and everybody else I can see out there, we came out of Vietnam determined that we would never again let our Army be committed where we did not win. We were not going to be patsies. We were not going to be abused. We were not going to be thrown in there without a strategy, without the resolve, and without the means to be decisive. We built that army. We built it on a big five, the opposing force principle and training, we built it on our combat training centers, we built it on battalion and brigade command selection boards, we built it on OPMS and EPMS, and we proved that Army in Desert Storm and in Just Cause and, in fact, it was decisive.

But with the end of the Cold War something began to change and as we lost the structure in the world, we found our armed forces committed more and more in ambiguous and difficult situations. It wasn't that we weren't prepared to be decisive in Korea or a replay of Desert Storm, but we weren't called on to do that. We were called on to go in to Haiti and restored democracy. And the Fauds Five V 150 1 armored fighting vehicles - five - were the most photographed, analyzed and tracked armored vehicles in the history of modern warfare. We knew exactly where they were and what they were capable of.

We went into Bosnia. It wasn't an exactly conventional war fighting mission. In fact, it's a mission we really would have preferred not to have had. And I was one of those on the Joint Staff who was quite concerned about this. We tried to limit the mission so it didn't grow and didn't creep and didn't get us in trouble, as we took the lesson from Somalia. But, we went in there. And then we went into Kosovo. And, by the summer of 2000, we had seen that we really were -- our country really was, as a result of what we had done in the '90s, as a result of the build-up of our military forces, we were historically dominant in a way no nation has been for 500 years. Our armed forces were not only the strongest, they were unchallengeable. Our economy drove the world economy. Our culture was the wellspring of movies and art and fashion around the world. Our consuming power plus our ideas just drove it and our language. With all due respect to my French friends and I don't know if there are any out here, France was being reduced rapidly to just another regional language. English was the language everybody wanted to learn. We were the incredible-- incredibly lucky beneficiaries of globalism. And, of course, after September 11th, we also discovered we were the victims of it.

What we're engaged in and what we have to operate within is a new form of warfare, which I've been calling "modern warfare". It's characterized by the patterns that we saw in Kosovo and the patterns we're seeing today. It starts with some degree of difficulty in defining a clear end state. It is hard to figure out exactly what your objective is or where you might end up. It includes planning and adapting as the fighting goes

on. No six-month window to get ready. You've got to continue to plan even as you fight. You have to operate simultaneously on multiple strategies. There is a heavy reliance up front on air power. Why? Well, because it's usually the most available means of making a military statement, and it has considerably improved over the years in its ability to strike targets precisely with high destructive capacity and rapidly. There is an inordinate fear of civilian casualties because we know that with civilian casualties you lose legitimacy. You lose your base of support. There is a difficulty in committing ground forces because, well, they are not there, or somebody else can do it, or it takes too long, or you may suffer too many casualties from it. There is a requirement to use coalitions and alliances and there is a heavy reliance on public affairs.

That's what modern warfare is. That's what we found it to be in Kosovo, and remarkably, that's what we are finding it to be in this current conflict. And so, the problem is how do we be decisive if it is not through D-day, island hopping, and the conventional means of using military power that are celebrated in American movies and in American history. In a word, it seems to me that modern military warfare gives you the capacity to be militarily decisive in a different way. You can violate the principles of war. You can, and still win. And you can still be decisive. You don't even have to be militarily decisive to be strategically politically decisive if you line up the other elements of national power correctly; the legal, the diplomatic, the economic on top of the military. How can this be? Because as long as we are superior and unchallengeable with our armed forces the way we are today, we can use our armed forces in limited ways and achieve tremendous leverage if we bring to bear the other elements of national power.

So, what is happening in Afghanistan today is a case in point. We go in with air power, we go in with special operating forces, and we use the Northern Alliance on the ground. And, inevitably, the Taliban falls, at least in the area where we've been able to target them. Why? Because they can't stand the weight of the air power, and with ground forces there to help provide the targeting and bring that power to bear, it is tactically decisive in those areas.

But I think the broader picture of the campaign also suggests that in order to be decisive, we have to fully take account of what modern warfare is. We have to understand that this is a struggle not only in Afghanistan, but it's also a struggle in a number of other countries against terrorism, and to win this struggle we have to win it from the outside in, and the bottom up, and slower is actually better. Why? Well, all the conditions that make fighting in Afghanistan so difficult – the geography, the culture, the language, the tortured history of the land - are reversed when we're dealing with our own country here. We know the geography, we speak the language, we understand the culture. The police officers are even friendly most of the time in this country. And, surely, we can from here and Britain and Germany and France and Italy, pull together what we need, take apart the terrorist network cell by cell, individual by individual, from the bottom to the top and take away Osama bin Laden's capacities to act.

To do this, though, we've got to have allies. We've got to have people working with us and they have to make changes in how their governments function. That's why we need the coalition. Not just for military physical access, but because if we are going to fight modern warfare we've got to have support. And, so we've got to give time for these governments, the governments of Germany, and France, and Italy, and Greece,

Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to change their procedures, to be able to share intelligence, to be able to take action against fundamentalists on their own soil. That's not enough. This is also a struggle for Islam. We are going to have to find those hundreds of millions and their leaders who believe Islam is tolerant and peace loving. And they're going to have to take their own stand against Osama bin Laden and his interpretation of what Islam is. And we are going to have to reinforce them. And that's going to take time.

And even that's not enough. I've heard a lot of people say they want to drain the swamp, and by that they usually mean where we're going after Afghanistan. Is it Somalia, is it Iraq, is it Libya, is it Syria, is it Iran? How many? How soon? How often? But I think it's more than that because that swamp is out there as a result of -- partly as a result of us. We are five percent of the world's population. We're taking 25 percent of the consumable resources. And that's an unsustainable condition in the long term. And so, part of winning the modern war is winning the information campaign, and a big part of that is what we're trying to do now, which is project a different image of America. But you can't project an image that doesn't reflect reality. And so, it means we're going to have to tend to the reality that's out there.

Even beyond the Islamic world the conditions of poverty, disease, despair and hopelessness in Africa and elsewhere will affect us. We can't have the benefits of globalism without helping build the safety net that lets us have those benefits. What it means for the military, I think, is this. First, I think precision strike's been a real blessing and I think we ought to continue to pursue it. We need global deployment and global capabilities, but air power is limited. It can only do so much. And what we saw in Kosovo wasn't the unlimited potential of air power; it was equally or even more so the limitations of air power to look inside, to look behind, to look underneath. We've got to have effective, capable ground forces. They've got to be able to get there. They've got to have high quality dedicated men and women who have the courage to be there on the ground. It means that whole spectrum of capabilities starting with special forces and going to the intermediate brigades and up to heavy forces. And I'm very much supportive of the direction that the Chief has taken the United States Army in its transformation. I think it's critical, and I think it needs to be supported and it needs to be resourced more intensively than it is today. And I hope that some of these additional resources will go into that transformation effort.

But I think even that's not enough. I think we've got to do more in terms of public affairs and training for our officers. Because what we find is that the public affairs and the communication of ideas can be strategically decisive in a global age. We've got to have that capacity. We've got to train our people to work with it. And beyond that, we've got to go back and look at the development of our officers and noncommissioned officers. During the 1970s and '80s, we made a tremendous effort to strengthen the skills of the muddy boots army. It was essential. We had, prior to that, battalion commanders who didn't know their systems. They couldn't fight their own tanks. They weren't technically competent. We can't ever lose that. But we can't be satisfied with that. Because there is no other source in the United States government for the strategic vision and the capability to assemble the military power with a diplomatic and the legal that the United States armed forces and their officers can bring together. That's what we should be teaching in our staff colleges, in our war colleges and our in

general officer courses, not only how to apply pure military force, but how to bring it in and use the other elements of power.

Let me just ask you a question: Why isn't Osama bin Laden indicted as a war criminal? He declared genocide against the United States. It's an order, his order, to kill all Americans, military and civilian, anywhere in the world. Sounds like genocide to me. I got a call a couple of days ago from the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia concerning Mr. Milosevic. He is on trial for genocide and other crimes against humanity. Why isn't Osama bin Laden? In many respects, the crowning, decisive blow of the Kosovo campaign wasn't the deployment of the Apaches, the preparation of ground forces of the air campaign. It was the fact that Milosevic was indicted. And when he was indicted all hopes that he had for compromise and finagling and cutting a deal were cut off.

I think the men and women who lead the armed forces and those who are coming up in it have to understand that in modern war you can get tremendous leverage from military power if you line it up with the diplomatic and the legal on top of it. To me, that's the charge for how to be decisive today. Keep the armed forces unchallengeable, force your adversaries to fight asymmetrically and line up the legal, the diplomatic, the economic and the military against them. That's the key to decisiveness. Thank you. (Applause)

PFALTZGRAFF

Thank you very much, General Clark for this concise and very important statement about military power. It fits brilliantly into the discussions this afternoon. Let me now introduce our next speaker.

We turn now to a discussion of missile defense, the very important topic on the national security and military agenda. We have to discuss this topic with us Rear Admiral Kathleen K. Paige, United States Navy. She is the Systems Technical Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. She is a 1970 graduate of the University of New Hampshire and was commissioned to the United States Navy in 1971. She has had many tours of duty since then. They include Technical Director, AGEIS Program Office, very important for our discussion this afternoon; Chief Engineer, Naval Surface Warfare Center and Baseline Manager for the Combat Systems Division of the AGEIS shipbuilding program. I might add that she has also had an assignment as Director Theater Air and Missile Defense and Systems Engineering. She is also a graduate, I might add here, with a Master of Science Degree from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and is a graduate also of the Defense Systems Management College and the Cornell University Program for Executives. So, it is with great pleasure that I welcome Rear Admiral Paige to this panel and to this discussion this afternoon. Admiral Paige. (Applause)

PAIGE

Good heavens. Thank you for that generous introduction. One thing that wasn't mentioned is that I am an Engineering Duty Officer, and so the way I have spent the day typically for the last 30 years of my Navy career has been working with engineers to build ships, combat systems and, more recently, ballistic missile defense systems. So, this really is a very rare opportunity and I will even say a welcome one to join you and participate in such a policy forum.

I have structured my remarks this afternoon around a statement from the Quadrennial Defense Review. That statement says that DOD has refocused and revitalized the missile defense program from one focused on a single site national missile defense system to a broad-based research development and test effort aimed at deployment of missile defense. I'll describe the key elements of this new program and how it responds to the transformational nature of the military as defined in the QDR. Next view graph, please.

We have a refocused and revitalized missile defense program, ladies and gentlemen, because of President Bush's strong commitment to national -- to missile defense, and because of the long-standing support from key Congressional leaders, which has allowed us over the many years to maintain at least some degree of momentum so that we have an opportunity to be prepared now that the nation has recognized that missile defense is, in fact, a terrorist threat. Now, I show here a quote from President Bush. He has talked often about missile defense. I selected this particular quote from the 27th of February for a couple of reasons. You read the quote and it is prescient in so many ways. It presages the potential for September 11th type of attack. It recognizes that the ballistic missile is a terrorist weapon. And it is essentially an outline for what we see in both the Quadrennial Defense review and in the structure of the new missile defense program. Next view graph please.

Now, in that quote President Bush addressed threats that are more widespread and less certain. That's really key to much of what we see in the QDR and in our new program. The QDR provides a model for responding to such a threat environment. I've listed in this view graph some of the quotes, some of the tenets from the QDR that apply to defense in general and, specifically, to missile defense. The tenet that I'd like to discuss first is the imperative that we move from a classic threat-based model to a capability-based model. And, Congressman Weldon set me up perfectly for this next discussion. Next view graph, please.

This next view graph gives you an idea graphically of the world's population of ballistic missiles, almost 30 years ago in 1972. Next view graph. Here we are almost 30 years later and just the graphic impact of the growth, the proliferation in that threat around the globe, to me is awesome. Now, certainly understanding the scope and general characteristics of the threat remains vitally important, even as we say we are moving away from a threat-based approach to addressing defense to a capabilities-based. But that's because what's even more sobering than what we know about the threat, is the number of times that we have been surprised by specific, very critical aspects of the threat. There are what we tend to call the unknown unknowns and listening to Mr. Weldon, unfortunately, there is also a category called the "I don't want to know's".

Let me give you just two examples of things that were truly unknown unknowns that surprised the intelligence community and, therefore, the military community. First was in 1993, North Korea launched a Nodong missile. We knew it. We tracked it. We knew what we expected of that missile and its flight. Looked at the data, put it away, and moved on. Four years later, 1997, for a reason I don't recall, a Navy analyst was reviewing those data and instead of stopping the review at the first sign of losing track on that ballistic missile that day, that analyst had patience and looked through some more data. And, guess what? Our tracking sensors started to track something again. It turned out that nobody had anticipated the range that that missile could

have, and so when the sensors first dropped track, the analyst said, "That's as far as the missile went. We don't expect it to fly any further." But, in fact, it turned out that that missile over flew Japan, flying further than we thought the missile capable of flying. It was a fairly embarrassing diplomatic incident when we went back to Japan and said, "Remember that missile launched from North Korea four years ago? Well, Japan, that over flew your country."

It was a year after that realization that we had another surprise, August 31, 1998. Again, it was North Korea, this time launching a Taepo Dong. We were prepared for a launch. In fact, we had some AEGIS ships stationed in order to track the launch. It didn't happen exactly when we expected. The United States ships had to go off on other assignments, but the Japanese AEGIS destroyer, Myoko, stayed on station and was able to track that Taepo Dong. What was that surprise? We had been told by the intelligence community that that missile didn't have three stages that North Korea couldn't build a three-stage rocket. Guess what? It had three stages. It is the surprises that get you on the defense. It is the surprises that we need to cope with in this new approach to defense. Next view graph?

This is a different way to look at the threat. And it shows you the range of various threat types. Now, I mention this for a number of reasons. First of all, for -- since the outset of missile defense program up until very recently, we had a very severe demarcation. We talked about strategic threats and then separately we talked about theater threats. And, those theater threats tended to be your shorter-range threats. Well, if you look at this graph, you'll see that we have examples of threat ranges that go from the short to the medium to the intermediate to the long range. We have now a continuum of threats. And even those threats that are of a shorter range, we have seen launched from ships at sea just as we launch trident missiles from sea. And so those missiles don't have to be of the classic intercontinental ballistic missile range to be able to reach our shores.

Another very personal way to view this graph, instead of looking at just the numbers and the lines, look at that short range missile on the left. That represents a missile that can fly from Iraq to Tel Aviv. The medium range missile next to it is something that can fly from North Korea to Japan. The intermediate range, further to the right, that's Libya to London. I had just arrived in London on the 11th of September, as the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon were being hit. And the largest parameter -- parabola is the United States being hit from anywhere around the globe. So, being able to address a missile of any range is of critical importance. We can't make that strategic versus theater demarcation any more and that's going to change the way we operate, the concept of operations in both our theater commands and in our unified commands.

Now, there's one other point I would like to make from this chart, and it is the fact that we are not going to restrict ourselves to being able to kill incoming ballistic missiles in only one or even two portions of their trajectory. We want to be able to kill in what we call the boost phase, soon after the launch of the ballistic missile, during mid-course, during that long period when it's flying out, as well as in the terminal phase. We want to do that for a couple of reasons, because technically each one has their advantages and opportunities, each of those regimes has their problems. Also, operationally, if we can take out a ballistic missile as it's launching, not only is that before its been able to release its decoys and its chaff, those things that confuse the

problem of killing the business end of the missile, but it also keeps the business end of the missile, that part that carries the weapon of mass destruction, the high energy explosives or the chemical or bio-agents, keeps them far from our shores. But it also gives us the ability to predict where will be that fallout and where is the best place to take the shot to prevent damage to the underlying countries or areas. Next view graph, please?

So to address that kind of threat environment, we have what is, in fact, a very different approach to missile defense. Yes, we've been working on missile defense for 15 years or more. We have proven many of the technologies. We're coming close to deploying the pack three, the Patriot Ballistic Missile Defense System which is able to kill in the terminal phase. But to date, we have had a collection of programs, each managed as independent programs, by each of the three services. From now on, they'll be managed as a single integrated program where you can bring the synergies to bear, you can create an architecture that gives you the power of overhead sensors, and command and control opportunities, and that gives us the flexibility that you need when you play defense, when you are in the reactive mode. We're also providing a lot of variety. You also always want a lot of arrows in your quiver, as large a magazine as you can have.

So what are we planning? A variety of basing modes, systems that can operate from ground, from sea, from air, and conceivably even from space. A variety of technologies, very different approaches to development concepts. And, again, trying to buy us the deck in the defense's favor, the ability to exploit complimentary phenomenologies, another very different part of the program. This is research development, test and evaluation. These systems must earn their way into the procurement budget before we commit the procurement dollars to them. They do so both by proving themselves in tests and proving that they provide value added to a larger architecture. And, the last thing that is very different about this approach, we're addressing protection, not just for the United States and for our deployed forces, but for our allies and friends. And not just protection for our allies and friends, but true cooperation and collaboration with our allies and friends. Next view graph?

We talk a lot about being capability based instead of threat based. That's discussed in the QDR. It is the hallmark of the new missile defense program. And, what does that mean? Well, bottom line is that means we have the management and the engineering flexibility to provide us an insurance policy against all of those unknown unknowns. Next view graph? And how do we go about actually delivering and fielding capability so we have protection available around the globe? Capability-based means you don't wait 20 years to have what you think at the outset is the ideal system, and it is a has-been by the time it is delivered. The plan is to be able to deliver incremental capability where we pull together the mature capabilities that are consistent and coherent in their architecture, that are integrated via a cohesive battle management and command and control system, and we test it thoroughly, and if directed, deploy it. Two years later, we upgrade that capability.

Now, an important point that I would like to make here is that this requires us to be operating basically in three epochs. We need to have very focused effort in executing well the immediate programs and engineering that we have on our plate today. At the same time, we need to be maturing technologies so that when we field the existing capability, we are prepared to start engineering and integrating and fielding the

upgrades to those systems, because the offense doesn't wait. But we're not going to just continue to evolve what we know and stay with what we know.

In parallel with that, we need to give equal emphasis to the wild blue yonder so when you get to the point of those later year block developments it may look very, very different than the initial block that's fielded, concepts that will just turn the whole idea of missile defense on its ear. Radically different. We're open to those ideas. And that's the only way that we will be able to address those unknown unknowns. Next view graph?

In the end, our ability to deter or defeat the ballistic missile threat as charged in the QDR, comes down to understanding that defense is a reactive, not an elective function. If we're going to succeed against the adversary's play book, we must have a very robust playbook ourselves. We must execute well with constancy of purpose. We need to put the guessing games, the insecurities, into the laps of those whom would do us harm, to us, to our allies and to our friends. Thank you very much. (Applause)

PFALTZGRAFF

Thank you very much, Admiral Paige. There is much that you have said that we should take on board. One thing that I liked in particular you said that we cannot make that theater intercontinental distinction any longer. We need to think about that as we think about missile defense requirements and the terrorist threat.

We now turn to our next speaker, Lieutenant General Anderson, United States Army. General Anderson is Deputy Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff U.S. Space Command, and Vice Commander U.S. Element North American Aerospace Defense Command, that is NORAD. In this capacity, General Anderson helps lead the unified command responsible for directing space control and support operations, including missile defense as well as the computer network defense and the computer network attack CAN capability. General Anderson has also served as Director for Strategic Plans and Policy in the Joint Staff, the assignment he had before his present assignment. And, I might add that previous to that he served as Commanding General, United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command. So, it is very -- with great pleasure, with very great pleasure, that I welcome General Anderson who has spoken at previous meetings of this kind to give us yet another dimension which is looking at the space dimension. Ed, great to have you back.

ANDERSON

Thank you very much, Bob. General Shinseki, fellow Flag Officers, both active and retired, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure to be here and certainly a great privilege to be a part of this very distinguished panel. General Eberhart sends his regrets. I can assure you that would very much like to have been here. He recognizes the importance of this particular forum and particularly as they address such current and relevant issues. I must add congratulations to General Shinseki and the Army staff and to my good friend Dr. Bob Pfaltzgraff and the IFPA staff for once again another magnificent and superb job in putting on the Fletcher conference.

As Bob indicated, I've been asked to speak about space in military operations. As I think you all know, U.S. Space Command, and as Bob indicated in his introduction, is not only responsible for space but it is also responsible for computer network

defense and computer network attack, which we have formed together into computer network operations. And so, I have chosen to expand my remarks just a little bit to not only address space, but to address cyber space, which I do think is a relevant issue for discussion here today. Next slide, please.

I am going to add my effort at trying to describe what this new environment is that we're going to be in using these measures up here. We had a taste of that this morning, a very good sense of that this morning. Certainly, as we all know, the president has clearly declared war on terrorism worldwide and, of course, all of our CINCS are prosecuting that through Operation Enduring Freedom. And what we have found is -- all of us have found is that Operation Enduring Freedom certainly presents some unique challenges, particularly to us as war fighters. If we consider a traditional war, and I admit that it's hard to define "traditional war" to be along the lines of what we used to refer to as two major theater wars, then I think we would all certainly agree that this is a nontraditional conflict that we are embarked on. The adversary is certainly not a peer competitor and certainly not a super power. And although he has global presence and certainly he has global reach, he does not have the conventional, dedicated nation state support that we would expect. In other words, a single nation supporting him, but he certainly has nation-state support as you'll recall from the discussion this morning. He may be fighting on an age-old battlefield. I mean we even see the reports of cavalry being used over in Afghanistan, and so on and so forth. But leveraging the latest, he is also leveraging the latest in commercial information technology. And clearly, as evidenced by the tragic events of the 11th of September, this adversary employs asymmetric weapons as part of his strategy as well. And this adversary clearly understands that information is a powerful and potent weapon and as he has effectively used mass media to spread his message.

So in this war we are fighting, I would suggest to you, a sophisticated enemy in perhaps a not so sophisticated battlefield environment. But just because it is not a sophisticated battlefield, that does not mean that high tech capabilities, such as space capabilities and cyber space capabilities, don't have a role. As a matter of fact, I submit to you that they have a very important role in Operation Enduring Freedom. Next slide, please.

It is interesting to note that Joint Vision 2020 outlined that the two keys to success in military operations were information and decision superiority. In other words, our ability to control space and cyberspace, I would offer to you, will determine whether our combatant commanders will be capable of achieving complete situational awareness, ultimately leading to information and decision superiority. In U.S. Space Command, our war fighters are working hard to build real-time situational awareness right now, for General Tommy Franks and ultimately for all CINCS. And, we use a traditional space capabilities of missile warning, satellite communications in order to link our war fighters over large distances, navigation and timing to allow our war fighters to know where they are and at the same time to allow our precision weapons to function, we provide terrestrial and space weather, an important factor in our operations, as well as intelligence surveillance and recognizance.

In addition to those standard space capabilities that we are all well aware of, we are also working to provide to General Frank's coherent change, detection capability, in other words, our ability to observe change over time; tracking of blue forces as well as providing time critical information which would enable our war fighters to bring

the right mix of either kinetic or non-kinetic weapons at the right place at the right time. In the area of information superiority, we are partnering with DOD agencies, other government agencies, the Joint Staff, the services, as well as law enforcement agencies and our allies as we continue to provide cyberspace protection of both our critical DOD information and our communications infrastructure.

But all of these efforts have led us to believe that there is a new perspective that is required, as well. And so, we have embarked on an effort to provide support to General Franks and CINC Sent and the other -- ultimately the other combatant commanders in developing a full spectrum information operations campaign for both CINC Sent and for the global counter terrorism campaign. So, as the QDR said, and obviously we agree, that space and information are war fighting core competencies, they are not just enablers as we have traditionally been accustomed to and we learn that every day. But that's today. What about tomorrow? Next slide, please.

What we are seeing in Operation Enduring Freedom is much the same as we have seen since Desert Storm, and that is that there has become a greater reliance on military and commercial space and information systems. And we certainly do not expect that that trend is going to diminish. But it is not just passing information that is the important piece of this, it is providing usable information in a timely manner over large distances that allow our war fighters to be -- give them the decisive advantage. So the requirement to collect and move real-time information, critical information, to our forces in the field we expect certainly will grow. But our potential adversaries are watching what is happening in Operation Enduring Freedom, just as they watched what was happening in Kosovo and just as they watched what was happening in Desert Storm, in all cases where we enjoyed and currently enjoy information superiority. And they will seek to deny that advantage to us.

The graphic on the right of this chart may serve as an indicator for you just to look at the cyber events that have happened. And if you were to extend that out one more year, as you may have read in the Defense News the other day, our expectation is that that number will double. So this is a situation that is getting worse, not better. And certainly, in the future the battle for information will be critical. So, what do we need to do? Next slide, please.

While at the risk of stating the obvious we must, we believe, maintain space and information superiority. We must make these a priority today, not just in the future. We will be challenged. We've already seen evidence of that and we can be sure of that in the future, as well. In the area of space superiority, space control is vital, giving our increasing reliance on space assets to include commercial assets. Now, if you look at the -- at the right those are the components that we use to define space control. And so, we must, we believe, first and foremost develop a comprehensive and robust terrestrial and space based surveillance system. We need the protection systems on and for our satellites, both to protect them from environmental hazards as well as from hostile acts. We need the prevention capabilities to be able to deny the enemy the use of his assets, as well as deny him from denying us the use of our assets. And, ultimately, we need a negation capability, preferably a reversible capability. But to offer the combatant commander whatever options he may need, it may mean that there are other types necessary, as well.

Now, I am not trying to suggest to you and I hope you would not let me leave here with the thought that we are advocating that space can do it all. It cannot. And it would be tough to do all of what I've just suggested to you and certainly it would be very, very expensive. There must be a mix of terrestrial and space based systems in the future and what we need to do is to develop the ability to model, simulate and analyze just like we have for terrestrial systems, so that we can make those trade-off decisions in an informed way. In the area of information superiority, indications and warning systems are at the top of our list. Our cyber systems will become prime targets. We already know that. But we want to know it before they do it. We don't want to be in the reactive posture that we are right now. We must be in a proactive posture. We believe that it is now time to treat full spectrum information operations as a key war fighting capability, and to develop the organizations and processes to employ it effectively. And DOD's role in the national information infrastructure protection must be addressed. We all know that our own war fighting infrastructure is directly tied to the national information infrastructure protection capability. So it's all about information and who controls it. This will be important as we work to transform the force. Next slide, please.

Transformation of our military has already begun, we already know that, led by the Army as a matter of fact. Has been for some time. And after we believe and we would offer that space and cyber space can make major contributions to the force during this transformation. There are several promising technologies that are out there that we need to translate into capabilities, which we believe would ultimately enhance our information and decision superiority capabilities. For example, space-based moving target indicator. Gives you the capability to see deep behind enemy lines, no risk to a crew, no concern about landing rights, and certainly gives you a huge field of view, in essence, global. Another capability - hyper-spectral imagery. A new generation of imagery products which unlock vital information on the battlefield. Among other things, it gives you the capability to detect camouflage vehicles.

And certainly space based laser communications to give us the opportunity to move bulk information both into and out of the theater of operations. So, as I say, we must translate these technologies into war fighting capabilities for our war fighters. And then, what we must do is integrate these capabilities into our joint and combined forces, for example, so that they can provide real-time communications between sensor and shooters and shooters and commanders, essential today and certainly very essential in the future. Certainly a global area of operations requires a global reach and space capabilities can provide that. We must compliment the high demand, low-density assets that are so precious in our inventory.

I'm not trying to say that if you have space-based radar, you don't need JSTARS. That's not it at all. As I indicated earlier, we have to determine the mix. But, we do think that there is a capability to compliment those kinds of systems. And, we must expand computer network operations to full spectrum information operations. We must take the next step and take full advantage of full spectrum information operations. This will be a major challenge, I can assure you. But, as I say, space and cyberspace we believe will be able to assist in transforming the way we fight. Next slide, please.

So, in conclusion, one of the keys to success will be our ability to leverage our space and information capabilities while denying that to our adversary. Developing these capabilities and integrating them with space, land and air capabilities will be of

utmost importance, both today as well as in the future. These capabilities will enable us a global perspective with worldwide connectivity, real-time situational awareness which will provide effects based solutions. Today, we are engaged in a two-front war, one front here at home and one front abroad. Space and information are key parts of that war today, and will be for every engagement in the future. Thank you very much and I look forward to your questions. (Applause)

PFALTZGRAFF

Thank you very much, General Anderson for remind us and pointing out the indispensable role of space and, indeed, of cyber space and, of course, space control. Very important as we think about military power in the 21st Century.

Now last, but not least, I turn to General Barry McCaffrey. General McCaffrey is the Olin Distinguished Professor of National Securities Studies at the United States Military Academy at West Point. He is also President of his own consulting firm based in Alexandria, Virginia and has been elected to the Board of Trustees of Microtek Systems and to the Board of Directors both of the Phoenix House Foundation and the Atlantic Council of the United States. All of us have known General McCaffrey in his previous assignments. In particular, I should remind you, but I really don't need to do so, but I will anyway, that he was Director of the White House Office and National Drug Control Policy from February 1996 until January 2001. In that capacity, he served as a member of the President's Cabinet and the National Security Council on drug related issues. He, of course, came to that position after a long and distinguished career in the United States Army. So, it is with very great pleasure that I welcome General McCaffrey to this discussion this afternoon. And, of course, we have seen General McCaffrey very often on television recently. Now, we have a chance to see him in person. Barry, welcome. (Applause)

McCAFFREY

Thanks very much, Bob. Thanks for that generous introduction. Normally what I do when I'm on TV is I go listen to Dave Cranes and then Wes Clark and then I know exactly what to say. Let me begin by thanking both Bob and Dr. Jackie Davis, because the two of you have been such a tremendous influence and part of their national security process. I thank you for helping organize a conference and for both of you for your continuing friendship over the years. Let me take particular note of Congressman Curt Weldon. You know, there are probably 30 or 40 Congressman who bear a disproportionate influence in shaping the national security process. You know, and our former -- one of our former chiefs was wont to say that those of us who are privileged to wear the uniform are only one aspect of a strong national defense. Clearly, the American people and also Congress. Why don't you join me in a round of applause for Congressman Curt Weldon. (Applause) It's always fun listening to Wes Clark. I started off listening to him when he was teaching political philosophy a few years ago when he was a Major. I'd go drift by his class. He has been a brilliant dedicated officer and a life long friend. Admiral Kathleen Paige, thank you for your presentation. And, Ed Anderson I've known for years. I didn't realize -- we were sitting up here, it was like being bugs under a light. I couldn't tell who was in the audience. Chief, thanks for your leadership, for your example. Bob Wood, DAMO-SS, smarter than most of us who have served in job. I saw Pete Cuvielo the world's smartest living human being - my title, not his - for helping set up such a turnkey modern Joint

headquarters in South Com. Chuck Maham and others who lead the Army or the joint forces in our latest conflict.

A couple thoughts, if you will, about looking toward the future. You know, there is a good argument that many of us who are senior military officers are the most conservative people you'll ever run into. There is a reason for it. We've seen things screwed up from the time we came into the Army at age 21, you know, rolling or falling down ravines, horizontal sleet, mud, confusion. I didn't get the word. We know a thousand ways to screw things up. We've seen it go right a lot, too, and we're very risk adverse. We don't like -- and many would argue historically the United States armed forces don't face risk very often. One could argue that except for the Jalu, Guadalcanal, and the Civil War we never faced situations where we think the survival of the force is at stake. And, until September 11th, we never thought the American people would pay with their lives for an enemy attack. It is a new world we're operating in.

Let me sort out for you five principles that I think many of us might want to bring to bear on what we're up to in organizing America's military. And, the first one might be odd for an infantry officer to start off with. I use to introduce myself for years when I was a J5 certainly, either as the Jane Fonda of the Joint Staff. That's when I'd go to National Security Council meetings and say, "How come everybody in here wants to fight but me? Can't we talk to these people? Do we have to start by bombing them?" You know, that kind of dialogue. And, then the other line I would like to use frequently was to introduce myself as the Nuclear Strategic Deterrent guy for the Pentagon. I think we all ought to remind ourselves frequently that the principle defense responsibility for the U.S. armed forces, bar none, is to prevent the employment of weapons of mass destruction against the U.S. or our allies. Period. Until we have done that we have not fulfilled our responsibilities.

And that involves a lot of things we don't talk about too much any longer. One is strong, modernized, carefully controlled nuclear attack forces at an appropriate level. And thank God the Navy and the Air Force have not yet walked away from that mission. It is not very visible. But we need to put lots of money into insuring that our nuclear attack capability is credible, secure, trained and modern. We clearly need sound international treaty constraints. We got it. Diplomacy is a huge piece of preventing the employment of weapons of mass destruction. And, our current diplomatic conceptual architecture is outmoded and has to get rethought. First-rate strategic intelligence is a piece of this huge primary responsibility. Do we -- you know, Kathleen Paige mentioned it. Do we actually know what it is we are facing? And, a lot of times it is painful to face up to some of these threats. And, then finally, it seems to me we've got to do a strategic and regional ballistic missile defense. I wrote an article for Armed Forces Journal International. I was tempted to put in there "I'm one of the few military officers that are unequivocal in promoting BMD as part of the American people's security." And, part of it I don't bear responsibilities like the Chiefs or many of the CINCs on opportunity costs of a billion dollars invested in BMD, will it represent a threat to my own programs. But, I think we back off it and we talk about our security responsibilities. That is the first responsibility.

Secondly, the invisible aspect of national defense. It's controlling the oceans choke points and their ports. We haven't been in a struggle, again one would argue, except for Guadalcanal where we thought we would lose control of the oceans' choke points. You know, we went and fought Desert Storm. It was great fun. It was the first and

probably last military campaign we will ever carry out where with under 500 casualties the tragedies didn't outweigh the gains. But a lot of -- one of the major -- many problems that comes out of Desert Storm, post-war analysis, forget the role that the Navy that got us there, we go to war by sea. If it's ammunition, POL, or equipment it's got to go through a port. And we can get there rapidly with our new transform Army divisions. I got all that. But we will fight only when we control the sea. So, we've got to keep whatever is appropriate as naval and other forces to control these choke points.

Three, we've got to have a strategic conventional attack capability. And I'm not sure we have adequately understood that this is a synergistic effect. It may well include strategic ballistic missiles. It certainly includes an air and sea component. It certainly includes cyber warfare. It certainly includes special operations forces as part of a strategic conventional attack capability. And again, to go back to Wes Clark's main point, none of this works unless it's in sync with the legal diplomatic economic leverage of the United States.

Fourth, expedition area operations air/ground. We've got a problem. We are going to have to understand certainly the Army is faced up that in the last five years we're going to have to build a very different kind of intervention capability to get substantial amounts of combat power into a theater of operations by air. Thank God for the C 17 and other ways of bringing combat power across a beach. If the Marine Corps walks away from understanding that their principle unique capability that we have to retain is the ability to intervene across a beach, we will be insecure in our national objectives.

Final one, air/land deterrents and stabilization. And there's, you know, the couple things we shouldn't forget. When you wake up in the morning you ought to say, "Thank God war in Korea didn't start today." There are still unpredictable people. We will fight for Korea. When we wake up in the morning we ought to remind ourselves there is still a reason for NATO deterrence forces to be on the grounds, that we are still in Southwest Asia until next fall when we address what to do about Iraq. We'll be there. We have the requirement to maintain deterrence and stabilization.

I think one of the worst things we ever came up with was the notion of exit strategies. And for that matter, sometimes the words "end game" are inappropriate when we talk about U.S. military strategy. Certainly, a prime example in my view was Haiti. Eight million people, abject misery, right in the middle of the hemisphere, right in the middle of the Caribbean, huge economic and political and cultural and social implications to the United States. Had we stayed there for 25 years with special forces, it would not have been a day too long. We do not, it seems to me, constrain ourselves when we talk about immediate exit strategies.

Three cautions: Number one, particularly with some of the incredible brain power in the room. And, I borrowed this line from General Dick Kavaosoes, one of my personal heroes and many of you in the room. "Who's pulling the trigger?" No one was ever killed with cyber warfare with information dominance. At the end of the day I want to hear who is the 23 year old flying the F 16. Who is in the tank, the Bradley fighting vehicle, what 11 teenage boys are sitting around looking down the sights of an M249? Who is pulling the trigger?

Number two, we've got to rethink the way we organize our headquarters. You know, you've got to retire to have an idea on this subject. You've got to retire. But we ought to look and say, "Where are the generals?" I was thrilled when the Air Force, years ago, took all of their generals, many of their generals, ran them out of town and put them out with their flying wings. Generals ought to be on the frontier. Less of them ought to be in headquarters.

A third caution: If you want to multiply force structure, the first thing you don't do is buy more units. You buy better training. You buy better quality of people. We know that in an intellectual sense but we better let that observation guide our funding priorities. Training and quality of people magnify force structure: a notion that is inadequately addressed.

My daughter is a Captain in the United States Army National Guard. You cannot imagine how proud I am of that fact. You know, she and her husband, a civilian lawyer, and I sort of have a triumphant in this. When she deploys, grandmother deploys. We are proud of the National Guard, a huge modernized sophisticated air and ground force. It is the wrong force to defend America in the coming 25 years. We've got to go out and look at it again and say, "How do we give 54 state and territorial governors the tools they need to defend the American people?" They don't need a tank division in New Jersey. Even worse, we've got these incredibly sophisticated ops research people who correctly will say, "Stock pile your F 16 brigade in northeast, put your chemical warfare capability together in California, put your armored units together in the Southeast." What we need to give the governors is non-Title 10 decentralized capabilities that were designed with a population or environmental algorithm in mind. The governor of New York needs 10 reconnaissance decontamination battalions for chem/bio/nuke attack. The governor of New Mexico needs one. We need to understand decentralized development of a National Guard force.

We need to go look at the American frontiers. It is unbelievable what happens on 7,000 miles of national frontier. We've got to create a national Gendarmerie. We took the border patrol, we took them from 3500 people to 7,000. I used to tell the Attorney General the right answer is 20,000. Now, I say the right answer is 40,000 people in a national Gendarmerie to control our own borders. This is not a job for the U.S. armed forces, for the National Guard. We do not want members of the armed forces having a role in domestic law enforcement policy. We need to modernize the coast guard. It's an incredibly effective force. Its ships are ancient. Its aircraft are ancient. It needs to be structured with a strategic outcome in mind and a doctrine. They've done their doctrinal analysis. The U.S. Coast Guard is inadequate for its current missions.

Then, finally, it seems to me we need to go look at resources. You know, I was on one of the discussion shows debating one terribly smart person without much experience and another nitwit. And, you know, one of the critiques I got from another retiree when I got off it was to say, "You know, golly, you can't call for more resource expenses. Be politically aware. Be sensitive to the realities of the coming 10 years." If the American people want to survive into the late parts of this century, we will spend whatever resources are required to construct an adequate national military strategy and, in addition, will develop the tools in foreign aid and foreign intervention to keep the American people free. It was 40 percent in World War II. It was 6 percent during the Cold War. It is 3 percent now. We have inadequate resources to defend the

American people. Lord protect the political leadership the next time we have a major incident and take 25,000 dead if we have been inadequately energized to do what is called for on an emergency basis in the coming two years to build an adequate defense.

I think it's moving in the right direction. Thankfully, we have, in my judgment, an incredibly good team currently leading the Department of Defense and, indeed, the Cabinet officers who are charged with this responsibility. But, it won't happen without resources. On that note, thanks very much for letting me share these ideas with you. (Applause)

PFALTZGRAFF Thank you very much, Barry, for helping us to integrate the many themes that have been a part this afternoon; the need to think about global strategy, regional presence, deterrence, power projection, organizational issues, training and quality of people and, of course, to talk about the National Guard and the Coast Guard. We will have the Commandant of the Coast Guard on our next panel. So, this is a good segue, indeed, into the next panel session on homeland security. Now, it is with great pleasure that I open the floor for questions. Please raise your hand and wait for the microphone. We have a few moments. We have, in fact, about 20 minutes for discussion. So, who would like to be the first to be recognized for a question? Right over here. Would you wait for the microphone please?

FROM AUDIENCE Hi. My name is Erin Winegrad. I'm with Inside Washington Publishers. I was wondering if the rest of the panel could comment on General McCaffrey's comments about restructuring the National Guard for homeland defense and what capabilities they need and how they should be structured, placed around the country and the rest of it.

MCCAFFREY Ask Admiral Paige first.

PAIGE Thank you, sir. I'm well equipped as an Engineering Duty Officer to talk about the National Guard. As a citizen and a taxpayer I'll say it makes great deal of sense to me and I'll pass the ball to that one.

PFALTZGRAFF Would General McCaffrey like to comment on his comment?

MCCAFFREY Well, you know, the armed forces constructed a model where we literally can't fight conventional high intensity operations from day one of the war without the active participation of the Reserves and the Guard. Air and ground Guard units literally are on our tip feds from day one on. And, you know, so they are a valued part of the defense team. And, in some cases, you know, you look at -- there are some parts of the Guard units that are far more competent, stabilized long term than their active component counterparts. There are just terrific capabilities. Military police companies are attached to my division in Desert Storm. Six of them, incredibly competent people. At the same time, I think we're facing a new era. We're not going to fight 17 divisions. If we do we can start them from scratch, but what is clear to me that will happen is we are entering a new era where we're going to have to look like Great Britain within five years. We're going to have to construct domestic defenses that are

responsive and adequate and they've got to be decentralized. And, the governor and the mayor and the city councils have to have appropriate force structure.

We need military police, light infantry, we need field hospitals, we need signal capabilities that have generators and trucks that can move around. We clearly need new biochem recon decontamination. And they can't be all clustered in one part of the country. They've got to be in every geographic entity. We need combat engineering units. You know, when infrastructure goes down, that's it. And, when you actually look at what's out there in America, it's scary. State police organizations are 2, 3, 4,000 people. Incredibly competent discipline, but these are squads that move around. The border patrol is organized -- and other INS, Customs DEA, FBI, don't have squadrons you can pull out of Southern California and move into, you know, Eagle Pass, Texas. The infrastructure just isn't there. I mean, thank God the NYPD and New York Fire Department were the ones that were so tested by this enormous tragedy. They're as well organized as any Army on the face of the earth. But, that isn't the case in, you know, Bopeep, Utah. And, there the Guard is literally the first thing the governor has to ask for in almost any emergency situation. You've got a problem with mail, you've got a problem with mass breakout at the state prison, you've got a problem with nuclear, chemical or biological warfares, riots, the court system isn't functioning; that's who you turn to. We've got the wrong Guard formation. We're going to have to rethink it.

PFALTZGRAFF

Next to comment on this issue is Congressman Weldon. Curt?

WELDON

Well, the first responders in America are not the military. The first responders are the 1.2 million men and women who serve in 32,000 departments across the country and have done so for the last 250 years. They're the men and women of the emergency response community. I know. I was one, and it doesn't matter of the size of the town. I was the Fire Chief and the mayor of a town of 3,000 people. In 1975 we had the largest disaster in the country. Two ships collided in our port. One carrying Vinylacitate , the other carrying (inaudible). It was, in fact, a chemical weapons incident. We had to handle it as volunteers and we did because you are properly trained and prepared.

We are never going to be able to have the military respond immediately to an incident that occurs, whether it's a hazmat incident on our railroads or whether it's a truck collision. We have to make sure that those men and women who will be the first in to respond are properly prepared and trained. Now, obviously, we've got to have the backup. The Guard plays a critical role there. As you know, the Congress saw fit to give the Guard training responsibility because they have the capability to integrate and bring in training systems. The (inaudible) is meant to be able to respond when you have that need. But, at it's best, it can't respond for at least four hours. The largest determination of loss of life is in the first ten minutes. So, the people in that first in truck, that first in police car better understand the immensity of what they have. That means they've got to be properly trained and they've got to be properly prepared. That means we're asking them in the 21st Century to do things they haven't done for the last 250 years. That means they've got to have basic chem and bio-detection systems. So unlike what happened in Japan in the sarin gas attack, the first responders don't

get wiped out. They can make some preliminary decisions about what they have and know who to call to bring in.

I do all the disasters in the Congress, I chair the Fire and EMS Caucus. I go on them all. I was out (inaudible) the earthquake walking the freeway with the Fire Chiefs of San Francisco and Oakland and the Incident Chief in California. They were using dogs to sniff for people that still might be trapped in between the freeways. And I said to them, "Chiefs, why aren't you using thermal imagers?" This is ten years ago. And, they said, "Well, what are thermal imagers?" So you can look between as long as you have an opening to see if there's heat to get enough of the body of the victim, our military has that. We don't do a good job of letting our civilian first responders understand the capabilities we have. In terms of communications, we are totally unprepared as a nation. The military is well prepared. If you bring the military in you've got a great communication system.

Go out and talk to your first responders. Chief Morris in Oklahoma City, his biggest challenge when the Murrough Building was bombed, was that he could not talk to any of the integrated agencies responding in the first few minutes to save lives. He couldn't use his radio system because the frequency allocation was all different. Some were on high band, some were on low band. The frequencies didn't match. So he went to portable cellular phones which immediately became Overtaxed. So what did the chief of one of our largest departments in the country do? We wrote down his message on pieces of paper and had fire and EMS people hand-deliver them. And that's America in the 21st Century. We do not have an integrated, coordinated emergency communication system for this country. And I can tell you, I'll have the Chief of D.C. meet with the Chief of Prince George's County, they can't even talk to each other.

We go out and train the first 125 largest cities and we give ourselves a false sense of security. Those same fire departments retrained to handle chem-bio incidents can't buy boots for their firefighters because their city budgets are cut. What good is giving a fire department a chemical detector or a biological suit if they don't have the funds in their budget to maintain it each year to guarantee the integrity of it? We've got to rethink the way we respond to homeland security. And, I can tell you right now, folks, we're not doing a very good job. That's not the fault of the military. It is the responsibility of Tom Ridge to steer us in a new direction. And, I'm telling you, it's an accident waiting to happen right now.

PFALTZGRAFF Next question. And, incidentally, we'll be hearing from Governor Ridge tomorrow, late morning. So, he will be with us. Next question? Yes. Please. Right back here. Wait for the microphone and then please identify yourself.

FROM AUDIENCE Lieutenant Jed from the Coast Guard and I teach at the Coast Guard Academy. Thank you for all of your comments today. And, my question is directed at the vision that each of you has described for the changing environment for our military in some part depends upon the ability to draw in the youth of America to sustain this vision into the future. How do you reconcile your vision with American children who are increasingly leaving high school without the ability to have the math skills or the reading skills or the technical capability to do what we would require of them in the future? For those that do have the ability, they are more attracted to high paying

civilian jobs to create video games or computer programming that takes them away from adding expertise to where the military needs it.

PFALTZGRAFF Well, who would like to address that question.

CLARK I'll address it.

PFALTZGRAFF Wes? General Clark?

CLARK Well, I'm very disturbed in the wake of September 11th. I thought I would find a real upsurge of desire to serve in the armed forces. I didn't find that anywhere. What I found was a lot of interest in it. And, I guess it goes back to the vision that a lot of young people have about America today. There seems to be an awareness of specialization. They are very interested in what we are doing and they sure hope we'll be successful. But, when I went to a couple of universities and I asked them, "What about you, sir?" They say, "Well, I'm studying engineering. I'm going to be an engineer," and so forth. I didn't get any sense that people are rushing to sign up for this. I think that's a commentary on the society that we live in.

It is not just the education or the technical skills, it's also the willingness to join and serve. And I think what we got on the 11th of September is a wakeup call. It says that what we've done in the past got us through the 20th Century but we are going to have to look at it differently in the future. And I think in order to really overcome the challenge that we're facing, we need to build a new sense of community in this country. It needs to be built neighborhood by neighborhood, block by block, city by city because that's the way we are going to fight the fight against terrorist cells in our own country. You've got to use the tragedy that's affected us first to send information out to people. There is a lot of people out there who would like to know what bio-war really is. Now, I can tell you that if you watch CNN we have a couple of pretty good specials on it. I think they're even better than the NBC specials I've seen, Barry. But that's not the way we ought to be educating our people.

And again, this comes back really to homeland security. We need a top to bottom communications channel. The states can't afford it. I'm from Arkansas now, and I can tell you we love our National Guard in Arkansas and we'd like more of it. But we'd also like to have a whole lot more aid for the fire department and the police department because we can't afford to do what we are required to do. We've got to have information out there and we've got to build a new sense of community around it. So, I think if we build a sense of community and we keep people interested in and engaged, we can get young people to stay in school and we can get young people to serve.

But, you know, we've reached -- we saw on the 11th of September, we saw the results of what all my European and African friends would tell me. They say, "We come to America, we visit. We really like you all. It is a great country and we really enjoy and we follow all your elections and we know all your politicians, we listen to your movies", and so on and so forth. They say, "But you know, you don't know where we live. I have been all over America, I can't find any news about my country on any of your television stations. I can't -- what I tell people in my country is they don't even know where it is. They don't know what the capital is, they don't know who the leaders are

and they don't know when the elections are. They just don't -- you don't care about us."

So I think what we have to do is use September 11th and sort of go back and reformulate. And we start with a sense of community. We have to have a sense of community. We have to know who our neighbors are. When I got off the subway three days after the incident up in Penn Station and I looked around, people were looking at me differently than they have ever looked at me in New York before. Always before they look at you like a soccer player. You know, they're watching your belly button. "Am I going to get by his briefcase or is he going to bump me when I go by?" For the first time I saw people looking at faces and they were asking, "Are we part of the same community?" That's what we've got to come out of this with. And it has to be built from the bottom up. It's got to be started by the government. And, it will lead to young people to want to stay and want to serve if we do this the right way.

PFALTZGRAFF Our next question is from right over here, please.

FROM AUDIENCE My name is Gene Porter. Commendable attention to homeland security and doing things better in the local fire departments and so on. But, we have a long history of preferring to fight our wars as far away from the U.S. as we can. I was struck by General McCaffrey's enthusiasm for keeping a battalion of special forces in Haiti for 25 or more years and the new QDR, which was cited several times by this panel, has a strong emphasis on overseas presence of U.S. military forces. So, I guess I'd like to ask the panel to comment on their vision of are we going to have a lot more U.S. military stationed or rotationally deployed overseas in order to continue to fight this war over the long haul?

PFALTZGRAFF Who would like to take this one on? This is a question that all of the panel members could say something about if they would like to. Maybe start with Congressman Weldon.

WELDON Well, I think we've got to be very selective in how we use our military. I was very troubled during the '90s. If you compare that period of time to the period after World War II, I think we had 10 major deployments in four years. And all of a sudden in the '90s we had something like 37 or 38 major deployments in a period of time where we're decreasing our defense budget by the largest margin certainly in this century, coupled with the uncontrolled proliferation causing us real problems. Congress doesn't necessarily object to America's deployment because we are still the only super power and we have a role to play. Our question is do we give ourselves to insert ourselves in a place like Bosnia? Why do we initially commit 36,000 troops to that theater when, perhaps, a neighboring country like Germany commits 4,000 troops up front, or our key ally is Britain. The question is the relationship of our allies to those efforts. So it's not a case of whether or not we are deployed, it is how we are deployed and for what purposes.

I think America is always going to have to play a lead role because of our stature. But I think whenever we put our troops into harm's way we should have considered every other option prior to that. Many of us in Congress opposed the Kosovo conflict initially, not because we did not support our troops, but because we thought our State

Department did not fully engage Russia to play the legitimate role they should have played to use their leverage to get Milosevic to step down. That was a question of where we could have used, and in the end we did use, Russia to bring in its power to force Milosevic out. Now, if we would have done that up front, perhaps we wouldn't have had to conduct that air campaign and put the troops on the ground in Kosovo the way we did. So, I guess what I would say is every policy maker, every member of Congress should put themselves in the mindset of understanding, which one of our panelists said, who's on the end of that gun? Who's shooting the bullet? Because that's the person we're affecting. And, we should only deploy our troops when that's the last course of action to make sure that we're going to attain the objectives that we want.

PFALTZGRAFF OK. Wes? General Clark?

CLARK I think what we've seen in the '90s is that there is a requirement for nation building. But it's not a requirement that falls primarily on the U.S. armed forces. But somebody's going to have to go out there and help other nations because the majority of the conflicts occur in states. With 6 billion people in the world, states don't meet the needs of their citizens. And what we've seen is we can no longer ignore it. Now, how can we fix it? Well, I think the most important assistance you give is trying to help a state establish a legal infrastructure. But if you want lawyers you can only get them really from the Guard and Reserve, and you have to mobilize people and send them out there, as we did in Haiti and in Bosnia. That's ineffective. What we need is an agency that's not a state department and not a defense department, but that can go in and mobilize and put people in who can bring a legal infrastructure, help put in the place the conditions for economic development, help work an educational infrastructure. And we should be doing that rather than what is the easiest thing to do, which is deploying troops.

The troop deployment again and again turns out to be the easy thing. Troops are deployable. They are effective, at least when they first go in, in settling things. But, they are not very effective at fixing it. And so, you know, my concern with Haiti is not that we didn't stay - I could have supported staying - but the act of staying wasn't fixing what was wrong with Haiti. We didn't know how to fix it, we didn't have the means to fix it, and keeping troops there was simply a palliative. So we've got to move past that. But we do have to address the problem of those people around the world who want the things that we have as Americans. They want equal opportunity guaranteed by law. And they can't have it. We can't do it with troops, but we've got to find some way to address that need.

PFALTZGRAFF We have time for one brief comment from Congressman Weldon and then I'm being told that we have only three minutes remaining. So --

WELDON Bob, just there are two other things that we could and should be doing. Number one, we need to set up a proactive effort using military technologies which has been done. In fact, I spoke with Admiral Watkins in the (inaudible) Commission yesterday on this issue. We need to use military technologies to help us understand weather conditions, things like the El Nino and La Nina effect, where you result in

desert conditions or floods or tornadoes which then result in shortages of food. And which result in regional conflicts. Because if we can upgrade the understanding when adverse weather conditions in remote countries will cause economic problems, will cause pressures that then result in regional conflict, which then results in more, we can sometimes perhaps preempt the conflict which then results in us having to put our military into a theater. Now, this was done by a project in the intelligence community called "Medea," funded through the Miter Corporation and the CIA. That kind of effort, where we use our military assets to help understand the conditions that may lead to war and help to deal with them in a non-military way, I think is something we have to do in the 21st century.

The second thing we have to do is use our intelligence in a more timely manner. We are moving to integrate our intelligence. CI21 is beginning to do that, but we're a long way. The army has led the way. General Shinseki, you know what I'm talking about. The army developed this information dominance center at Fort Belvoir where they integrate intelligence systems to do massive data mining and profiling, profiling of the bad guys and the bad regions. We do not have a national capability for a national data fusion center. We should have had that three years ago, bringing together all 32 classified agencies from drug interdiction to the State and Commerce department to the CIA, the NRO, the NSA and all of those other agencies where the news controlled by the agencies themselves, but so that when we have a profile of a person like bin Laden or al-Qaeda, we can run that data through a massive high speed computer using cutting edge technology, like Starlight or Spires, the kind of technology the Army has developed, the kind of technology special forces command has right now down at McDill. That kind of model needs to be beyond the military and needs to involve all of our intelligence capabilities. And, it's not there today and it certainly should be. Those two things that can help us avoid the eventuality of having to put soldiers on the ground.

PFALTZGRAFF

Let me now on our collective behalf express thanks to this panel for the outstanding discussion that we had, the presentations which were superb. The only regret that we all have is that we haven't had more time for discussion from the audience. So, again, many thanks. (Applause) We shall now take a very brief 20 minute break, but you must be back in the room by 4 p.m. We will resume promptly at 4 p.m. with our next panel.